Gregory Hartmann v. Brian Chudzik

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________

No. 25-2762
______________

GREGORY HARTMANN; JOHN HAYS; DEWAYNE
BAILEY; BRYANT ISHAQ; HOWARD CHAPMAN;
CHRISTO BELONY; ROBERT EDWARDS, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,
Appellants

v.

HON. BRIAN E. CHUDZIK; HON. EDWIN TOBIN; HON.
MILES BIXLER; HON. ANDREW LEFEVER, in their
official capacities as Magisterial District Judges;
LANCASTER COUNTY; WARDEN OF THE
LANCASTER COUNTY PRISON
______________

Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 5:22-cv-01588)
District Judge: John M. Gallagher
______________

Argued June 30, 2026
______________

2

Before: SHWARTZ, PHIPPS, and RENDELL, Circuit
Judges.

(Filed: July 31, 2026)
______________

David Costigan
Steven Oberlander
Stuart T. Steinberg
Dechert
2929 Arch Street
Cira Center
Philadelphia, PA 19102

Sara J. Rose [ARGUED]
Ariel Shappell
Richard T. Ting
Solomon F. Worlds
American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania
P.O. Box 60173
Philadelphia, PA 19104

Counsel for Appellants

Michael Daley
Megan L. Mallek [ARGUED]
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Administrative Office of
Pennsylvania Courts
1515 Market Street, Suite 1414
Philadelphia, PA 19102

David J. MacMain
Stephen G. Rhoads [ARGUED]

3

MacMain Leinhauser
433 W Market Street, Suite 200
West Chester, PA 19382

Counsel for Appellees

Adeel Bashir
Office of Federal Public Defender
250 N 7
th
Avenue, Suite 600
Phoenix, AZ 85007

Daniella Gordon
McCarter & English
1600 Market Street, Suite 2900
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for National Ass’n of Criminal Defense
Lawyers Amicus

Kiley M. Vebanac
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Appellate
Litigation Section
1251 Waterfront Place
Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Counsel for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Amicus

Matthew P. Cavedon
Cato Institute
1000 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20001

Patrick Maley

4

K&L Gates
One Newark Center, 10
th
Floor
Newark, NJ 07102

Nicholas P. Vari
K&L Gates
210 Sixth Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Counsel for Cato Institute Amicus

James P. Davy
All Rise Trial & Appellate
P.O. Box 15216
Philadelphia, PA 19125

Counsel for Public Defender Ass’n of Pennsylvania
Amicus

Gabriel K. Gillett
Jenner & Block
353 N Clark Street, Suite 4500
Chicago, IL 60654

Counsel for Barry Friedman, Kellen Funk, John
Giammetteo, Helen Hershkoff, David Marcus, Judith
Resnik, Joanna Schwartz, and Fred O. Smith Amici

____________

OPINION
______________

5

SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs were arrested in Lancaster County,
Pennsylvania, and detained in the Lancaster County Prison
(“LCP”) pending trial. They sued Magisterial District Judges
Brian Chudzik, Edwin Tobin, Milex Bixler, and Andrew
Lefever in their official capacities (the “MDJs”), Lancaster
County, and the LCP Warden for violations of their Equal
Protection, Due Process, and Sixth Amendment rights,
claiming that the MDJs set their bail without considering their
ability to pay and without counsel present. The District Court
(1) abstained from reviewing their Equal Protection and Due
Process claims under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
and (2) dismissed their Sixth Amendment claim. For the
following reasons, we will vacate and remand the District
Court’s order abstaining under Younger and affirm its order
dismissing the Sixth Amendment claim.

I
1

A

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 540 entitles
arrestees to “preliminary arraignments.” At those proceedings,
the MDJ must read the charges to the defendant but may not
ask questions about them. Pa. R. Crim. P. 540(F). In addition,
the MDJ must inform the defendant of his right to counsel but

1
Because we are reviewing an order entered under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the factual background is drawn from the
well-pleaded allegations in the First Amended Complaint,
which are accepted as true. Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist.,
452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).

6

does not appoint counsel for the preliminary arraignment itself.
Id. at 540(F)(1). Finally, the MDJ must determine whether the
defendant will be released pending trial, and what, if any, bail
conditions to impose.
2
Id. at 540(F)(3).

