Janet Spencer v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY On Appeal from the United States District Court for…

1
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-3155
JANET SPENCER,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 02-cv-00957)
District Judge: Honorable Alan N. Bloch
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 16, 2004
Before: Sloviter, Rendell and Aldisert, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: January 22, 2004)
OPINION OF THE COURT

-- 1 of 5 --

2
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
The question for decision in this appeal by Janet Spencer from adverse summary
judgment in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
requires us to decide whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision
that Spencer was capable of performing light work, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and was
therefore not entitled to supplemental security income benefits under Subchapter XVI of
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. Because we are writing for the parties
who are familiar with the facts and the proceedings in the Social Security Administration
and the district court we will confine our discussion to the basic legal precepts.
I.
“The Social Security Act defines disability in terms of the effect a physical or
mental impairment has on a person’s ability to function in the work place.” Heckler v.
Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 459-460 (1983); 42 U.S.C. § 423(c) (2002). Under the Act and
implementing regulations, the claimant bears the burden of establishing disability. Id.;
20 C.F.R. § 416.912 (2003).
To be eligible for benefits, a claimant must demonstrate not only that she has a
medically determinable physical or mental impairment, but that such impairment is so
severe that it prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity that exists in
the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also Campbell, 461 U.S. at 460;
Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1994).

-- 2 of 5 --

3
The term “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”) is defined in the regulations as
the most an individual can still do after considering the physical and/or mental limitations
affecting her ability to perform work related tasks. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945 (2003).
The Commissioner’s findings regarding an individual’s capacity for performing
light work must be supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial
evidence is less than a preponderance of evidence and more than a mere scintilla;
substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but
rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (quotations and citation
omitted). If the evidence can justify a refusal to direct a verdict where the case is before
a jury, there is “substantial evidence.” Olsen v. Schweiker, 703 F.2d 751, 753 (3d Cir.
1983) (citation omitted). “We will not set the Commissioner's decision aside if it is
supported by substantial evidence, even if we would have decided the factual inquiry
differently.” Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
II.
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) considered the examinations Spencer
received by James Richardson, M.D., Patricia A. Simpson, L.S.W., a licensed social
worker, Larry D. Smith, Ph.D., a state agency psychologist, Richard M. Hahn, M.D.,
Michael Niemiec, D.O. and George P. Naum, III, D.O. The ALJ elicited vocational
expert testimony at the administrative hearing. The ALJ asked the vocational expert

-- 3 of 5 --

4
whether work existed in the national economy for a hypothetical person with Spencer’s
age, education and work experience; who had the RFC for light exertional work,
requiring no climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds, no more than occasional stairs,
ramps, or balancing; and only occasional stooping, crouching or crawling; no close
concentration or attention to detail for extended periods of time, no fast paced assembly
line work; and no more than rare changes in the work setting.
The expert testified that the hypothetical person could perform the jobs of library
clerk, general office clerk, kitchen worker and cleaner, which existed in significant
numbers in the local and national economy.
III.
We are satisfied that substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision
that Spencer was capable of performing light work with modifications and was not
disabled.
In deciding that Spencer had the RFC for the light work, the ALJ considered the
opinion of Dr. Hahn that Spencer could perform sedentary work and the opinion of Dr.
Naum that Spencer was disabled. The ALJ appropriately determined, however, that more
weight should be accorded to the objective evidence and assessment of the state agency
position expressed by Dr. Niemiec than to the opinions of consultive examiners, Dr.
Hahn and Dr. Naum. Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that
an ALJ may rely upon a non-examining physician’s opinion when it is consistent with

-- 4 of 5 --

5
the record).
The ALJ did determine that Spencer had a severe mental impairment and included
all of Spencer’s limitations that were supported by the record in his hypothetical
questions to the vocational expert.
We have considered all contentions raised by the parties and conclude that no
further discussion is necessary. The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/ Ruggero J. Aldisert
Circuit Judge
_________

-- 5 of 5 --