Michael Reynolds v. Municipality of Norristown, a/k/a Borough of Norristown

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 19-1965
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MICHAEL REYNOLDS
v.
MUNICIPALITY OF NORRISTOWN, a/k/a Borough of Norristown; RUSSELL BONO;
OFFICER CHARLES DOUGLASS, Badge #191; CORPORAL JOSEPH BENSON, Badge
#178; OFFICER BRIAN GRAHAM, Badge #226; OFFICER LINDSEY TORNETTA;
SERGEANT TIMS, Badge #109; SERGEANT LANGDON, Badge #161,
Officer Charles Douglass, Corporal Joseph Benson,
Officer Lindsey Tornetta, Sergeant Tims,
Appellants
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No. 2-15-cv-00016)
District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 6, 2020
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Before: McKEE, BIBAS, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion filed: August 19, 2020)
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OPINION*
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McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Appellants contest the district court’s denial of summary judgment based on their
qualified immunity claims. The district court concluded that there were numerous
disputed facts and that summary judgment was therefore inappropriate.1 Appellants
merely challenge the validity of those factual disputes which we lack jurisdiction to
review in an interlocutory appeal. Therefore, we will dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Qualified immunity cases represent an exception to the general rule that denials of
summary judgment are not final decisions within the appellate jurisdiction of this Court.2
“This is so because such orders conclusively determine whether the defendant is entitled
to immunity from suit; . . . this question could not be effectively reviewed on appeal from
a final judgment because by that time the immunity from standing trial will have been
irretrievably lost.”3 However, we may only review such orders when they turn on purely
legal questions, within the meaning of Mitchell v. Forsyth.4
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1 See Reynolds v. Municipality of Norristown, No. 15-0016, 2019 WL 1429550, at *8
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2019) (describing specific disputed facts in the record). This satisfies
our supervisory rule in Forbes v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 313 F.3d 144, 149 (3d Cir.
2002) (“We . . . require that future dispositions of a motion in which a party pleads
qualified immunity include, at minimum, an identification of relevant factual issues and
an analysis of the law that justifies the ruling with respect to those issues.”).
2 Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 771–72 (2014).
3 Id. at 772.
4 472 U.S. 511, 528-30 (1985); see Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 772–73 (describing factual
questions that are not immediately appealable).

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By contrast, when “the district court determines that factual issues genuinely in
dispute preclude summary adjudication,” appellate jurisdiction is lacking.5 Here,
appellants challenge the district court’s determination of what specific officers did or did
not do.
As we lack jurisdiction to review those findings of fact by the district court, we
must dismiss this appeal.
5 Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 188 (2011) (citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313
(1995)).

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