In setting bail, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal
Procedure 523 requires the MDJ to “consider all available
information as that information is relevant to the defendant’s
appearance or nonappearance at subsequent proceedings, or
compliance or noncompliance with the conditions of the bail
bond, including information about:”

(1) the nature of the offense
charged and any mitigating or
aggravating factors that may bear
upon the likelihood of conviction
and possible penalty;
(2) the defendant’s employment
status and history, and financial
condition;
(3) the nature of the defendant’s
family relationships;
(4) the length and nature of the
defendant’s residence in the
community, and any past
residences;
(5) the defendant’s age, character,
reputation, mental condition, and

2
Preliminary arraignments are typically held via video,
are not officially recorded or transcribed, and last only a few
minutes.

7

whether addicted to alcohol or
drugs;
(6) if the defendant has previously
been released on bail, whether he
or she appeared as required and
complied with the conditions of
the bail bond;
(7) whether the defendant has any
record of flight to avoid arrest or
prosecution, or of escape or
attempted escape;
(8) the defendant’s prior criminal
record;
(9) any use of false identification;
and
(10) any other factors relevant to
whether the defendant will appear
as required and comply with the
conditions of the bail bond.

Pa. R. Crim. P. 523(A). Lancaster County MDJs typically
apply either a “10%” bail condition that requires the defendant
to pay at least ten percent of the total bail amount, or a
“straight” bail condition that requires the defendant to pay the
entire bail amount.

Defendants who cannot post bail remain incarcerated
but can challenge the initial bail determination at any time,
including during their preliminary hearing, which must be
scheduled within fourteen days of the preliminary arraignment.
Pa. R. Crim. P. 529(a)-(c), 540(G)(1). Preliminary hearings,
however, are often postponed, so defendants who wait until the
preliminary hearing to challenge the bail determination

8

typically remain in custody longer than fourteen days before
review occurs.

B

Plaintiffs were arrested at different times in Lancaster
County in 2022 and 2023, and all appeared before MDJs for
preliminary arraignments without counsel via video from
either LCP or a police station. Plaintiffs allege that, during
each of these preliminary arraignments, the MDJs imposed
cash bail without inquiring into the Rule 523 factors, including
financial status. Plaintiffs remained detained pending trial
because they could not afford to post the bail that had been set.

Plaintiffs initiated this class action, alleging (1)
violations of their right to counsel under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments against the MDJ Defendants and
Lancaster County and (2) Due Process and Equal Protection
violations against the MDJ Defendants and the LCP Warden.
Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the LCP Warden from detaining
individuals on cash bail unless the MDJs inquire into the Rule
523 factors, including ability to pay. Plaintiffs also seek
declaratory relief that Defendants have violated Plaintiffs’
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants moved
to dismiss the claims twice.

The District Court granted Defendants’ first motions to
dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ Sixth Amendment claim, relying
primarily on Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191
(2008). Based on Rothgery, the Court reasoned “the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches at the initiation of
criminal proceedings, which in Pennsylvania is the preliminary
arraignment,” such that Plaintiffs were entitled to counsel at

9

the first critical stage postattachment proceeding, which, in
Pennsylvania, is the preliminary hearing. H.C. v. Chudzik, No.
5:22-cv-01588-JMG, 2023 WL 2745173, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
31, 2023) (“Chudzik I”). Because the Court held that Plaintiffs
were not entitled to counsel at the preliminary arraignments, it
dismissed Plaintiffs’ Sixth Amendment claim.

After denying Defendants’ second motion to dismiss the
remaining claims, the District Court sua sponte ordered
3
the
parties to brief “[w]hether Younger abstention should apply.”
H.C. v. Chudzik, No. 5:22-cv-01588-JMG, 2025 WL 2312324,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2025) (“Chudzik II”). Following
briefing, the District Court abstained under Younger because
(1) “the equitable relief that Plaintiffs demand would
inevitably lead to federal ‘intrusion . . . into the daily conduct
of state criminal proceedings,’ which contravenes the
principles of comity,” and (2) Pennsylvania courts are capable
of addressing “Plaintiffs’ bail challenges, completely obviating
the need for a federal court to hear these claims.” Id. at *12
(quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)).

Plaintiffs appeal.

3
“[A] court may raise Younger abstention sua sponte.”
Altice USA, Inc. v. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 26 F.4th 571, 575
n.2 (3d Cir. 2022).

