Joanne Bronga v. ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, LARRY G. MASSANARI {Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 43 c }

01-3364Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit14 mar 2002

Testo completo

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
NO. 01-3364
__________
JOANNE BRONGA,
Appellant
v.
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
*LARRY G. MASSANARI
*{Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 43(c)}
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 00-cv-3580)
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 8, 2002
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, and
ALITO and RENDELL, Circuit Judges,
(Filed March 14, 2002 )
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Joanne Bronga appeals from the District Court’s order upholding the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Bronga’s claims for Disability Insurance
Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. The Administrative Law Judge
("ALJ") determined that Bronga was "not disabled" under the Act, and therefore not
entitled to Disability Insurance Benefits. The ALJ’s determination was affirmed by the
Appeals Counsel. The District Court’s subsequent affirmance is now before us on
appeal. We will also affirm.
The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
405(g), and we have jurisdiction on appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291.
Our standard of review requires us to determine whether the ALJ’s determination
was based on "substantial evidence." 42 U.S.C. 405(g). Substantial evidence requires
"more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971) (citation omitted). As long as the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence, we must not conduct our own independent evaluation of the
evidence. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001).
Bronga alleges that she is disabled due to abdominal pain, and disorders of the
urinary tract and female reproductive system. After considering evidence of Bronga’s
functional capacity, the ALJ acknowledged that her physical condition did limit her

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ability to do certain light work. Nonetheless, the ALJ concluded that she was still able to
do her past relevant work as a computer systems hardware analyst, because it was a
sedentary position.
The District Court carefully reviewed the evidence in this case, as well as the
ALJ’s opinion, and disposed of each of Bronga’s arguments in a detailed and thoughtful
manner. We agree with the District Court that the ALJ properly concluded at step four of
the five-step analysis that Bronga was not disabled because she is able to do her "past
relevant work." Furthermore, the District Court correctly found that there is substantial
evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s determination of Bronga’s residual
functional capacity, as well as its finding that her subjective complaints were not fully
credible. We likewise agree with the District Court that the ALJ properly considered the
treating physician’s findings.
Accordingly, we will AFFIRM.
___________________________
Please file the foregoing Not Precedential Opinion.
/s/ Marjorie O. Rendell_
Circuit Judge

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