Jackalin S. Williams v. Carolina Healthcare System, Incorporated

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1394
JACKALIN S. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CAROLINA HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INCORPORATED,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
SUSANNE THOMASON, RN, Assistant Director; ANGELA HUMPHREY,
Director; SHERRY LAURENT, Director, Medical Affairs,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen,
Senior District Judge. (3:10-cv-00232-GCM)
Submitted: September 29, 2011 Decided: November 1, 2011
Before KING, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion .
Jackalin S. Williams, Appellant Pro Se. Matthew E. Orso, Kevin
V. Parsons, SMITH, PARSONS & VICKSTROM, PLLC, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Jackalin S. Williams appeals the district court’s
order granting summary judgment to her former employer, Carolina
Healthcare System, Inc. (“Carolina Healthcare”), on her claims
of race-based discrimination. We affirm.
This court reviews de novo a district court’s order
granting summary judgment, viewing the facts and drawing
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th
Cir. 2011). Summary judgment may be granted only when “there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
“[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a
verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 249 (1986); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
380 (2007) (“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is
no genuine issue for trial.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). For a non-moving party to present a genuine issue of
material fact, “[c]onclusory or speculative allegations do not
suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of
[the non-moving party’s] case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power

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Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Williams first claims that Carolina Healthcare acted
discriminatorily by failing to promote her. To establish a
prima facie case of failure to promote under Title VII, Williams
was required to show that: (1) she is a member of a protected
group; (2) she applied for the position in question; (3) she was
qualified for the position; (4) she was rejected; and (5) the
position remained open or was filled by similarly qualified
applicants outside the protected class. Page v. Bolger, 645
F.2d 227, 229-30 (4th Cir. 1981). Upon a satisfactory prima
facie showing, “the burden shifts to the employer to articulate
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action.” Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt.,
Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004). If this burden is met,
the burden returns to the employee to demonstrate that the given
reason was but a “pretext for discrimination.” Id.
The district court found that Williams set forth a
prima facie case of discrimination, but that she failed to
overcome the non-discriminatory reasons for her non-promotion.
We agree that Williams has failed to demonstrate the pretext in
Carolina Healthcare’s proffered reasons for its promotion
decision. Although the promoted employee was preselected for
the position, preselection does not, in itself, demonstrate

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racial discrimination. Blue v. United States Dep’t of the Army,
914 F.2d 525, 541 (4th Cir. 1990). Title VII does not require
fairness or the promotion of the most qualified candidate; it
only prohibits discrimination. Id. The arguments raised by
Williams on appeal are likewise unconvincing or were not raised
before the district court.
Williams also brought a claim of discrimination in
compensation. In order for Williams to establish a prima facie
case under Title VII for unequal compensation, she must show:
“(1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job
performance; (3) adverse employment action with respect to
compensation; and (4) that similarly-situated employees outside
the protected class received more favorable treatment.”
White v. BFI Waste Servs., LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir.
2004). The district court found that Williams failed to
demonstrate that she was similarly-situated to the employees to
whom she compared herself. We find no reversible error in the
district court’s analysis or its denial of Williams’ unequal pay
claim.
Williams’ final claim was that she was
discriminatorily denied the benefit of working from home.
Williams acknowledged, however, that she could not accomplish
her job duties remotely at the time she requested to work from

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home. We agree with the district court’s finding that Williams
failed to set forth a cognizable claim of discrimination.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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