Irizarry v. Catsimatidis

11-4035-cv
Irizarry v. Catsimatidis
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 2
3
4
August Term, 2012 5
6
(Argued: December 13, 2012 Decided: July 9, 2013) 7
8
Docket No. 11-4035-cv 9
10
11
BOBBY IRIZARRY, RUBEN MORA, JOSELITO AROCHO, JOSEPH CREMA, 12
ALFRED CROKER, FRANK DELEON, MARIO DIPRETA, WILLIAM HELWIG, 13
ROBERT MISURACA, ROBERT PASTORINO, VICTOR PHELPS, DANIEL 14
SALEGNA, GILBERTO SANTIAGO, 15
16
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 17
18
CARLOS TORRES, on behalf of himself and all others similarly 19
situated, LEWIS CHEWNING, 20
21
Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-Appellees, 22
23
RAYMOND ALLEN, LLANOS BLAS, NABIL ELFIKY, MOHAMMED DABASH, 24
CARLOS MARTINEZ, LUIS MORALES, STEVE GROSSMAN, FRANKLYN 25
COLLADO, DAVID ADLER, DINO A. ZAINO, PATRICK LABELLA, ROBERT 26
MASTRONICOLA, ANTHONY BROOKS, VICTOR BENNETT, CANDIDO MOREL, 27
JOSE MARTINEZ, WAYNE HENDRICKS, HAROLD HORN, TROY MILLER, 28
OUSMANE DIATTA, ELLIOT STONE, TINA RODRIGUEZ, GABRIEL 29
KARAMANIAN, BRIAN HOMOLA, ANNA GARRETT, NELSON BETANCOURT, 30
JOSE DELACRUZ, YURI LAMARCHE, MICHAEL GROSECLOSE, RODOLFO 31
DELEMOS, PIO MOREL, ABIGAIL CLAUDIO, MALICK DIOUF, DAVID 32
OTTO, ALEJANDRO MORALES, VICTOR DIAZ, PAUL PETROSINO, 33
EDUARDO GONZALEZ, JR., JOSE BONILLA-REYES, VINCENT PEREZ, 34
MARTIN GONZALEZ, CALVIN ADAMS, WILLIAM FRITZ, KATHERINE 35
HALPERN, CHRISTIAN TEJADA, EDWARD STOKES, PLINIO MEDINA, 36
TOWANA STARKS, LAWSON HOPKINS, RUBEN M. ALEMAN, EUGENE 37
RYBACKI, EARL CROSS, MANOLO HIRALDO, ROBERT HAIRSTON, 38
39
Plaintiffs, 40
41
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1
2
3
-v.- 4
5
JOHN CATSIMATIDIS, 6
7
Defendant-Appellant. 8
9
GRISTEDE’S OPERATING CORP., GRISTEDE’S FOODS NY, INC., 10
NAMDOR, INC., GRISTEDE’S FOODS, INC., CITY PRODUCE OPERATING 11
CORP., 12
13
Defendants-Counter-Claimants, 14
15
GALLO BALSECA, JAMES MONOS, 16
17
Defendants. *
18
19
20
21
22
Before: 23
W ESLEY AND H ALL , Circuit Judges, G OLDBERG , Judge.**
24
25
26
27
A class of current and former employees of Gristede’s 28
supermarkets sued several corporate and individual 29
defendants for alleged violations of the Fair Labor 30
Standards Act and the New York Labor Law. The United States 31
District Court for the Southern District of New York 32
(Crotty, J.) granted partial summary judgment for the 33
plaintiffs, concluding that John Catsimatidis, the owner, 34
president, and CEO of Gristede’s, was the plaintiffs’ 35
“employer” under both laws. Catsimatidis appeals, and we 36
AFFIRM IN PART, VACATE IN PART, AND REMAND. 37
38
*The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as
listed above.
