Richard Colletti v. N.j. Transit Corporation, body corporate of the State of New Jersey On Appeal From…

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 01-3581
_________________
RICHARD COLLETTI, Appellant
v.
N.J. TRANSIT CORPORATION,
body corporate of the State of New Jersey
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 00-cv-05793)
District Judge: Honorable John C. Lifland
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 20, 2002
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, GREENBERG, Circuit Judge,
and BARZILAY, Judge, U.S. Court of International Trade.
(Filed: July 31, 2002)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
BARZILAY, Judge, U.S. Court of International Trade.
Richard Colletti ("Colletti") appeals from a decision of the District Court granting
defendant N.J. Transit Corporation’s motion to dismiss his complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The District Court held that Colletti’s claim seeking judicial review of
the Special Board of Adjustment’s (the "Board") decision under the Railway Labor Act
("RLA") was untimely because his claim was commenced after the two year statute of
limitation. See 45 U.S.C. 153 First (r) (1993). Additionally, the District Court found
that Colletti’s due process claim raised pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1993) was not a
separate claim cognizable under the Railway Labor Act. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm the District Court’s decision.
I.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291 (2002). The Court has
plenary review of a District Court order granting dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). See Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 315 (3d. Cir. 1997). When the
dismissal is based on a finding that the claim was time barred we must determine if "the
time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been
brought within the statute of limitations." Bethel v. Jendoco Constr. Corp., 570 F.2d
1168, 1174 (3d Cir. 1978) (emphasis added) (quoting Hanna v. United States Veterans’
Administration Hospital, 514 F.2d 1092, 1094 (3d Cir. 1975)).
This dispute originated with an incident that occurred over a two day period at the
Matawan, New Jersey, train station between Colletti, then a forty-five year old white
male and Andre DuBose ("DuBose"), an African-American male. Colletti was
employed as a ticket agent for New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc. ("N.J. Transit").
On March 17, 1993, while Dubose was in the waiting room area of the Matawan train
station, Colletti and DuBose became engaged in a verbal confrontation culminating with
DuBose stating that he was going to file a complaint against Colletti that same day.

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Colletti alleges that Dubose returned to the station the next day, March 18, 1993, but left
when he saw a transit police officer speaking with Colletti.
On March 19, 1993, Colletti was arrested on DuBose’s complaint of harassment
and charged with a bias crime. Following the arrest and the report of the incident,
Colletti was suspended without pay by his supervisor. On April 5, 1993, N.J. Transit
held an initial hearing regarding the confrontation; however, neither Colletti nor DuBose
attended. Colletti asserts that he did not attend the hearing based on the advice of his
counsel. A union representative was present at the hearing and objected to the
procedure. At the hearing, two witnesses testified to the incidents. The substance of the
testimony supported DuBose’s version of the events; however, Colletti asserts that the
witness’ testimony corroborating his actions against Mr. Dubose were hearsay because
"only police reports and investigative reports of interviews were offered before the
hearing official." On April 20, 1993, Colletti’s Superintendent entered a discipline
ruling which terminated Colletti’s employment. Colletti then took an internal appeal to
N.J. Transit’s Director of Labor Relations, which was denied. "Colletti then appealed to
the Special Board of Adjustment, No. 975, which consisted of three members, a neutral
member, one member chosen [by] NJ [sic] Transit and one member chosen by Colletti’s
Union." Colletti, No. 00-5793, slip op. at 2. On January 10, 1995, the Board denied
Colletti’s appeal.
On April 14, 1994, while Colletti’s appeal was pending, DuBose filed a civil suit
against Colletti and N.J. Transit in New Jersey Superior Court alleging various tort
claims. Colletti cross-claimed against N.J. Transit claiming in Count I that N.J. Transit
wrongfully terminated his employment and in Count II that N.J. Transit failed to defend
him. The superior court severed DuBose’s claims from Colletti’s cross-claims against
N.J. Transit. DuBose’s civil case against Colletti and N.J. Transit was tried by a jury and
resulted in a verdict of no cause of action. "Apparently, the jury concluded that Colletti
had been negligent in his conduct toward DuBose, but also concluded that there were no
damages resulting therefrom." "Thereafter, NJ Transit filed a motion to dismiss
Colletti’s cross-claims and Colletti filed a cross-motion for default against NJ Transit for
failing to file an answer to the cross-claims." Colletti, No. 00-5793, slip op. at 2-3. On
November 21, 1997, a default judgment was entered against N.J. Transit; however, N.J.
Transit filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. On April 17, 1998, the superior
court vacated the default judgment and N.J. Transit renewed its motion for dismissal or,
in the alternative, summary judgment. Id. On August 12, 1998, the superior court
granted partial summary judgment in favor of N.J. Transit dismissing all claims except
those concerning Colletti’s claim of reverse racial discrimination, specifically stating that
all other claims fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts pursuant to
RLA, 45 U.S.C. 141. N.J. Transit then filed for summary judgment on the racial
discrimination claims and Colletti filed a cross-motion for reconsideration. Both motions
were argued on February 19, 1999. On April 9, 1999, the superior court granted N.J.
Transit summary judgment and dismissed Colletti’s racial discrimination claims. Colletti
then appealed and on June 7, 2000, the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
affirmed the lower court’s decision. On October 31, 2000, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey denied Colletti’s petition for certification.
On November 24, 2000, Colletti filed a complaint in Federal District Court
seeking judicial review of the Board’s decision to terminate his employment, claiming
that N.J. Transit had violated his civil rights as guaranteed under 42 U.S.C. 1983. On
June 11, 2001, N.J. Transit moved to dismiss pursuant to L. Civ. R. 7.1 and Appendix N
of the Local Civil Rules claiming that Colletti’s appeal from the Board’s decision was
time barred and that his due process claims were not cognizable under the RLA. On
August 23, 2001, the District Court agreed and held that Colletti’s claim seeking judicial
review of the Board’s decision was untimely and that his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim was not
cognizable under the District Court’s federal question jurisdiction because the claim was
beyond "the extremely narrow framework of review on appeal from the Special Board of
Adjustment’s decision under the RLA." Colletti, No. 00-5793, slip op. at 8.
II.
Colletti argues that his federal court action was not untimely because the statute of
limitations period under the RLA was tolled pending final resolution of the state court
matters. Colletti asserts "[t]he District Court’s decision is erroneous by its failure to
recognize the several unique procedural events that occurred in this case, beyond the

