United States of America v. Robert Gerard Schettler

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 01-2331
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ROBERT GERARD SCHETTLER,
Appellant.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 00-31 Erie)
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
Argued: January 15, 2002
BEFORE: SCIRICA, GREENBERG, and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges
(Filed: January 29, 2002)
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
Thomas W. Patton, Esq. (ARGUED)
Office of Federal Public Defender
1001 State Street
1111 Renaissance Centre
Erie, PA 16501
Attorney for Appellant
Thomas M. Gannon, Esq. (ARGUED)
United States Department of Justice
Criminal Division, Appellate Section
Room 6206
10th & Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Patrick Henry Building
Washington, DC 20530
Marshall J. Piccinini, Esq.
Office of United States Attorney
100 State Street
Suite 302
Erie, PA 16507
Bonnie R. Schlueter, Esq.
Office of United States Attorney

-- 1 of 3 --

633 United States Post Office & Courthouse
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Attorney’s for Appellee
BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted Robert Gerard Schettler of conspiring to distribute and to
possess with intent to distribute in excess of 500 grams of powder cocaine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. 846. The district court sentenced Schettler to a custodial term of eighty-two
months followed by a four-year term of supervised release. On this appeal, Schettler
claims that his conviction should be reversed because the trial court failed to suppress
evidence and statements tainted by a warrantless search of Schettler’s home. After a
careful review of this matter, we are convinced that there was no error in denying
Schettler’s motion to suppress.
Review of a district court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress evidence is
plenary. See United States v. Williams, 3 F.3d 69, 71 (3d Cir. 1993). Review of a district
court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress, including a subsidiary finding that a
defendant’s consent to search was voluntary, is for clear error. See United States v. Kim,
27 F.3d 947, 954-55 (3d Cir. 1994).
At the suppression hearing on January 16, 2001, the district court correctly
concluded that Schettler was illegally seized when postal inspectors directed him to open
the front door of his home. The court noted that no reasonable person would have
believed that he was free to remain in the house. Having found that Schettler was
illegally seized, the district court was obligated to analyze the subsequent statements and
evidence under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590, 603-04 (1975) (mandating that a district court deciding whether evidence obtained
following a Fourth Amendment violation is admissible must consider "[t]he temporal
proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, . . .
and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.") (citations
omitted).
The district court denied Schettler’s motion to suppress. The court concluded
that Schettler voluntarily invited the postal officers into his kitchen and the officers
minimized the coerciveness of the setting by holstering their weapons and limiting the
number of the officers present in the kitchen. The court also explained that Schettler had
been given his Miranda rights and signed various consent forms. The court considered
Schettler’s age and educational background and found that he was an educated, middle-
aged man. In the final analysis, the court declared "that any technical seizure which may
have occurred on the porch is of no moment insofar as the suppression issues involved in
this motion are concerned."
Schettler contends that the district court failed to follow the law of Brown by not
discussing the temporal proximity of the search or the statements to the illegal seizure,
not mentioning the intervening circumstances, and not considering the purpose or
flagrancy of the illegal seizure.
We conclude that the district court did follow the basic parameters of Brown v.
Illinois. Schettler executed the consent forms while sitting at his kitchen table in a
relatively calm, relaxed atmosphere. The postal inspectors had put their weapons away
and the number of officers in the kitchen was limited. Schettler was allowed to go to the
bathroom, he was over fifty years old, he had some college education, and he was
employed. The encounter was not unduly prolonged and the officers engaged in no
physical or psychological pressure or coercion.
We reject Schettler’s contention that the district court rested its ruling entirely on
the fact that Schettler was given his Miranda warnings and was informed that he did not
have to consent to a search. It is true that Brown unequivocally states that giving
Miranda warnings does not, by itself, purge the taint of the illegal seizure. Id. at 602
(explaining that if Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of an
unconstitutional arrest, the effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted).
In this case, however, the court also considered Schettler’s age, educational background,
the lack of coercion on the part of the officers, and the postal inspector’s explanation of
the consent forms. Further, consideration of the Brown factors was unnecessary to

-- 2 of 3 --

determine that the taint of the illegal seizure had been purged.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction and sentence entered
against Schettler will be affirmed.
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing memorandum opinion.
/s/Myron H. Bright
Circuit Judg

-- 3 of 3 --