14-3721 | Omnilex

Testo completo

14‐3721‐cv(L)
Montesa, et al. v. Schwartz, et al.
i
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 2
3
August Term, 2015 4
5
(Argued: November 2, 2015 Decided: September 12, 2016) 6
7
Docket Nos. 14‐3721‐cv, 14‐3771‐cv, 14‐3811‐cv 8
________________________________________________________________________ 9
10
R EBECCA MONTESA, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of C.W., 11
E.W. and N.W., infants, MARIE JEAN B APTISTE, individually and as a parent and 12
natural guardian of PJB, DJB, and DJB, infants, I SRAEL MEDIUA, individually and 13
as a parent and natural guardian of H.M., infant, MARC E. D ORSANVIL , 14
individually and as a parent an natural guardian of M.D. and N.D., infants, 15
MARTINE NARCISSE, R ONALD R OSEMOND, individually and as a parent and 16
natural guardian A.L., infant, MARLENE ISRAEL , individually and as a parent and 17
natural guardian of B.I. 1 and B.I. 2, infants, K ERLINE L OUIS , individually and as a 18
parent and natural guardian of KL and RL, infants, Y OLENE H IPPOLYTE , 19
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of I.H. 1, I.H. 3 and R.H., 20
infants, MARIE S OMISE LOUIS , individually and as a parent and natural guardian 21
of S.L., infant, K RYSTAL WILSON, individually and as a parent and natural 22
guardian of E.W. and M.E., infants, P AUL R OONEY , individually and as a parent 23
and natural guardian of DR, and JR, infants, NASIK E LAHI, individually and as a 24
parent and natural guardian of K.E. and S.E., infants, D ONIQUE JOHNSON, 25
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of D.J., infant, B ETTY 26
C ARMAND, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of D.E, J.E., and 27
S.E., infants, R OSENAY JACQUES , individually and as parents and natural 28
guardians of J.J., C.J., and A.L., infants, E LZA JACQUES , individually and as 29
parents and natural guardians of J.J., C.J., and A.L., infants, LANA R HEUBOTTOM , 30
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of J.R,, infant, H IRAM R IVERA, 31
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of A.R. and T.R., infants, 32
S TEVEN WHITE , individually, collectively and as parents and natural guardians of 33
A.W., infant, E MILIA WHITE , individually, collectively and as parents and natural 34
guardians of A.W., infant, R AMONA JONES , individually and as a parent and 35
natural guardian of Y.J., E.J., G.J., and T.J., infants, W ILMA G LOVER‐K OOMSON, 36

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individually and as a parent and natural guardian of F.K., infant, Y OLANDA 1
WHITE , CHRISTOPHER MESIBOV, individually and as parents and natural 2
guardians of J.M. 1, and J.M. 2, infants, DONNA MESIBOV, individually and as 3
parents and natural guardians of J.M. 1, and J.M. 2, infants, ALFRED C OLE , 4
individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School 5
District, ROBERT MALEBRANCHE, individually and as a taxpayer residing within 6
the East Ramapo Central School District, L ORRAINE A LCIMAS , individually and as 7
a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, IREUS 8
R EGINAL , individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo 9
Central School District, E MMANUEL A LEXIS , individually and as a taxpayer 10
residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, O VID C OLAS , 11
individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School 12
District, KIM FOSKEW , L ENTZ E UGENE , individually and as a taxpayer residing 13
within the East Ramapo Central School District, LENARD S AINVIL, individually 14
and as a parent and natural guardian of C.B. and W.B., infants, F RANKY S ANVIL , 15
individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School 16
District, ADOLFINA MARTINEZ , individually and as a parent and natural guardian 17
of C.M. and E.M., infants, MONESE THEODORE, individually and as a parent and 18
natural guardian of R.T., infant, L ANA AUGUSTE , individually and as a parent and 19
natural guardian of SA, infant, L ILANA WILSON‐ORTA, individually and as 20
parents and natural guardians of SW, and AO, infants, A NTHONY O RTA, 21
individually and as parents and natural guardians of SW, and AO, infants, 22
K IMBERLY C OLLICA‐FOX , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of 23
A.C. and R.C., infants, MALLORY JOHNSON, individually and as a parent and 24
natural guardian of A.L., infant, B EVERLY JONES , individually and as a parent and 25
natural guardian of T.S., infant, K ENICE H IBBERT, individually and as a parent 26
and natural guardian of E.P., infant, L ITIA H AGANS, individually and as a parent 27
and natural guardian of D.C. and D.S., infants, B EVERLY PATTERSON WATSON, 28
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of J.W., infant, F LAMBERT 29
TELUSCA, individually, collectively and as parents and natural guardians of F.T. 30
and S.T., infants, E NELLE PIERRE , individually and as a parent and natural 31
guardian of C.P., J.P. and K.P., infants, ANNE C ARMAND‐L UNDI , individually and 32
as a parent and natural guardian of A.S. and PL., infants, L EVY C AZEAU, 33
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of T.C., infant, MARIE JOSY 34
JEAN‐B APTISTE, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of HJB, JJB, 35
and JJB, infants, A NNIE C RUDOP , individually and as a taxpayer residing within 36

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the East Ramapo Central School District, JULIA THOMPSON, individually and as a 1
taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, K ENNETH 2
ISAACS , individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central 3
School District, Peter Sharpe, individually and as a taxpayer residing within the 4
East Ramapo Central School District, F RANTZIE L AMARRE‐C HAM , individually 5
and as a parent and natural guardian of MC, MC, and MC, infants, D ORIAN 6
B UTCHER, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of S.B., infant, 7
MARGARET TUCK, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of J.A., 8
infant, R EGINALDA B RUNO , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of 9
S.A., infant, R ETTVIE JOURDAIN, individually and as a parent and natural 10
guardian of P.D., infant, MARIA F LORES‐MARTINEZ , individually and as a parent 11
and natural guardian of A.M., infant, PEARLINE W RAY , individually and as a 12
parent and natural guardian of R.M., infant, S HARON PARKER , individually and 13
as a parent and natural guardian of A.P., infant, B OILEAU MEHU, individually, 14
collectively and as a parents and natural guardians of C.M., F.M. and K.M., 15
infants, MARTHO F ERDINAND, individually and as parents and natural guardians 16
of WL and BL, infants, JEAN B ERNADIN L AGUERRE, individually and as parents 17
and natural guardians of WL and BL, infants, L AMARTINE L ARAME, individually 18
and as a parent and guardian of L.L. 1 and L.L. 2, infants, E THENE L ARAME, 19
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of I.L., J.L. and R.L., infants, 20
P ATRICK JEANBAPTISTE, individually and as a parent and guardian of PJ JR., DJ 21
and DPJ, infants, MARIE MATHELUS, individually and as a parent and natural 22
guardian of A.M., infant, MARIE A URELUS , individually and as a parent and 23
guardian of C.A. and J.A., infants, JEAN‐R ENE V ICSAMA, individually and as a 24
parent and natural guardian of F.V. and R.V., infants, L UCIENNE S AINT F ORT, 25
individually and as a legal guardian of D.P., H.R. and M.P., infants, V ELLA 26
MARDY‐A RRE , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of R.M., infant, 27
R ONY JACQUES , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of M.J., T.J. 28
and T.R.J., infants, L ISA R OSS , individually and as a parent and natural guardian 29
of DR, infant, L ISA MEYERS , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of 30
S.M., infant, G EORGES D ELALEU, individually and as a parent and natural 31
guradian of D.C., infant, B ENITA G ILES , individually and as a parent and a natural 32
guardian of B.G., infant, P ATRICIA C OLLINS , individually and as a parent and 33
natural guardian of J.C. and J.M., infants, D EMERUANT C. L OUISTHELMY , 34
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of D.L., M.L., and R.L., infants, 35
S ERGO B EAUBOEUF, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of M.M., 36

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infant, JUNIE C LAUTAIRE, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of 1
C.C., J.J. and T.C., infants, A DELE F ORTUNE , individually, collectively and as 2
parents and natural guardians of T.F., infants, JOCELIN NOEL , individually and as 3
a parent and natural guardian of E.N. and J.N., infants, R OLAND A LEXANDRE, 4
individually, collectively and as a parent and natural guardian of D.A., E.A. and 5
Z.A., infants, P RESLER LOUIS‐JUSTE , individually and as a parent and natural 6
guardian of ELJ, and PLJ, infants, A NNA NARCISSE, individually and as a legal 7
guardian of JF and AM, infants, H ARVEY W ILLIAMS, individually and as a legal 8
guardian of M.A. and M.J., infants, JESULA A UGUSTE, individually and as a 9
taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, P IERRE 10
D ESROSIERS , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of C.D., infant, 11
JULIETTE JEAN K ERNOSAINT , individually, G EROLD S T. B RICE , individually, 12
MICHELLE L ARAME, individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East 13
Ramapo Central School District, JERISON L ORA, individually and as a taxpayer 14
residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, MAGDA D ESDUNES , 15
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of O.D., infant, P ATRICIA 16
JOURDAIN, individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo 17
Central School District, D ESHAWN PARKER , individually and as a taxpayer 18
residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, R USSELL B ISHOP , 19
individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School 20
District, OSWALD D UBOIS , individually, COLIN G RANT, individually and as a 21
taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, K ENNETH 22
B OLT, individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central 23
School District, C HRIS B IBBINS , individually and as a taxpayer residing within the 24
East Ramapo Central School District, JOANNE C HERIMOND , individually and as a 25
taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, MELVERLEEN 26
B ULLOCK, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of C.B., infant, 27
C LEAVON B ULLOCK, individually, R OBERT JAMES , individually and as a taxpayer 28
residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, E DENS Z ULME, 29
individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School 30
District, REBECCA ADJETEY, individually and as a taxpayer residing within the 31
East Ramapo Central School District, R AYSHON R ETTWAY , individually, MAGDA 32
PIERRE‐LOUIS, individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo 33
Central School District, T ATIANA PIERRE‐LOUIS , individually and as a taxpayer 34
residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, MARIEE C OMEAU, 35
individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School 36