10

II
4

A
5

We first address the District Court’s abstention under
Younger from reviewing Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and Due
Process claims. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l
Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (explaining that
courts must resolve “threshold grounds for denying audience
to a case on the merits,” such as abstaining under Younger,
prior to “reaching the merits” (citation omitted)). Generally,
“a federal court’s ‘obligation’ to hear and decide a case is
‘virtually unflagging.” Sprint Commc’ns., Inc. v. Jacobs, 571
U.S. 69, 77 (2013) (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)). Federal
courts should decline to exercise jurisdiction
6
under Younger
in deference to ongoing state proceedings “in only a narrow

4
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§
1331 and 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
5
We review orders dismissing actions under Younger
de novo. PDX N., Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Lab. &
Workforce Dev., 978 F.3d 871, 881 n.11 (3d Cir. 2020).
6
When a court abstains under Younger, it is
acknowledging it has subject matter jurisdiction but deciding
specific circumstances support not exercising that jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Weekly v. Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 614–15 (5th Cir.
2000) (“Federal courts do not abstain on Younger grounds
because they lack jurisdiction; rather, Younger abstention
‘reflects a court’s prudential decision not to exercise
jurisdiction which it in fact possesses.’”). Thus, Younger
abstention is not a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

11

range of cases.” ACRA Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki, 748
F.3d 127, 136 (3d Cir. 2014).

That range includes cases in which a plaintiff seeks to
enjoin a state proceeding falling into any of three categories:
(1) state criminal prosecutions, (2) state civil enforcement
proceedings, or (3) state civil proceedings involving orders in
furtherance of the state courts’ judicial function. Id. at 138
(citing Sprint, 571 U.S. at 73). If the relief sought involves a
request to enjoin a case falling within one of those three
categories, then courts consider the so-called Middlesex
factors to determine whether to abstain. PDX N., Inc. v.
Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Lab. & Workforce Dev., 978 F.3d 871,
883 (3d Cir. 2020). These factors are whether: (1) there are
“ongoing judicial proceeding[s]”; (2) those “proceedings
implicate important state interests”; and (3) there is “an
adequate opportunity in the state proceeding to raise [federal]
challenges.” Id. (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v.
Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).

Younger abstention is inappropriate here because
Plaintiffs do not seek to enjoin “state criminal prosecutions.”
7

Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78. Rather, they seek only a declaration that
the MDJ Defendants may not detain, and an injunction against
the LCP Warden prohibiting him from detaining, individuals
on cash bail unless the MDJs inquire into their ability to pay.
Because the requested “injunction [is] not directed at the state
prosecutions [themselves] . . ., but [rather is directed] only at .

7
Plaintiffs do not claim the proceedings here involve
state civil enforcement proceedings or state civil proceedings
involving orders in furtherance of the state courts’ judicial
function.

12

. . an issue[, namely bail,] that could not be raised in defense of
the criminal prosecution,” Younger does not apply. Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975) (holding that Younger
did not apply to a challenge to “the legality of pretrial
detention without a judicial hearing”); see also Stewart v.
Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding Younger
does not bar a Fourth Amendment claim based on a district
attorney’s re-arrest policy where “[t]he issues . . . raised could
not have been raised in defense of [a plaintiff’s] criminal
prosecution, and the injunction sought would not bar his
prosecution”); Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F.2d 1073, 1080
(3d Cir. 1972) (explaining that Younger abstention does not
apply to “injunctive or declaratory relief against state officers
with respect to violations of federal constitutional rights not
amounting to an injunction which will halt or substantially
interfere with a pending prosecution” “[e]ven if a state
prosecution is pending”). Because Plaintiffs’ bail
determinations are ancillary to the merits of their criminal
prosecutions and do not involve defenses to their alleged
crimes, their request that MDJs consider these financial
considerations in reaching bail decisions is not a request to
enjoin ongoing state criminal prosecutions.
8
Gerstein, 420

8
For this reason, two of our sister Courts of Appeals
agree that Younger does not apply to federal court challenges
to state court bail proceedings like the one at issue here. See
Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2018)
(“Younger abstention is not appropriate in this case because
the issues raised in the bail appeal are distinct from the
underlying criminal prosecution and would not interfere with
it. Regardless of how the bail issue is resolved, the prosecution
will move forward unimpeded.”); Walker v. City of Calhoun,

13

U.S. at 108 n.9 (explaining that Younger abstention is
inappropriate where the injunction sought “could not prejudice
the conduct of the trial on the merits”).

