Antonio R. Washington v. SUSAN GERLINSKI, Warden On Appeal From the United States District Court For the…

BPS-225 UNREPORTED - NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 02-4235
ANTONIO R. WASHINGTON,
Appellant,
v.
SUSAN GERLINSKI, Warden
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 01-cv-01175)
District Judge: Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
and for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 5, 2003
Before: Barry, Ambro and Becker, Circuit Judges
(Filed: June 24, 2003)
OPINION

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2
PER CURIAM
Appellant Antonio Washington, a federal prisoner incarcerated at the Allenwood Low
Security Correctional Institution at White Deer, Pennsylvania, appeals the order of the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his petition for writ of
habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. According to Washington’s petition, in
1990, he was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of
two counts of possession with intent to distribute less than one gram of cocaine, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841. The sentencing court applied the career offender provision of section
4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines and sentenced Washington to a term of
imprisonment of 262 months. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed the conviction. Washington then filed an unsuccessful motion
to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court.
In June 2002, Washington filed the section 2241 petition at issue in this matter,
alleging that his sentence violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which held
that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. Specifically, Washington asserted that his
sentences are illegal and unconstitutional because the jury determined neither the drug
quantity nor the fact of his prior convictions. In a supplement to his petition, Washington
contended that the small amount of cocaine in his case and the absence of a determination

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of the drug quantity by the jury implicated the sentencing provision of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a);
he claimed that, applying the rule of lenity, he should have been sentenced under the lesser
penalty of that statute instead of under section 841(b)(1)(C). The District Court summarily
denied the petition, holding that section 2255 did not provide an “inadequate or ineffective”
remedy for Washington such that he could pursue his claims in a section 2241 habeas
petition. Washington appeals.
Because this appeal presents “no substantial question,” we will summarily affirm.
3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. It is well-established that a prisoner’s claims challenging
the legality of his conviction and sentence must ordinarily be raised in a motion under section
2255. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1997). Such claims may not be raised
in a section 2241 petition except where the remedy under section 2255 would be “inadequate
or ineffective.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251. Section 2255 is not
inadequate or ineffective merely because the sentencing court has previously denied relief,
or because a petitioner is unable to meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements for filing a
second or successive section 2255 motion under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996. See id. Indeed, we recently held that section 2255 is not inadequate
or ineffective for individuals to raise Apprendi claims. Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d
117, 120-121 (3d Cir. 2002).
We will affirm the order of the District Court.

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