contract owner of real property lots situated in Shooting Point v. W. M. CUMMING, JR., Resident Engineer for the Virginia Department of Transportation…

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
 SHOOTING POINT, L.L.C.; LEMOIN B.
CREE, in individual capacity as
shareholder of Shooting Point,
L.L.C.; MARLENE CREE, in individual
capacity as shareholder of Shooting
Point, L.L.C.; NICOLE KILLEBREW, in
individual capacity as shareholder
of Shooting Point, L.L.C.;
MONTAIGNE CREE, in individual
capacity both as shareholder of
Shooting Point, L.L.C., as well as
contract owner of real property lots
situated in Shooting Point; L.
BARRETT CREE, in individual
capacity both as shareholder of
Shooting Point, L.L.C., as well as No. 03-1120 contract owner of real property lots
situated in Shooting Point; SHOOTING
POINT PROPERTY OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
W. M. CUMMING, JR., Resident
Engineer for the Virginia
Department of Transportation for
Northampton County, Virginia, in
his individual and/or personal
capacity only; JOHN W. WESCOAT;
SUZANNE WESCOAT; JOHN W.
WESCOAT, JR.; CURTIS H. JONES, JR.,
Defendants-Appellees. 

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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
Rebecca Beach Smith, District Judge.
(CA-02-193-2)
Argued: January 22, 2004
Decided: May 14, 2004
Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Williams joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Andrew Michael Sacks, SACKS & SACKS, Norfolk,
Virginia, for Appellants. Alan Brody Rashkind, FURNISS, DAVIS,
RASHKIND & SAUNDERS, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellees John
W. Wescoat, Suzanne Wescoat, John W. Wescoat, Jr., Curtis H.
Jones, Jr. James Christian Stuchell, Assistant Attorney General,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee W. M. Cumming, Jr. ON BRIEF: James A. Cales, III,
FURNISS, DAVIS, RASHKIND & SAUNDERS, Norfolk, Virginia,
for Appellees John W. Wescoat, Suzanne Wescoat, John W. Wescoat,
Jr., Curtis H. Jones, Jr.
OPINION
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
I.
Several individuals and entities that owned a parcel of land in the
Tidewater area of Virginia brought a civil rights action under 42
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U.S.C. § 1983 against the adjoining landowners and the local resident
engineer for the Virginia Department of Transportation ("VDOT")
alleging violations of their federal civil and constitutional rights and
asserting various state law claims. On Defendants’ motion to dismiss,
the district court dismissed the action and held that, inter alia, the
court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to enter-
tain the landowner’s § 1983 claims. Plaintiffs-Appellants
("Plaintiff(s)" or "Shooting Point") appeal the dismissal on Rooker-
Feldman grounds. Because the case is essentially a residential land
dispute and the federal issues are inextricably intertwined with those
that the state court has already decided, we affirm.
II.
This case arises from a private property dispute in Northampton
County, on the Eastern Shore of Virginia, between adjoining land-
owners with differing plans for the development of the land. Plaintiffs
are individuals and entities that own a parcel of land, comprising
roughly 176 acres, known as Shooting Point.1 The Shooting Point
property is surrounded by a 900-acre tract of land owned by Defen-
dants John and Suzanne Wescoat (the "Wescoat property"). The Wes-
coat property is subject to a fifteen-foot-wide easement benefitting the
Shooting Point property for the purpose of ingress and egress to state
highway Route 622. The easement, granted by deed in 1974, is a non-
exclusive easement to be used by both the servient and dominant ten-
ements.
On December 29, 1999, Shooting Point recorded a plat, approved
by Northampton County, which divided the Shooting Point develop-
ment into eighteen separate parcels for sale to private property own-
ers. Many of the lots have already been sold or placed under contract.
1Plaintiff Shooting Point, L.L.C. is a Virginia corporation. Plaintiffs
Lemoin B. Cree, Marlene Cree, Nicole Killebrew, Montaigne Cree, and
L. Barrett Cree are suing in their individual capacities as Shooting Point
L.L.C.’s shareholders. Plaintiffs Lemoin B. Cree and L. Barrett Cree are
contract owners of real property lots falling within the scope of the
Shooting Point property. Plaintiff Shooting Point Property Owners Asso-
ciation, Inc. is a Virginia corporation comprised of Shooting Point prop-
erty owners.
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According to Shooting Point’s federal complaint, the Wescoats are
unhappy with Plaintiffs’ plans for the property and are attempting to
restrict access to the easement, hoping to cause Plaintiffs to abandon
the property and sell it to the Wescoats at a reduced price. They also
allege that defendant W.M. Cumming ("Cumming"), the local Resi-
dent Engineer for VDOT, conspired with the Wescoats to require
Shooting Point to obtain a commercial entrance permit when other
similarly situated property owners had not been required to do so, and
then deliberately delayed the issuance of the permit to purposefully
interfere with the Shooting Point development.