The District Court erred in reaching the opposite
conclusion. It relied on O’Shea for the proposition that
Younger “preclude[d] equitable intervention” where “the
plaintiffs requested ‘an injunction aimed at controlling or
preventing the occurrence of specific events that might take
place in the course of future state criminal trials’” because
“such an injunction ‘would disrupt the normal course of
proceedings in the state courts via resort to the federal suit for
determination of the claim ab initio.’” Chudzik II, 2025 WL
2312324, at *7 (italics omitted) (quoting O’Shea, 414 U.S. at
499-501).
9
O’Shea, however, is distinguishable. The relief

901 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir. 2018) (concluding the district
court was not required to abstain where the plaintiff “merely
asks for a prompt pretrial determination of a distinct issue,
which will not interfere with subsequent prosecution”).
9
The District Court’s reliance on Daves v. Dallas
County, 64 F.4th 616 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (holding that
Younger required abstention from review of state bail
procedures), and Wallace v. Kern, 520 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1975)
(holding Younger required abstention from challenge to
incarceration of pretrial detainees unable to make bail), was
also misplaced. In Daves, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit explicitly “disagree[d] with some or all of the reasoning
in” our court’s ruling in Stewart that “found Younger
inapplicable.” 64 F.4th at 631. We are obligated to apply our
own precedent, including Stewart. Likewise, Wallace held that
Younger required abstention from a challenge to the

14

requested in O’Shea would have enjoined statewide practices
applicable to setting bonds, imposing criminal sentences, and
collecting fees for jury trials and would have required an
“ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings” and
“continuous supervision by the federal court over . . . conduct”
in “future criminal trial proceedings,” and thus constituted
“unwarranted anticipatory interference in the state criminal
process.” 414 U.S. at 492, 500-01. Because plaintiffs in
O’Shea challenged nearly every stage of state criminal
proceedings—from setting bail to sentencing—granting the
relief requested would have resulted in “continuous or
piecemeal interruptions of the state proceedings.” Id. at 500.
Plaintiffs here “merely ask[] for a prompt pretrial
determination of a distinct issue,” namely, inquiry into their
financial ability to post bail, “which will not interfere with the

incarceration of pretrial detainees unable to make bail, because
the “proposition that the principles underlying Younger are
applicable only where the federal court is seeking to enjoin a
pending state criminal prosecution is not supportable.” 520
F.2d at 405. Our precedent contradicts this view, see Stewart,
275 F.3d at 225 (holding that Younger abstention did not apply
to plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment challenge to prosecutors’
“rearrest policy” because “[t]he issues raised could not have
been raised in defense of [plaintiff’s] criminal prosecution”);
Conover, 477 F.2d at 1080 (holding that Younger did not
require abstention where requested injunction related to
“intake interviews” by probation officers would not “halt or
substantially interfere with a pending prosecution”), and thus
we do not follow it.

15

subsequent prosecution[s]” or require ongoing supervision,
10

so O’Shea does not require Younger abstention. Walker v.
City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir. 2018); see
also Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 766 n.2 (9th Cir.
2018) (distinguishing O’Shea on similar grounds).
11

10
Contrary to the MDJs’ statement at oral argument,
Plaintiffs’ relief asks the District Court to answer the “yes or
no question” of whether MDJs must consider the factors in
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 523 to make initial
bail determinations and does not seek federal oversight of
preliminary arraignments to ensure that they are conducted in
a subjectively acceptable way. Oral Arg. Tr. 15:07-15:57.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek relief similar to that sought in
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 108 n.9, which required state courts to
make probable cause determinations, and Conover, which
required certain procedures for juvenile intake interviews, 477
F.2d at 1080. Neither decision expressed concerns about
excessive federal intrusion, and we found no subsequent
history to suggest either ruling led to such a result. See, e.g.,
In re: Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 309 So.2d 544 (Fla.
1975) (amending Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure in
response to Gerstein).
11
The District Court also prematurely addressed the
Middlesex factors when it assessed whether Plaintiffs had an
adequate remedy in state court before determining that
Plaintiffs sought to enjoin one of the three types of proceedings
to which Younger applies. Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of
State, 938 F.3d 453, 462 (3d Cir. 2019) (“consider[ing]
Middlesex’s ‘additional factors’” “[o]nly after [it] finds that a
proceeding fits” within one of the “three exceptional categories
of proceedings,” like an “ongoing criminal prosecution.”).