**The Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, of the United States
Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
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1
2
JONATHAN D. HACKER (Walter Dellinger, Brianne J. 3
Gorod, Joanna Nairn, on the brief), O’Melveny 4
& Myers LLP, Washington, D.C. for Appellant. 5
6
DEEPAK GUPTA, Gupta Beck PLLC, Washington, D.C. 7
(Gregory A. Beck, Jonathan E. Taylor, Gupta 8
Beck PLLC, Washington, D.C.; Adam T. Klein, 9
Justin M. Swartz, Molly A. Brooks, Outten & 10
Golden LLP, New York, NY, on the brief) for 11
Appellees. 12
13
RACHEL GOLDBERG, Attorney, Office of the Solicitor 14
(M. Patricia Smith, Solicitor of Labor, 15
Jennifer S. Brand, Associate Solicitor, Paul 16
L. Frieden, Counsel for Appellate Litigation, 17
on the brief), for Amicus Curiae Secretary of 18
Labor. 19
20
Tsedeye Gebreselassie, Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, 21
National Employment Law Project, New York, NY, 22
for Amicus Curiae Make The Road New York, 23
Brandworkers International, Restaurant 24
Opportunities Center New York, Chinese Staff 25
and Workers Association, National Mobilization 26
Against Sweatshops, National Employment Law 27
Project, Legal Aid Society of New York, Urban 28
Justice Center, Asian American Legal Defense 29
and Education Fund. 30
31
32
33
W ESLEY , Circuit Judge. 34
35
After the failure of a settlement in a wage-and-hour 36
case brought by a group of employees of Gristede’s 37
supermarkets, the plaintiff employees moved for partial 38
summary judgment on the issue of whether John Catsimatidis, 39
the chairman and CEO of Gristede’s Foods, Inc., could be 40
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held personally liable for damages. The case turns on 1
whether Catsimatidis is an “employer” under the Fair Labor 2
Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), and the New York 3
Labor Law (“NYLL”), N.Y. Lab. Law §§ 190(3), 651(6). The 4
United States District Court for the Southern District of 5
New York (Crotty, J.) granted partial summary judgment for 6
the plaintiffs on the issue, establishing that Catsimatidis 7
would be held jointly and severally liable for damages along 8
with the corporate defendants. See Torres v. Gristede’s 9
Operating Corp., No. 04 Civ. 3316(PAC), 2011 WL 4571792 10
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2011) (“Torres III”). Catsimatidis 11
appeals. We affirm the district court’s decision so far as 12
it established that Catsimatidis was an “employer” under the 13
FLSA; we vacate and remand the grant of partial summary 14
judgment on plaintiffs’ NYLL claims. 15
Background 16
Catsimatidis is the chairman, president, and CEO of 17
Gristede’s Foods, Inc., which operates between 30 and 35 18
stores in the New York City metro area and has approximately 19
1700 employees. Although a series of mergers and 20
acquisitions has complicated the question of which companies 21
are responsible for the Gristede’s business and 22
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supermarkets, the parties have not made corporate structure 1
the focus of this case. They essentially agree that 2
Catsimatidis is the owner and corporate head of all 3
implicated companies, but they dispute the manner and degree 4
of his control over the stores and employees. 5
In 2004, a group of then-current and former employees 6
of Gristede’s supermarkets sued several companies involved 7
in operating the stores. The employees also sued three 8
individual defendants: Catsimatidis, Gristede’s District 9
Manager James Monos, and Gristede’s Vice President Gallo 10
Balseca. The district court certified a class composed of 11
“[a]ll persons employed by defendants as Department Managers 12
or Co-Managers who were not paid proper overtime premium 13
compensation for all hours that they worked in excess of 14
forty in a workweek any time between April 30, 1998 and the 15
date of final judgment in this matter (the ‘class period’).” 16
Torres v. Gristede's Operating Corp., No. 04 Civ. 3316(PAC), 17
2006 WL 2819730, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006) (“Torres 18
I”) (quotation marks omitted). In this decision, the court 19
noted that the parties disputed the duties of co-managers 20
and department managers, though the scope of plaintiffs’ 21
duties are not at issue in this appeal. 22
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After two-and-a-half years of litigation, the district 1
court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on their 2
FLSA and NYLL claims, which concerned reduction of hours, 3
withholding of overtime, misclassification as exempt 4
employees, and retaliation. See Torres v. Gristede's 5
Operating Corp., 628 F. Supp. 2d 447, 461-63, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 6
2008) (“Torres II”). The court held that plaintiffs were 7
entitled to liquidated damages, the amount of which would be 8
determined in future proceedings. Id. at 462 n.14, 465. 9
Plaintiffs reserved the right to move separately for a 10
determination that the individual defendants were 11
individually liable as joint employers. Id. at 453 n.2. 12
Following the summary judgment order, the parties 13
reached a settlement agreement, which the district court 14
approved. The corporate defendants later defaulted on their 15
payment obligations under the agreement. Defendants sought 16
to modify the settlement, but the district court denied 17
their request. Plaintiffs then moved for partial summary 18
judgment on Catsimatidis’s personal liability as an 19
employer. 20
The district court granted the motion for reasons both 21
stated on the record at the conclusion of oral argument on 22
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the motion, see Special App’x at 43-46, and memorialized in 1
a written decision, see Torres III. The reasons included 2
the fact that Catsimatidis “hired managerial employees,” 3
“signed all paychecks to the class members,” had the “power 4
to close or sell Gristede’s stores,” and “routinely 5
review[ed] financial reports, work[ed] at his office in 6
Gristede’s corporate office and generally preside[d] over 7
the day to day operations of the company.” Torres III, 2011 8
WL 4571792, at *2. According to the district court, “[f]or 9
the purposes of applying the total circumstances test, it 10
does not matter that Mr. Catsimatidis has delegated powers 11
to others[; w]hat is critical is that Mr. Catsimatidis has 12
those powers to delegate.” Id. (citation omitted). The 13
court concluded that “[t]here is no area of Gristede’s which 14
is not subject to [Catsimatidis’s] control, whether [or not] 15
he chooses to exercise it,” and that, therefore, 16
Catsimatidis “had operational control and, as such, [] may 17
be held to be an employer.” Id. at *3. 1
18
1In its oral ruling and accompanying order, the district
court granted summary judgment finding Catsimatidis individually
liable as an “employer” under the NYLL, but the court did not
explain its reasons beyond what might be inferred from its
discussion setting forth its reasoning in the FLSA context. See
Torres III, 2011 WL 4571792, at *1; Special App’x at 46-47.