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District, AKA MARLEE C OMEAU, G ERALD C HEREMEANT, individually and as a 1
taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, A RTHUR 2
MONDESTIN, individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo 3
Central School District, R AYSHON PETTWAY , individually and as a taxpayer 4
residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, S YBIL B EACH E DWARDS , 5
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of A.E., infant, A NTONIO 6
MIGUEL , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of A.M., infant, 7
JUDITH D ESIR , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of J.S, infant, 8
E NLUS V IERGELINE , V IERGELINE E NLUS individually and as a parent and natural 9
guardian of GJ, MJ, infants, NAJA W ILSON, individually and as a parent and 10
natural guardian of ET, ET and ET, infants, D YNAA L ATURE , individually and as a 11
parent and natural guardian of D.D., infant, MINNIE W ILSON, individually and as 12
a parent and natural guardian of I.W., infant, F AMILLA E PPS , individually and as 13
a parent and natural guardian of J.E., infant, PRUDENCE WRAY , individually and 14
as a parent and natural guardian of NR and GM, infants, D ONNA G ARCES , 15
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of S.G., infant, INGRID R ENER, 16
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of BE, and AE, and LE, 17
infants, ODNY E UGENE , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of J.E., 18
infant, JEAN R. MARSEILLE, individually, JADIA D ORCELLY , individually, B ADIO 19
D OSSELAINE, individually, R OBERT B ADIO , individually and as a taxpayer residing 20
within the East Ramapo Central School District, P IERRE LOUIS C YNILLE, 21
individually, MURIELLE G UERIN, individually and as a parent and natural 22
guardian of M.G., infant, F ERDILUS D IEUDONNE , individually and as a parent and 23
natural guardian of JF, CF, and AF infants, A LINE TELUSCA, individually, 24
collectively and as parents and natural guardians of, F.T. and S.T., infants, P AUL 25
L ARAME, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of, V.L., infant, 26
V ALQUISE L OUIS JACQUES , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of 27
A.L., infant, MARIE ROSE MICHEL , individually and as a parent and natural 28
guardian Y.M., infant, NADEGE D ORCELLY , individually and as a taxpayer 29
residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, S ERGO PIERRE , 30
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of A.P., infant, C ADET S AUVAL, 31
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of A.S., infant, T ONY 32
MARSEILLE , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of E.M., infant, 33
MARIE LOUIS, individually, collectively and as parents and natural guardians of 34
S.L., infant;, JUDSON L OUIS , individually, collectively and as parents and natural 35
guardians of S.L., infant;, Y OLENE B ONNY , individually and as a parent and 36

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natural guardian of APJ and PJ, infants, JULIA D ERIVAL, individually and as a 1
parent and natural guardian of S.D., infant, L INDA R. G ILBERT, individually and 2
as a parent and natural guardian of WG, DG, and JG, infants, D IEVLINE S T. 3
G ERMAIN, individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo 4
Central School District, MATHIE D IEJUSTE , individually, C LAUDE D ORCELLY , 5
individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School 6
District, MARIE L AFONTANT , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of 7
S.D., infant, L AGUERRE C ICERON, individually, MARIE R OSE EXHAUTES, 8
individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School 9
District, DAPHKAR FLEURIS, individually and as a taxpayer residing within the 10
East Ramapo Central School District, Peggy Floyd, individually and as a parent 11
and natural guardian of S.F., infant, L OUIS W HARTON, individually and as a 12
graduate of the East Ramapo Central School District, C OURTNEY JOYCE, 13
individually, B LANDINE L AROQUE , individually and as a parent and natural 14
guardian of S.M., infant, JOSEPH C HARLES C LERVEAUX , individually and as a 15
parent and natural guardian of C.C., infant, JEAN JEAN C HARLES , individually 16
and as a parent and natural guardian of D.C., infant, MARIE NICOLE DESCAS , 17
individually, collectively and as parents and natural guardians of N.D. and S.D.., 18
infants, EUGENIE E UGENE , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of 19
A.R. 1 and A.R. 2, infants, C ARMELLE MEHU, individually, collectively and as a 20
parents and natural guardians of C.M., F.M. and K.M., infants, U. JOSIE 21
A LEXANDRE, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of ZA, DA and 22
EA, infants, S HELOMITHE JEAN, individually and as a current student age 18 or 23
older in the East Ramapo Central School District, PATRICIA D ESROCHES , 24
individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central School District, 25
D ARLENE L AUTURE, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of BL and 26
AL, infant, R UTH A RCHANGE , individually and as a parent and natural guardian 27
of J.L. and R.L.1 and R.L.2, infants, E MMANUEL A UGUSTIN, individually and as a 28
parent and natural guardian of E.A., K.A., M.A., and S.A., infants, B ERTHANE 29
A NTOINE , individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo 30
Central School District, MARILIA MONTILUS , individually and as a parent and 31
natural guardian of S.M., infant, MARK G RIFFITH , JR ., individually, MEGHAN C. 32
F ITZGERALD, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of S.C., infant, 33
JUDY K ARIUS , individually and as parents and natural guardians of F.K.; infant, 34
MATT K ARIUS , individually and as parents and natural guardians of F.K.; infant, 35
A DOLPHE L UBIN, individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central 36

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School District, A GLA PIERRE , individually, collectively and as parents and 1
natural guardians of G.P. infant, G ESNER PIERRE , individually, collectively and as 2
parents and natural guardians of G.P. infant, A LEXANDRA JOACHIM , individually 3
and as a parent and natural guardian of S.J. infant, A LEXANDRA V OLCY , 4
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of S.P. infant, A LLISSIA 5
B ASQUIAT, individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central School 6
District, AMANDA B LAND, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of 7
A.R. 1 and A.R. 2, infants, AMIONNE C HARLES, individually and as a taxpayer 8
residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, A NDREA NIEDELMAN, 9
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of A.N. and T.N., infants, 10
A NGELA JORDAN, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of R.P., 11
infant, A NISE MACK, individually and as current student age 18 or older of the 12
East Ramapo Central School District, A NISHA C ARRASQUILLO , individually and as 13
a parent and natural guardian of A.M. infant, A NITA C UNNINGHAM , individually 14
and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, 15
A NNAJEAN F RANCOIS , individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East 16
Ramapo Central School District, A NNE D IEUJUSTE , individually and as a taxpayer 17
residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, A NNEBETHE GUILLAME‐ 18
F ISH , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of S.P., infant, A NNIE F. 19
WILSON, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of S.W., infant, 20
A NNIE THOMSPON, individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East 21
Ramapo Central School District, A NSELME H UGUETTE, individually and as a 22
parent and natural guardian of A.B. and E.B., infants, A NTHONY G OULD, 23
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of A.N. and T.N., infants, 24
A NTONIO E TIENNE , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of B.E. and 25
C.E., infants, A RKITE F ELIX , individually and as a taxpayer residing within the 26
East Ramapo Central School District, A SSETNE B ERNARD, individually and as a 27
taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, B ARBARA 28
TURNER , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of L.E., infant, 29
B ETHANI JONES , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of J.J.1, J.J.2 30
and J.L., infants, B EVERLY PAIGE, individually and as a parent and natural 31
guardian of D.C., infant, B ILL MACK, individually and as a parent and natural 32
guardian of A.M. and J.M., infants, BONNY Y OLENE , individually and as a parent 33
and natural guardian of A.J. and P.J., infants, BRENNAH H ARRISON, individually 34
and as a parent and natural guardian of N.S., infant, C ARIDA PETIT‐NAN, 35
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of J.P. and S.P., infants, C ARL 36

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JENKINS , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of T.J., infant, C ARLA 1
JOHNSON, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of L.R., infant, 2
C ARLO JOSEPH , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of C.J., J.J., and 3
R.J., infants, C ARMEL F EDE , individually and as a taxpayer residing within the 4
East Ramapo Central School District, C ARMELLE JUSTINE‐MOREAU, individually 5
and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, 6
C AROL SEC, individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo 7
Central School District, C ASEY C ICERON, individually and as a taxpayer residing 8
within the East Ramapo Central School District, CATHERINE TELLEZ , individually 9
and as a parent and natural guardian of J.L., infant, C ERIL C AYO , individually 10
and as a parent and natural guardian of B.C., D.C. and R.C., infants, C HANTAL 11
JEAN, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of S.B., infant, C HARLES 12
L OUVIERE , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of J.L., infant, 13
C HERI PARIS‐H UDSON, individually, collectively and as parents and natural 14
guardian of C.H. infant, JOHN H UDSON, individually, collectively and as parents 15
and natural guardian of C.H. infant, C HRISTINA D UNCAN, individually, 16
collectively and as parent and natural guardian of C.D. and S.D.,. infants, R YAN 17
D UNCAN, individually, collectively and as parent and natural guardian of C.D. 18
and S.D.,. infants, CHRISTINA L OSIER , individually and as a graduate of the East 19
Ramapo Central School District, C HRISTINIA PATTERSON, individually and as a 20
parent and natural guardian of D.B. and M.B., infants, C ICERON L AGUERRE , 21
individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School 22
District, CINDY S EVIER , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of J.S.1 23
and J.S.2, infants, C ONSTANT F RIEND, individually and as a parent and natural 24
guardian of N.F., infant, C OURTNEY J. JASMIN, individually and as a taxpayer 25
residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, C RAIG B EITAL , 26
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of D.B., infant, D ANIEL PIERRE 27
MAURICE , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of D.M. and J.M., 28
infants, DAVID MCC RAY , individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East 29
Ramapo Central School District, D AWN H OLNESS, individually, collectively and 30
as parents and natural guardians of D.H. infant, E ROLL H OLNESS , individually, 31
collectively and as parents and natural guardians of D.H. infant, D EBRAH B ROWN, 32
individually and as a parent and natural guardians of D.B., infant, D EMENTRIUS 33
H OLMES, individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central 34
School District, D ENISE B ALTHAZAR , individually and as a parent and natural 35
guardian of D.B., infant, D ENISE D EL V ALLE, individually and as a parent and 36

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natural guardian of L.J. and P.J., infants, D IEUDONNE F ERDILUS , individually and 1
as a parent and natural guardian of A.F. and C.F., J.F., K.F. and S.F., infants, 2
D OMINIQUE R EMY , individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central 3
School District, D ONOVAN D UNKLEY , individually and as a graduate of the East 4
Ramapo Central School District, D OROTHY R OONEY , individually and as a 5
taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, D OSSELAINE 6
B ADIO , individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central 7
School District, D OUGLAS C ANTOR , individually and as a parent and natural 8
guardian of Z.C., infant, E DWARD MEDINA, JR ., individually and as a parent and 9
natural guardian of J.M., infant, E LDA G OUBOTH , individually and as a taxpayer 10
residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, E LDINE C ICERON, 11
individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School 12
District, EMMA S UBIAO‐D IZON, individually and as a parent and natural guardian 13
of M.D., infant, E NID L AMBERT, individually and as a parent and natural 14
guardian of A.M., infant, E NLUS V IERGELINE , individually and as a parent and 15
natural guardian of G.J. and M.J., infants, E NNEDY B ASQUIAT, individually and as 16
a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, ESPERA 17
E MMANUEL, individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo 18
Central School District, E STEL CADET, individually and as a parent and natural 19
guardian of A.C., infant, E STHER D URANDICE, individually and as a taxpayer 20
residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, E TONNANTE JOSEPH , 21
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of R.J., infant, F ANNIE 22
O NABANJO Q, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of D.B., infant, 23
F ARA S T.FLEUR, individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo 24
Central School District, F ATIMA D ARLENE C ANICO , individually and as a taxpayer 25
residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, F ELICIA E VANS , 26
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of C.E. and M.E., infants, 27
F LORE S T.L OUIS , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of V.S., infant, 28
F RANCENA H EYWARD, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of M.C. 29
and M.S., infants, F RANCIS JAMAR , individually and as a parent and natural 30
guardian of H.G., I.G. and N.G., infants, F RANCKEL M. JOSEPH , individually and 31
as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, F RANCOIS 32
B EVOLUS , individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo 33
Central School District, F RANDY G EORGES, individually and as a taxpayer 34
residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, F RED MICHEL , 35
individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School 36

