Salt Institute; Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. MICHAEL O. LEAVITT, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, No. 05-1097 

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
 SALT INSTITUTE; CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
MICHAEL O. LEAVITT, SECRETARY OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, No. 05-1097 
Defendant-Appellee.
GROCERY MANUFACTURERS OF
AMERICA; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
HOME BUILDERS,
Amici Supporting Appellants. 
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Gerald Bruce Lee, District Judge.
(CA-04-359-1)
Argued: February 2, 2006
Decided: March 6, 2006
Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Luttig wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Widener and Judge King joined.

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COUNSEL
ARGUED: Catherine E. Stetson, HOGAN & HARTSON, L.L.P.,
Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Alisa Beth Klein, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Civil Division, Appellate
Section, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Stephen A.
Bokat, Robert Costagliola, NATIONAL CHAMBER LITIGATION
CENTER, INC., Washington, D.C.; Reed Rubinstein, Mark E. Solo-
mons, GREENBERG TRAURIG, Washington, D.C., for Appellants.
Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Paul J. McNulty, United
States Attorney, Mark B. Stern, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, Civil Division, Appellate Section, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellee. Richard S. Silverman, Gregory G. Garre, Dirk C. Phil-
lips, HOGAN & HARTSON, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Amicus
Curiae Grocery Manufacturers of America Supporting Appellants.
Thomas J. Ward, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILD-
ERS, Washington, D.C.; Karl S. Bourdeau, Gus B. Bauman, Leah A.
Dundon, BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND, P.C., Washington, D.C., for
Amicus Curiae National Association of Home Builders Supporting
Appellants.
OPINION
LUTTIG, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-appellants, The Salt Institute and the Chamber of Com-
merce, claim that the Information Quality Act (IQA) grants them a
legal right to accurate information and that defendant-appellee, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, Michael Leavitt, has
deprived them of this right. The agency concluded that appellants had
no such right under the IQA and denied appellants’ petition seeking
information and correction. The district court held that appellants
lacked Article III standing to pursue a suit challenging the agency’s
denial. For the reasons stated below, we agree that appellants lack
Article III standing and we therefore affirm the district court’s dis-
missal of appellants’ suit for lack of jurisdiction.
I.
In May of 2003, appellants filed a petition with the National Heart,
Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) "seeking correction of informa-
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tion disseminated by NHLBI, which [information] directly states and
otherwise suggests that reduced sodium consumption will result in
lower blood pressure in all individuals." J.A. 26. The petition, which
purported to be filed pursuant to the Information Quality Act, 44
U.S.C. § 3516, note, took issue with the findings of two studies that
were funded in part by NHLBI grants. J.A. 26-28. The findings of
those studies suggested that all Americans could reduce their blood
pressure by lessening their sodium consumption. Id. at 27. NHLBI
published these findings in news releases, on its website, and in at
least one report. Id. at 29-30.
Appellants’ petition for correction asserted that the studies’ find-
ings do not meet the standards for data quality set out in the IQA and
claimed that, to meet the IQA’s standards, those findings had to be
qualified according to such factors as race, history of hypertension,
sex, age, body-mass index, and education level. See id. at 30. In other
words, appellants maintain that lowering sodium intake reduces blood
pressure for only certain groups of Americans, not for all Americans.
The petition requested that NHLBI "make publicly available" the raw
data that supported the studies’ findings in order to allow appellants
to test their validity for different groups of individuals. Id. at 38.
Because appellants’ lone request was that information be made
public, NHLBI construed their petition for correction as a request for
information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and
denied it. Id. at 42-47, 49-50. Appellants appealed, restating their con-
tention that their petition was proper under the IQA and arguing that
it should be granted. Id. at 52-61. The agency affirmed its initial deci-
sion, id. at 69-73, and appellants filed a complaint in the district court
alleging that the agency had violated the IQA and the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), id. at 18-21. The district court dismissed the
suit, holding that appellants lacked Article III standing, Salt Institute
v. Thompson, 345 F. Supp. 2d 589, 598-601 (E.D. Va. 2004), and,
alternatively, that they had no right to judicial review under either the
IQA or the APA, id. at 601-03.
II.
We review the district court’s dismissal of the case for lack of
standing de novo. White Tail Park, Inc. v. Stroube, 413 F.3d 451, 459
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(4th Cir. 2005). The district court held that appellants had not estab-
lished the injury in fact, traceability, or redressability necessary to
establish their Article III standing. Salt Institute, 345 F. Supp. 2d at
598-601. As to injury in fact, the district court concluded that "none
of the Plaintiffs’ alleged harms is sufficiently concrete and particular-
ized to confer standing." Id. at 599.
