United States of America v. Michelle Hebron, a/k/a Michelle Hell, a/k/a BG

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4748
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHELLE HEBRON, a/k/a Michelle Hell, a/k/a BG,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.
(1:08−cr−00086−WDQ−16)
Submitted: July 21, 2011 Decided: August 11, 2011
Before KING and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Raymond J. Rigat, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Christopher M. Mason,
Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Michelle Hebron appeals her conviction and 360 month
sentence on one count of conspiracy to participate in a
racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
Hebron, who pled guilty to the offense, raises three claims of
error on appeal. First, she alleges that the district court
abused its discretion when it failed to conduct a competency
hearing. Second, she claims that the district court abused its
discretion when it accepted her guilty plea. Finally, she
contends that the district court abused its discretion when it
denied her motion to withdraw her guilty plea prior to
sentencing. Finding no merit in Hebron’s contentions, we affirm
for the reasons that follow.
I. Competency Hearing
Neither Hebron nor the government requested a competency
hearing at any point in the proceedings before the district
court. A district court shall sua sponte order a competency
hearing “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the
defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or
defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he
is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”
18 U.S.C. §4241(a). This court has noted that “[i]n determining

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whether there is reasonable cause to order a competency hearing,
a trial court must consider all evidence before it, including
evidence of irrational behavior, the defendant’s demeanor at
trial, and medical opinions concerning the defendant’s
competence.” United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1290 (4th
Cir. 1995). We review a district court’s failure to sua sponte
order a competency hearing for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 733, 742 (4th Cir. 2007).
Here, Hebron is unable to point to examples of irrational
behavior, a demeanor that raised questions regarding her
competence, medical opinions addressing her competence, or any
other evidence that would give rise to reasonable cause to
believe that she failed to comprehend the nature of the
proceedings against her or was unable to assist in her own
defense. Because Hebron fails to show reasonable cause that
would require the district court to order a competency hearing,
we refuse to find that the district court abused its discretion
in failing to do so.
During the Rule 11 colloquy, the district judge asked
questions to determine whether Hebron was capable of
understanding the proceedings and the plea agreement.
Specifically, the judge ensured that Hebron understood the
English language and understood the nature of the charge to
which she was pleading guilty and the maximum possible

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penalties. After Hebron made the district judge aware of her
mental health history of schizophrenia and hallucinations, the
judge carefully ensured that Hebron was taking her medications
nightly as prescribed, and determined that she had taken her
prescribed doses the night previous. The judge also asked
questions of Hebron’s attorney regarding his interactions with
Hebron. Hebron’s attorney stated that he had met with Hebron
nine times and had at least five phone calls with her and
assured the judge that Hebron had not said or done anything to
raise concerns about her ability to understand the proceedings.
Hebron’s attorney noted that he had promised Hebron that he
would request a medical evaluation prior to sentencing. Although
Hebron’s attorney requested that the judge order a medical
evaluation prior to sentencing, her attorney did not raise any
questions or concerns regarding Hebron’s competency to enter
into a plea agreement. While the decision by Hebron’s attorney
to request a medical evaluation prior to sentencing and not to
request a competency hearing despite his knowledge of her mental
health history is not dispositive, it does provide a strong
indication that Hebron’s attorney did not have doubts about
Hebron’s competency.
In Mason, we found that the district court had abused its
discretion in failing to order a competency hearing where the
court had before it evidence of Mason’s pre-trial suicide

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attempt, initial medical reports raising concerns about the
defendant’s competence, and affidavits from Mason’s counsel
attesting to Mason’s doctors’ belief that Mason was incompetent.
52 F.3d at 1293. The court there found that the facts “clearly
gave rise to reasonable cause to believe the defendant may have
been incompetent” and remanded for a retrospective determination
of Mason’s competence. Id. Here, unlike in Mason, there is no
medical evidence of incompetency and no evidence raising
questions concerning Hebron’s ability to understand what was
happening.
The responses of Hebron and her attorney during the
colloquy demonstrate that she was capable of consulting with her
attorney and understood the nature of the proceedings against
her. See United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 395-96 (4th
Cir. 2002) (“The test for determining competency is whether ‘[a
defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . .
and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding
of the proceedings against him.’”) (citations omitted)
(alterations in original). Hebron fails to show that reasonable
cause existed to raise doubts about her competency to enter into
a guilty plea, and we reject her claim that the district court
abused its discretion by failing to order a competency hearing
prior to accepting her plea.

