Tommie L. Rios v. JOANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY Pursuant to F.R.A.P.43 c

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 02-1869
TOMMIE L. RIOS,
Appellant
v.
*JOANNE B. BARNHART,
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY
*(Pursuant to F.R.A.P.43(c))
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 01-cv-00754)
District Judge: Honorable Alan N. Bloch
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 4, 2003
Before: SLOVITER, RENDELL and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: February 4, 2003)
OPINION OF THE COURT
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Tommie Lou Rios appeals from the District Court’s order entered on January 22,
2002, upholding the Social Security Administration’s determination of her onset date of

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disability benefits. We will affirm.
Tommie Lou Rios, a college graduate with experience as an accountant and financial
consultant, suffers from a number of ailments, including the serious residual effects of an
injury to her right index finger, arthritis in her right knee, high blood pressure, heart
problems, mild dementia, and a depressive disorder. In 1995, Rios filed an application with
the Social Security Administration for disability benefits, alleging a disability onset date of
July 23, 1994. After a hearing, the ALJ denied Rios’s application, finding that Rios was not
disabled during the relevant time period. Rios sought review of the decision in the District
Court, an action that was ultimately remanded back to the Commissioner because the tape
recording of the administrative hearing could not be located for transcription. A new
hearing was held on July 10, 2000, at which the ALJ concluded that Rios became disabled
on December 18, 1998, and Rios was awarded benefits as of that date. On December 28,
2000, the decision of the ALJ became the final decision of the Commissioner, and Rios
again sought review in the District Court, challenging the ALJ’s determination of her
disability onset date. On January 22, 2002, the District Court affirmed the decision of the
Commissioner. This timely appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Although
Rios alleges that the ALJ committed a wide variety of errors, we can find no basis upon
which to disturb the ALJ’s conclusions. Our review is limited to ensuring that the ALJ’s
decision was supported by substantial evidence, which is “more than a mere scintilla,” and
“means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

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1 We note that Rios’s brief is scattered with miscellaneous undeveloped allegations
of error, and that to the extent that some of these allege more than that the ALJ’s decision
was unsupported by substantial evidence – for instance, Rios’s apparent claim that the ALJ
misapplied the five-step sequential analysis – we find them without legal merit.
2 The only medical evidence even potentially in conflict with the ALJ’s findings is
the report from Rios’s chiropractor, Dr. Straughn. Rios places heavy emphasis on Dr.
Straughn’s report, which stated that Rios’s “neck, shoulder and arm problem ha[d] denied
her the ability to perform her job” during the period in which he treated her – from August
to November 1995. We have recognized, however, that “a chiropractor’s opinion is not ‘an
acceptable medical source’ entitled to controlling weight.” Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d
358, 361 (3d Cir. 1999). Instead, a chiropractor’s opinion may be considered by the ALJ
“insofar as it is deemed relevant to assessing a claimant’s disability.” Hartranft, 181 F.3d at
361; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(e)(3). Here, although Dr. Straughn opined that Rios
could not perform her job, his findings of her specific limitations – for instance, that she
could not sit for more than six hours at a time, or lift more than ten pounds occasionally –
were not inconsistent with the ALJ’s conclusion that Rios had the residual functional
capacity to perform work not requiring exertion above the light level. Moreover, Dr.
Straughn’s diagnosis is unsupported by any clinical medical evidence and is generally
inconsistent with other evidence in the record. Thus, the ALJ did not err in according little
weight to Dr. Straughn’s report.
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conclusion.”1 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Burns v. Barnhart,
312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002); Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001).
Rios has continually maintained that the onset date of her disability was in July of
1994. That claim was rejected in both hearings before the ALJ, and there is substantial
evidence in the record that supports the ALJ’s conclusions. There is no persuasive
evidence – medical or otherwise – suggesting that Rios’s various ailments prevented her
from working in her previous capacity prior to the onset date established by the ALJ.2
Rios’s previous work as an accountant and financial consultant was relatively undemanding
physically, and the medical evidence provides no indication that her physical impairments
were so severe as to prevent her from performing that work. Similarly, there is no medical

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evidence to suggest that Rios’s mental impairments were disabling prior to the onset date
established by the ALJ, and it in fact appears that Rios concedes the propriety of the ALJ’s
findings on that score. In short, the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly, the order of the District Court will be AFFIRMED.
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TO THE CLERK OF COURT:
Please file the foregoing not precedential opinion.
/s/ Marjorie O. Rendell
Circuit Judge

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