Barrios Roblero v. Barr BIA Ruehle, IJ A205 152 943

18-1674
Barrios Roblero v. Barr
BIA
Ruehle, IJ
A205 152 943
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 1
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 2
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 3
New York, on the 20
th
day of March, two thousand twenty. 4
5
PRESENT: 6
ROBERT D. SACK, 7
PETER W. HALL, 8
STEVEN J. MENASHI, 9
Circuit Judges. 10
_____________________________________ 11
12
JESUS MANUEL BARRIOS ROBLERO, 13
Petitioner, 14
15
v. 18-1674 16
NAC 17
WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 18
ATTORNEY GENERAL, 19
Respondent. 20
_____________________________________ 21
22
FOR PETITIONER: Samuel N. Iroegbu, Albany, NY. 23
24
FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney 25
General; Jessica E. Burns, Senior 26
Litigation Counsel; Don G. 27
Scroggin, Trial Attorney, Office 28

2
of Immigration Litigation, United 1
States Department of Justice, 2
Washington, DC. 3
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 4
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 5
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 6
is DENIED. 7
Petitioner Jesus Manuel Barrios Roblero, a native and 8
citizen of Mexico, seeks review of a May 8, 2018, decision of 9
the BIA affirming a July 10, 2017, decision of an Immigration 10
Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding 11
of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 12
(“CAT”). In re Barrios Roblero, No. A 205 152 943 (B.I.A. 13
May 8, 2018), aff’g No. A 205 152 943 (Immig. Ct. Buffalo July 14
10, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 15
underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 16
We have considered the IJ’s decision as supplemented and 17
modified by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 18
271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are 19
well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Paloka v. 20
Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Courts review de 21
novo the legal determination of whether a group constitutes 22
a ‘particular social group’ under the [Immigration and 23

3
Nationality Act].”); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 1
513, 516 (2d Cir. 2009) (reviewing denial of CAT protection 2
under the substantial evidence standard). 3
Asylum and Withholding of Removal
4
To establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of 5
removal based on membership in a particular social group, 6
Barrios Roblero had to “establish both that the group itself 7
was cognizable, . . . and that the alleged persecutors 8
targeted [him] on account of h[is] membership in that group.” 9
Paloka, 762 F.3d at 195 (internal quotation marks and citation 10
omitted). To be cognizable, a social group must be 11
“(1) composed of members who share a common immutable 12
characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and 13
(3) socially distinct within the society in question.” Id. 14
(quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 15
2014)). “‘Particularity’ refers to whether the group is 16
‘sufficiently distinct’ that it would constitute ‘a discrete 17
class of persons.’” Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. 208, 210 18
(B.I.A. 2014) (quoting Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 19
584 (B.I.A. 2008)). Social distinction requires that the 20
shared traits that characterize the social group be 21
sufficient for the group to “be perceived as a group by 22

4
society.” Id. at 216; see also Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & 1
N. Dec. at 240; Paloka, 762 F.3d at 196 (“[W]hat matters is 2
whether society as a whole views the group as socially 3
distinct, not the persecutor’s perception.”). Once the 4
applicant has established a cognizable social group, he must 5
demonstrate a nexus between his membership in that group and 6
the persecution he suffered. Paloka, 762 F.3d at 196-97. 7
The agency reasonably found that Barrios Roblero’s 8
proposed social group, “young men who are escaping 9
recruitment of the drug cartel in Mexico” lacked 10
particularity and social distinction. He presented no 11
evidence that Mexican society regards “young men who are 12
escaping recruitment of the drug cartel” as a distinct social 13
group, or that the proposed group is identified or treated 14
differently by society. Cf. Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 15
70, 73–74 (2d Cir. 2007) (deferring to BIA’s conclusion that 16
“affluent Guatemalans” are not sufficiently particular or 17
socially distinct, in part because it is impractical to 18
distinguish petitioners who are targeted because of their 19
group membership from those who are targeted for criminal 20
motives). The only unifying characteristic of the group, 21
which could be composed of males of various ages and 22

5
backgrounds, is the attempted recruitment. See Ucelo-Gomez, 1
509 F.3d at 73 (“[A]lthough the existence of persecution is 2
a relevant factor, a social group cannot be defined 3
exclusively by the fact that its members have been subjected 4
to harm.” (internal quotations marks and emphasis omitted)); 5
see also Paloka, 762 F.3d at 196 (“[A] persecutor’s perception 6
alone is not enough to establish a cognizable social group.”).7
Because Barrios Roblero failed to establish a cognizable 8
social group, the agency did not err in denying asylum and 9
withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 10
1231(b)(3)(A). 11
Convention Against Torture
12
To receive protection under the CAT, an applicant must 13
“establish that it is more likely than not that he . . . would 14
be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 15
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). “Torture is defined as any act by 16
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, 17
is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . at the 18
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 19
official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 20
C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). “[T]orture requires . . . that 21
government officials know of or remain willfully blind to an 22

6
act and thereafter breach their legal responsibility to 1
prevent it.” Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2
2004). 3
The agency reasonably concluded that there was 4
insufficient evidence to establish that Barrios Roblero would 5
more likely than not be tortured. His evidence described 6
general conditions in Mexico. Without more, such evidence 7
is insufficient to demonstrate that Barrios Roblero will more 8
likely than not be targeted and tortured by the cartel and 9
that if he were targeted that Mexican officials would consent 10
or acquiesce to his torture. See Mu-Xing Wang v. Ashcroft, 11
320 F.3d 130, 144 (2d Cir. 2003) (requiring showing that 12
someone in applicant’s “particular alleged circumstances” 13
would be tortured); Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 14
432 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2005) (requiring “particularized 15
evidence” beyond general country conditions to support a CAT 16
claim). 17
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 18
DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 19
stays VACATED. 20
FOR THE COURT: 21
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 22
Clerk of Court 23