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District, GARFIELD WALKER , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of 1
A.W. and J.W., infants, G ENIESE THEAGENE , individually and as a parent and 2
natural guardian of S.F., infant, B AUDLAFRE THEAGENE, individually and as a 3
parent and natural guardian of S.F., infant, G ERRY D EDIVITIS, individually and as 4
a parent and natural guardian of N.D., infant, G INA M. D UNCAN, individually 5
and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central School District, G LADYS CAYO , 6
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of M.P. and S.J., infants, 7
G LORIA KEY , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of A.K., S.K. and 8
T.K., infants, G UY CHARLES , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of 9
A.C., M.C. and T.C., infants, ILLYANA D EJEAN, individually and as a parent and 10
natural guardian of M.F., infant, INGRID B OUCICANT , individually and as a 11
graduate of the East Ramapo Central School District, INGRID PENA, individually 12
and as a parent and natural guardian of A.E., B.E. and C.E., infants, ISENIELA 13
JEAN C HARLES , individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central School 14
District, JACQUELINE G RANNUM , individually and as a parent and natural 15
guardian of N.G.1, N.G.2 and N.G.3, infants, JAMES G ULIFIELD, individually and 16
as a parent and natural guardian of J.G., Q.G. and Q.G.2, infants, JANAY JORDAN, 17
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of J.F., infant, JEAN 18
B ELLANTOU , individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central School 19
District, JEAN B OUCICANT , individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo 20
Central School District, JEAN C LAUDE A UGUSTE , individually, collectively and as 21
parents and natural guardians of S.A., infant, L ANA A UGUSTE , individually, 22
collectively and as parents and natural guardians of S.A., infant, JEAN D ENIS , 23
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of W.D., A.D. and S.D., 24
infants, JEAN JOSEPH, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of J.J. 25
and K.J., infants, JEAN MARIO V IL , individually, collectively and as parents and 26
natural guardians of R.V., infant, MARIMENE V IL , individually, collectively and as 27
parents and natural guardians of R.V., infant, JEAN WILSON JOCELIN, individually 28
and as a parent and natural guardian of S.J., infant, JEFHTEY CAJUSTE , 29
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of K.R., infant, JERMAINE 30
W ALKER , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of I.W., N.W. and 31
T.W., infants, JESITA C ICERON, individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo 32
Central School District, JOCELINE S HANGASE , individually and as a parent and 33
natural guardian of D.S., infant, JOEL G UE , individually and as a graduate of the 34
East Ramapo Central School District, JOHN B OYKIN, individually and as a 35
graduate of the East Ramapo Central School District, JOHN MILES , individually 36

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and as a parent and natural guardian of X.M., infant, JOHNBERRY B ADIO, 1
individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central School District, JORGE 2
MONTANO , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of G.M., infant, 3
JOSEPH C HARLES, individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central 4
School District, JOSEPH F LEURANT, individually and as a graduate of the East 5
Ramapo Central School District, JOSETTE F RANCOIS , individually and as a 6
graduate of the East Ramapo Central School District, JUANA S ANTIAGO , 7
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of C.G., infant, JUCANGE 8
G ASPORD, individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central School 9
District, JUDITH ISRAEL , individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo 10
Central School District, JUDITH JOHN‐R OBINSON, individually and as a parent and 11
natural guardian of L.R. and P.R., infants, JULYSSE A LEXANDRE, individually and 12
as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central School District, JUSTIN B UDDE , 13
individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central School District, 14
K ALICHA C AMERON, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of K.C. 15
and O.C., infants, KATHLEEN C ANCIO , individually and as a graduate of the East 16
Ramapo Central School District, K ATHLEEN D. C ASTOR , individually and as a 17
graduate of the East Ramapo Central School District, K ATHRIN B ALL , individually 18
and as a parent and natural guardian of K.J. and L.J., infants, K ATHRYN K ARIUS , 19
individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central School District, 20
K ATIANA S AME, individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central 21
School District, K ATRINA G RIGSBY , individually and as a parent and natural 22
guardian of K.G., infant, K ELLY S COTT, individually and as a graduate of the East 23
Ramapo Central School District, K ERNEY O BY , individually, collectively and as 24
Grandparents and natural guardians of D.O., infant, S ANDRA O BY , individually, 25
collectively and as Grandparents and natural guardians of D.O., infant, K ETNA 26
F RENEL FORESTAL , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of D.F.1, 27
D.F.2 and K.F., infants, K IMBERLY TREVISAN, individually and as a parent and 28
natural guardian of K.T., S.T., V.T.1 and V.T.2., infants, KRISTEN R ABELER, 29
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of S.O., infant, L ACHANDA 30
JOHNSON, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of R.J., infant, 31
L AGUERRE B ERNADIN, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of B.L. 32
and W.L., infants, LAMARRE BEAUVAIS , individually and as a graduate of the East 33
Ramapo Central School District, L ATASHA D. E VANS , individually and as a parent 34
and natural guardian of O.J. and R.F., infants, L ATICIA THEZAN, individually and 35
as a parent and natural guardian of C.T. and J.T., infants, L ATTICHA A CKERMAN, 36

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individually and as a parent and natural guardian of D.A. and J.J., infants, L EON 1
C AYO , individually, collectively and as parents and natural guardians of I.C., 2
infant, MONA C AYO , individually, collectively and as parents and natural 3
guardians of I.C., infant, L INDA H ARVEY , individually and as a parent and natural 4
guardian of B.H. and T.H., infants, L ISA G OLDBERG, individually and as a parent 5
and natural guardian of B.M., G.G., M.G. and S.M., infants, L ISA PHILLIPS , 6
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of O.P., infant, LOCITA PIERRE , 7
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of C.E., infant, LORA F ULLARD, 8
individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central School District, L OUIS 9
JEAN JACQUES , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of J.J., infant, 10
L UCY B ROCKS , individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central School 11
District, MACK R OBERTS , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of 12
S.L. and T.B., infants, MAE O LA MCG ILL , individually and as a parent and natural 13
guardian of T.L., infant, MANUEL PALMA , individually, collectively and as 14
parents and natural guardians of C.P., J.P., and M.P., infants, MAYRA PALMA, 15
individually, collectively and as parents and natural guardians of C.P., J.P., and 16
M.P., infants, MARC‐A UGUSTE D ESERT, individually and as a graduate of the East 17
Ramapo Central School District, MARCUS E XANTUS , individually and as a 18
graduate of the East Ramapo Central School District, MARGUEDALA L AHENS , 19
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of I.L. and M.L., infants, JEAN 20
E MMANUEL L AHENS , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of I.L. 21
and M.L., infants, MARIA S INGH , individually and as a parent and natural 22
guardian of E.S., infant, PATRICK JEAN B APTISTE, individually, collectively and as 23
parents and natural guardians of D.J.1 and D.J.2 and P.J., infants, MARIE 24
C ADICHON, individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central School 25
District, MARIE C AIZON, individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo 26
Central School District, MARIE C HARLES , individually and as a graduate of the 27
East Ramapo Central School District, MARIE C LERVEAUX , individually and as a 28
graduate of the East Ramapo Central School District, MARIE JOSEPH , individually 29
and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central School District, MARIE K ATTY 30
D ORELEUS, individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central School 31
District, MARIE L EONARD, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of 32
A.L., infant, MARIE THERES L UBIN, individually and as a parent and natural 33
guardian of A.L.1, A.L.2, B.L. and S.L., infants, MARIE Y DELPE MANBRUN, 34
individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central School District, 35
MARION GRANT, individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central 36

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School District, MARLENE S ANCHEZ , individually and as a parent and natural 1
guardian of R.F., infant, MARTHA S AINT F ORT, individually and as a graduate of 2
the East Ramapo Central School District, MARY H AYES , individually, collectively 3
and as parents and natural guardians of Z.H., infant, MARY JAMES G IBSON, 4
individually, collectively and as parents and natural guardians of K.C., infant, 5
MARYANN WILLIAMS, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of C.W., 6
K.W., O.W., and T.W., infants, MATHIEU D IEUJUSTE , individually and as a 7
taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, MICHAEL 8
L AKES, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of A.L., infant, 9
MICHELE L OVELL , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of I.L., 10
infant, MINI JACOB, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of J.J.1 and 11
J.J.2., infants, MONA L EGER , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of 12
M.L. and S.L., infants, MYRTHO F ERDINAND, individually and as a parent and 13
natural guardian of B.L. and W.L., infants, NADIA D ORCELLY , individually and as 14
a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, NAMOI 15
JOSEPH , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of M.R., infant, NANA 16
TWUM , individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central 17
School District, NANCY TOUSSAINT, individually, collectively and as parents and 18
natural guardians of H.T., infant, R APHAEL TOUSSAINT, individually, collectively 19
and as parents and natural guardians of H.T., infant, NAOMI B AHLE , individually 20
and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, 21
NAOMI L EGERME , individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East 22
Ramapo Central School District, NAOMY L AGUERRE, individually and as a parent 23
and natural guardian of D.B. and J.A., infants, NATALIE S ANCHEZ , individually 24
and as a parent and natural guardian of A.S., C.S. and M.S., infants, NESLIE 25
C ADET A LTUME, individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo 26
Central School District, NICOLAS MONTANO , individually and as a taxpayer 27
residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, NICOLE R APHINO , 28
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of A.M., A.P. and M.M., 29
infants, ONIKKA WHITEHEAD, individually and as a parent and natural guardian 30
of E.W. and I.W., infants, ORICHA H ERNANDEZ , individually and as a taxpayer 31
residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, O RLANDO L ORVEUS, 32
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of A.L., D.L. and J.L., infants, 33
O SNY E XANTUS, individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo 34
Central School District, P AMELA H ILL , individually and as a parent and natural 35
guardian of K.W.1 and K.W.2, infants, PAMELA S IMPSON, individually and as a 36