16

Because Plaintiffs do not seek to enjoin ongoing state
criminal prosecutions, Younger does not bar review of their
claims in federal court.
12

B
13

We next review the order dismissing Plaintiffs’ Sixth
Amendment claim that they are entitled to counsel at their
preliminary arraignments. “The Sixth Amendment right of the
‘accused’ to assistance of counsel in ‘all criminal prosecutions’
is limited by its terms: ‘it does not attach until a prosecution is
commenced.’” Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 198 (quoting McNeil v.
Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991)). “[A] criminal
defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial officer, where
he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to
restriction, marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings
that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.” Id. at 213. “Once attachment occurs, the accused at
least

is entitled to the presence of appointed counsel during any
‘critical stage’ of the postattachment proceedings.” Id. at 212.
At a “critical stage,” “the accused is confronted, just as at trial,
by the procedural system, or by his expert adversary, or by
both, in a situation where the results of the confrontation might
well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere
formality.” United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189

12
Because Plaintiffs do not seek to enjoin ongoing state
prosecutions, we need not consider Plaintiff’s alternate
argument that the Middlesex factors counsel against abstaining
under Younger. See Malhan, 938 F.3d at 462.
13
We exercise plenary review of a district court’s order
granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Burtch
v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011).

17

(1984) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The
Supreme Court has cautioned courts to “avoid[] the mistake of
merging the attachment question (whether formal judicial
proceedings have begun) with the distinct ‘critical stage’
question (whether counsel must be present at a postattachment
proceeding unless the right to assistance is validly waived)”
and explained that “counsel must be appointed within a
reasonable time after attachment to allow for adequate
representation at any critical stage before trial, as well as at trial
itself.” Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 211-12.

In Pennsylvania, the right to counsel attaches at the
preliminary arraignment because that is where a criminal
defendant “learns the charge against him” when the MDJ reads
the charges, and “his liberty is subject to restriction” when the
MDJ makes the initial bail determination. Id. at 213.
Defendants are entitled to counsel at critical stages after the
preliminary arraignment, but the preliminary arraignment itself
is not a critical, postattachment stage for three reasons.

First, the preliminary arraignment is not a
postattachment proceeding. Rather, it is the proceeding at
which the right to counsel attaches. Second, the facts alleged
in the complaint fail to show that a trial-like confrontation
occurs at the preliminary arraignment. According to the
complaint, no prosecutor attends the preliminary arraignment
and Rule 540(F) allows the MDJ only to read the charges but
not to ask the defendant about them. Pa. R. Crim. P. 540(F).
The MDJ then informs the defendant of his right to counsel and
makes an initial bail determination. These events are not trial-
like confrontations. See United States v. Portillo, 969 F.3d
144, 161 (5th Cir. 2020) (explaining that criminal defendant’s
initial appearance, where “the magistrate judge briefly recited

18

the facts of the indictment, the maximum penalties Portillo
faced, and the government’s intent to detain him without bond
pending trial” was not a “critical stage”); Farrow v. Lipetzky,
637 F. App’x 986, 988 (9th Cir. 2016) (not precedential)
(holding that “preliminary bail determination made at the
initial appearance [did not] render that hearing a critical
stage”).
14
Third, although bail determinations may impact
criminal defendants’ decisions to plead guilty and thus trial
outcomes, “pretrial custody” after the preliminary arraignment,
alone, “does not present the high probability of substantial
harm” necessary to render an initial bail determination a
“critical stage,” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 122-23, as the individual
can seek review of that decision at any time.

Because the preliminary arraignment is not a
postattachment critical stage, Plaintiffs were not entitled to
counsel at such proceedings, so the District Court correctly
dismissed their Sixth Amendment claim.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, vacate
in part, and remand.

14
Likewise, this case is distinct from Betschart v.
Oregon, 103 F.4th 607 (9th Cir. 2024), in which the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by concluding that a bail hearing
where “witnesses are called, evidence is presented, facts are
mitigated, alternatives to incarceration are proposed, and the
defendant can address the court,” was a “critical stage.” Id. at
623.