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control of Mr. Colletti, that support equitable tolling of not only the RLA limitations
period, but the applicable two year limitations period in maintaining a 42 U.S.C. 1983
action." Colletti also claims that the District Court erred in finding that Colletti’s claims
of due process violations brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 were preempted by the
RLA. Additionally, Colletti argues that an alleged violation of a public employee’s due
process rights affords a fourth ground for judicial review of RLA Adjustment Board
decisions.
In determining whether Colletti’s action was untimely, we first examine the
language of 45 U.S.C. 153. Section 153 First (q) states in pertinent part:
If any employee . . . is aggrieved by the failure of any division of the
Adjustment Board to make an award in a dispute referred to it, or is
aggrieved by any of the terms of an award . . . then such employee . . . may
file in any United States district court in which a petition under paragraph
(p) could be filed, a petition for review of the division’s order.
Section 153 First (r) states "[a]ll actions at law based upon the provisions of this section
shall be begun within two years from the time the cause of action accrues under the
award of the division of the Adjustment Board, and not after." Thus, Colletti had two
years from the time of the Board’s decision to file an appeal of that decision in the
District Court. Since the Board’s decision was made on January 10, 1995, and Colletti
did not file for District Court review of the Board’s decision until November 24, 2000,
he commenced his action almost three years after the two year statute of limitation period
had expired. Therefore, the only possibility for Colletti to avoid the dismissal of his
claims is to have the statute of limitations tolled.
Colletti contends tolling is proper here because he was involved in litigation in the
New Jersey state courts during the time in question. In essence, Colletti asks for this
Court to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling. "Equitable tolling is a doctrine that
permits courts to extend a statute of limitations on a case-by-case basis to prevent
inequity." Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
It is hornbook law that limitations periods are "customarily subject to
’equitable tolling, ’" Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89,
95, 111 S. Ct. 453, 457, 112 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1990), unless tolling would be
"inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute," United States v.
Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48, 118 S. Ct. 1862, 1868, 141 L. Ed. 2d 32 (1998).
Young v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 1036, 1040, 152 L. Ed. 2d 79, 87 (2002).
Some courts "have been strict in their interpretation of this statute of limitations
based on Congress’ express intent to encourage prompt resolution of the railway claims."
Transportation Communications International v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 1993 WL
313584, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 1993), aff’d, 30 F.3d 903 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Gatlin
v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 631 F.2d 551, 555 (8th Cir. 1980) "No circumstances
whatsoever exist for the extension of the limitations period. . . ."; Joint Council Dining
Car Employees v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 157 F.2d 417, 420 (2d. Cir. 1946) ("[A] court
is not justified in finding any exception to, or extension of, this period")).
As the Seventh Circuit explained in Transportation Communications International v.
CSX Transportation, Inc.,:
Finally, we note that the proper test for determining whether to toll a
limitations period is whether tolling, in a given context, is consonant with
the particular legislative scheme. American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414
U.S. 538, 557-58, 94 S. Ct. 756, 768-69, 38 L. Ed. 2d 713 (1974), accord
Joint Council, 157 F.2d at 421. ("The statutory limitation, like the
remainder of the Act, must be construed in an effort to effectuate its
purpose and intent."). Congress, in enacting the RLA, placed the burden of
resolving minor disputes with the Board. Union Pacific R.R. Co. v.
Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94, 99 S. Ct. 399, 402-03, 58 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1978)
(per curiam) ("Congress considered it essential to keep ... ’minor’ disputes
within the Adjustment Board and out of the courts."). "The effectiveness of
the Adjustment Board in fulfilling its task depends on the finality of its
determinations." Id. Given this policy of finality, as well as the absence of