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parent and natural guardian of Q.W., infant, P ATRICIA B YNUM , individually and 1
as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, 2
P HYNESCHEA S HAARIEFEREL, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of 3
J.J. and T.J., infants, P IERRE L OUIS C YNILLE, individually and as a taxpayer 4
residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, P RISCILLA B ROWN, 5
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of A.A., infant, P RUCILE 6
V ALEUS , individually, collectively and as parents and natural guardians of E.V., 7
N.V. and R.V., infant, R AQUEL NEWELL, individually and as a parent and natural 8
guardian of H.N., infant, R AQUEL PAUL , individually and as a graduate of the 9
East Ramapo Central School District, R ASHEED JERIMIE , individually and as a 10
taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, R AYMONDE 11
B EAUVAIS , individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo 12
Central School District, R EBEA G RARDA, individually and as a taxpayer residing 13
within the East Ramapo Central School District, REGINE TAYETTE, individually 14
and as a parent and natural guardian of M.M., infant, R ICKEY MCG ILL , 15
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of R.M. and S.M., infants, 16
R OBERT MCG EE , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of R.M., 17
infant, R OBERT Y OUNG , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of R.Y., 18
infant, MARIE JOSIE ALEXANDRE, individually, collectively and as parents and 19
natural guardians of D.A., E.A. and Z.A., infants, R OSELAURE FLEURANTIN, 20
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of R.F. and S.F., infants, R OSE 21
F RASER , individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central 22
School District, R OWSON B OIROND, individually and as a graduate of the East 23
Ramapo Central School District, R UBIN JOANUS , individually and as a parent and 24
natural guardian of B.J. and G.J. and P.J., infants, RUTH L AUTURE‐WALKER , 25
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of J.L., M.L. and O.L.,. infants, 26
S AHARA EVANS , individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central 27
School District, S ANTANA A LLARD, individually and as a parent and natural 28
guardian of J.S. and S.A., infants, S ERETTE L AURENT, individually and as a parent 29
and natural guardian of A.C., infant, S HARON B RYANT, individually and as a 30
taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, S HEILA 31
JACKSON, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of S.J., infant, S HEILA 32
JEFFRIES , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of A.J. and J.J., 33
infants, SHERINE GORDON, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of 34
B.L.1 and B.L.2, infants, S HIRLEY JACKSON, individually and as a parent and 35
natural guardian of T.W., infant, S IABHAIN S NEAD, individually and as a parent 36

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and natural guardian of C.B. and T.B., infants, S ONIA B. WATKINS , individually 1
and as a parent and natural guardian of G.W., infant, S TEPFON MCC RAY , 2
individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central School District, 3
S TEPHANIE K ARIUS , individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central 4
School District, S TEPHANIE L AURENT, individually and as a parent and natural 5
guardian of G.M.1 and G.M.2., infants, STERLING INZAR , individually, collectively 6
and as parents and natural guardians of DI. and T.I., infants, L ORRAINE INZAR , 7
individually, collectively and as parents and natural guardians of DI. and T.I., 8
infants, S YLVIE PIERRE , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of E.P., 9
infant, T AMME WHITAKER, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of 10
R.W., infant, T ERREL A CKERMAN, individually and as a graduate of the East 11
Ramapo Central School District, T ERRY BYNUM , individually and as a parent and 12
natural guardian of A.B. and D.B., infants, T JOKDALEM ARSA A RTHA, individually 13
and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, 14
T RACY H ARRIS , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of C.H., E.H. 15
and N.H., infants, ULANA WILSON‐O RTA, individually, collectively and as parents 16
and natural guardians of A.O. and S.W., infant, A NTHONY WILSON‐O RTA, 17
individually, collectively and as parents and natural guardians of A.O. and S.W., 18
infant, V ERONA G REY , individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central 19
School District, V ERONICA L EVEILLE, individually and as a parent and natural 20
guardian of C.L., L.L., R.K., and S.L., infants, V ICTORIA C OPELAND, individually 21
and as a parent and natural guardian of D.C., infant, V ICTORIA JEAN C HARLES , 22
individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central School District, 23
V IRGINIA H ARRIS , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of T.H., 24
infant, V ITAL JOSEPH , individually, collectively and as parents and natural 25
guardians of S.J., infant, T ANYA JOSEPH , individually, collectively and as parents 26
and natural guardians of S.J., infant, W ELMIR F RANCOIS , individually and as a 27
graduate of the East Ramapo Central School District, W ILBUR S TUART, 28
individually and as a graduate of the East Ramapo Central School District, 29
W ILLARD B ODIE , individually and as a parent and natural guardian of D.W., 30
infant, W ILLIAM TYNES , individually, collectively and as parents and natural 31
guardians of D.S. and D.T., infants, T EAL Y VETTE TYNES, individually, collectively 32
and as parents and natural guardians of D.S. and D.T., infants, W ILLIAM F LLOYD, 33
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of J.F., infant, C HARLES‐ 34
PIERRE , individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central 35
School District, Y OLANDA B ARHAM , individually and as a parent and natural 36

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guardian of D.O., infant, Y OLANDA NAVARRO , individually and as a parent and 1
natural guardian of R.P., infant, Y OLANDE PANIAGUE , individually and as a 2
parent and natural guardian of L.H. and O.H., infants, YOLENE A LTIDOR, 3
individually and as a taxpayer residing within the East Ramapo Central School 4
District, YONEL C ADICHON, individually and as a taxpayer residing within the 5
East Ramapo Central School District, Y VELOURD TREVIL , individually and as a 6
parent and natural guardian of Y.T., infant, Y VETA B ELANGE, individually, 7
collectively and as parents and natural guardians of E.B. and Y.B., infants, H ARRY 8
B ELANGE , individually, collectively and as parents and natural guardians of E.B. 9
and Y.B., infants, Y VONNE L ORINCE, individually and as a parent and natural 10
guardian of S.L., infant; on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, on 11
behalf of themselves and on behalf of the East Ramapo Central School District, 12
T AISHA PAQUIOT, individually and as a parent and natural guardian of P.D., 13
infant, C AROLD F ORTUNE , individually, collectively and as parents and natural 14
guardians of T.F., infants, F RANKY S AINVIL , individually and as a taxpayer 15
residing within the East Ramapo Central School District, L ISA MYERS , 16
individually and as a parent and natural guardian of S.M., infant, S AMESON 17
D ESCAS , individually, collectively and as parents and natural guardians of N.D. 18
and S.D., infants, C ARME MEHU, individually and as a graduate of the East 19
Ramapo Central School District, MARJORIE METELLUS, individually and as a 20
parent and natural guardian of I.C., infant, H ARRIET C HAMBERS, individually and 21
as a parent and natural guardian of A.J., J.C. and R.C., infants, 22
23
Plaintiffs‐Appellees, 24
‐ v. ‐ 25
26
D ANIEL S CHWARTZ , Y EHUDA WEISSMANDL , MOSES F RIEDMAN, MOSHE HOPSTEIN, 27
E LIYAHU SOLOMON, A RON WIEDER, MORRIS KOHN, R ICHARD STONE , JOEL K LEIN, 28
E LIEZER WIZMAN, A LBERT D’A GOSTINO , NATHAN R OTHSCHILD, 29
30
Defendants‐Appellants, 31
32
E AST R AMAPO C ENTRAL S CHOOL D ISTRICT, 33
34
Defendant. 35
________________________________________________________________________ 36
37

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1
Before: H ALL and L OHIER, Circuit Judges, and R EISS , District Judge.
2
3
We address an Interlocutory and Certified Appeal from a decision of the 4
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Seibel, J.) 5
which held that the Plaintiffs‐Appellees—Students currently attending East 6
Ramapo public schools—have standing to bring 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against 7
the Defendants‐Appellants—present and former East Ramapo School Board 8
Members—for violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the 9
United States Constitution and that the Board Members are not entitled to 10
qualified immunity. The Board Members argue that the students lack standing 11
because they did not suffer a direct injury resulting from a violation of the 12
Establishment Clause. The Board Members further contend that even if the 13
students have standing, the Board Members are entitled to absolute and qualified 14
immunity. We hold that the Students lack standing to pursue their Establishment 15
Clause claims, and therefore those claims must be dismissed. Judge Reiss 16
dissents in a separate opinion. 17
18
REVERSED and REMANDED. 19
 The Honorable Christina Reiss of the United States District Court for the
District of Vermont, sitting by designation.

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1
L AURA D. B ARBIERI, 2
Arthur Zachary Schwartz, Advocates for 3
Justice Legal Foundation, New York, NY 4
for Plaintiffs‐Appellees. 5
6
D AVID J. B UTLER, 7
Bryan M. Killian, Randall M. Levine, David 8
B. Salmons, Stephanie Schuster, Morgan, 9
Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Washington, DC for 10
Defendants‐Appellants Daniel Schwartz, 11
Yehuda Weissmandl, Moses Friedman, Moshe 12
Hopstein, Eliyahu Solomon, Aron Wieder, 13
Morris Kohn, Richard Stone, Joel Klein, and 14
Eliezer Wizman. 15
16
MARK D. H ARRIS , 17
Adam W. Deitch, Jessica Zietz, Proskauer 18
Rose LLP, New York, NY for Defendant‐ 19
Appellant Nathan Rothschild. 20
21
MEREDITH D. B ELKIN, 22
Marian C. Rice, L’Abbate, Balk, Colavita & 23
Contini, LLP, Garden City, NY for 24
Defendant‐Appellant Albert D’Agostino. 25
26
H ALL , Circuit Judge: 27
28
I. BACKGROUND 29
This case is a part of a longstanding conflict within the East Ramapo 30
School District (the “District”) in Rockland County, New York. The Plaintiffs‐ 31
Appellees (“Student‐Plaintiffs”) are students who are currently enrolled in the 32

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District’s public school system. They allege that a majority of the East Ramapo 1
School District Board (“School Board”) are of the Orthodox/Hasidic Jewish faith 2
or are sympathetic to the interests of the Orthodox/Hasidic Jewish community 3
(“Board Defendants”).1 The Student‐Plaintiffs claim that over the last decade the 4
Board Defendants have siphoned money out of the public school system and into 5
yeshivas and other religious organizations for the benefit of the Hasidic 6
children’s religious education and the Board Defendants’ shared religious 7
community. The Student‐Plaintiffs allege that the Board Defendants have 8
promoted the Hasidic Jewish faith in violation of the First Amendment to the 9
United States Constitution by (1) systematically funding Hasidic schools with 10
public monies by manipulating the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 11
(“IDEA”) settlement process, (2) providing preferential treatment to Hasidic 12
Institutions when they attempted to sell and lease two school buildings, and (3) 13
buying religious books with public money and loaning the books to Hasidic 14
schools. 15
1 Student‐Plaintiffs further assert in their briefs that Board Defendants’ children
do not attend the District’s schools. We do not consider this allegation, which
appears for the first time in their brief. See Kleinman v. Elan Corp., 706 F.3d 145,
153 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.
1998) for the proposition that “a party may not amend pleadings through a
brief”).

