United States of America v. Mohan Othniel Greenwood

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4339
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MOHAN OTHNIEL GREENWOOD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, District
Judge. (1:05-cr-00294-TSE)
Submitted: July 13, 2007 Decided: August 2, 2007
Before MICHAEL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Marvin D. Miller, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Chuck
Rosenberg, United States Attorney, James L. Trump, Assistant United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Mohan Othniel Greenwood appeals his conviction and resulting
sentence for possession with the intent to distribute one hundred
kilograms or more of marijuana. We affirm.
I.
On June 17, 2006, Det. D.C. DeCoster of the Fairfax, Virginia
police department learned from the FBI that a Mayflower tractor-
trailer believed to contain a large shipment of marijuana would be
leaving a warehouse in Fredericksburg, Virginia, heading north on
I-95 into Fairfax County. The FBI asked Det. DeCoster to stop the
truck if he observed a traffic violation.
In the early afternoon of June 17, Det. DeCoster spotted the
tractor-trailer and followed it for several miles in Fairfax
County. The truck was proceeding slowly (25 m.p.h.) in heavy
traffic when Det. DeCoster noticed that the front license plate was
bent so that only a portion of it was displayed; Det. DeCoster
could not see the date of the plate or the state that issued it.
Believing the obscured license plate violated Virginia law, the
detective stopped the tractor-trailer. Det. DeCoster questioned
the driver and sole occupant of the truck, defendant Greenwood. In
the course of being questioned as to the purpose of his trip,
Greenwood offered to let Det. DeCoster examine the trailer. The
detective declined at that time. After less than 20 minutes,

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another officer arrived with a police dog. Det. DeCoster then gave
Greenwood a warning ticket and told him he was free to go. Just as
Greenwood turned away, the detective asked him if the officers
could search the tractor-trailer. Greenwood said yes and handed
Det. DeCoster his keys. The police dog alerted at the rear of the
trailer. The officers then searched the trailer and subsequently
discovered 76 bales of marijuana, with a total weight of
approximately 1,750 pounds.
After the police arrested Greenwood, a federal grand jury
indicted him for possession with intent to distribute marijuana in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006). A jury convicted him of this
charge and the district court sentenced him to 108 months’
imprisonment, four years of supervised release, a $100 special
assessment, and a $2500 fine. Greenwood noted a timely appeal.
II.
On appeal, Greenwood raises four issues: three challenges to
his conviction and one to his sentence.
1.
First, Greenwood claims that the initial seizure of the
tractor-trailer violated the Fourth Amendment and therefore his
consent was “invalid.” For this reason, he maintains that the
district court should have suppressed the marijuana seized from the
vehicle. This argument is meritless.

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1Greenwood also maintains that the transfer of the 1750 pounds
of marijuana from state to federal law enforcement authorities
violated the Fourth Amendment. Because Greenwood had no possessory
interest in the contraband seized marijuana, that argument is also
meritless.
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The district court concluded that Det. DeCoster had an
objectively reasonable basis for the traffic stop of the tractor-
trailer. The court considered the detective’s testimony about the
badly bent license plate, corroborated by a photograph of the front
of the truck, and found the detective credible. We have no basis
for concluding that this credibility finding constituted clear
error. Greenwood maintains that since his license plate was issued
by Missouri, it need not comply with Virginia law requiring
“[e]very license plate” to be fastened as to be “clearly visible”
and “clearly legible.” Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-716 (2002). But, as
the district court reasoned, § 46.2-716 does not restrict its
operation solely to Virginia license plates. Even if § 46.2-716
does not apply to out-of-state license plates, at the very least,
this long-standing statute provided an objectively reasonable basis
for the stop. Moreover, since the asserted unlawfulness of the
stop provides the sole basis for Greenwood’s contention that his
subsequent consent was “invalid,” that contention also fails. 1
2.
Greenwood next argues that the district court violated his Due
Process rights by permitting police officers to testify that the
substance seized was marijuana. We review evidentiary rulings for

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abuse of discretion. According to Greenwood, the district court
abused its discretion in permitting police officers, who were not
designated as experts, to testify that they seized marijuana from
his truck. We disagree.
The Government need not offer scientific experts to establish
the chemical composition of a controlled substance. See United
Sates v. Uwaeme, 975 F.2d 1016, 1019-20 (4th Cir. 1992). Rather,
lay testimony can establish the illicit nature of a substance.
See, e.g., United States v. James, 40 F.3d 850, 869 (7th Cir.
1994). In this case, the police officers offered testimony that
the substance was marijuana based on their own observations as to
the appearance, feel, smell, packaging and method of transport.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this
lay testimony.
3.
Greenwood further maintains that the district court violated
his Due Process and Confrontation Clause rights in permitting his
trial to go forward after the Government destroyed all but about
540 pounds of the marijuana seized from his tractor-trailer. To
prevail on this claim, Greenwood must demonstrate that the
destroyed evidence was exculpatory and that the Government acted in
bad faith. See, e.g., Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
The district court found no basis for concluding that the
destroyed evidence could have been exculpatory or that in

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2Greenwood seems to believe that the FBI’s violations of 28
C.F.R. § 50.21 (by destroying the bales less than 60 days after
seizure) conclusively establishes bad faith by the Government.
Although this may provide “some evidence” of the Government’s bad
faith, it does not “in and of itself” establish bad faith. See
United States v. Deaner, 1 F.3d 192, 200 (3d Cir. 1993).
3Greenwood asserts that the inclusion of marijuana in the
Schedule of Controlled Substances, see 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006),
violates the Constitution because some states recognize the
legitimate use of marijuana for medical purposes. Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27-28 (2005), renders that argument untenable.
See U.S. Const. art. VI (“Supremacy Clause”).
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destroying it, the Government acted in bad faith. We agree. As
the district court noted, the only conceivable way for the
destroyed bales to have been exculpatory would have been for
Greenwood to demonstrate that they never existed or did not contain
marijuana. Greenwood failed to offer such evidence. Moreover, the
numerous photographs in the record and scientifically tested
samples taken from each of the bales make such arguments
untenable. 2
4.
Finally, Greenwood argues that his sentence was “unlawfully
determined.” We have carefully reviewed the record and find that
the sentence accorded with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005), and was entirely reasonable. 3

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III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before us and argument would not aid in
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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