United States of America v. Shaunte Blakely

*Sitting by designation: Cynthia H. Hall, Circuit Judge, U.S.C.A., Ninth Circuit.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 02-2783
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SHAUNTE BLAKELY,
Appellant
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(Dist. Court No. 01-CR-00518)
District Court Judge: Joel A. Pisano
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 16, 2003
Before: ALITO, ROTH, HALL,* Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: July 18, 2003)
OPINION OF THE COURT

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PER CURIAM:
In this direct criminal appeal, Shaunte Blakely, argues that he was deprived of the
effective assistance of counsel in proceedings before the District Court. As a general
course, we do not review such claims on direct appeal. United States v. Haywood, 155
F.3d 674, 678 (3d Cir. 1998). On occasion, exception is made where “the record is
sufficient to allow a determination of ineffective assistance of counsel.” United States v.
Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991).
In order to show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the
two-part standard enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, the
defendant must show that, considering the facts of the case, his counsel’s challenged
actions were unreasonable, id. at 690, and, therefore, did not fall “within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-
57 (1985) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). We review a
defendant’s claim under the “strong presumption that the counsel’s conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be
considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Second, the defendant must
show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s conduct in that there is a “reasonable
probability” that deficient assistance of counsel affected the outcome of the proceeding at
issue. Id. at 694-95.

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The record now before us is not sufficiently developed to review Blakely’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim at this time. First, the record is inadequate for the
purpose of determining whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. Neither counsel nor
the defendant have testified under oath concerning the reasons for the counsel’s decision
to forego an evidentiary hearing on the substance-identification issue. Second, the record
is insufficient for the purpose of determining whether counsel’s conduct prejudiced the
outcome of the sentencing proceeding. Government witnesses, including a DEA chemist,
were present at the defendant’s sentencing hearing and were prepared to testify as to the
nature of the substance at issue; however, as defense counsel revoked his client’s
objection to the substance-identification issue before these witnesses were presented, the
record does not document the content of their intended testimony. Without a fully
developed record as to the nature of the government witnesses’ intended testimony and
accompanying evidence, we cannot evaluate the defendant’s claim that his counsel’s
conduct prejudiced the outcome of the District Court proceedings.
We affirm the District Court’s judgment of sentence, without prejudice to the
raising of this ineffectiveness claim in a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255, as the
record is insufficient to fit the claim within the narrow exception to the general rule of
Haywood, 155 F.3d at 678, as enunciated in Headley, 923 F.2d at 1083, that a claim of
ineffective assistance is properly raised in a collateral proceeding.

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