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statutory authority by which the Board may reconsider its awards, we
would be hard-pressed to hold that tolling is consonant with the RLA’s
legislative scheme. Cf. Gatlin, 631 F.2d at 555 (emphasizing the strict
finality of Board decisions under the RLA and the narrow scope of review
given district courts in such cases and stating that no circumstances exist
for extension of the limitations period and that the decision of the Board
must be deemed final).
30 F.3d at 907. This Circuit "[has] exercised caution in using the [equitable tolling]
doctrine" to ensure compliance with Congressionally enacted procedural requirements.
Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
Because Colletti’s claims arose from the review of his employment termination by
the Board, he was required to file for review of the Board’s decision and assert his 42
U.S.C. 1983 claim in accordance with the two year time limit mandated by 45 U.S.C.
153 First (r). Colletti’s argument for tolling the two year limitation is flawed. We need
not decide whether the Seventh Circuit is correct in concluding that equitable tolling is
not allowed under the RLA, for our jurisprudence is clear that even if tolling is allowed,
it ought to be applied with "caution." Seitzinger, 165 F.3d at 240. At all events,
Colletti’s failure to comply with 45 U.S.C. 153 First (r) was caused by his own
inattentiveness to the two year filing requirement. As a general rule, courts are far less
inclined to apply equitable tolling in instances where a plaintiff mistakenly failed to
assert his rights.
In other cases, we have explained that equitable tolling "may be appropria
if (1) the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff, (2) if the plaintiff has
’in some extraordinary way’ been prevented from asserting his rights, or (3)
if the plaintiff has timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the wrong
forum." United States v. Midgley, 142 F.3d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 1998)
(quoting Kocian v. Getty Refining & Mktg. Co., 707 F.2d 748, 753 (3d Cir.
1983)). In Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236 (3d Cir.
1999), we recently held that "equitable tolling may be appropriate [in a
Title VII action] when a claimant received inadequate notice of her right to
file suit, where a motion for appointment of counsel is pending, or where
the court has misled the plaintiff into believing that she had done
everything required of her." Id. at 240 (citing Baldwin County Welcome
Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S.147, 151, 104 S. Ct. 1723, 80 L. Ed. 2d 196
(1984)). In the final analysis, however, "a statute of limitations should be
tolled only in the rare situation where equitable tolling is demanded by
sound legal principles as well as the interests of justice." Midgley, 142 F.3d
at 179 (quotations marks and citation omitted); see also Seitzinger, 165
F.3d at 239 ("The law is clear that courts must be sparing in their use of
equitable tolling.").
Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir.1999).
Colletti asserts that equitable tolling is warranted because he reasonably believed
that the claims arising out of the Board’s decision were preserved by the cross-claims he
made during the state proceedings. Colletti however, was on notice that his claims fell
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. As the District Court stated,
even if the Court did have the power to toll the running of the statute of
limitations based on Colletti’s state court filing, Colletti’s claims would
still be considered untimely. The state court unequivocally put Colletti on
notice that his RLA claims were exclusively within the federal court’s
jurisdiction on August 12, 1998. If this Court were to apply equitable
tolling, Colletti would have had until August 12, 2000 at the latest to re-file
his RLA claims in federal court. Colletti filed his complaint with this court
on November 24, 2000, well over two years after the latest possible filing
date.
Colletti, No. 00-5793, slip op. at 7.

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Thus, Colletti knew he was mistaken to rely on state court adjudication for the
resolution of claims clearly within the purview of the RLA and its statutory mandated
jurisdictional requirements. We conclude that the time limitation set forth in 45 U.S.C.
153 First (r) should not be equitably tolled in this instance and, therefore, Colletti’s
action was time barred. Since we find Colletti’s action is time barred, we need not and
do
not address the remainder of his claims.
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing Opinion.
BY THE COURT:
/s/Judith M. Barzilay
Judge, U.S. Court of International Trad

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