Marco Pastor v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES On Petition for Review of an Order of the…

Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern*
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-5121
MARCO PASTOR
Petitioner,
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(No. A75-454-824)
Immigration Judge: Hon. Henry S. Dogin
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 1, 2008
Before: RENDELL and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
POLLAK, District Judge*
(Opinion filed: February 19, 2008 )
OPINION
POLLAK, District Judge
Petitioner Marco Pastor appeals the Board of Immigration Appeals’ affirmance of

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a decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) to deny a request for continuance of removal
proceedings. This court has jurisdiction over the petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
See Khan v. Attorney General, 448 F.3d 226, 229-33 (3d Cir. 2006). We write primarily
for the parties, and assume familiarity with the facts, decisions, and records of the case.
Seeking employment-based permanent residency, petitioner submitted an
application for Labor Certification (Form ETA-750) to the Department of Labor.
Petitioner requested a continuance of his removal proceedings pending resolution of the
application. The Immigration Judge had previously granted two continuances on other
grounds, and denied this third request. Petitioner argues that this denial was an abuse of
discretion and violated his right of due process.
We are bound by precedent to reject these arguments. In Khan v. Attorney
General, we held that “[w]here . . . an alien has failed to submit a visa petition, an IJ’s
decision to deny the alien’s continuance request is squarely within the IJ’s broad
discretion, at least absent extraordinary circumstances . . . .” 448 F.3d at 234. Here,
petitioner has neither submitted a visa application nor alleged “extraordinary
circumstances” that could nevertheless render the IJ’s decision an abuse of discretion.
Petitioner’s due process claim, like that presented in Khan, “merely recasts his
abuse-of-discretion argument in constitutional terms and can be denied for the reason[]
already stated.” Id. at 236.
Accordingly, the petition for review will be denied.

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