Corsair Special Situations Fund, L.p. v. Engineered Framing Systems, Incorporated

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1805
CORSAIR SPECIAL SITUATIONS FUND, L.P.,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ENGINEERED FRAMING SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED; JOHN J. HILDRETH,
P.E.; MARIE N. HILDRETH; EFS STRUCTURES, INCORPORATED,
Defendants – Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Paul W. Grimm, Magistrate District
Judge. (1:09-cv-01201-PWG)
Submitted: June 29, 2011 Decided: August 5, 2011
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas Vecchio, DILWORTH PAXSON, LLP, Cherry Hill, New Jersey,
for Appellants. Derek P. Roussillon, Robert S. Brennen, MILES &
STOCKBRIDGE, PC, Baltimore, Maryland, Matthew S. Sturtz, MILES &
STOCKBRIDGE, PC, Towson, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Engineered Framing Systems, Incorporated,
John J. Hildreth, P.E., Marie N. Hildreth, and EFS Structures,
Incorporated (collectively, “the EFS Parties”), appeal the
magistrate judge’s orders granting summary judgment to Corsair
Special Situations Fund, L.P. (“Corsair”), in Corsair’s civil
action. The EFS Parties argue on appeal that the magistrate
judge erred in granting summary judgment to Corsair on its claim
for breach of contract, in granting declaratory relief to
Corsair, and in imposing a permanent injunction. We affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s adverse grant
of summary judgment and construe the facts in the light most
favorable to the EFS Parties. PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead
Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2011). Summary
judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). To survive summary judgment on Corsair’s claim for
breach of contract, the EFS Parties were required to submit
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that they
satisfied the terms of an express condition precedent to
Corsair’s performance. See All State Home Mortg., Inc. v.
Daniel, 977 A.2d 438, 447 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009).

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We have reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs
and conclude that the magistrate judge properly granted summary
judgment to Corsair on its claim for breach of contract because
the undisputed evidence of record showed that no reasonable jury
could find that the EFS Parties satisfied the terms of the
condition precedent to Corsair’s performance. Additionally,
because a court determining whether to grant a motion for
summary judgment need only consider materials in the record
before it, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Campbell v. Hewitt,
Coleman & Assocs., Inc., 21 F.3d 52, 55 (4th Cir. 1994), the
magistrate judge’s grant of summary judgment to Corsair without
consideration of testimony the EFS Parties hoped to present at
trial was not error.
The EFS Parties also challenge the magistrate judge’s
grant of declaratory relief to Corsair, seemingly arguing that
the court should have declared that the grant of relief was
subject to limitations and restrictions. However, because the
EFS Parties fail to support this claim in accordance with Fed.
R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (“[T]he [appellant’s] argument . . . must
contain . . . appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them,
with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on
which the appellant relies.”), we deem it abandoned.
See Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 607

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(4th Cir. 2009); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241
n.6 (4th Cir. 1999).
Finally, the EFS Parties contend that the magistrate
judge erred in granting a permanent injunction to Corsair
because Corsair failed to establish its entitlement to such an
injunction. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the
magistrate judge did not grant injunctive relief to Corsair.
See Ulstein Mar., Ltd. v. United States, 833 F.2d 1052, 1055
(1st Cir. 1987) (“A declaratory judgment states the existing
legal rights in a controversy, but does not, in itself, coerce
any party or enjoin any future action.”).
Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate judge’s orders.
We deny the EFS Parties’ motion to expedite and dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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