United States of America v. Matthews

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-2095
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
and
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
Claimant - Appellee,
versus
ROBERT V. MATTHEWS,
Claimant - Appellant,
and
NORTH CAROLINA’S ORIGINAL COPY OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS,
Defendant,
and
WAYNE PRATT, INCORPORATED,
Claimant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (CA-03-204-5-BO)

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Argued: May 24, 2006 Decided: June 22, 2006
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and WILLIAMS and MICHAEL, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Michael Atwater Stratton, STRATTON FAXON, New Haven,
Connecticut, for Appellant. William Dale Talbert, Special Deputy
Attorney General, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Joel T. Faxon, STRATTON
FAXON, New Haven, Connecticut, for Appellant. Roy Cooper, North
Carolina Attorney General, Grayson G. Kelley, Chief Deputy Attorney
General, Karen A. Blum, Assistant Attorney General, NORTH CAROLINA
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina; Frank D. Whitney,
United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).

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1
We refer to Pratt and Wayne Pratt, Inc. collectively as
“Pratt.”
3
PER CURIAM:
Robert V. Matthews appeals a district court order awarding
possession of a historic document to the State of North Carolina
(“the State”). This award followed the United States’ dismissal of
a forfeiture action against the document and a remand from our
prior decision instructing the district court to restore the
parties to the status quo ante. We affirm.
I.
The facts and procedural history are fully set forth in our
prior opinion, see United States v. Matthews (In re Matthews), 395
F.3d 477, 478-80 (4th Cir. 2005); we summarize them here. In
February 2000, Wayne Pratt, Inc., a corporation owned by antiques
dealer Wayne Pratt, 1 purchased a document believed to be one of the
original copies of the Bill of Rights (“the document”). Matthews
claims that he contributed half of the $200,000 purchase price as
a “passive investor” in a venture by Pratt to buy and resell the
document for profit. J.A. 700. The State, having learned of the
document and believing it to be its missing copy of the Bill of
Rights, contacted federal officials. In March 2003, federal agents
seized the document during a staged purchase from Pratt in
Pennsylvania. Pratt’s attorney, John L. Richardson, was conducting

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the transaction on Pratt’s behalf and possessed the document when
it was seized.
The United States subsequently brought a civil forfeiture
action against the document in the Eastern District of North
Carolina, and the document was delivered into the custody of the
United States Marshal. Pratt, Matthews, and the State claimed
ownership of the document; the United States took the position that
the State was the legal owner. Pratt subsequently withdrew his
claim and conveyed all his rights in the document to the State.
The same day, the United States voluntarily dismissed the
forfeiture action.
After the voluntary dismissal, the district court ruled that
the State was the legal owner of the document. Matthews appealed,
and we vacated the district court decision, holding that the
district court lacked authority to adjudicate ownership rights in
the document after the dismissal of the forfeiture action.
See Matthews, 395 F.3d at 480-83. We determined that the district
court should have instead restored the parties to the status quo
ante. See id. at 483. We recognized, however, that the “status
quo ante” might refer either to the situation that existed before
the document was seized or to the situation existing after the
document was seized but before the forfeiture action was filed.
See id. We left this issue for the district court to decide on
remand with input from the parties. See id. Specifically, we

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instructed that “[i]f the district court determines that it must
return the parties to the status quo ante that existed post-seizure
but pre-complaint, the court should then turn to Matthews’ motion
for return of property”; and, “[i]n ruling on that motion, the
court should consider whether it is best construed as a motion [for
return of property] pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
41(g).” Id. Alternatively, we directed that “[i]f ... the
district court concludes that it must return the parties to the
status quo ante that existed before the document was seized, the
court must then determine to whom the document should be returned.”
Id.
Discussing the second alternative, we declined to decide in
the first instance to whom the document should be returned, noting
the existence of “potential factual questions,” including questions
concerning the effect of Pratt’s assignment of his interests in the
document to the State. Id. at 484. Further, while expressing no
opinion about whether the State might be entitled to possess the
document, we explained that “the district court may properly
consider the Pratt assignment in determining the pre-seizure status
quo ante.” Id. at 484 n.3. And, we instructed the district court
to “consider the arguments of both Matthews and the State in
resolving the right of possession issue.” Id. Finally, we
emphasized that “[w]hatever method the district court chooses [to
restore the pre-seizure status quo ante] should fully preserve the

