United States of America v. Hasan Murphy

* Honorable Petrese B. Tucker, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 06-5195
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
HASAN MURPHY,
Appellant
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 05-cr-00609)
District Judge Katharine S. Hayden
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Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1 (a)
February 7, 2008
Before: MCKEE and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
and TUCKER, District Judge *1
(Opinion filed: March 16, 2010)
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OPINION
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2
TUCKER, District Judge
Hasan Murphy pled guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1), possession of a
firearm by a felon. The District Court sentenced him to a 92-month term of imprisonment
and a three-year term of supervised release. We affirm.
I.
On appeal, Murphy contends that his sentence must be vacated because it is
unreasonable. He argues that the District Court failed to comply with the second and
third steps of the sentencing procedure outlined in United States v. Gunter. 462 F.3d 237
(3d Cir. 2006). Murphy asserts that the Court did not properly rule on his motion for
departure based on the conditions of his pre-trial confinement. He further contends that
the Court did not “meaningfully consider” the factors of his criminal history and the
conditions of his 15-month confinement at Pasaic County Jail, as provided for in 18
U.S.C. §3553(a).
When imposing a sentence, a District Court must give “meaningful consideration”
to the Section 3553(a) factors. In determining reasonableness, the sentence is affirmed
“as long as it is within the statutorily prescribed range...and [the sentence] is reasonable.”
United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 327 (3d Cir. 2006). Specifically, the appellate
court “must be satisfied that the [District] Court exercised its discretion by considering
the relevant factors set forth in Section 3553(a). Id. at 329. Here, Mr. Murphy briefed the
issue in advance of sentencing and the parties argued the matter, which the Court

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expressly acknowledged along with its discretion to depart or vary downward from the
advisory Sentencing Guidelines. In a similar case, United States v. Jackson, the
Defendant argued at sentencing for a downward departure on the grounds of
“extraordinary acceptance of responsibility.” 467 F.3d 834, 836 (3d Cir. 2006). Similar
to the present matter, the District Court heard the arguments on the motion but did not
expressly rule on it. Id. at 836,839. Instead, the Court moved to consideration of the
Section 3553(a) factors and discussed the points it considered pertinent before sentencing
the Defendant to the lowest end of the Guidelines range. Id. at 836-37. The sentence was
affirmed because the Court “was able to infer meaning from the District Court’s actions.”
Id. at 840. Contrary to Murphy’s assertions, we are satisfied that no ambiguity exists as to
whether the District Court understood its discretion to depart from the Guidelines.
Accordingly, Mr. Murphy’s claim is denied.
Likewise, the record demonstrates that the District Court gave “meaningful
consideration” to the Section 3553(a) factors in determining Murphy’s sentence. Both
parties agree that the Court reiterated the factors at sentencing, thus demonstrating an
understanding of the analysis required. The record also demonstrates that not only did the
Court understand the law properly, it applied the correct law and considered Murphy’s
arguments. Accordingly, the sentence is affirmed.

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