Romero-Flores v. Barr BIA Christensen, IJ A206 688 042/043

17-2263
Romero-Flores v. Barr
BIA
Christensen, IJ
A206 688 042/043
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 1
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 2
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 3
New York, on the 13
th
day of January, two thousand twenty. 4
5
PRESENT: 6
JON O. NEWMAN, 7
JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 8
Circuit Judges.
1
9
_____________________________________ 10
11
GLENDA XIOMARA ROMERO-FLORES, 12
DIEGO SAUL SANTOS-ROMERO, 13
Petitioners, 14
15
v. 17-2263 16
NAC 17
WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 18
ATTORNEY GENERAL, 19
Respondent. 20
_____________________________________ 21
22
FOR PETITIONERS: Peter E. Torres, New York, NY. 23
24
FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 25
Attorney General, Civil Division; 26
Claire L. Workman, Senior 27
Litigation Counsel; Maarja T. 28
Luhtaru, Trial Attorney, Office of 29

1
The panel originally included Circuit Judge Christopher F. Droney, who fully
retired from the court on December 31, 2019. This case is decided by the
remaining two judges, consistent with section E(b) of the Internal Operating
Procedures of the Second Circuit.

2

Immigration Litigation, United 1
States Department of Justice, 2
Washington, DC. 3
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 4
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 5
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 6
is DENIED. 7
Petitioners Glenda Xiomara Romero-Flores and her son 8
Diego Saul Santos-Romero, natives and citizens of Honduras, 9
seek review of a June 30, 2017, decision of the BIA affirming 10
a January 9, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 11
denying Romero-Flores’s application for asylum, withholding 12
of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 13
(“CAT”). In re Glenda Xiomara Romero-Flores, Diego Saul 14
Santos-Romero, Nos. A 206 688 042/043 (B.I.A. June 30, 2017), 15
aff’g Nos. A 206 688 042/043 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 9, 16
2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 17
underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 18
Under the circumstances of this case, we have considered 19
both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of 20
completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 21
524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review 22
are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Y.C. v. 23
Holder, 741 F.3d 325, 332 (2d Cir. 2013). 24

3

Because Romero-Flores expressly waives her CAT claim, we 1
address only asylum and withholding of removal. To establish 2
eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal, “the 3
applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, 4
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion 5
was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting 6
the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); id. 7
§ 1231(b)(3)(A); see also Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 8
341, 348 (BIA 2010). Asylum or withholding of removal “may 9
be granted where there is more than one motive for 10
mistreatment, as long as at least one central reason for the 11
mistreatment is on account of a protected ground.” Acharya 12
v. Holder, 761 F.3d 289, 297 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal 13
quotation marks omitted). An applicant “must provide some 14
evidence of [a persecutor’s motives], direct or 15
circumstantial.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 16
(1992); see also Manzur v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494 17
F.3d 281, 291 (2d Cir. 2007). 18
Romero-Flores has waived her claim that she was harmed 19
on account of her political opinion or membership in a social 20
group based on her gender; she presses only her family-based 21
social group claim. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 22
540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005). 23

4

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination 1
that Romero-Flores failed to demonstrate that the harm she 2
suffered or fears would be on account of her membership in a 3
family-based social group. Romero-Flores’s testimony 4
regarding a connection between the robbery of her store in 5
2014, and her father, who had previously owned the store and 6
had been robbed and killed by gang members in 1989, was 7
speculative given the length of time between those events and 8
the fact that the only connection she could make is that the 9
gang members may have known that the store was robbed in the 10
past and thus thought it would be a good target. However, 11
she also testified that the people who robbed her were not 12
the people who killed her father, and she did not have any 13
reason to think that they were connected to her father’s 14
killers. Her attempt to identify a nexus between her harm 15
and a social group of her family members was further 16
undermined by her concession that, other than her father, no 17
family members had been threatened by gang members. See 18
Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999) 19
(finding claimed fear of future persecution weakened when 20
similarly situated family members remain unharmed in 21
petitioner’s native country). Finally, Romero-Flores also 22
acknowledged that the men who robbed her would not have been 23

5

interested in her if she did not have money. This record 1
provides substantial evidence for the agency’s conclusion 2
that Romero-Flores was targeted because she was thought to 3
have money. This harm as a result of “general crime 4
conditions” does not constitute persecution on account of a 5
protected ground. Id. at 314; see Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 6
509 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2007) (“harm motivated purely by 7
wealth is not persecution”). This nexus determination is 8
dispositive of both asylum and withholding of removal. See 9
8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A) 10
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 11
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 12
that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 13
and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 14
is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 15
in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 16
Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 17
34.1(b). 18
FOR THE COURT: 19
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 20
Clerk of Court 21
22