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parties’ ability to pursue their ownership claims in other
proceedings.” Id. at 484.
On remand, the district court conducted a hearing at which
Matthews and the State presented arguments concerning the issues
left open by our prior opinion. Thereafter, the district court
determined that it was appropriate to return the parties to the
pre-seizure status quo ante. Following this approach, the court
explained that, “considering only the superior possessory interest
at the time immediately [before] the seizure, the document would be
returned to Richardson,” who possessed it on Pratt’s behalf.
J.A. 1684. But, noting our instruction to consider the Pratt
assignment, the district court found that “the assignment was a
distinct legal transaction from the civil forfeiture proceedings,
the validity of which is not dependant upon the existence of the
forfeiture proceedings.” Id. at 1685. The district court thus
concluded that “any interest which Richardson [and] Pratt ... [had]
in the Bill of Rights, including any possessory interest, passed to
the State ... and was not affected by the voluntary dismissal.”
Id.
Further, the district court rejected Matthews’ claim that he,
too, had a possessory interest in the document because he provided
half the purchase money. Based on the record, the court found that
Matthews never possessed the document and therefore that “despite
any ownership interest, Matthews cannot demonstrate a basis for a

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2
The parties do not challenge the decision by the district
court to restore the pre-seizure status quo ante.
7
possessory interest in the document at the time of the status quo
ante.” Id. at 1685-86. Accordingly, the district court ordered
that the document be returned to the State. Soon thereafter, the
document was delivered to the Governor of North Carolina.
II.
Matthews contends that the district court erroneously
concluded on remand that the State was entitled to possess the
document following the dismissal of the forfeiture action. 2
Matthews maintains that he acquired at least a one-half possessory
interest in the document by providing half the purchase money for
it. In particular, he argues that his purchase money contribution
created a resulting trust in his favor. See Restatement (Third) of
Trusts § 9(1) (2003) (providing that “where a transfer of property
is made to one person and the purchase price is paid by another, a
resulting trust arises in favor of the person by whom the purchase
price is paid”).
We conclude that the district court did not err. Matthews’
argument that he is the beneficiary of a resulting trust overlooks
the limited nature of our instructions to the district court on
remand. While a resulting trust relates to ownership rights in
property, see Ronald Chester et al., Bogert’s Trusts and Trustees

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3
In its order on remand, the district court discussed the
right of possession issue in terms of a motion for return of
property, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g), apparently because the State
filed such a motion on remand. We believe, however, that the
State’s motion and the discussion by the district court of that
motion were unnecessary, as our prior opinion directed the
district court (if it chose to restore the pre-seizure status quo
ante) simply to determine to whom the document should be returned,
see Matthews, 395 F.3d at 483. In any event, the discussion by
the district court relating to the motion did not affect its
ultimate determination of who is entitled to possess the document.
4
We reject Matthews’ arguments that the existing record was
insufficiently developed to resolve this and other issues and that
the district court improperly denied him the opportunity to
conduct further discovery and to present additional evidence.
8
§ 465 (3d ed. 2005), our prior opinion expressly foreclosed any
determination of ownership on remand, see Matthews, 395 F.3d at
483-84. Instead, we instructed the district court to perform a
more limited task--namely, to determine who is entitled to possess
the document such that the parties are restored, as closely as
possible, to the status quo ante. 3 See id. And, as the district
court recognized, the record shows conclusively that unlike Pratt,
the State’s assignor, Matthews never possessed the document.4 See,
e.g., J.A. 672, 710 (deposition testimony by Matthews that he
“played a passive role” in the document venture and “never had
possession of the document”); id. at 1465 (filing by Matthews on
remand stating that “[t]he understanding between Matthews and Pratt
was that they would each own a 50% share of the document, and that
Pratt would possess the document”). Moreover, nothing in the
district court order returning the document to the State prevents

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Matthews from litigating, in other proceedings, his claim that he
owns the document and thus is entitled to permanent possession.
See id. at 1686 (“This Order does not affect the parties’ ownership
claims.”); see also Matthews, 395 F.3d at 484.
III.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
AFFIRMED

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