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3
I D E A SETTLEMENT PROCESS 1
Pursuant to both federal and state law, school districts are required to 2
provide students with disabilities a free and appropriate public education. 3
School districts are required to create an individualized education program 4
(“IEP”) for each student with a disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). Each such student 5
is entitled to receive an IEP that is individually tailored to meet the student’s 6
specific needs. Each school district has a Committee on Special Education 7
(“CSE”) that is tasked with comprehensively evaluating each student to identify 8
the student’s individualized special education needs and annual goals. Parents 9
may work with the CSE in order to facilitate a school placement and IEP that 10
satisfies the school district and the family. If a parent disagrees with the CSE’s 11
placement determination, the parent has the right to an Impartial Hearing. See 20 12
U.S.C. § 1415. If, however, parents choose unilaterally to send their child to 13
private school without completing the Impartial Hearing process, the parent 14
does not have a right to receive tuition reimbursement from the state or the 15
school district. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412. In any case, the school district and parents 16
may be reimbursed by the state and federal government for any special 17

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education placement in a private school that is approved by the CSE. See 20 1
U.S.C. § 1411. 2
The Student‐Plaintiffs assert that over the past several years an increasing 3
number of students purportedly eligible for special education services in the 4
District have been placed in private religious schools for the ostensible purpose 5
of providing those students with required services under the IDEA. The Student‐ 6
Plaintiffs allege that the Board Defendants have an unwritten agreement with 7
Hasidic parents by which any Hasidic student who is eligible for an IEP will be 8
placed in a religious school if the Hasidic parents simply write a letter to the 9
Board disagreeing with the public school CSE placement and requesting a 10
private school placement.2 The Board Defendants then pass a private placement 11
resolution in lieu of an Impartial Hearing and reimburse the parents for the 12
tuition of the private placement. Because the IDEA settlements occur prior to the 13
Impartial Hearing, the district is not statutorily entitled to reimbursement from 14
the state or federal government. The Student‐Plaintiffs allege that the Board 15
Defendants knew or should have known before affirming the IDEA settlement 16
2 The Student‐Plaintiffs allege that the placements occurred at three ethnically,
racially, and religiously homogenous schools: Rockland Institute for Special
Education, Kiryas Joel (an out of District public school with a substantial Hasidic
student population), and Hebrew Academy for Special Children.

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agreements that appropriate non‐religious school placements were available and 1
were or would have been proposed by the CSE. The Student‐Plaintiffs allege that 2
by manipulating the IDEA settlement process, the Board Defendants diverted 3
funds away from the public schools in the District and into the Hasidic religious 4
institutions. 5
In the spring of 2010, the Office of Special Education of the New York State 6
Education Department (“NYSED”) conducted a monitoring review to ensure that 7
the District’s policies, procedures, and practices regarding the placements of 8
students with disabilities were consistent with the requirements of federal and 9
state laws and regulations. NYSED determined that the District had violated a 10
number of regulations and had engaged in a practice of placing students with 11
disabilities in private schools when appropriate placements were available in 12
public facilities. NYSED ordered the District to take remedial action that 13
included ordering the CSE to re‐evaluate and revise the placement 14
recommendations of the students placed in private schools that lacked the proper 15
documentation. 16
In February 2012, after NYSED conducted a follow‐up monitoring review 17
of the District’s private school special education placements to ensure that the 18

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deficient practices had been successfully changed, NYSED determined that the 1
District had failed to implement the recommended changes. As a result, NYSED 2
withheld reimbursement, thereby costing the District millions of dollars. 3
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 4
In April 2009, the School Board closed Colton Elementary School. The 5
School Board then leased Colton to the Hebrew Academy for Special Children 6
(“HASC”) and Congregation Basi Malka, a synagogue, for a period of five years. 7
For three of those five years, the School Board allegedly did not increase the rent 8
and repeatedly allowed HASC to pay rent late.3 In preparing to sell the property, 9
the School Board hired Valuation Plus, Inc. to appraise Colton. Valuation Plus 10
valued the property at $6.6 million. The Town of Ramapo Real Property 11
Assessment lists Colton’s market value at just under $12 million. On May 25, 12
2011, the School Board agreed to sell Colton to HASC and Bais Malka for $6.6 13
million. 14
In April 2009, the School Board also closed the Hillcrest School and hired 15
Valuation Plus, Inc., to appraise the property. Valuation Plus appraised Hillcrest 16
at $5.9 million. After issuing a Request for Proposals and receiving a number of 17
3 The Student‐Plaintiffs concede that the tenants eventually paid the District all of
the back rent that they owed.

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bids from local Hasidic institutions, the School Board received a second appraisal 1
from Appraisal Group International that valued Hillcrest at $3.24 million. The 2
Town of Clarkstown estimated Hillcrest’s value at $11 million, and a separate 3
third‐party appraiser valued the property at $13.9 million. The District accepted 4
Congregation Yeshiva Avir Yakov’s $3.1 million bid. On August 31, 2010, the 5
New York State Commissioner of Education prohibited the sale from closing, 6
and the Congregation began leasing the property instead. On June 6, 2011, the 7
Commissioner officially set aside the sale. 8
TEXTBOOK PURCHASES 9
Beginning in 2011, the Student‐Plaintiffs allege, the Board Defendants 10
ordered or condoned the ordering of non‐secular books that reflected traditional 11
values and stories rooted in the Jewish tradition. The books include titles that 12
contain obvious Jewish themes such as: I Keep Kosher, Let’s Go to Shul!, and Why 13
Weren’t You Zisha and Other Stories. The Board Defendants then loaned these 14
books to students attending local yeshivas. 15
THE LAWYER: ALBERT D’AGOSTINO 16
In November 2009, the School Board replaced its previous general counsel 17
with Albert D’Agostino. D’Agostino previously gained a reputation for 18

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representing the Lawrence Union Free School District’s Board of Education, 1
which has political and demographic traits similar to those of the East Ramapo 2
School District. The majority of board members on the Lawrence Board of 3
Education are alleged to have been practitioners of the Orthodox Jewish religion, 4
whose children attended private yeshivas. The Student‐Plaintiffs allege that, both 5
in this case and in the Lawrence School District, D’Agostino devised an IDEA 6
settlement scheme in order to divert public money into private religious schools. 7
Upon commencing work in East Ramapo, D’Agostino is alleged to have billed 8
the District at a significantly higher hourly rate than the School Board’s previous 9
counsel. According to the plaintiff’s Complaint, at School Board meetings 10
D’Agostino has exhibited an extremely combative and alienating style that has 11
offended and antagonized the community members who are opposed to the 12
School Board’s actions. 13
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 14
Three groups of plaintiffs brought the underlying lawsuit: (1) the Student‐ 15
Plaintiffs, (2) former students, and (3) taxpayer plaintiffs. These plaintiffs 16
collectively sued four groups of defendants: current school board members, 17

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former school board members, the school board’s lawyer Albert D’Agostino,4 1
and the East Ramapo School District.5 2
The underlying lawsuit asserted ten different claims, alleging various 3
violations of common law, state statutes, federal statutes, and the United States 4
Constitution. The district court dismissed, for failure to state a claim, all of the 5
claims except those asserting violations of the Establishment Clause.6 The district 6
court also dismissed all of the former students’ claims for lack of standing. The 7
remaining plaintiffs amended their complaint alleging under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 8
that the Defendants collectively promoted the Hasidic Jewish faith in violation of 9
the First Amendment by (1) systematically funding Hasidic schools with public 10
monies through the manipulation of the IDEA settlement process, (2) providing 11
preferential treatment to Hasidic institutions when they attempted to sell and 12
lease two school buildings, and (3) buying religious books with public money 13
4 The Student‐Plaintiffs do not bring claims against D’Agostino with respect to
the religious textbook purchases.
5 The plaintiffs originally brought the underlying suit on behalf of the East
Ramapo School District; due to the nature of the claims, however, the magistrate
judge ordered the District to intervene on behalf of the defendants.
6 The district court initially allowed the New York state law claim for unlawful
gift of public funds to move forward but later dismissed this claim as well.

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and loaning the books to religious schools. The plaintiffs seek an injunction, 1
monetary damages, and attorneys’ fees. 2
Responding to the Amended Complaint, the defendants then collectively 3
moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting, among other things, that they 4
were entitled to absolute and qualified immunity and that the Student‐Plaintiffs 5
lacked standing. The district court determined that the defendants were not 6
entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity and that the Student‐Plaintiffs 7
had standing. The district court also dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ § 1983 8
Establishment Clause claims for equitable relief against all the former Board 9
Defendants because those defendants were no longer on the Board and an 10
equitable judgment against them could not redress any of the plaintiffs’ injuries.7 11
In addition, the district court dismissed the Taxpayer‐Plaintiffs’ claims for 12
damages, determining that the Taxpayer‐Plaintiffs could only be entitled to 13
declaratory and injunctive relief. The Taxpayer‐Plaintiffs are not a party to this 14
interlocutory appeal, their claims are not before us, and their suit is currently 15
proceeding in the district court. 16
7 The district court also dismissed the Student‐Plaintiffs’ claims against former
board member Nathan Rothschild for the claims relating to the Colton School
transaction and the religious book purchases because he was not on the board at
the time these transactions had taken place.

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The district court certified to this court for interlocutory appeal under 28 1
U.S.C. § 1292(b) its decision that the Student‐Plaintiffs had standing to bring an 2
Establishment Clause claim. We granted the Defendants’ petition for 3
interlocutory appeal to address two issues: whether the Student‐Plaintiffs have 4
standing and whether the Defendants are protected by absolute or qualified 5
immunity. Because we conclude that the Student‐Plaintiffs do not have standing 6
to pursue their claims under the circumstances of this case, we address only the 7
standing issue. 8
III. DISCUSSION 9
The Student‐Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants’ unconstitutional actions 10
contributed to the defunding of the public school system, which in turn injured 11
the Student‐Plaintiffs by depriving them of educational opportunities and by 12
damaging their psychological and mental well‐being. For the reasons that follow 13
we hold that the Student‐Plaintiffs lack standing to assert their Establishment 14
Clause claims because they are only indirectly affected by the conduct alleged to 15
violate the Establishment Clause. 16
We review de novo a district court’s decision regarding plaintiffs’ standing. 17
Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Comm’n, 768 F.3d 18

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183, 191 (2d Cir. 2014). At the pleading stage, we “accept[] all well‐pleaded 1
allegations in the complaint as true and draw[] all reasonable inferences in the 2
plaintiff’s favor.” Bigio v. Coca–Cola Co., 675 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal 3
quotation and alteration omitted). In rebutting a motion to dismiss, “[t]he party 4
invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing” the elements of 5
standing “with the manner and degree of evidence required.” Lujan v. Defenders 6
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 7
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal 8
courts to “Cases” or “Controversies.” U.S. C ONST. art. III, § 2. The purpose of 9
Article III is to limit federal judicial power “to those disputes which confine 10
federal courts to a role consistent with a system of separated powers and which 11
are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial 12
process.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United For Separation of Church and 13
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)). 14
“One element of the case‐or‐controversy requirement is that plaintiffs must 15
establish that they have standing to sue.” Keepers, Inc. v. City of Milford, 807 F.3d 16
24, 38 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). Three elements comprise the 17
“irreducible constitutional minimum,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, of Article III 18

