Dorothy M. Hartman v. Greenwich Walk Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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NO. 02-4067
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DOROTHY M. HARTMAN,
Appellant
v.
GREENWICH WALK HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC.;
JOHN D’ANGELO; DENNIS MILSTEIN;
ONOLFI ELECTRIC CO; ROBERT O’GORMAN
________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 99-cv-04685)
District Judge: Honorable Marvin Katz
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 24, 2003
Before: ALITO, FUENTES and BECKER,
Circuit Judges
(Filed August 4, 2003)
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OPINION
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BECKER, Circuit Judge.
Dorothy M. Hartman appeals from the District Court’s order granting summary

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1We review the district court’s grant of summary judgement de novo, applying the
same standards as did the district court. See Nelson v. Upsala College, 51 F.3d 383, 385
(3d Cir. 1995).
2Under Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), where the non-moving party
bears the burden of proof on a particular issue, the party seeking summary judgment may
discharge its initial burden by “pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of
evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Id. at 325.
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judgment to the defendants in this action alleging discrimination in violation of The Fair
Housing Act and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1982. Hartman, an African-American, owns a unit
in the Greenwich Walk Condominium in Philadelphia. Hartman filed a complaint in the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Greenwich Walk
Homeowners’ Association, and against John D’Angelo and Dennis Milstein in their
respective capacities as president and vice-president of the Association. Hartman alleges
that the defendants discriminated against her based on race or color. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 We will affirm because a review of Hartman’s sworn
testimony reveals that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the defendants
have shown that there is an absence of evidence to support Hartman’s claims.2
Hartman claims in her deposition that she was subject to a campaign of racial
discrimination in the form of racial slurs and vandalism. She submits that the defendants
violated Sections 1981 and 1982 by tolerating a racially discriminatory environment in
the condominium. Specifically, she claims that trash was thrown in front of the building
and that doughnuts and eggs were thrown at her apartment. Similarly, she believes that
her downstairs neighbors conspired with the defendants to place pornographic material

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outside her unit entrance. She claims that these acts were racially motivated and that the
defendants were responsible. However, she admitted not knowing who committed these
acts.
Hartman also testified that a neighbor told her that D’Angelo had graffiti with the
word “Niggers” removed from the wall outside the building. However, she admits never
to have seen this graffiti. Hartman also complains that other graffiti found on South
Street, outside her apartment building, is directed personally at her and is part of
defendants’ campaign to racially discriminate against her. She feels the defendants are
responsible, but she admits not knowing who wrote the graffiti.
Hartman relies on Bradley v. Carydale, 707 F. Supp 217 (E.D. Va. 1989), where
the court held that building managers’ and owners’ failure to investigate a tenant’s
complaint of racial harassment comes within the explicit terms of §§ 1981 and 1982.
Hartman’s reliance on Bradley is, however, misplaced. In Bradley, another tenant had
repeatedly verbally abused and physically threatened the plaintiff and her friends. In
contrast, there is no indication in this case that any of the tenants or owners in the
Greenwich Walk ever made any racial slurs or committed any acts of vandalism directed
at Hartman.
The record reveals that Hartman never, either directly or indirectly, linked any of
the defendants or any of the Association’s members in the making of racial slurs,
committing the alleged acts of vandalism, or encouraging members of the association to

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engage in discriminatory conduct. Furthermore, there is no showing that any of the acts
alleged, by whomever committed, were directed towards Hartman.
Hartman also submits that as part of the campaign against her the defendants have
delayed in providing her with maintenance and services in violation of the Fair Housing
Act. Specifically, she claims that the defendants have delayed in fixing the roof, changing
a light bulb in the common area hallway, and repairing a piece of wood trim in the
common hallway area. Additionally, Hartman claims that they have neglected to water
two trees outside of her building. However, Hartman once again fails to provide any
evidence showing that the time and the manner in which the association handled these
repairs is attributable to racial discrimination or that it has a discriminatory effect.
Finally, Hartman claims that the Association’s policy of requiring owners to obtain
permission to seek a variance has a discriminatory effect. Hartman sought permission to
operate a business in her home. The defendants refused to grant her permission to seek a
variance to operate her home-based business. Hartman believes this refusal constitutes
disparate treatment because D’Angelo, a white male, maintains his law practice in one of
the units in the condominium. In Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1025, the
Seventh Circuit used a four factor analysis in determining whether conduct has a
discriminatory effect in violation of the Fair Housing Act. The four factors are:
(1) how strong is the plaintiff’s showing of discriminatory effect; (2) is
there some evidence of discriminatory intent, though not enough to satisfy

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the constitutional standard of Washington v. Davis [429 U.S. 229 (1976)];
(3) what is the defendant’s interest in taking the action complained of; and
(4) does the plaintiff seek to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide
housing for members of minority groups or merely to restrain the defendant
from interfering with individual property owners who wish to provide such
housing.
Id. at 1290. We will follow these factors here, but conclude that the Association’s
policy of forcing owners to obtain permission to seek a variance does not violate the Fair
Housing Act.
First, Hartman has failed to show that this requirement perpetuates segregation or
that it has a greater adverse impact on one racial group than on another. Therefore, the
showing of discriminatory effect in this case is extremely weak. Second, Hartman has
failed to show any evidence of discriminatory intent. Third, the defendants have provided
a reason for the policy, i.e., preventing increased foot traffic of the general public in a
residential unit. All Hartman has shown is that D’Angelo, the president of the
Association, has his law practice in one of the units at the Greenwich Walk. However,
Hartman and D’Angelo are not similarly situated. D’Angelo’s building has no occupants
other than D’Angelo and his wife, whereas Hartman lives in a building in which there are
three other units. Naturally, the board of directors would be more reluctant to allow an
owner to run a business in a residential building where other people live.
The fourth factor, which examines the relief the plaintiff seeks, arguably favors
Hartman. Hartman is not seeking to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide
housing. She merely seeks to restrain the defendant from interfering with what she

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considers to be her property rights. However, since the other three factors favor the
defendants, this factor alone is insufficient to establish a violation of the Fair Housing
Act.
In conclusion, the defendants have met their initial Celotex burden of production
by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.
See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Hartman, on the other hand, has failed to introduce any
material with specific facts showing a need for trial. See id. at 324; see also FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(e). In the absence of any evidence supporting the claim of racial discrimination, the
defendants are entitled to summary judgment. The judgment of the District Court will be
affirmed.

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TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing Opinion.
BY THE COURT:
_/s/ Edward R. Becker
Circuit Judge

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