James D. Schneller, Heirs v. Prospect Park Nursing

ALD-134 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 09-4372
JAMES D. SCHNELLER, HEIRS AND BENEFICIARIES OF
MARJORIE C. SCHNELLER, BY JAMES D. SCHNELLER,
TRUSTEE AD LITEM; ESTATE OF MARJORIE SCHNELLER, BY AND
THROUGH JAMES D. SCHNELLER, TRUSTEE AD LITEM;
MARJORIE ZITOMER, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF MARJORIE
SCHNELLER; ESTATE OF GEORGE H. SCHNELLER, BY AND THROUGH
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE JAMES D. SCHNELLER
v.
PROSPECT PARK NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER,
ITS OWNERS AND EMPLOYEES; MARJORIE ZITOMER;
RICHARD SCHNELLER; T. SERGEANT PEPPER, ESQUIRE
James D. Schneller,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-08-cv-05704)
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel
Submitted by the Clerk for Possible Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 25, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 8, 2010)

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Schneller filed his complaint pro se. In it, he purported to represent other persons and
entities. As a pro se litigant, Schneller may not represent parties other than himself. See
Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that non-
lawyer proceeding pro se could not represent his own children); 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (parties
may proceed in federal court “personally or by counsel”). Accordingly, we will treat him
as the sole Appellant in this appeal. See also Schneller v. Fox Subacute at Clara Burke,
317 F. App’x 135, 137 n.1 (3d Cir. 2008).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM
Appellant James D. Schneller, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s
dismissal of his action and denial of his post-judgment motions. For the reasons that
follow, we will dismiss in part for lack of jurisdiction and otherwise summarily affirm the
judgment of the District Court.
Schneller initiated the underlying civil action in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 2008.1 In it, he primarily alleged that
defendants committed medical and legal malpractice in rendering negligent services to his
parents at the ends of their lives. By opinion and order entered on June 26, 2009, the
District Court dismissed all of his claims and ordered the case closed. On July 10,
Schneller timely filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on August 6, 2009.
On August 11, Schneller filed a motion to “supplement the record,” followed by a motion
for sanctions and costs on September 1. The District Court denied Schneller’s motion to
supplement the record on September 4, 2009, and denied his motion for sanctions and

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Because the motion for reconsideration was filed within ten business days of the
District Court’s entry of judgment, the time to file a notice of appeal from the June 26,
2009 dismissal was tolled until the District Court denied the motion for reconsideration
on August 4, 2009. See former Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (amendment effective Dec. 1, 2009).
Appellant’s subsequent motions to supplement the record and for sanctions do not fall
within the subset of post-judgment motions which toll the time for filing a notice of
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A).
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costs on September 9, 2009. On October 8, 2009, Schneller filed a six-page document
entitled “Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis” which detailed the
errors allegedly made by the District Court in dismissing Appellant’s complaint and
denying his post-judgment motions and requested leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The
District Court granted him leave to appeal in forma pauperis on October 27, 2009, and
Schneller filed a document entitled “Notice of Appeal” on November 10, 2009.
Appellant seeks to appeal both the District Court’s dismissal of his action and its
denial of his post-judgment motions. The District Court’s judgment dismissing the
underlying action became final on August 6, 2009, when the District Court denied
Appellant’s timely-filed motion for reconsideration.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (vesting
jurisdiction in courts of appeals over “final decisions” of the district courts); Budinich v.
Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199-200 (1988) (holding that a final decision is
one that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but
execute the judgment, and that a question remaining to be decided after entry of such a
decision does not affect its finality). Because Schneller failed to file a notice of appeal
within thirty days of entry of that order, we lack jurisdiction over the District Court’s June

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26, 2009 opinion and order dismissing his action and its August 6, 2009 order denying his
motion for reconsideration. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205,
213 (2007) (holding that the timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional
requirement).
The District Court’s denials of Appellant’s post-judgment motions are separately
appealable. See Pennsylvania v. Flaherty, 983 F.2d 1267, 1276 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Post-
judgment orders are final for purposes of § 1291 and immediately appealable because the
policy against piecemeal review is unlikely to be undermined.”). The Court denied
Schneller’s motion to supplement the record by order entered September 4, 2009.
Because he failed to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of that denial, we also lack
jurisdiction over his appeal with respect to that order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1);
Bowles, 551 U.S. at 213. However, Schneller’s motion for sanctions was not denied until
September 9, 2009. On October 8, 2009, Schneller filed a document entitled “Plaintiffs’
Motion for Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis” which specified those orders he wished
to appeal, the grounds he wished to appeal them on, and the court he wished to appeal
them to. The District Court should have treated this document as a notice of appeal. See
Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1); Masquerade Novelty v. Unique Indus., 912 F.2d 663, 665 (3d
Cir. 1990) (explaining that “a party will be deemed to have complied with Rule 3(c) if it
has, within the time provided to file an appeal, filed documents that ‘specify the party or
parties taking the appeal; . . . the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from; and
. . . the court to which the appeal is taken’”). Because this document was timely-filed

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with respect to the District Court’s denial of Appellant’s motions for sanctions, we retain
jurisdiction over his appeal from that order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1); Flaherty, 983
F.2d at 1276.
In his motion for sanctions and costs, Schneller argued that pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, Appellees should be sanctioned for
filing frivolous and vexatious motions and pleadings for the purpose of causing
unnecessary delay and increasing the cost of the litigation. While Schneller set forth the
facts and legal arguments made by Appellees that he disagreed with, he did not provide
any basis from which the District Court could have concluded that Appellees alleged
those facts or made those arguments “for an improper purpose” or with the intent of
“misleading the court.” Schneller’s motion for sanctions was not the proper vehicle for
challenging these assertions and arguments – appeal was. Because Schneller failed to
timely appeal from the District Court’s dismissal of his action and denial of his motion for
reconsideration, we cannot consider these arguments at the present time.
Because Schneller’s appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily
affirm the orders of the District Court denying the requested relief. See 3d Cir. LAR
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. Schneller’s appeal from the District Court’s dismissal of his action,
denial of his motion for reconsideration, and denial of his motion to supplement the
record is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1);
Bowles, 551 U.S. at 213.

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