Edward Saterstad v. Kevin Stover

ALD-397 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 07-2384
________________
EDWARD SATERSTAD,
Appellant
v.
KEVIN STOVER; KELLY STOVER; HENRY KLUGH; MARK AMWAY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 06-cv-02070)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
_______________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action
Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 27, 2007
BEFORE: SLOVITER, CHAGARES and COWEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed October 5, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
This is an appeal from the district court’s denial of Edward Saterstad’s motion
seeking payment of expenses incurred as a result of defendants’ removal of the action to
federal court. For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm. See I.O.P. 10.6.
Appellant Edward Saterstad filed a claim against Kevin Stover, Kelly Stover

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128 U.S.C. § 1447 governs procedure after removal and states in pertinent part:
(c )... An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any
actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal....
2
(collectively, “the Stovers”), Henry Klugh and Mark Amway in the Pennsylvania Court
of Common Pleas for Dauphin County. Appellant’s state court action alleged violations
of the Federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute (“RICO”), 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), Kevin and Kelly Stover removed
the action to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. On
December 22, 2006, the District Court determined that the removal was procedurally
defective and remanded the case to state court. Appellant then moved pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1447 1 to seek payment from Defendants for expenses incurred as a result of the
removal to federal court. The District Court entered an order on April 9, 2007, denying
Appellant’s request for expenses. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to that order
on May 4, 2007.
We review the denial of fees and costs of expenses under section 1447(c) on an
abuse of discretion standard. See Mints v. Educ. Testing Serv., 99 F.3d 1253, 1260 (3d
Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court has held that “[a]bsent unusual circumstances, courts
may award attorney’s fees under section 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked
an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Conversely, when an objectively
reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546

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2 The District Court remanded the action because the Stovers failed to join Henry
Klugh in the removal petition, thus violating the procedural rule that requires all
defendants to join in a removal petition. See Memorandum and Order at 3-4, December
22, 2006 (holding that it was insufficient to note only that Klugh assented) . The court
noted that while removal was appropriate the procedural violation did not deprive the
court of jurisdiction. Id.
3
U.S. 132, 141 (2005). We see no reason to disturb the District Court’s determination that
Appellant is not entitled to costs. Appellant in his state court complaint alleged a right
arising under federal law. Significantly, the District Court did not dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction but rather for a procedural defect.2 The Defendants had an
objectively reasonable basis pursuant to section 1441(b) for removing the case to federal
court.
In sum, because Saterstad’s appeal presents us with no substantial question, see
I.O.P. 106, we will summarily affirm.

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