After a series of private disputes, on February 16, 2000, the Wes-
coats filed suit in the Circuit Court of Northampton County, seeking
to enjoin Plaintiffs’ proposed use of Shooting Point. They argued that
converting Shooting Point into a subdivision was not a reasonable use
of the parcel; that the proposed use of Shooting Point would overbur-
den the fifteen-foot-wide easement; and that, under Virginia law, such
use of the easement required Shooting Point to obtain a commercial
entrance permit. Notwithstanding those proceedings, Plaintiffs
applied for a commercial entrance permit from Cumming, who they
contend resisted issuing the permit, in bad faith, as long as possible.
Ultimately, however, on August 14, 2000, Cumming issued Plaintiffs
a permit for Shooting Point. Subsequently, the Wescoats filed a sec-
ond state action, seeking a declaratory judgment that the permit was
unlawfully issued because the regulation requirements were not satis-
fied.
The two suits were consolidated for trial. The state court deter-
mined: (1) that the easement existed; (2) the specific location of the
easement; (3) that the use of Shooting Point as a subdivision would
not overburden the easement; (4) that the commercial entrance permit
regulation applied to the Shooting Point Subdivision; and (5) that the
permit issued to Plaintiffs by Cumming was invalid as a matter of law
because the road did not meet the statutory requirements for an
entrance permit. Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia, which recently affirmed the judgment of the state trial court.2
2Shooting Point, LLC v. Wescoat, No. 02-0801, appeal granted Aug.
1, 2002; Wescoat v. Shooting Point, L.L.C., No. 02-0803, appeal granted
Aug. 1, 2002. Though the state appeal was pending during the district
court action below, the Virginia Supreme Court recently affirmed. 265
Va. 256, 576 S.E.2d 497 (2003).
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Despite the pending appeal, on March 25, 2002, Plaintiffs filed the
instant action in federal court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1985, for alleged violations of their rights guaranteed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Count One alleges that all Defendants par-
ticipated in a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs of their federal civil and
constitutional rights. Counts Two through Five allege that defendant
Cumming, in his individual capacity, deprived Plaintiffs of their
rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, to just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment, and to procedural and sub-
stantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Count Six
alleges various supplemental state law claims arising out of the same
incidents.
Defendants filed timely answers to the Complaint and also filed
separate motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings. The
district court declined the parties’ request for oral argument because
the issues had been extensively, and exhaustively, briefed by all par-
ties. On December 20, 2003, the district court issued its Memorandum
Opinion and Final Order dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint in its
entirety. Shooting Point, LLC v. Cumming, 238 F. Supp. 2d 729 (E.D.
Va. 2002). Count One was dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim; Counts Two, Three and
Four were dismissed on Rooker-Feldman grounds; Count Five was
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies; and Count Six (the state law claims) was dismissed because
the court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction.3
Before this Court, Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal on Rooker-
Feldman grounds only.
3The Defendants filed a motion to alter or amend judgment, which the
district court denied. The court did, however, enter a supplemental order
clarifying the reasons for its dismissal of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 conspiracy
claim. The court clarified that it dismissed that claim because the Plain-
tiffs could not show a deprivation of a federal constitutional right. For
this reason, Plaintiffs contend that this decision was also based on the
district court’s conclusion that Rooker-Feldman precluded its review of
the state court’s decision that they were not entitled to a permit and thus,
they have no federally protected property interest. This issue is therefore
absorbed and disposed of by our Rooker-Feldman analysis of the due
process and equal protection claims, which follows.
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III.
The district court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
Shooting Point’s suit, and our review of that ruling is de novo. Safety-
Kleen, Inc. v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Guess v.
Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 967 F.2d 998, 1002 (4th Cir. 1992)). The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that "lower federal courts generally
do not have [subject-matter] jurisdiction to review state-court deci-
sions." Id. at 875 (quoting Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th
Cir. 1997) and citing D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-
86 (1983)); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16
(1923)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal "review of
adjudications of the state’s highest court [and] also the decisions of
its lower courts." Jordahl v. Democratic Party, 122 F.3d 192, 199
(4th Cir. 1997). The Rooker-Feldman bar extends not only to issues
actually decided by a state court but also to those that are "inextrica-
bly intertwined with questions ruled upon by a state court." Plyler,
129 F.3d at 731 (internal quotation marks omitted). A federal claim
is "inextricably intertwined" with a state court decision if "success on
the federal claim depends upon a determination that the state court
wrongly decided the issues before it." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
"Under either the ‘actually decided’ or the ‘inextricably inter-
twined’ prong, the principle is the same: ‘[A] party losing in state
court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate
review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based
on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the
loser’s federal rights.’" Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d
194, 199 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S.
997, 1005-06 (1994)). Thus, "if in order to grant the federal plaintiff
the relief sought, the federal court must determine that the state court
judgment was erroneously entered or must take action that would ren-
der the judgment ineffectual, Rooker-Feldman is implicated." Jor-
dahl, 122 F.3d at 202 (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting Ernst v.
City Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 491 (3d Cir. 1997)). Because federal
jurisdiction to review the decisions of state courts "is reserved exclu-
sively to the Supreme Court, it is improper for federal district courts
to exercise jurisdiction over a case that is the functional equivalent of
an appeal from a state court judgment." Ernst, 108 F.3d at 491.
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IV.
After considering the appropriate case law, the district court con-
cluded that Shooting Point’s complaint was barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine because a favorable decision by that court would
require federal review of the Virginia court’s decision or would pro-
duce a result that was at odds with the result reached in the state
courts. We agree.
Because the ultimate ruling of the Virginia state courts was that
Shooting Point was not entitled to a required permit under the then
prevailing state law,4 we cannot grant the requested relief insofar as
Shooting Point’s selective enforcement claim seeks to absolve them
of their state law obligation to obtain a commercial entrance permit
from the VDOT on the theory that others similarly situated have not
been required to obtain a permit. The Virginia courts have clearly
held that Shooting Point was required to obtain a commercial entrance
permit and that, under the then prevailing law, Shooting Point was not
entitled to that permit. Because the Virginia courts implicitly held that
Shooting Point was properly subject to the VDOT regulations, a fed-
eral district court finding of selective enforcement in violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would clearly
contravene the state courts’ judgment.5 The district court, therefore,
4During oral argument, the parties indicated that, sometime after the
state court entered its judgment, the VDOT amended its regulations in a
manner that now allows for the issuance of a permit for easements such
as Shooting Point’s. Consequently, Shooting Point later obtained a valid
permit. Because this change was not retroactive, Shooting Point’s claim
is governed by the VDOT regulations effective when Shooting Point first
applied for a permit. It is undisputed that the state courts held that under
those regulations, Shooting Point was not entitled to a commercial
entrance permit, as a matter of law.
5It appears from the record and oral argument that Plaintiffs were
aware of this alleged selective enforcement while the state court actions
were pending. Thus, the claim could have, and probably should have,
been brought there. See In re Varat Enters., Inc., 81 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th
Cir. 1996) (Under res judicata principles, the judgment in a prior action
bars litigation "not only of every matter actually adjudicated in the earlier
case, but also of every claim that might have been presented.")(emphasis
added).
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correctly concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes its
exercise of federal jurisdiction over Shooting Point’s selective
enforcement claim.
V.
The district court also concluded that Rooker-Feldman bars Shoot-
ing Point’s Procedural and Substantive Due Process claims, asserted
in Counts Three and Four of the Complaint. Plaintiffs argue that
Defendant Cumming, acting under color of law, deprived them of due
process of law when he delayed issuance of the commercial entrance
permit. The district court correctly noted that "to establish a substan-
tive due process violation, Plaintiffs must show: (1) that they had a
property interest in the permit; (2) that the state deprived them of that
interest; and (3) ‘that the state’s action falls so far beyond the outer
limits of legitimate governmental action that no process could cure
the deficiency.’" Shooting Point v. Cumming, 238 F. Supp. 2d 729,
738 (E.D. Va. 2002) (quoting Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48
F.3d 810, 827 (4th Cir. 1995)). Likewise, the district court properly
noted that: "In order to claim a violation of procedural due process,
Plaintiffs must make a similar showing: (1) that they have a property
interest in the permit; (2) of which the state deprived them; (3) with-
out due process of law." Id.
Because the court correctly noted that both the procedural and sub-
stantive due process claims necessarily depend upon Plaintiffs "legiti-
mate claim of entitlement" to a "property interest", we agree that
Rooker-Feldman bars federal review of those claims insofar as the
state courts have already decided that "the issuance of the commercial
entrance permit to the Plaintiffs was impermissible. . . ." Id. To grant
relief to Shooting Point, the district court "would have to rule that the
state court’s decision was wrong and that the Plaintiffs were entitled
to the permit." Id. Even though the actual language and tenor of the
district court’s opinion might not explicitly declare the state judgment
invalid, when the effect of its decision would carry the same import
and would clearly render the state court judgment ineffectual, Rooker-
Feldman is a bar to federal jurisdiction. Thus, Counts Three and Four
were properly dismissed.
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VI.
As we have previously stated: "Resolving the routine land-use dis-
putes that inevitably and constantly arise among developers, local res-
idents, and municipal officials is simply not the business of federal
courts . . . Accordingly, federal courts should be extremely reluctant
to upset the delicate political balance at play in local land-use dis-
putes." Sylvia Dev. Corp., 48 F.3d at 828-29 (citation omitted). Shoot-
ing Point presents no persuasive or compelling reason for us to
disturb or upset this "delicate political balance." See id. In any event,
we decline to depart from our settled and appropriately cautious view
that "independence of state courts would surely be compromised if
every adverse decision in state court merely rang the opening bell for
federal litigation of the same issues." Breckenride, 211 F.3d at 198.
We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED
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