Jemmy Rampengan v. ALBERTO R. GONZALES, United States Attorney General

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-1764
JEMMY RAMPENGAN,
Petitioner,
versus
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, United States Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals. (A97-188-511)
Argued: September 19, 2006 Decided: November 17, 2006
Before MICHAEL and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and Thomas E. JOHNSTON,
United States District Judge for the Southern District of West
Virginia, sitting by designation.
Petition for review granted; vacated and remanded by unpublished
opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge Michael
and Judge Johnston joined.
ARGUED: Alexander Manjanja Chanthunya, Silver Spring, Maryland, for
Petitioner. Lindsay L. Chichester, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Peter D.
Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Carol Federighi, Office of
Immigration Litigation, Allison Cendali, Civil Division, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

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2
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).

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3
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner Jemmy Rampengan seeks review of the ruling of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying him and his family
withholding of removal. The BIA, without making its own factual
findings, affirmed the decision of the immigration judge, who found
Rampengan’s testimony incredible. Because the immigration judge did
not provide specific and cogent reasons for discrediting
Rampengan’s testimony, we grant the petition, vacate the BIA’s
decision, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
I.
According to the declaration he filed with his application for
asylum, Rampengan, who is Christian, was born in Indonesia and
lived there before arriving in the United States. In 1998, while
visiting a business associate and prominent Christian leader named
Herman Parimo, he was kidnapped by a group of Muslims, beaten, and
held captive without food for twelve hours. His captors assailed
him with questions about Parimo, called him a “bastard Christian,”
and broke the middle finger of his right hand, which remains
crippled.
In February of 1999, Rampengan received threatening phone
calls at least once a week seeking information about Parimo. That
July a stranger gave Rampengan’s daughter a note, warning: “watch

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1Rampengan does not contest those rulings. He argues only that
Judge Bryant and the BIA improperly denied withholding of removal.
4
out, your daughter would be gone.” In January 2000, Rampengan
received at least one more threatening phone call demanding
information about Parimo. One year later, Rampengan asserts,
Muslims attacked him in his church and destroyed the edifice. The
attackers separated the men from the women and hit Rampengan over
the head with a club. Finally, in June 2001, Muslims allegedly
stoned the house of Rampengan’s father-in-law, in which Rampengan
and others were conducting a prayer meeting that included the
singing of Christian songs. Rampengan applied for a visa to come to
the United States, received it on July 25, 2001, and departed
Indonesia with his family on August 25, 2001.
Rampengan and his family remained in the United States past
the visas’ February 2002 expiration date and filed for asylum and
withholding of removal early in 2003. In August of 2003, Rampengan
appeared before an immigration judge who denied him and his family
voluntary departure, asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Immigration Judge John
M. Bryant denied them voluntary departure because Rampengan could
not post the necessary bond and denied asylum because Rampengan
applied too late. 1 In June 2005 the BIA affirmed the immigration
judge’s decision. Rampengan timely filed a petition for review in
this Court.

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5
II.
Because the BIA’s opinion contains no analysis beyond that in
the immigration judge’s decision and makes no additional findings
of fact, we review the reasoning in the immigration judge’s
decision. See Gandarillas-Zambrana v. Board of Immigration Appeals,
44 F.3d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1995). Judge Bryant ruled that
Rampengan did not qualify for withholding of removal because he had
not met his burden of proof: he failed to demonstrate that there
was a clear probability he would be persecuted because of his
religion if he returned to Indonesia. The judge found insufficient
evidence of future persecution to warrant withholding of removal
and waved off evidence of past persecution as incredible.
Rampengan contends that he demonstrated he was persecuted in
Indonesia on account of his religion and that such persecution
entitles him to a rebuttable presumption that withholding of
removal is appropriate under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(I) (2006).
His claims of past persecution are supported almost entirely by his
own testimony, but that testimony, if credible, may suffice to meet
his burden of proof. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). Judge Bryant,
however, found Rampengan’s testimony to be unreliable.
Although we afford substantial deference to the credibility
determinations of immigration judges in asylum proceedings, we
require that a judge who rejects a witness’s testimony as
incredible provide a specific and cogent reason for her disbelief.

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2Rampengan explained in his application for asylum that he did
not file for asylum within one year of his arrival in the United
States because he was “depressed and confused.” (Supp. J.A. 64.)
Part C of the application indicated that Rampengan should be
prepared to explain himself further at his interview or hearing,
but the record contains no indication that he was ever questioned
on the matter.
6
See Figeroa v. I.N.S., 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1989). In the
instant case, Judge Bryant found that Rampengan’s tardy petition
for asylum undermined his entire testimony. According to the judge,
“no reasonable person, if he or she had experienced the experiences
which the respondent asserted were experienced by them [sic], would
not, in the normal course and straightaway, make application for
asylum.” (J.A. 35.) This reason, although specific, is not
particularly cogent. Cf. Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 538 (4th
Cir. 2006) (“Examples of specific and cogent reasons include
inconsistent statements, contradictory evidence, and inherently
improbable testimony . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
At no point in Rampengan’s testimony was he asked why he did not
submit his application for asylum sooner, and Judge Bryant’s
decision nowhere discusses the justification Rampengan offered in
the application itself. 2 A person’s tardy filing of an application
for asylum, without more, is simply an insufficiently impelling
reason to conclude that the entirety of the person’s testimony is
dubious. Cf. id. at 540 (rejecting an immigration judge’s adverse
credibility determination that was based on the early filing of a
witness’s application for asylum).

