Case No: 03-2844 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. Raymond Anglada Leonor

The Honorable J. Clifford Wallace, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth*
Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No: 03-2844
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RAYMOND ANGLADA LEONOR,
Appellant
__________________________
On appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Judge: The Honorable Jerome B. Simandle
District Court No. 03-CR-152
__________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1
June 18, 2004
Before: ALITO, SMITH and WALLACE, Circuit Judges*
(Filed: June 2, 2005)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
_________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
On March 4, 2003, Raymond Leonor pled guilty to a single count information

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Counsel advised Leonor of his right to file an informal brief pursuant to 3d Cir.1
L.A.R. 109.2(a), but Leonor chose not to do so.
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charging him with knowingly and intentionally possessing more than five hundred grams
of cocaine with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(B). At sentencing on June 13, 2003, the District Court determined that
Leonor’s guideline range was 51 to 63 months of incarceration, which was compressed to
60 to 63 months as a result of the mandatory statutory minimum of five years given the
nature of the offense. Although Leonor’s counsel raised the possibility of moving for a
“safety valve” downward adjustment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5), a recent
ruling by this Court foreclosed that possibility. See United States v. Boddie, 318 F.3d 491,
494 (3d Cir. Jan. 28, 2003). The District Court sentenced Leonor to 60 months
imprisonment and a four-year term of supervised release.
After filing a timely notice of appeal, Leonor’s counsel moved to withdraw
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In Anders, the Supreme Court1
held that the “constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process”
necessitates that appellant’s counsel vigorously act as an advocate for the defendant. Id.
at 744. Thus, counsel’s
role as advocate requires that he support his client’s appeal to the best of his
ability. Of course, if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a
conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request
permission to withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a
brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the
appeal.

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The District Court had jurisdiction over this federal criminal offense pursuant to 182
U.S.C. § 3231. We exercise appellate jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
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Id. In United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001), we reiterated that an
Anders brief must demonstrate that counsel has “thoroughly examined the record in
search of appealable issues,” and it must “explain why the issues are frivolous.” Thus,
our inquiry is twofold: (1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the requirements of
Anders; and (2) “whether an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous
issues.” Id. (citing United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also
Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 (explaining that the court must proceed, “after a full examination
of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous”). If review fails to
reveal any non-frivolous issues, the Court “may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and
dismiss the appeal.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
We conclude that counsel fulfilled the requirements of Anders with respect to
Leonor’s conviction. Counsel asserted that there were no deficiencies with regard to2
Leonor’s guilty plea colloquy. Our review of the appended plea agreement and colloquy
verifies that Leonor’s plea complied with both the requirements of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11 and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
Our own independent review of the record reveals, however, that Leonor’s
sentence was imposed before the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker,
125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). At first blush, this suggests that there may be a possibility that

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Leonor might benefit if he were resentenced under an advisory sentencing scheme.
Leonor, however, was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of sixty months, see 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), and a remand for resentencing cannot result in a lighter sentence.
Accordingly, there is no basis for vacating Leonor’s sentence. Indeed, Leonor may have
anticipated as much as he did not respond to this Court’s inquiry regarding the
applicability of Booker.
Accordingly, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and we will affirm
Leonor’s conviction and sentence. We certify that the issues presented in the appeal lack
legal merit and thus do not require the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari with the
Supreme Court. 3d Cir. LAR 109.2(b).

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