Marc Pierre Hall v. Warden Williamson; U.s. Attorney Gonzales; Thomas Marino

BLD-390 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 07-2533
________________
MARC PIERRE HALL,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN WILLIAMSON;
U.S. ATTORNEY GONZALES;
THOMAS MARINO
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 06-cv-02456)
District Judge: Honorable James F. McClure, Jr.
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 20, 2007
Before: MCKEE, FUENTES AND VAN ANTWERPEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
(Filed: October 4, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Marc Pierre Hall, a federal inmate currently incarcerated at USP-Lewisburg in
Pennsylvania, appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2241. We will affirm.
In December 1995, Hall was convicted by a jury sitting in the United States
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina on charges of a narcotics law
conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, possession of a firearm and a destructive
device in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) and (2),
and damage to real property affecting commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). Hall
was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment on the § 846 conviction, a concurrent
sentence of 480 months on the § 844(i) conviction, a consecutive sixty month sentence on
one of the § 924(c) convictions and a consecutive life sentence on the other § 924(c)
conviction. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Hall’s judgment of conviction
and sentence on November 17, 1997, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. See
United States v. Hall, 129 F.3d 1261, 1997 WL 712885 (4 th Cir. 1997)(table), cert. denied
524 U.S. 932 (1998).
Hall thereafter filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, based upon, inter alia, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey v.
United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), and jurisdictional challenges to the four counts on
which he was found guilty. The District Court for the Western District of North Carolina
dismissed Hall’s § 2255 motion on October 10, 2001, after concluding that his Bailey
claim had been rejected on direct appeal and that his jurisdictional challenges did not
entitled him to relief. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Hall’s request for a
certificate of appealability and dismissed the appeal on the reasoning of the District

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Court. See United States v. Hall, 26 Fed. Appx. 357, 2002 WL 216431 (4 th Cir. 2002).
Once again, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Hall v. United States, 537 U.S. 894
(2002).
Hall continued his quest for relief in the Fourth Circuit by seeking authorization to
file a second or successive motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Although the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals denied Hall such authorization, it did so without prejudice to his
right to file a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See In re Hall, C.A. Nos. 02-
260 and 02-267, slip order at 1 (4th Cir. Nov. 12, 2002). Hall did just that. While
incarcerated at USP-Marion in Illinois, Hall filed a § 2241 petition on May 6, 2003 in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. That petition was
subsequently transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois where it would ultimately be dismissed without prejudice on February 20, 2004,
because it was unclear if Hall was still incarcerated, and, if so, where. See Hall v. United
States, S.D. Ill. Civ. No. 03-cv-00451.
Hall continued seeking habeas relief by filing a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241 in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut in March 2004.
After concluding that Hall’s amended § 2241 petition contained a claim that is properly
raised in a § 2255 motion, the court construed Hall’s petition as a second or successive §
2255 motion and transferred it to the United States District Court for the Western District
of North Carolina for whatever action that court deemed appropriate. See Hall v.
Choinski, Civ. No. 04-cv-00472, 2005 WL 2234504 (D.Conn. Sept. 13, 2005). Agreeing

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with the construction of Hall’s filing as a § 2255 motion, the Western District of North
Carolina dismissed it without prejudice as an unauthorized successive § 2255 motion on
October 25, 2005, see Hall v. United States, Civ. No. 05-cv-00425, and the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals dismissed the subsequent appeal. Hall v. United States, C.A. No. 05-
7793 (4th Cir. Mar. 14, 2006).
Not to be discouraged, Hall – who was once again incarcerated at USP-Marion –
filed another § 2241 petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Illinois wherein he argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bailey and Jones v.
United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000), render his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) “void
as a ‘nonexistent’ federal crime.” The District Court rejected Hall’s contention,
concluding that his argument was without merit and did not provide him with a basis for
relief under § 2241. Accordingly, the District Court summarily dismissed Hall’s § 2241
petition with prejudice See Hall v. Bledsoe, Civ. No. 06-cv-00257, 2006 WL 2631985,
*3 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2006). Hall’s appeal of that decision was dismissed by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals. See Hall v. Bledsoe, C.A. Nos. 06-3709 and 06-3710.
After Hall was transferred to USP-Lewisburg, he filed yet another habeas petition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, this time in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania. In his petition, Hall claimed that: 1) the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Bailey and Jones render 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) a nonexistent federal crime under
the “active employment” criteria; 2) the statutory provisions set forth at 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a) & (b) were ineffective laws at the time of his trial; and 3) his arrest was without

