Ronald Clark v. JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary

DLD-214 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-1395
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RONALD CLARK,
Appellant
v.
JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary; LOUIS FOLINO, Superintendent;
LYNNE M. ABRAHAM, District Attorney
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-01274)
District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 30, 2008
Before: BARRY, CHAGARES and ROTH, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
(Opinion filed: July 10, 2008)
_________
OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Ronald Clark appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint. For the
reasons below, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.

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The procedural history of this case and the details of Clark’s claims are well
known to the parties, set forth in the District Court’s thorough opinion, and need not be
discussed at length. Briefly, Clark alleged that he was entitled to injunctive relief and
damages because he was housed on death row after he was granted a new sentencing
hearing. The Magistrate Judge recommended that appellees’ motion to dismiss be
granted. The District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation and dismissed the
complaint. Clark filed a timely notice of appeal, and we have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
The District Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Clark’s complaint
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Our review of the District Court’s application
of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is plenary. Parkview Assoc. Partnership v. City of
Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 323 (3d Cir. 2000). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a
District Court of jurisdiction to review, directly or indirectly, a state court adjudication.
See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573 (3d Cir. 2005). The Supreme
Court has explained that this doctrine is narrow and confined to cases “brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before
the District Court proceedings commenced and inviting District Court review and
rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 284 (2005).

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Here, Clark litigated in state court the question of whether he is entitled to be
moved off of death row pending his re-sentencing. The Court of Common Pleas of
Greene County held that Clark did not have a protected liberty interest in being housed
elsewhere and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court affirmed.
Clark v. Beard, 918 A.2d 155 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2007). The Court held that the complaint
did not state a claim under the Eighth Amendment or the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. While Clark clearly lost in state court, the injuries he complains
of here were not caused by the state court judgment but rather by the Department of
Corrections’s policy. “[A] district court is not divested of jurisdiction simply because a
party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state court.”
Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006). Thus,
the District Court erred in concluding that Clark’s claims were barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine.
However, we agree with the District Court that Clark’s claims are barred by claim
and issue preclusion. Clark either brought or could have brought his claims in the state
court proceedings. He sought the same relief in state court based on the same facts, and
the state court issued a final and valid judgment on the merits of his claims. See Turner,
449 F.3d at 548-50.
Summary action is appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in the
appeal. See Third Circuit LAR 27.4. For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by

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the District Court, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See Third Circuit
I.O.P. 10.6.

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