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standing: “(1) an injury in fact, (2) a sufficient causal connection between the 1
injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) a likel[ihood] that the injury will 2
be redressed by a favorable decision,” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 3
2334, 2341 (2014) (internal quotations omitted). To be sufficient for purposes of 4
standing, an injury must be “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is 5
(a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 6
hypothetical[.]” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotations, citations, and footnote 7
omitted). In determining standing, we focus on “the party seeking to invoke 8
federal jurisdiction, rather than the justiciability of the issue at stake in the 9
litigation.” Fulani v. Bentsen, 35 F.3d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). 10
In addition to analyzing these standing requirements, we have “adverted 11
to a ‘prudential’ branch of standing,” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 12
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014), which embodies “judicially self‐ 13
imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction,” Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. 14
v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (internal quotation omitted) abrogated on other 15
grounds by Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387. Prudential standing encompasses the rule 16
against the adjudication of generalized grievances, the rule prohibiting plaintiffs 17
from asserting the rights of third parties, and the rule barring claims that fall 18

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outside “the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or 1
constitutional guarantee in question.” Valley Forge, 454 U.S at 474–75 (internal 2
quotation omitted). Although characterized as “prudential,” these concerns 3
relate to the elements of Article III standing. See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3; 4
Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (per curiam). 5
As relevant to the Student‐Plaintiffs’ claims before us, the First 6
Amendment declares that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 7
establishment of religion.” U.S. C ONST. amend. I. This mandate has been made 8
“wholly applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Sch. Dist. of 9
Abington Tp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963)). Litigants asserting an 10
Establishment Clause claim against a State or municipal defendant must, like all 11
civil litigants, demonstrate standing. See Sullivan v. Syracuse Hous. Auth., 962 F.2d 12
1101, 1107 (2d Cir. 1992). Our jurisprudence has developed three distinct theories 13
of standing entitling an individual to pursue a claim that the Establishment 14
Clause has been violated: (1) taxpayer, (2) direct harm, and (3) denial of benefits. 15
Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2011). These three 16
theories evolved out of the unique context in which plaintiffs bring 17
Establishment Clause claims and have come into existence because 18

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Establishment Clause injuries, by their nature, can be “particularly elusive.” 1
Saladin v. City Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 691 (11th Cir. 1987). The 2
unconstitutional promotion of religion often injures no particular individual any 3
more than any other individual. That is, unlike most litigated injuries, the harm 4
is often inherently generalized. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475. Thus, these 5
specific theories of standing developed in response to the concerns that gave rise 6
to our prudential standing jurisprudence, and they have evolved to allow only 7
particular types of Establishment Clause injuries to be adjudicated. 8
Here, the Student‐Plaintiffs’ sole argument is that they have standing 9
under a direct exposure theory to assert that the Defendants violated the 10
Establishment Clause and directly injured them.8 Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. 11
Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 72 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[S]tanding to assert an Establishment Clause 12
claim may rest . . . on the plaintiff’s direct exposure to the challenged activity.”). 13
We therefore address only whether the Student‐Plaintiffs have sufficiently 14
8 The term “direct exposure” arises out of our jurisprudence construing the direct
harm theory of standing under the Establishment Clause, and our use of the term
“direct exposure” here includes all theories of direct harm. See Altman v. Bedford
Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 72 (2d Cir. 2001).

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pleaded a basis demonstrating their direct exposure to the unconstitutional 1
establishment of religion.9 2
In order to establish direct exposure standing, the Student‐Plaintiffs must 3
allege that they are “directly affected by the laws and practices against which 4
their complaints are directed.” Schempp, 374 U.S at 224 n.9. In delineating 5
between a direct effect and an indirect effect of a challenged governmental act, 6
i.e. the directness of a plaintiff’s injury, we are guided by our Establishment 7
Clause jurisprudence. A review of our precedent reveals that direct exposure 8
cases tend to occur in two different contexts: 1) the plaintiff is exposed to and 9
affected by a law that on its face establishes religion (“religious law” cases) or 2) 10
the plaintiff is exposed to and affected by a religious expression or message 11
sponsored or promoted by the government, (“expression” cases).10 Under the 12
9 As noted above, the plaintiffs who have asserted standing as taxpayers are
proceeding in the district court to advance their Establishment Clause claims.
The Student‐Plaintiffs are not among the taxpayers group that is continuing to
challenge the constitutionality of the Defendants’ actions. If the taxpayer
plaintiffs succeed in proving their claims, they will be entitled to an injunction. In
this respect, we note that the primary difference between the Student‐Plaintiffs’
claims and the taxpayer claims is that, by structuring their claims under a direct
exposure theory, the Student‐Plaintiffs are not limited to injunctive relief and are
able to seek damages.
10 Although many of the “religious law” cases do not use the term “direct
exposure,” these cases are similar to the “expression” cases in that both types of

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religious law line of cases, a religious law’s prohibition or mandate is grounded 1
in or at least significantly influenced by a “religious” tenet or principle (e.g., the 2
sinfulness of consuming alcohol) and directly and immediately injures the 3
plaintiff’s economic well‐being. 11 See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 118 4
(1982) (plaintiff was denied a liquor license because of store’s proximity to a 5
church, thus resulting in economic loss); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489–90 6
(1961) (plaintiff was prohibited from holding office in Maryland because he 7
refused to swear that he believed in God); Two Guys From Harrison‐Allentown, Inc. 8
v. McGinely, 366 U.S. 582, 592 (1961) (plaintiff was prosecuted for violating blue 9
laws and was prohibited from selling goods on Sunday). Under these cases, the 10
cases involve plaintiffs being confronted directly by the challenged action—
either religion‐infused laws or religious messages.
11 To the extent that the Defendants argue the Student‐Plaintiffs lack standing
because their injury is not religious in nature, see Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch.
Comm’rs., 641 F.3d 197 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc), we note that standing to assert a
violation of the Establishment Clause is broader than standing with respect to
Free Exercise Clause claims. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224 n.9; Altman, 245 F.3d at
72. Importantly, unlike claims under the Free Exercise Clause, nonreligious and
economic injuries are sufficient to establish standing under the Establishment
Clause. See McGowan v. State of Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430 (1961) (recognizing
standing for an Establishment Clause claim where the “[a]ppellants . . .
concededly have suffered direct economic injury”). We therefore discern no
requirement that an Establishment Clause injury must implicate a plaintiff’s
religious sensibilities in order for a plaintiff to establish standing to assert such a
claim.

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plaintiffs challenged a facially religious law that was causing personalized 1
economic harm. See McGowan v. State of Maryland., 366 U.S. 420, 430–31 (1961) 2
(“Appellants here concededly have suffered direct economic injury, allegedly 3
due to the imposition on them of the tenets of the Christian religion. We find 4
that, in these circumstances, these appellants have standing to complain that the 5
statutes are laws respecting an establishment of religion.”). 6
In “expression” cases, by comparison, the plaintiff’s injury is not economic. 7
The injury often occurs when a plaintiff comes into contact with, or is exposed to, 8
a government‐promoted expression of religion. These exposures usually occur in 9
public spaces, see Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682 (2005) (plurality op.) 10
(plaintiff challenging a display of the Ten Commandments outside the Texas 11
State Capitol), or in public schools, see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 423 (1962) 12
(plaintiff challenging a state program of daily classroom prayer). The injury in an 13
“expression” case can be difficult to distill because the basis for the injury is 14
simply exposure to a state‐sponsored religious message. Cooper v. U.S. Postal 15
Service, 577 F.3d 479, 489 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Standing is often a tough question in the 16
Establishment Clause context, where the injuries alleged are to the feelings alone. 17
This is often the case in religious display cases where the fact of exposure 18

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becomes the basis for injury and jurisdiction.”). Because this injury is often 1
elusive, the connection between the plaintiff and the challenged action—i.e. the 2
“exposure”—must be direct and immediate in order to satisfy the requirement 3
that the plaintiff have a “direct and personal stake in the controversy.” Sullivan, 4
962 F.2d at 1107. 5
Synthesizing these several types of cases, we can conclude that a plaintiff 6
will have direct exposure standing in at least the following circumstances: when 7
(1) a plaintiff is personally constrained or otherwise subject to control under a 8
governmental policy, regulation, or statute grounded in a “religious” tenet or 9
principle (e.g., a statute that directly precludes plaintiff from conducting 10
business on Sunday); or (2) a plaintiff is personally confronted with a 11
government‐sponsored religious expression that directly touches the plaintiff’s 12
religious or non‐religious sensibilities. In both situations, it is a plaintiff’s 13
interaction with or exposure to the religious object of the challenged 14
governmental action that gives rise to the injury. Thus, a plaintiff is “directly 15
affected,” Schempp, 374 U.S at 224 n.9, as opposed to indirectly affected, by an 16
unconstitutional governmental action when a plaintiff’s injury arises out of 17
plaintiff’s immediate and personal confrontation with the object of that 18

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governmental action—most commonly a government‐sponsored religious 1
expression or a governmental policy, statute, or regulation grounded in a 2
“religious” tenet or principle. 3
The Student‐Plaintiffs argue that their claims fall within the direct 4
exposure line of cases because they are “directly affected” by the Defendants’ 5
unconstitutional acts. Schempp, 374 U.S at 224 n.9. They contend that the 6
unconstitutional IDEA settlement payments reduce the size of the District’s 7
budget, which directly affects the quality of the education they receive.12 8
Specifically, the Student‐Plaintiffs allege that in “order to fund their 9
unconstitutional diversion of public resources to the yeshivas and religious 10
education, the Defendants have significantly cut spending on programs 11
fundamental to the operation of the public schools,” Joint App’x at 1081, and that 12
the Defendants have decreased the number of “advanced classes, [Board of 13
12 We are skeptical that the Student‐Plaintiffs have alleged a causal connection
between the real estate transactions or the religious book purchases and their
educational injury because the real estate sales were never finalized and the
religious book purchases had a de minimis effect on the District’s budget.
Regardless, our analysis of the Student‐Plaintiffs’ standing in relation to their
IDEA Settlement claims applies with equal force to the real estate transactions
and religious book purchases because, to the extent that these actions affect the
District’s budget, the relationship between the District’s budget and the
educational injury is the same.

