Raymond T. Pryer v. C.o. 3 Slavic; C.o. 1 Cook; C.o. 1 D. Bursey

UNREPORTED – NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 00-3297
_____________
RAYMOND T. PRYER
v.
C.O. 3 SLAVIC; C.O. 1 COOK; C.O. 1 D. BURSEY,
Appellants
_____________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 92-1461)
District Judge: Honorable Gary L. Lancaster
_____________
Argued
October 26, 2000
Before: MANSMANN, ALITO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
_____________
ORDER AMENDING OPINION
_____________
The opinion filed on May 30, 2001 is amended as follows:
Page 18, line 2 – delete the word “effectively”;
Page 18, insert the following paragraphs before the paragraph beginning
“Rather than reversing . . . .

-- 1 of 3 --

1 That the District Court’s decision was predicated on the absence of error
affecting the liability verdict is further “apparent from the record” through the Court’s
express reliance on Wheatley v. Beetar, 637 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1980), in which the
Second Circuit upheld a new trial limited to damages because the defendant had received
a fair trial on the issue of liability.
2 Where a trial court articulates its reasons for an exercise of discretion, it need not
anticipate and address every possible concern in order to be entitled to deference. Here,
for example, the District Court cannot reasonably be faulted for failing to address the
possibility that the damages verdict was the result of compromise, as that suggestion was
never advanced by the Defendants, but instead originated with the majority in this
appeal.
2
The majority seeks to justify its departure from our
established standard of review, and its consequent substitution
of its discretion for that of the trial judge, by invoking two
purported exceptions: First, the majority asserts that no
deference is due “where a trial court fails to explain its
grounds for exercising discretion, and its reasons for doing so
are not otherwise apparent from the record”. Supra at 7 n.4.
However, the District Court’s reasons for limiting the second
trial to damages are made abundantly clear in its opinion: As
the Court explained, “a new trial is appropriate on the issue of
damages because the court failed to properly instruct the jury
on damages” (by, inter alia, giving an unwarranted nominal
damages instruction), and because the resulting nominal
damages award was against the weight of the evidence.
Implicit in the Court’s recital of errors in the damages
instructions and award was its recognition that there was no
error in the liability instructions or verdict.1 Ordinarily, the
presence of error limited to a single issue should be
considered reason enough to limit retrial to that issue.
Although the majority may consider the stated reasons
insufficient, it cannot fairly be said that the trial Court
“articulated no rationale”.2
Second, the majority asserts that the District Court’s
grant of a partial retrial “turns on the application of a legal
precept to the evidence”. Supra at 7 n.4. The majority does
not identify what “legal precept” it deems controlling. The
due process and fairness concerns set forth in Gasoline

-- 2 of 3 --

3
Products clearly speaks to discretion, and we (and other
courts) have always considered its application to be an
exercise of discretion, rather than a legal determination. The
majority’s cryptic invocation of the “legal precept” exception,
without identifying a controlling question of law, threatens to
eviscerate the abuse of discretion standard: potentially, every
exercise of discretion may be subjected to plenary review at
the whim of the reviewing court by pointing out that some
“legal precept” is somehow involved. By substituting its
judgment for that of the District Court (in which the
discretion is intended to be reposed) on the basis of such ill-
considered, amorphous exceptions, the majority has
fundamentally altered our standard of review, effectively
overruling sub silentio our decisions in Vizzini and Stanton.
Page 19, line 2 – delete “finding an abuse of discretion by” and substitute
“overriding”
Page 19, line 3 – after Court add “‘s discretion”
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
/s/ Carol Los Mansmann
Circuit Judge
Dated: June 5, 2001

-- 3 of 3 --