To invoke the jurisdiction of an Article III court, the plaintiffs
"must have suffered an ‘injury in fact.’" Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The injury "required by Art. III may
exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of
which creates standing." Id. at 578 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 500 (1975)). The injuries alleged by appellants are the depriva-
tion of the raw data from the studies and the asserted incorrectness in
NHLBI’s public statements.
Although there is no general common law right to information
from agencies or to informational correctness, appellants insist that
these rights are conferred by the IQA. The IQA provides in full:
(a) In general.— The Director of the Office of Management
and Budget shall, by not later than September 30, 2001, and
with public and Federal agency involvement, issue guide-
lines under sections 3504(d)(1) and 3516 [this section] of
title 44, United States Code, that provide policy and proce-
dural guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and maxi-
mizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of
information (including statistical information) disseminated
by Federal agencies in fulfillment of the purposes and provi-
sions of chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code [this
chapter], commonly referred to as the Paperwork Reduction
Act.
(b) Content of guidelines.— The guidelines under subsec-
tion (a) shall—
(1) apply to the sharing by Federal agencies of, and access
to, information disseminated by Federal agencies; and
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(2) Require that each Federal agency to which the guide-
lines apply—
(A) issue guidelines ensuring and maximizing the quality,
objectivity, utility, and integrity of information (including
statistical information) disseminated by the agency, by not
later than 1 year after the date of issuance of the guidelines
under subsection (a);
(B) establish administrative mechanisms allowing affected
persons to seek and obtain correction of information main-
tained and disseminated by the agency that does not comply
with the guidelines issued under subsection (a); and
(C) Report periodically to the director—
(i) the number and nature of complaints received by the
agency regarding the accuracy of information disseminated
by the agency; and
(ii) how such complaints were handled by the agency.
44 U.S.C. § 3516, note. By its terms, this statute creates no legal
rights in any third parties.1 Instead, it orders the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget to draft guidelines concerning information quality
1Although appellants contend that this case has nothing to do with
FOIA, that statute also does not grant legal protection to their claimed
right to information. The Supreme Court has held that "data generated by
a privately controlled organization which has received grant funds from
an agency . . . but which data has not at any time been obtained by the
agency" — the exact sort of data sought by appellants here — "are not
‘agency records’ accessible under the FOIA." Forsham v. Harris, 445
U.S. 169, 178 (1980). Subsequent legislation has required that data pro-
duced by federal grantees be accessible to the public through FOIA. Pub.
L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-495 (1998); 64 Fed. Reg. 54,926 (Oct.
8, 1999). However, this requirement applies only to data first produced
under new or continuing grants awarded after April 17, 2000. 65 Fed.
Reg. 14,406 (Mar. 16, 2000). The grants in question here were not
awarded after April 17, 2000. Therefore, FOIA does not grant appellants
a right to this information.
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and specifies what those guidelines should contain. Because the stat-
ute upon which appellants rely does not create a legal right to access
to information or to correctness, appellants have not alleged an inva-
sion of a legal right and, thus, have failed to establish an injury in fact
sufficient to satisfy Article III.
Against this conclusion, appellants argue that the Supreme Court
recognized the sufficiency of informational injuries in Federal Elec-
tion Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998). However, in relying
upon Akins, appellants confuse two distinct standing inquiries: the
concreteness of the alleged injury and the status of the claimed right.
In Akins, the Supreme Court held that an informational injury was
"sufficiently concrete and specific" to satisfy Article III. Id. at 25. In
this case, we have not decided (and need not decide) the question
whether appellants’ alleged injury is sufficiently concrete and spe-
cific. Rather, we have decided the antecedent question whether Con-
gress has granted a legal right to the information in question. Akins
controls the former question, but not the latter. Indeed, on the latter
question, Akins is distinguishable because the statute in question
there, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, clearly created a
right to information by requiring the Federal Election Commission to
make certain information available to the public. See 2 U.S.C.
§ 434(a)(11)(B) ("The Commission shall make a designation, state-
ment, report, or notification that is filed with the Commission under
this Act available for inspection by the public.").2 The IQA, by con-
trast, does not create any legal right to information or its correctness.
Because the statute upon which appellants rely does not grant the
2The appellants’ reliance on Public Citizen v. United States Depart-
ment of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989), is likewise unavailing. Public Citi-
zen held that an informational injury under the Federal Advisory
Committee Act was not a "generalized grievance." Id. at 449-50. How-
ever, like the statute in Akins, the statute at issue in Public Citizen con-
ferred the informational right the plaintiffs claimed had been violated.
See 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 10(a)(1) ("Each advisory committee meeting shall
be open to the public."); id. at § 10(b) ("[T]he records, reports, tran-
scripts, minutes, appendixes, working papers, drafts, studies, agenda, or
other documents which were made available to or prepared for or by
each advisory committee shall be available for public inspection.").
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rights that appellants claim were invaded, appellants cannot establish
an injury in fact and, therefore, lack Article III standing to pursue
their case in the federal courts.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
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