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3Judge Bryant put it this way:
The respondents testified that they specifically and
purposefully requested from their pastor a letter. It
flies in the face of reason that the respondents would
have not requested from the respondent in addition to the
pastor’s attestation to their status as Christians the
incidents to which they testified which directly
pertained to their church of which the pastor was the
pastor and therefore would have knowledge and incidents
which may have occurred individually to these two
respondents [sic]. Again, this would suggest, if not
demonstrate, that the events to which respondents
testified did not occur in the manner to which they
7
Judge Bryant also doubted Rampengan’s testimony because a
letter from Rampengan’s Indonesian pastor failed to corroborate
Rampengan’s account of his church’s destruction. The letter, which
states only that Rampengan and his family members are obedient
Christians of good moral character, is dated July 20, 2001—five
days before Rampengan received his visa to come to the United
States, and more than a month before he left Indonesia. Even so,
Rampengan maintained in his oral testimony that he requested the
letter after his arrival in the United States.
Judge Bryant did not point to Rampengan’s performance on the
witness stand as a reason to doubt his testimony, however. Instead,
the judge’s distrust stemmed from Rampengan’s request for the
pastor’s letter. Judge Bryant seemed to conclude that, to secure
asylum, Rampengan requested a letter from his Indonesian pastor
attesting only to his Christian faith. To the judge, this narrow
request called into question Rampengan’s account of the church
attack itself.3 But Judge Bryant’s decision never explains how he

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testified.
(J.A. 34–35.)
4Rampengan’s questioning by the counsel for the Department of
Homeland Security included the following exchange:
Q. [W]hy did you request that letter?
A. Letter as recommendation that I am a Christian and I was
attending church in Indonesia.
Q. Why did you need the letter?
A. I get that letter as recommendation that I am a member of the
church in Indonesia.
Q. So that you could use it here in the United States to get a
new church?
A. I mean it’s not for the church in America but for the
Government of America.
Q. Well then why didn’t your pastor write a letter saying that
they had all the problems that you said in your application
and not just simply that you were attending church?
A. Maybe my pastor didn’t know what to put in the letter.
(Supp. J.A. 31–32.)
8
arrived at such a confident conclusion regarding the request for
the letter. The muddled testimony on the subject is not clear as to
the nature of Rampengan’s request, or even as to its purpose.4
Furthermore, Judge Bryant’s decision never considers the
possibility that the pastor misunderstood or responded improperly
to Rampengan’s request (a possibility likewise ignored during oral
testimony). We offer no opinion as to whether Judge Bryant might
have found Rampengan to be untrustworthy on other grounds. We
simply conclude that the reasons the judge offered are insufficient
to sustain an adverse credibility determination.
With no cogent reason to doubt Rampengan’s credibility
offered, there is no barrier to finding past persecution on account
of religion. Rampengan’s description of the church attack and the

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5When asked why he was attacked, Rampengan answered: “I’m not
sure why they attack me, but I think because I’m a Christian.”
(Supp. J.A. 18.)
9
beating he received in 1998 remain uncontradicted in the record.
Judge Bryant’s objection to the 1998 beating—that Rampengan was not
sure why he was attacked—is unavailing. 5 Rampengan need not know to
a moral certainty the reason for his persecution; he is required
only to establish that he experienced persecution on account of his
religion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(I). Here reasonable and
substantial evidence does not support Judge Bryant’s determination
to the contrary, so the decision must be vacated. See I.N.S. v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Because he has
established that he endured past persecution, Rampengan is entitled
to a rebuttable presumption that he will face persecution on
account of his religion if returned to Indonesia. See 8 C.F.R. §
1208.16(b)(1)(I).
III.
Rampengan does not explicitly appeal the denial of withholding
of removal under the CAT. Instead, he focuses his argument on
withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2000).
Nevertheless, his claim that the BIA “erred in holding that the
petitioners were not eligible for withholding of removal” (Pet’r
Br. 1) is sufficiently broad to warrant consideration under the
CAT. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). Because we here decide that

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Rampengan has demonstrated past persecution within the meaning of
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(I), the immigration judge on remand should
reconsider his and his family’s eligibility for withholding of
removal under the CAT.
IV.
Finally, we note that this appeal lists only Rampengan as a
petitioner in the caption. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
15(a)(2)(A) requires a petition for review of an agency order to
name each party seeking review in the caption or body of the
petition. Rampengan’s wife and two children do not appear in the
caption, but they are listed on Rampengan’s application for asylum.
In their briefs, both parties repeatedly refer to “petitioners” and
clearly contemplate the claims of all four applicants rising and
falling as one. Judge Bryant treated the family as one applicant in
the administrative proceedings, as did the BIA on appeal. Because
the application for asylum and withholding of removal was joint,
the claims of Rampengan’s wife and children should be treated the
same as his on remand, notwithstanding the omission of their names
from the petition on appeal. Cf. Miljkovic v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d
580, 583–84 (7th Cir. 2004).

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V.
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petition for review,
vacate the decision of the BIA, and remand the case for further
consideration of the evidence in light of Rampengan’s presumption
of future persecution.
PETITION FOR REVIEW
GRANTED; DECISION
VACATED AND REMANDED

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