United States of America v. Betty Strickland, a/k/a Chip

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4816
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BETTY STRICKLAND, a/k/a Chip,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:10-cr-00179-F-1)
Submitted: April 27, 2012 Decided: June 28, 2012
Before WYNN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James C. White, LAW OFFICE OF JAMES C. WHITE, PC, Chapel Hill,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
A jury found Betty Strickland guilty of conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and possession with
intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Strickland’s convictions stem from
her involvement with her son, Donald Shealey, who is the leader
of an organization known as the Face Mob Family. The record
reveals that Strickland stored drugs and drug proceeds in her
home for the benefit of the Face Mob Family.
On appeal, Strickland argues that the district court
erred in denying her Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29
motion. This court reviews the district court’s denial of a
motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v.
Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
271 (2010). “If there is substantial evidence to support the
verdict, after viewing all of the evidence and the inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the Government, the
court must affirm.” United States v. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d 566,
571 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 564 (2011) (citation
and emphasis omitted). The Court does not “review the
credibility of the witnesses and assume[s] that the jury
resolved all contradictions in the testimony in favor of the

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government.” United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 245 (4th
Cir. 2007).
With respect to this argument, Strickland alleges only
that the Government failed to present evidence sufficient to
establish the minimum quantity of 100 grams of heroin charged in
the indictment. After reviewing the evidence adduced at trial,
including witness testimony and wiretap transcripts, we conclude
that the district court did not err in denying Strickland’s
motion for judgment of acquittal.
Strickland next argues that the district court erred
in determining the relevant drug quantity pursuant to U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 2D1.1(c) (2010) because
the evidence was insufficient to attribute to her over 100 grams
of heroin. This court reviews a district court’s calculation of
the quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant for sentencing
purposes for clear error. United States v. Slade, 631 F.3d 185,
188 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2943 (2011) (quotation
omitted). Given the evidence presented, we conclude that the
district court did not err in calculating the quantity of drugs
attributable to Strickland.
Lastly, Strickland argues that the district court
erred in applying a two-level enhancement, pursuant to USSG
§ 2D1.1(b)(1), for possession of a firearm in connection with
her drug-trafficking activities. The district court’s

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determination that a sentencing enhancement is warranted is a
factual determination reviewed for clear error. United
States v. Thorson, 633 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 2011). The
relevant section of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a
two-level sentencing enhancement if the defendant possessed a
firearm in connection with her drug-trafficking activities.
USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). This enhancement “should be applied if the
weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the
weapon was connected with the offense.” USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n.3.
“[T]he Government does not need to prove precisely concurrent
acts, such as a gun in hand while in the act of storing drugs.”
United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 629 (4th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, Strickland stored the firearm in her home, which
is also where she stored drugs and money for the Face Mob
Family. In light of the evidence in the record, we conclude
that the district court did not clearly err in enhancing
Strickland’s base offense level pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1).
Accordingly, we affirm Strickland’s convictions and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED

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