Angel Santiago Diaz v. Commissioner of Social Security on Appeal From the United States District Court for…

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 01-4278
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ANGEL SANTIAGO DIAZ
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. No. 00-cv-01422)
District Judge: Nicholas H. Politan
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 7, 2002
BEFORE: NYGAARD, BARRY, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed June 12, 2002)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
Angel Santiago Diaz seeks review of the District Court’s determination that the
Administrative Law Judge’s ("ALJ") ruling was supported by substantial evidence when
he found that Diaz was not disabled in accordance with the Social Security Act. Diaz has
not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 31, 1994, the date on which he
alleges he became disabled due to back pain and mental impairment.
Our role as a reviewing court is limited to determining whether the
Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, which is "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quotation and citation omitted); see also
42 U.S.C. 405(g), 1383(c)(3). We are bound by the ALJ’s findings of fact if they are
supported by substantial evidence in the record. Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427
(3d Cir. 1999).
Diaz challenges the ALJ’s decision on at least five grounds. First, Diaz contends
that the ALJ failed to engage in a pain analysis. Second, Diaz argues that the ALJ
improperly disregarded the opinion evidence of the Sall/Myers organization. Third, Diaz
disputes the completeness of the ALJ’s written decision. Fourth, Diaz argues that the ALJ
dismissed all of his psychiatric evidence "on a whim." Finally, Diaz contends that the
ALJ’s decision that he is capable of light work is not supported by any objective analysis
of the evidence. We have carefully considered Diaz’s arguments and find that they lack
merit.

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First, when considering a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain, an ALJ must
engage in a two-step analysis. First, an ALJ must determine if the alleged disabling pain
could reasonably result from the medically determinable impairment. 20 C.F.R.
404.1529(b). Second, an ALJ must consider the intensity and persistence of the
claimant’s disabling pain, and the extent to which it affects his ability to work. 20 C.F.R.
404.1529(c)(1). In doing so, an ALJ must consider all of the available evidence
including any factors relevant to the claimant’s symptoms. 20 C.F.R. 404.1529(c). In
this case, while the ALJ made no specific finding concerning the first prong of the "pain
analysis," the ALJ’s decision concerning the second prong is sufficient to support the
ALJ’s final decision. See Ketcher v. Apfel, 68 F. Supp. 2d 629, 651 (D. Md. 1999) ("a
lack of an explicit finding at the first step of the required pain analysis does not constitut
reversible error if the ALJ cites to substantial evidence to support his overall finding on
his subjective complaint of pain") (citing Mickles v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 918, 920-21 (4th
Cir. 1994)). Thus, the ALJ properly evaluated the claimant’s subjective allegations of
pain, and his determination that Diaz’s testimony was not credible was based on
substantial evidence.
Second, it is within the discretion of the ALJ to accord less weight to the report
prepared by the Sall/Myers Medical Associates, an organization that specializes in
workers compensation ratings, liability evaluations, and treatment, than to other medical
reports. See Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1185 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992). Third, while
the ALJ’s written decision lacks a detailed analysis of each piece of evidence, we find the
decision sufficient to support the ALJ’s final conclusion that Diaz is not disabled. Fourth,
the ALJ’s decision to dismiss Diaz’s psychiatric evidence appropriately states the
governing standards for mental impairments, and his conclusion that Diaz does not have a
severe impairment involving any mental disorder is supported by substantial evidence.
See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520a. Finally, the ALJ’s conclusion that Diaz is capable of
performing light work is also supported by substantial evidence. In particular, the
evidence demonstrates that Diaz testified that he can walk several blocks, stand for thirty
to forty-five minutes, sit for fifteen to twenty minutes, and lift up to ten pounds.
In sum, we find that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and
we therefore affirm.
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TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/ Frank Magill
United States Circuit Judg

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