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II. Acceptance of Plea
In addition to her procedural claim that the district court
abused its discretion in failing to conduct a competency
hearing, Hebron also raises a substantive competency claim. A
defendant raising a substantive claim that he was not competent
to be convicted “must demonstrate his incompetency by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Beck v. Angelone, 261 F.3d 377,
388 (4th Cir. 2001). The test for determining competency, as set
forth by the Supreme Court, is whether a defendant “has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a
rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings
against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)
(internal quotation marks omitted). We review a district court’s
determination that a defendant is competent to enter a guilty
plea for abuse of discretion. United States v. Moussaoui, 591
F.3d 263, 291 (4th Cir. 2010).
Hebron argues that the district court violated her
substantive due process rights when it accepted her plea despite
having been made aware of her long-term mental illness, the fact
that she was taking several psychotropic medications at the time
of her plea, and the fact that her attorney had requested a
medical evaluation during the plea colloquy. This court has
explained, however, that “‘[n]ot every manifestation of mental

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illness demonstrates incompetence to stand trial; rather, the
evidence must indicate a present inability to assist counsel or
understand the charges.’” Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 192
(4th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States ex rel. Foster v.
DeRobertis, 741 F.2d 1007, 1012 (7th Cir. 1984)). In addition,
we have emphasized that “the fact that the petitioner has been
treated with anti-psychotic drugs does not per se render him
incompetent to stand trial.” Id. Moreover, the fact that
Hebron’s attorney requested a medical evaluation weighs against
Hebron’s claim here, as her attorney specifically requested an
evaluation prior to sentencing, a strong suggestion that he
intended to use the results to present mitigating circumstances
at sentencing and was not concerned with competency issues at
the time of the plea. Hebron’s reliance on her mental illness to
support her substantive competence claim fails to demonstrate an
abuse of discretion by the district court in accepting her plea,
particularly in light of the extensive inquiry into the
voluntariness and intelligence of her decision by the district
court.
As discussed in detail supra, the district court here
conducted a thorough Rule 11 colloquy. There is nothing in the
record to reflect that Hebron was unable to communicate
effectively with her attorney or that she failed to understand
the consequences of her guilty plea. Among the issues

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established during the plea colloquy and while Hebron was under
oath included the following:
(1) That Hebron was satisfied with the representation of
her counsel;
(2) That Hebron understood the elements of and maximum
penalties for the crime to which she was pleading guilty;
(3) That Hebron understood she had the right to plead not
guilty, but that by pleading guilty she was foregoing
certain rights, including the right to a jury trial;
(4) That Hebron’s decision to plead guilty was not the
result of any threats or promises and was the result of her
own free will and because she was guilty;
(5) That Hebron agreed that she had read and agreed to the
terms of the plea agreement and the stipulated facts
attached to it.
Throughout this colloquy, the district judge had an
opportunity to observe Hebron’s demeanor and tone in response to
these questions before deciding to accept her plea as knowing
and voluntary. In Beck, we refused to disturb the trial court’s
conclusion that the defendant was competent to plead guilty. 261
F.3d at 383, 392. In that case, the trial court relied upon an
extensive plea colloquy during which the defendant was “clear
and responsive” in expressing his understanding of the nature of
the charges against him, his waiver of certain rights by

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entering a guilty plea, and the voluntariness of his decision.
Id. at 388. Moreover, Beck did “nothing to lead his counsel or
the state trial court to question his competency” and none of
the mental health experts that examined him “indicated that Beck
was incompetent to stand trial or assist in his defense.” Id. at
388-89. Similar facts obtain here, and the district court thus
acted well within its discretion in concluding Hebron was
competent to enter a guilty plea.
III. Denial of Motion to Withdraw Plea
This court reviews a district court’s denial of a motion to
withdraw a plea for abuse of discretion. United States v. Moore,
931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991). A defendant is permitted to
withdraw a guilty plea if she can “show a fair and just reason
for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). We
have instructed district courts to consider six factors in
determining whether a defendant has met this burden: (1) whether
the defendant has offered credible evidence that her plea was
not knowing or not voluntary; (2) whether the defendant has
credibly asserted her legal innocence; (3) whether there has
been a delay between the entering of the plea and the filing of
the motion to withdraw the plea; (4) whether the defendant has
had the close assistance of competent counsel; (5) whether
withdrawal will cause prejudice to the government; and (6)

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whether it will inconvenience the court and waste judicial
resources. Moore, 931 F.2d at 248.
Prior to sentencing, Hebron sent several letters to the
court requesting leave to withdraw her guilty plea. In her first
three letters, Hebron wrote that her decision to enter a guilty
plea had been based on a “misunderstanding,” claiming her
attorney had told her the sentencing range in the plea agreement
was 200-260 months. Hebron claimed she would have not have
agreed to the plea if she had known her sentencing range was
300-360 months. In her fourth letter to the court, Hebron
acknowledged that the sentencing range she had agreed to was
300-360 months, but claimed she was not responsible for Moore’s
murder and requested a more lenient sentence. During her
sentencing hearing, Hebron’s attorney raised the issue of
Hebron’s desire to withdraw her plea, though he stated his
understanding that she wished to withdraw her motion to withdraw
her plea. Upon questioning by the district judge, however,
Hebron reiterated her wish to withdraw her plea and go to trial.
When the district court judge asked Hebron if she had anything
to add to the reasons provided in her letters to the court in
support of her motion, Hebron stated that she had “nothing else
to say besides what I wanted to in the letters.”
The district court denied Hebron’s motion, setting out the
reasons for its denial in a Memorandum Opinion dated June 28,

