Sejid Smriko v. Attorney General of the United States

*The Honorable Alan D. Lourie, Circuit Judge for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 05-5346
SEJID SMRIKO,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA No. A71-685-464)
Immigration Judge: Nicole Kim
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 15, 2007
Before: FUENTES, GREENBERG, and LOURIE,* Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 30, 2007)
OPINION OF THE COURT

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FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Sejid Smriko petitions for review of his order of removal. Because the legal issue
presented on appeal was resolved by a prior panel of this Court, we will deny the petition.
I.
Sejid Smriko is a native and citizen of Bosnia-Hergezovina who was admitted to
the United States in 1994 as a refugee. Smriko was later granted status as a lawful
permanent resident (“LPR”), but the Attorney General never formally terminated
Smriko’s refugee status. Between 1996 and 1999, Smriko was convicted three times of
retail theft offenses, and the government initiated removal proceedings against him.
Before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), Smriko challenged the initiation of removal
proceedings, asserting that his status as refugee, which had never been revoked, insulated
him from removal. The IJ rejected this argument and ordered Smriko removed; the Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed without opinion.
In Smriko’s first appeal to this Court, we concluded that Smriko had presented the
BIA with “novel and substantial” legal issues of statutory interpretation that the BIA
should have addressed. See Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2004).
Because it had not, but had instead employed its streamlining procedures, we remanded
for the BIA to interpret the immigration statutes relevant to Smriko’s contention. On
remand, the BIA issued an opinion concluding that a refugee who has adjusted status to
LPR can be placed in removal proceedings, even though his refugee status was never

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formally terminated. See In re Sejid Smriko, 23 I & N Dec. 836 (BIA 2005).
In this appeal, Smriko challenges the BIA’s decision in Smriko, claiming it to be
an unreasonable interpretation of the relevant immigration statutes. Since briefs were
filed, however, this Court decided Romanishyn v. Attorney General, 455 F.3d 175 (3d
Cir. 2006), which resolved the issue presented here. In Romanishyn, we ruled that
Smriko was a “correct and reasonable” interpretation by the BIA, and is thereby entitled
to deference by this Court. 455 F.3d at 185. Smriko’s attorney laudably brought
Romanishyn to the attention of the panel, and recognized that it binds our resolution of
this case. See Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 9.1 (“It is the tradition of this
court that the holding of a panel in a precedential opinion is binding on subsequent
panels.”).
Accordingly, Smirko’s petition for review of the BIA’s decision must be denied.

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