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probable cause. Hall’s § 2241 petition was assigned to a Magistrate Judge who issued a
Report recommending that it be dismissed. The Magistrate Judge concluded that, with
respect to his second and third claims, Hall had not established that he satisfies the safety-
valve language of § 2255, i.e., that the remedy by a § 2255 motion is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention. With respect to his first claim, the
Magistrate Judge concluded that, to the extent the claim was based on Bailey, petitioner
had presented the claim on direct appeal and in his initial § 2255 motion. Insofar as
Hall’s claim was based on Jones, the Magistrate Judge determined that the claim could
arguably be raised in a § 2241 petition, see Report at 12, citing Martin v. Perez, 319 F.3d
799, 805 (6th Cir. 2003), but that Hall had previously presented such a claim in the § 2241
petition that was filed in and disposed of on the merits by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Illinois just three months prior to the instant filing.
Over Hall’s objections, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report
and dismissed his § 2241 petition. The District Court agreed with the Magistrate Judge’s
conclusion that § 2255 is not “inadequate or ineffective” with respect to Hall’s second
and third claims since he had an unobstructed procedural opportunity to raise these claims
on direct appeal and in his first § 2255 motion. The District Court rejected Hall’s
contention that he was not challenging his conviction and sentence, but instead was
attempting to initiate a lawsuit concerning the enforcement of his sentence. The District
Court further noted that Hall had not objected to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that
he had previously presented his Bailey claim on direct appeal and in his initial § 2255

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1 Section 2244(a) states:
No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application for a
writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to a
judgment of a court of the United States if it appears that the legality of
such detention has been determined by a judge or court of the United States
on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus, except as provided in
section 2255.
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motion, and that, in any event, the conclusion was correct. Finally, as to his claim under
Jones, the District Court concluded that Hall was barred from presenting this argument in
a second § 2241 petition by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)1 given the disposition of that claim by
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois in September 2006.
While the District Court acknowledged that the District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois did not specifically discuss Hall’s claim under Jones in its written decision, the
claim was nonetheless presented in Hall’s § 2241 petition which was disposed of on the
merits. This timely appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and will summarily affirm the
District Court’s order of dismissal. As the District Court properly concluded, a § 2255
motion is the presumptive means for a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a
conviction or sentence, unless such a motion would be “inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of his detention.” Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir.
2002); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ¶ 5. A § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective only when
“some limitation of scope or procedure” prevents a movant from receiving an
adjudication of his claim. Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d

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Cir. 2002). Section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely because a prior motion
has been unsuccessful or a petitioner is unable to meet the stringent gatekeeping
requirements for filing a second or successive § 2255 motion. Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120-
21. See also Cradle, 290 F.3d at 539.
The “safety valve” provided under § 2255 is extremely narrow and has been held
to apply in unusual situations, such as those in which a prisoner has had no prior
opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime later deemed to be non-criminal
because of an intervening change in the law. See Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120 (citing In re
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251). Such is not the case here. As the District Court properly
concluded, with the exception of his claim advanced pursuant to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000), Hall had the opportunity to (and,
at least with respect to his Bailey claim, did in fact ) raise his claims on direct appeal and
in his initial § 2255 motion. The exception identified in In re Dorsainvil is, thus, simply
inapplicable as to these claims and Hall may not seek relief under § 2241.
We likewise agree with the District Court’s conclusion that § 2241 is not an
avenue available to Hall for the presentation of his Jones claim given the merits
disposition rendered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois on his § 2241 petition raising that same claim. See Zayas v. INS, 311 F.3d 247,
255 (3d Cir.2002) (§ 2244(a) is a “finality provision which applies to any habeas
application challenging ‘the detention of a person pursuant to a judgment of a court of the
United States,’ and hence embraces, without textual limitation, habeas applications

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brought under ... under § 2241"). See also Chambers v. United States, 106 F.3d 472, 475
(2d Cir.1997) (dismissing petitioner’s § 2241 petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) because
a previous § 2241 petition raising the same claims had “already been decided on its
merits”); Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir.1998); Triestman v. United
States, 124 F.3d 361, 373 n. 17 (2d Cir.1997); George v. Perrill, 62 F.3d 333 (10th
Cir.1995).
Because the § 2241 petition was properly dismissed and no substantial question is
presented by this appeal, the District Court’s order of dismissal entered on May 15, 2007
will be affirmed. See Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. We will further deny
Hall’s motions seeking to stay this appeal and requesting a complete copy of the District
Court record, including transcripts, free of charge. Hall originally requested that the
appeal be stayed while he pursued an application in the Supreme Court. Aside from the
fact that Hall has failed to demonstrate that a stay is warranted, he has stated in a recent
submission that the Supreme Court Clerk returned his documents to him and it appears he
now wishes to proceed with his appeal in this Court. With respect to his request for a
copy of the entire District Court record, Hall is simply mistaken in his belief that his in
forma pauperis status entitles him to as much. Finally, given our disposition of the appeal
and Hall’s failure to demonstrate that transcripts are needed, we will deny that request as
well.

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