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2010. Applying the legal standard set forth in Moore, the
district court concluded that the third factor—the extent of
delay between the plea and the motion—weighed in Hebron’s favor,
but noted that “the other factors militate against permitting
withdrawal.” With respect to the first Moore factor, the
district court found that Hebron had not offered any evidence to
show that her plea was not knowing or voluntary, refusing to
credit Hebron’s claim that she did not know the actual
sentencing range was 300-360 months in light of the text of the
agreement and the fact that both she and her attorney signed it.
The district court found that Hebron failed to credibly assert
her innocence—the second Moore factor—noting that her final
letter “neither contradicts the stipulated facts establishing
her guilt nor offers evidence supporting her innocence.” The
district court also weighed the fourth Moore factor against
Hebron, finding that Hebron “had the close assistance of
competent counsel, who has shown exemplary patience and skill in
dealing with her” and noting that Hebron herself expressed
satisfaction with her attorney’s services during her
rearraignment. Because allowing Hebron to withdraw her plea
would require her inclusion in yet another trial group from the
multi-defendant indictment, the district court also counted the
fifth and sixth Moore factors against Hebron, concluding that
granting Hebron’s motion would “prejudice the Government and

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inconvenience the Court.” The district court concluded that
Hebron had failed to meet her burden of demonstrating a “fair
and just reason for withdrawing her plea” and denied the motion.
On appeal, Hebron contends that the district court abused
its discretion when it denied her motion to withdraw her guilty
plea because it improperly weighed the fourth, fifth, and sixth
Moore factors against her and because it failed to take into
account the effects of her mental illness on the intelligence
and voluntariness of her plea. Because Hebron’s arguments are
not supported by the facts in the record, she fails to show that
the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion.
Hebron argues that the evidence of her mental illness
presented before the district court suggested a “strong
possibility” that her plea was not knowing or voluntary. Br. of
Appellant 22-23. She contends that the nature of her illness,
the medications she was prescribed, and the quality of her
letters to the court should have suggested to the district court
that she was not competent to enter a guilty plea or to be
sentenced. However, as discussed in more detail supra, Hebron’s
claims of incompetence are not borne out by the record, and the
district court conducted a thorough Rule 11 colloquy to ensure
Hebron understood the nature and consequences of her plea before
deciding to accept it. Moreover, even after Hebron underwent a
full medical evaluation prior to sentencing, her attorney did

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not raise questions regarding her competency, limiting his use
of the results to argue that Hebron’s history and mental illness
“does weigh on what type of sentence she should be receiving.”
Accordingly, the district court properly weighed the first
factor against Hebron.
Hebron suggests on appeal that her mental illness should
count in her favor with respect to the second Moore factor,
noting that the “history and extent of her illness also begs the
question whether Hebron was legally guilty of the crime charged
by reason of insanity.” Br. of Appellant 23. This contention is
without merit. Not only did Hebron’s trial counsel not raise any
concerns regarding Hebron’s competency before the trial court,
but, as the government points out, Hebron stipulated to facts
that suggest she was able “to appreciate the nature and quality
or the wrongfulness of [her] acts.” Br. of Appellee 37, n.10
(quoting 18 U.S.C. §17 (codifying requirements of insanity
defense)). The second Moore factor does not weigh in favor of
Hebron’s motion.
Arguing that there was a “breakdown in communication” with
her attorney, Hebron also contends that she “may not have had
the close assistance of counsel.” Br. of Appellant 23. In
support, Hebron points to the fact that her attorney thought
Hebron intended to withdraw her motion to withdraw her plea at
her sentencing hearing, Hebron’s complaints to the district

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court regarding the “misunderstanding” she had with her attorney
regarding the sentencing range in the plea agreement, and the
fact that her attorney failed to request a competency hearing
prior to Hebron’s entering into a plea agreement. However, the
record also includes evidence of Hebron’s cooperation and
satisfaction with her trial counsel. During the Rule 11
colloquy, Hebron expressed her satisfaction with her attorney’s
representation. In her final letter to the district court,
Hebron recanted her statement that her attorney had
misrepresented the sentencing range in the plea agreement.
Moreover, during the sentencing hearing, Hebron’s attorney
stated that her decision to attempt to withdraw her plea was
“different,” but denied that he was surprised by her choice. On
balance, it simply cannot be said that the district court abused
its discretion in weighing this factor against Hebron’s request
to withdraw her plea.
Finally, Hebron argues that the district court improperly
weighed the fifth and sixth Moore factors against her because
there was a group of her co-defendants already scheduled to go
to trial in December 2010. This argument fails to appreciate the
need for the government to allocate additional resources to the
December trial if Hebron were to be included in the group of
defendants and the need for the trial court to cope with
additional evidence and witnesses, but it is unclear how

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strongly these factors weigh against Hebron. Nonetheless, taken
together, the Moore factors do not provide Hebron with a “fair
and just” reason for withdrawing her plea, and the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied her motion to
withdraw her plea.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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