Jae-Young Lee v. Tae Shin

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-2376
JAE-YOUNG LEE,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TAE SHIN; S & K TRADING & CONSULTING,
INCORPORATED, t/a SK Trading,
Defendants - Appellants,
and
CAROL KAYE GARCIA; CARLOS GARCIA,
Defendants.
No. 06-1517
JAE-YOUNG LEE,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TAE SHIN; S & K TRADING & CONSULTING,
INCORPORATED, t/a SK Trading,
Defendants - Appellants,
and

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CAROL KAYE GARCIA; CARLOS GARCIA,
Defendants.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge. (CA-04-
1920-AMD; 1:04-cv-01920-AMD)
Submitted: March 7, 2007 Decided: April 24, 2007
Before WILLIAMS, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jack L. B. Gohn, GOHN, HANKEY & STICHEL, L.L.P., Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellants. JoAnne Zawitoski, Jonathan I. Ahn,
Alexander M. Giles, Marisa A. Trasatti, SEMMES, BOWEN & SEMMES,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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1After some delay, but prior to the district court granting
the default judgment, Shin also received a notice from the district
court informing him that his motion for extension had been
rejected.
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PER CURIAM:
This consolidated appeal arises from a default judgment
entered in favor of Jae-Young Lee (“Lee”) against Tae Shin
(“Shin”). Shin appeals several of the district court’s rulings on
motions filed after the default judgment was granted. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
In June 2004, Lee filed suit against Shin. Shin was
personally served with a copy of the summons and complaint. Over
the next few months, Shin contacted several lawyers but ultimately
decided to proceed pro se. Shin asserts that because of an
incorrect mailing address specified in the complaint he did not
receive correspondence from the district court relating to the
action. Nevertheless, at least two weeks before Lee moved for
entry of default, Shin received a letter from Lee’s counsel
informing him that his pro se motion for extension, which was filed
on July 16, 2004, had been rejected by the district court and his
answer was past due. 1 The letter also informed Shin of the
imminent possibility of a default judgment and encouraged Shin to
contact Lee’s counsel with any questions. The district court
ultimately granted Lee’s motion for default judgment on October 27,

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2In No. 06-1517, Shin appeals the decisions of the district
court denying his motions for reconsideration. The briefs filed in
No. 06-1517 are substantially the same as the briefs filed in No.
05-2376. In light of our determination in No. 05-2376, we also
affirm the decisions of the district court in No. 06-1517.
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2004. On September 30, 2005, Shin filed a motion to set aside the
default judgment, which the district court denied.
In No. 05-2376, Shin appeals the order of the district court
denying his motion to set aside the default judgment.2 We review
the denial of a motion to set aside default judgment under Rule 60
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for an abuse of discretion.
Park Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 812 F.2d 894, 895-96 (4th Cir.
1987). We have reviewed the record and find that the district
court did not abuse its discretion. Specifically, Shin’s actions
did not constitute “excusable neglect” under Rule 60(b)(1) because
he knowingly failed to obtain meaningful legal representation,
declined to address the claims made against him, and neglected to
apprise himself of the developments in the litigation, despite
being served with the summons and complaint and receiving
correspondence from opposing counsel admonishing him to respond.
See Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc. v. Fodor Contracting Corp.,
843 F.2d 808, 811 (4th Cir. 1988) (discussing excusable neglect
when the litigant himself is at fault). Accordingly, we affirm the
decision of the district court. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

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the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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