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Cooperative Educational Services] programs, teachers, and guidance counselors” 1
available to the Student‐Plaintiffs, id. at 1073. Additionally, Defendants are 2
alleged to have “eliminated all assistant principals[;] [] extracurricular activities 3
[,] such as art and music[;] and the Students with Interrupted Formal Education 4
(SIFE) program, which ensure[s] that immigrant students achieve their full 5
potential [] and do not significantly lag behind their peers.” Id. In sum, the 6
Student‐Plaintiffs allege that in order unconstitutionally to fund religious 7
education the Defendants have defunded the educational services upon which 8
the Student‐Plaintiffs rely. As a result of this transfer of resources, authorized or 9
promoted by the Defendants, the Student‐Plaintiffs have “performed below their 10
peers in state‐mandated academic examinations,” id. at 1075, and “are 11
experiencing academic harm and will continue to experience harm to their 12
academic careers,” id. at 1033. 13
We are presented here with a novel theory of liability that the Student‐ 14
Plaintiffs seek to couch in terms of an Establishment Clause violation. The 15
allegations of injury in this case, however, preclude their fitting within the type 16
of “direct exposure” injury that our jurisprudence has heretofore regarded as 17
flowing from an Establishment Clause violation. The Student‐Plaintiffs are 18

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neither alleging that they are subject to a religiously infused law that prohibits 1
them from learning, see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 100 (1968), nor alleging 2
that they are confronted by a government‐sponsored religious message, see Engel, 3
370 U.S. at 423. The Student‐Plaintiffs lack standing because they do not allege 4
that their injuries were caused by a personal exposure to and confrontation with 5
the object of the governmental action they challenge—the alleged IDEA 6
settlement scheme. 7
Instead, as described above, the Student‐Plaintiffs allege that they were 8
deprived of educational services because public funds, which otherwise would 9
have been available to them, were diverted to an unconstitutional purpose. 10
Contrary to their assertion the Student‐Plaintiffs have not been “directly affected” 11
by the payment of the IDEA settlements in support of religious institutions; they 12
have only been indirectly affected. Schempp, 374 U.S at 224 n.9 (emphasis added). 13
This is so because the alleged harm—the deprivation of educational services—is 14
merely incidental to the IDEA Settlement disbursements themselves. It does not 15
arise out of the Student‐Plaintiffs’ personal interaction with the IDEA Settlement 16
process. The Student‐Plaintiffs’ injury is too far removed, too attenuated, from 17
the alleged unconstitutional component of the act of funneling public monies to 18

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support the advancement of Orthodox Hasidic Jewish schools to constitute the 1
type of injury cognizable and compensable as the result of an Establishment 2
Clause violation. We hold, therefore, that the Student‐Plaintiffs do not have 3
standing to assert an Establishment Clause violation. 4
We have not found a case, and the Student‐Plaintiffs do not point to one, 5
where an appeals court has recognized their theory of direct exposure—where 6
the plaintiffs’ exposure is the loss of a favored governmental service or benefit 7
caused, in part, by a diversion of public resources away from such service or 8
benefit to support a preferred religion. This is unsurprising. The Student‐ 9
Plaintiffs’ injury arises out of being enmeshed in an underfunded school system, 10
not out of being directly exposed to the alleged unconstitutional IDEA 11
Settlements themselves. An alleged causal connection between the underfunding 12
of the school district’s budget and the alleged unconstitutional expenditures is 13
insufficient to give rise to a direct injury. To hold otherwise would impermissibly 14
expand the concept of direct exposure to include injuries that are unrelated to the 15
challenged governmental act but which flow in fact from a government’s 16

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decision to fund one program or service at the expense of another.13 This is a 1
theory of indirect injury and recognizing it would allow plaintiffs who are only 2
incidentally affected by a challenged governmental expenditure to assert 3
Establishment Clause claims. 14 Viewing this injury as a direct exposure to an 4
Establishment Clause violation is foreclosed by our jurisprudence. See Schempp, 5
374 U.S at 224 n.9; Winn, 563 U.S. at 142. 6
We fully recognize that the Student‐Plaintiffs are not disinterested parties; 7
they undoubtedly have an interest in how the District allocates its funds. Their 8
13 Similarly, if we were to recognize that the Student‐Plaintiffs have direct
exposure standing here, then there would be little need for separate and distinct
standing requirements for taxpayers, see Winn, 563 U.S. at 142 (explaining that a
plaintiff must pay taxes and challenge a budgetary expenditure in order to
establish taxpayer standing), because essentially all individuals, regardless of
whether they pay taxes, are affected by changes in the government’s budget and
would therefore have standing to challenge any government expenditure—a
result eschewed by our standing jurisprudence, see e.g., Altman, 245 F.3d at 74
(rejecting the view that an act committed by a paid municipal employee
constitutes an expenditure for purposes of conferring taxpayer standing because
“[n]early all governmental activities are conducted or overseen by employees
whose salaries are funded by tax dollars” such that conferring “taxpayer
standing on such a basis would allow any municipal taxpayer to challenge
virtually any governmental action at any time”).
14 The district court’s previous ruling in this case dismissing the Student‐
Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claims for lack of standing to challenge the
School Board’s administration of Title I and Title III programs at religious
schools because the Student‐Plaintiffs were not directly exposed to the alleged
unconstitutional Title I and Title III contracts is consistent with our analysis and
articulation of the direct injury requirement.

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interest, however, is similar to that of any other individual who is affected by the 1
District’s budget, regardless of whether that person is an employee, a student, a 2
vendor, a taxpayer, or a citizen. Because the Student‐Plaintiffs’ theory of injury is 3
premised on the allegations that reducing the funds available to meet the 4
District’s budget affects them as beneficiaries of the budget, the Student‐Plaintiffs 5
have suffered an injury that is common to all individuals who are affected by the 6
budget.15 7
15 Our dissenting colleague contends that the Student‐Plaintiffs are
distinguishable from other beneficiaries of the District’s budget because as
students in the District’s schools “they are entitled to have the diverted funds
spent on their educations.” Diss. Op. at 7. The dissent, however, cites no
authority for this proposition. While the dissent correctly points out that the New
York State Constitution requires the state to provide students with a sound basic
education, id. at 7 n.3, this alone does not entitle the Student‐Plaintiffs to have the
IDEA reimbursement funds or other diverted funds spent specifically on their
educations. Moreover, there is no free‐standing federal constitutional right to a
public education that entitles the Student‐Plaintiffs to a minimum level of
educational services such that the deprivation of those services creates a
cognizable injury. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (“Public education is
not a ‘right’ granted to individuals by the Constitution.”). Although the Student‐
Plaintiffs “identify the educational programs and resources formerly provided at
their schools which are now unfunded,” Diss. Op. at 7, this situation only reflects
how the IDEA Settlements affect the District’s budget and, then, how those
changes in the District’s budget affect the Student‐Plaintiffs. It is precisely
because the Student‐Plaintiffs’ alleged injury arises out of the effects that the
IDEA Settlements have on the District’s budget, and not out of the effects the
IDEA Settlements have on the Student‐Plaintiffs themselves, that make the
Student‐Plaintiffs’ injury indirect. The Students‐Plaintiffs’ injury could be direct,

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26
We note that the Student‐Plaintiffs’ claims, as pleaded, are not that the 1
students were directly exposed to a school system that is increasingly segregated 2
based on religion, in part because of the alleged IDEA settlement conspiracy. See 3
e.g., Southside Fair Hous. Comm. v. City of New York, 928 F.2d 1336, 1342 (2d Cir. 4
1991) (finding sufficient, for standing purposes, allegations that the plaintiffs’ 5
neighborhood “ha[d] become increasingly and substantially segregated on racial 6
and religious grounds, with a large proportion of the Latino and African‐ 7
American population being displaced to neighborhoods outside the Area,” as 8
“[t]hey live[d] in the very neighborhood where the disputed land sales took 9
place and claim[ed] that they [were] being displaced by the creation of an 10
exclusive white Hasidic enclave”). The Student‐Plaintiffs have abandoned their 11
Equal Protection claim and, other than in a passing reference to increasing school 12
segregation, they do not assert that experiencing a segregated school system 13
contributes to their injury. Nor do the Student‐Plaintiffs claim that they have 14
“standing on the ground that they have incurred a cost or been denied a benefit 15
however, if their claim was that the underfunding of educational programs itself
was an unconstitutional establishment of religion, i.e., that the Defendants
decision to cancel a previously offered program had no secular purpose,
primarily advanced religion, or excessively entangled the government with
religious affairs. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).

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on account of their religion.” Winn, 563 U.S. at 130. The Student‐Plaintiffs claim 1
that their injury arises solely out of the District’s lack of funds and is premised 2
solely on their enrollment in the District’s schools. 16 This attenuated relationship 3
among the alleged unconstitutional expenditure, the District’s budget, and the 4
Student‐Plaintiffs’ enrollment in the District’s schools is insufficient to confer 5
standing because the alleged unconstitutional expenditure has an effect on the 6
Student‐Plaintiffs’ education that is only indirectly and incidentally related to the 7
unconstitutionality of the expenditure. 8
For the reasons articulated above, we hold that the Student‐Plaintiffs lack 9
standing to assert an Establishment Clause claim against the Defendants. It is 10
therefore unnecessary to decide whether the Defendants are entitled to absolute 11
or qualified immunity because our decision with respect to standing renders this 12
16 While we recognize that education “is not merely some governmental benefit
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation,” Plyler, 457 U.S.
at 221, we are hesitant to recognize the Student‐Plaintiffs’ theory of liability—
holding individual Board Member Defendants responsible for damages for
educational injuries caused by a lack of resources due to an Establishment Clause
violation. This theory attempts to remedy an injury that may be causally related,
but is not sufficiently connected, to the unconstitutional act or within the zone of
interests of the underlying constitutional prohibition. See Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 12
(noting “the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of
interests protected by the law invoked” (internal quotes omitted)).

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issue moot.17 See Morris‐Hayes v. Bd. of Educ. Of Chester Union Free School Dist., 423 1
F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding it unnecessary to decide whether defendants 2
were entitled to qualified immunity when the court dismissed the claims on 3
separate grounds). 4
IV. CONCLUSION 5
We have considered the Student‐Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and find 6
them to be without merit. We REVERSE the district court’s decision and 7
REMAND with instructions to dismiss the Student‐Plaintiffs’ claims against all 8
defendants. 9
17 To be clear, we make no determination as to the merits of the Student‐
Plaintiffs’ claims.

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1
REISS, District Judge, dissenting: 1
The majority holds that Student‐Plaintiffs fail to allege standing to assert 2
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims because they are only indirectly affected by Defendants’ 3
alleged Establishment Clause violations. I respectfully disagree, and would 4
affirm in part the district court’s decision.1 5
The majority cabins Student‐Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claims to a 6
“direct exposure theory” and, for that reason, addresses “only whether the 7
Student‐Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded a basis demonstrating their direct 8
exposure to the unconstitutional establishment of religion.” Maj. Op. at 15–16 9
(footnote omitted). I believe Students‐Plaintiffs’ claims are broader than the 10
majority’s formulation, and that the Establishment Clause does not require 11
“direct exposure” to the unconstitutional establishment of religion. See Sch. Dist. 12
of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221 (1963) (“The Establishment Clause, 13
unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct 14
governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which 15
establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce non‐ 16
1 I agree with the majority that Student‐Plaintiffs cannot establish standing to
challenge real estate transactions that were not consummated or the provision of
a de minimus number of religious books.