1

Hartmann v. Chudzik, No. 25-2762
PHIPPS, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
The Majority Opinion does not follow the general rule of
Younger abstention that “a federal court cannot enjoin an
ongoing state-court criminal proceeding.” Borowski v. Kean
Univ., 68 F.4th 844, 849 (3d Cir. 2023) (citing Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41, 45 (1971)). By declining to abstain,
the Majority allows the possibility of federal-court supervision
of state-court bail hearings. That unavoidably conflicts with
the Supreme Court’s decision in O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488 (1974). There, the Supreme Court held that Younger
abstention is appropriate in response to claims for equitable
relief against a “county magistrate and judge” for allegedly
“set[ting] bond in criminal cases . . . without regard to the facts
of a case or circumstances of an individual defendant.” Id. at
491–92; see id. at 499–502. Here, the plaintiffs challenge a
state-court judge’s failure to consider certain facts, primarily
the ability to pay, when determining bail. In light of that
congruence, fidelity to O’Shea demands abstention under
Younger.
The Majority Opinion’s only answer to O’Shea is a form of
judo; it attempts to use the strength of O’Shea against itself.
According to the Majority Opinion, the reason for abstention
in O’Shea was that the claims there extended beyond bond
hearings to include “nearly every stage of [the] state criminal
proceedings.” Maj. Op. at 14. But abstention in O’Shea was
not based on the cumulative weight of the challenges, and
therefore its Younger abstention holding applied to every claim
individually. See O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 499–502. So judo does
not work here.
Nor is there any other way around O’Shea. The authorities
principally cited by the Majority Opinion – footnote 9 in
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), and Stewart v.
Abraham, 275 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2001) – both involved the

2

detention of criminal defendants without any judicial hearing.
1

In both instances, the courts declined to abstain under Younger
and ultimately considered the claims for pre-detention judicial
hearings. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 108 n.9; Stewart, 275 F.3d
at 226. By contrast, the requested relief here is not an order for
an otherwise nonexistent hearing; every plaintiff in this case
received a bail hearing. This case, therefore, is well outside the
ambit of both footnote 9 in Gerstein and Stewart, which were
themselves exceptions to Younger abstention.
Finally, the underlying rationale of O’Shea applies here
with unabated force. The proposed injunction in O’Shea
“contemplate[d the] interruption of state proceedings to
adjudicate assertions of noncompliance by petitioners” that
amounted to “nothing less than an ongoing federal audit of
state criminal proceedings.” O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 500. The
same holds true here, where the plaintiffs request a federal
injunction against the Lancaster County Prison Warden to
prevent the enforcement of detention orders issued by
Magisterial District Judges unless those judges “comply with
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and engage in
a constitutionally adequate inquiry into all factors essential to
a lawful bail determination, including ability to pay.” 1st Am.
Class Action Compl. ¶ VII(c) (JA197). As pointed out by the
Majority Opinion, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal
Procedure 523 sets forth ten considerations for bail
determinations. See Pa. R. Crim. P. 523(A)(1)–(10); see also

1
In Gerstein, the challenge was to a Florida statute permitting
pretrial detention based on solely a prosecutor’s information,
without a preliminary hearing. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at
859–60. In Stewart, the challenge was to a rearrest exception
in the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure that
permitted the Commonwealth to reinstitute charges that had
been previously dismissed at a preliminary hearing in front of
a judge and to arrest the subject based on those new charges
without a “judicial finding of probable cause prior to the
rearrest.” Stewart, 275 F.3d at 224; see also id. at 223–24.

3

Lancaster Cnty. R. Crim. P. 117(III)(B) (granting authority to
Magisterial District Judges to set bail). Without Younger
abstention, a criminal defendant’s constitutional claim of
inadequate consideration of any of those factors would trigger
federal-court review. Apart from the potential volume of
challenges that await, that litigation would be inherently
burdensome – a criminal defendant would testify against the
Magisterial District Judge who set his bail, and to avoid a
finding of noncompliance with the injunction, the Magisterial
District Judge would likely provide testimony as well. The
accused would become the accuser, and the neutral would
become the accused. That is much worse than the mere fear of
a federal audit that prompted abstention in O’Shea. Here, the
federal-court intervention would be nothing short of the
upending and subsequent micromanagement of a state-court
criminal proceeding.
In sum, because O’Shea governs, the District Court did not
err in abstaining under Younger, and I respectfully dissent.