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2
observing individuals or not.”). At the pleadings stage, I would find that 1
Student‐Plaintiffs adequately allege they are “directly affected by the . . . 2
practices against which their complaints are directed.” Id. at 224 n.9. 3
Although Student‐Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing standing as a 4
jurisdictional requirement, “standing allegations need not be crafted with precise 5
detail, nor must the plaintiff prove his allegations of injury.” Baur v. Veneman, 6
352 F.3d 625, 631 (2d Cir. 2003). Indeed, “general factual allegations of injury 7
resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice[.]” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 8
504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). In determining standing, we must “accept [] all well‐ 9
pleaded allegations in the complaint as true [and] draw [] all reasonable 10
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cty., Inc. v. 11
Litchfield Historic Dist. Comm’n, 768 F.3d 183, 191 (2d Cir. 2014) (alterations in 12
original and internal quotation marks omitted) (reversing and remanding district 13
court’s dismissal of claims for lack of standing). 14
The majority concludes that Student‐Plaintiffs fail to allege injuries that are 15
sufficiently direct for prudential standing. The prudential standing doctrine is 16
“in some tension with [the Supreme Court’s] recent reaffirmation of the principle 17
that a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide cases within its jurisdiction is 18

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3
virtually unflagging.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. 1
Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). At the pleadings stage, 2
its requirements are neither stringent nor inflexible. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 3
83, 99, 101 (1968) (observing that “[s]tanding has been called one of ‘the most 4
amorphous (concepts) in the entire domain of public law[]’” and that “the 5
emphasis in standing problems is on whether the party invoking federal court 6
jurisdiction has ‘a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,’ and whether 7
the dispute touches upon ‘the legal relations of parties having adverse legal 8
interests[]’”) (citation and footnote omitted). Prudential standing ensures that 9
Student‐Plaintiffs’ claims “fall within the zone of interests to be protected or 10
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question[,]” a standard 11
that, at least for pleading purposes, is satisfied here. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. 12
Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (internal 13
quotation marks omitted). 14
“The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious 15
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” Larson v. Valente, 456 16
U.S. 228, 244 (1982). “Primary among those evils” against which the 17
Establishment Clause guards “have been sponsorship, financial support, and 18

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4
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.” Comm. for Pub. Educ. & 1
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973) (internal quotation marks 2
omitted). “It is equally well established, however, that not every [practice] that 3
confers an ‘indirect,’ ‘remote,’ or ‘incidental’ benefit upon religious institutions 4
is, for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid.” Id. at 771. For this reason, 5
Establishment Clause cases are fact sensitive,2 often requiring courts to “sift[] 6
through the details[,]” employ “careful judgment[,]” and draw “fine 7
distinctions[.]” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 847‐48 8
(1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 9
In a close case like this one, we should hesitate to dismiss Student‐ 10
Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims based on the application of “[s]ynthesiz[ed]” 11
rules that emphasize narrow categories of “direct exposure[.]” Maj. Op. at 19. 12
Establishment Clause jurisprudence does not mandate that rigid approach. To 13
the contrary, “[b]ecause standing in Establishment Clause cases can be shown in 14
2 In Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014), the Supreme Court, which
was sharply divided as to the merits, nonetheless unanimously agreed that
whether there is a violation of the Establishment Clause is a “fact‐sensitive”
inquiry. 134 S. Ct. at 1825 (plurality opinion); id. at 1838 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“As we all recognize, this is a ‘fact‐sensitive’ case.”); id. at 1851 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“The facts here matter to the constitutional issue; indeed, the
majority itself acknowledges that the requisite inquiry [is] a ‘fact‐sensitive’
one[.]”).

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5
various ways,” Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 145 (2011), 1
“[i]f an establishment of religion is alleged to cause real injury to particular 2
individuals, the federal courts may adjudicate the matter.” Id. “Like other 3
constitutional provisions, the Establishment Clause acquires substance and 4
meaning when explained, elaborated, and enforced in the context of actual 5
disputes.” Id. 6
This court’s decision in Altman v. Bedford Central School District, 245 F.3d 49 7
(2d Cir. 2001) imposes no greater burden. The Altman court explained that 8
“direct exposure to the challenged activity” is only one basis for Establishment 9
Clause standing, which, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not require “‘proof 10
that particular religious freedoms are infringed.’” Altman, 245 F.3d at 72 11
(quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224 n.9). As an example of “direct exposure,” the 12
Altman court pointed to “students attending a public school, and their parents, 13
hav[ing] standing to challenge a program of Bible reading in the school because 14
they are ‘directly affected by the laws and practices against which their 15
complaints are directed[.]’” Id. (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224 n.9). In this 16
dicta, the Altman court did not suggest that “direct exposure” required the 17
students to actually be exposed to Bible reading. Altman thus reflects the 18

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6
important distinction that “a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated 1
on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended.” 2
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223. For this same reason, a plaintiff’s ability to avoid direct 3
exposure is not a defense to an Establishment Clause violation. See id. at 224‐25 4
(“[T]he fact that individual students may absent themselves [from Bible reading 5
in school] upon parental request[] . . . furnishes no defense to a claim of 6
unconstitutionality under the Establishment Clause.”). 7
As the Altman court further recognized, the Establishment Clause does not 8
require personal confrontation with, or constraint by, religious tenets, practices, 9
or expressions; it requires only some “direct injury” as opposed to an 10
“indefinite” injury indistinguishable from that suffered by the public at large: 11
“[t]he party who invokes the power must be able to show, not only that the 12
[practice] is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of 13
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he 14
suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.” 15
Altman, 245 F.3d at 72 (quoting Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Hawthorne, 16
342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952)) (emphasis supplied). 17

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In this case, each Student‐Plaintiff attends one of the District’s public 1
schools. Collectively, they challenge Defendants’ alleged systematic diversion of 2
state and local taxes, federal funds, and grant monies in order to finance special 3
education at Yeshivas. They identify the educational programs and resources 4
formerly provided at their schools which are now unfunded, explain how they 5
are entitled to have the diverted funds spent on their educations,3 and claim 6
Defendants’ alleged diversion of resources deprives them of their “right to a 7
sound basic education by the laws and policies of the federal government and 8
the State of New York.” Joint App’x at 1072. Student‐Plaintiffs allege they can 9
demonstrate through budgetary records and academic test scores a direct causal 10
link between Defendants’ alleged diversion of District funds and the academic 11
harm they suffer. Accepting these allegations as true and drawing all reasonable 12
3 Although the majority correctly points out “there is no free‐standing federal
constitutional right to a public education that entitles the Student‐Plaintiffs to a
minimum level of educational services[,]” Maj. Op. at 25 n.15, the New York
Constitution provides that the New York Legislature “shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the
children of [that] state may be educated.” N.Y. Const. art. XI, § 1; see also Bd. of
Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369 (N.Y. 1982)
(interpreting the New York Constitution to require provision of “a sound basic
education”). In any event, an Establishment Clause claim does not require
Student‐Plaintiffs to establish that the violation deprived them of a free‐standing
federal constitutional right.

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8
inferences in Student‐Plaintiffs’ favor, at the pleading stage, their causation 1
allegations are not implausible. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982) 2
(recognizing that the deprivation of an education exerts an “inestimable toll . . . 3
on the social economic, intellectual, and psychological well‐being of the 4
individual”). 5
In characterizing Student‐Plaintiffs’ injuries as “too far removed, too 6
attenuated, from the alleged unconstitutional component of the act of funneling 7
public monies to support the advancement of Orthodox Hasidic Jewish 8
schools[,]” Maj. Op. at 22–23, the majority ignores the fact that the Student‐ 9
Plaintiffs’ educational harm arises directly out of the allegedly unconstitutional 10
acts, the general public, including taxpayers, are not suffering this same injury, 11
and Student‐Plaintiffs could not assert Establishment Clause claims if the District 12
diverted the same funds for a secular purpose. As a result, Student‐Plaintiffs’ 13
alleged injuries are not “similar to that of any other individual who is affected by 14
the District’s budget, regardless of whether that person is an employee, a 15
student, a vendor, a taxpayer, or a citizen[,]” Maj. Op. at 25, and they do not 16
allege a “generalized grievance[] . . . [that would be] most appropriately 17
addressed in the representative branches.” Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475 (internal 18

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9
quotation marks omitted). Moreover, no other class of plaintiffs can assert this 1
same claim or is better situated to assert a deprivation of this same interest. See 2
Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99‐100 (1979) (noting that 3
“under the prudential principles[,] . . . the judiciary seeks to avoid deciding 4
questions of broad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated 5
and to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a 6
particular claim”). 7
Although the majority points out that the Student‐Plaintiffs fail to cite 8
precedent authorizing their Establishment Clause claim, it is equally true that 9
there is no precedent prohibiting it. Accordingly, “[r]ather than attempting to 10
define the outer limits” of the Establishment Clause “on the basis of the present 11
record, the Court’s opinion [should] wisely permit[ ] the parties . . . to create a 12
factual record that will inform that decision.” United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 13
151, 160 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted); see also Rosenberger, 14
515 U.S. at 838‐39 (“If there is to be assurance that the Establishment Clause 15
retains its force in guarding against those governmental actions it was intended 16
to prohibit, we must in each case inquire first into the purpose and object of the 17
governmental action in question and then into the practical details of the 18

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10
program’s operation.”). “Tenuous theories of liability are better assayed in the 1
light of actual facts than in pleader’s supposition.” Adato v. Kagan, 599 F.2d 1111, 2
1117 (2d Cir. 1979); see also Braden v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 477 F.2d 1, 4‐5 (3d Cir. 3
1973) (“It would perhaps be possible for us to decide this last issue on the present 4
record but we think we should not do so. Very important constitutional 5
questions are presented and the Supreme Court has repeatedly informed us that 6
such difficult issues should not be decided except upon a full record and after 7
adequate hearing.”) (collecting Supreme Court cases). 8
For the reasons set forth above, I would affirm in part the district court’s 9
conclusion that Student‐Plaintiffs have adequately alleged standing at the 10
pleadings stage, and I would defer a determination of qualified immunity. 4 11
12
4 See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317 (1995) (observing that “an interlocutory
appeal concerning [the factual basis for qualified immunity] in a sense makes
unwise use of appellate courts’ time, by forcing them to decide in the context of a
less developed record, an issue very similar to one they may well decide anyway
later, on a record that will permit a better decision” and concluding that “we are
persuaded that [i]mmunity appeals . . . interfere less with the final judgment rule
if they [are] limited to cases presenting neat abstract issues of law”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

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