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Discussion2
1
I. Definition of “employer” under the FLSA 2
The Supreme Court has recognized “that broad coverage 3
[under the FLSA] is essential to accomplish the [statute’s] 4
goal of outlawing from interstate commerce goods produced 5
under conditions that fall below minimum standards of 6
decency.” Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 7
U.S. 290, 296 (1985). Accordingly, the Court “has 8
consistently construed the Act liberally to apply to the 9
furthest reaches consistent with congressional direction.” 10
Id. (quotation marks omitted). “The common law agency test 11
was found too restrictive to encompass the broader 12
definition of the employment relationship contained in the 13
[FLSA].” Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 14
1993). Instead, the statute “defines the verb ‘employ’ 15
2“We review an award of summary judgment de novo, and we
will uphold the judgment only if the evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to the party against whom it is entered,
demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact
and that the judgment was warranted as a matter of law.”
Barfield v. NYC Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir.
2008) (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). “The nonmoving party must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,
and this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its
favor.” Rubens v. Mason, 527 F.3d 252, 254 (2d Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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expansively to mean ‘suffer or permit to work.’” Nationwide 1
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (quoting 2
29 U.S.C. § 203(g)). Unfortunately, however, the statute’s 3
definition of “employer” relies on the very word it seeks to 4
define: “‘Employer’ includes any person acting directly or 5
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an 6
employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). The statute nowhere defines 7
“employer” in the first instance. 8
The Supreme Court noted early on that the FLSA contains 9
“no definition that solves problems as to the limits of the 10
employer-employee relationship under the Act.” Rutherford 11
Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728 (1947). The Court 12
has also observed “that the ‘striking breadth’ of the FLSA’s 13
definition of ‘employ’ ‘stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ 14
to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a 15
strict application of traditional agency law principles’ in 16
order to effectuate the remedial purposes of the act.’” 17
Barfield, 537 F.3d at 141 (quoting Darden, 503 U.S. at 326) 18
(internal citation omitted). 19
“Accordingly, the Court has instructed that the 20
determination of whether an employer-employee relationship 21
exists for purposes of the FLSA should be grounded in 22
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‘economic reality rather than technical concepts.’” Id. 1
(quoting Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 2
28, 33 (1961)). The “economic reality” test applies equally 3
to whether workers are employees and to whether managers or 4
owners are employers. See Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 5
172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999). 6
“[T]he determination of the [employment] relationship 7
does not depend on such isolated factors” as where work is 8
done or how compensation is divided “but rather upon the 9
circumstances of the whole activity.” Rutherford, 331 U.S. 10
at 730. Some early cases concerned managerial efforts to 11
distance themselves from workers in an apparent effort to 12
escape the FLSA’s coverage. For example, in Goldberg, the 13
Supreme Court considered whether a manufacturing cooperative 14
was an “employer” of “homeworker” members who created 15
knitted and embroidered goods in their homes and were paid 16
by the month on a rate-per-dozen basis. 366 U.S. at 28-29. 17
The Court concluded that this constituted an employer- 18
employee relationship because management’s authority made 19
“the device of the cooperative too transparent to survive 20
the statutory definition of ‘employ’ and the Regulations 21
governing homework.” Id. at 33. “In short, if the 22
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‘economic reality’ rather than ‘technical concepts’ is to be 1
the test of employment, these homeworkers are employees.” 2
Id. (internal citations omitted). Similarly, the Court 3
noted in Rutherford that “[w]here the work done, in its 4
essence, follows the usual path of an employee, putting on 5
an ‘independent contractor’ label does not take the worker 6
from the protection of the Act.” 331 U.S. at 729. 7
The Second Circuit “has treated employment for FLSA 8
purposes as a flexible concept to be determined on a case- 9
by-case basis by review of the totality of the 10
circumstances”; we have “identified different sets of 11
relevant factors based on the factual challenges posed by 12
particular cases.” Barfield, 537 F.3d at 141-42. 13
In Carter v. Dutchess Community College, 735 F.2d 8 (2d 14
Cir. 1984), we identified factors that are likely to be 15
relevant to the question of whether a defendant is an 16
“employer.” In that case, prison inmates teaching classes 17
in a program that was managed by a college claimed the 18
college was their employer. The district court rejected 19
this assertion because “the college had only qualified 20
control over the inmate instructors; the Department of 21
Correctional Services always maintained ultimate control.” 22
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Barfield, 537 F.3d at 142 (describing Carter) (quotation 1
marks omitted). This Court, however, concluded that the 2
“ultimate control” rule “would not comport with the 3
‘remedial’ purpose of the FLSA, which Congress intended to 4
‘have the widest possible impact in the national economy.’” 5
Id. (quoting Carter, 735 F.2d at 12). Instead, we 6
established four factors to determine the “economic reality” 7
of an employment relationship: “whether the alleged employer 8
(1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) 9
supervised and controlled employee work schedules or 10
conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method 11
of payment, and (4) maintained employment records.” Id. 12
(quoting Carter, 735 F.2d at 12). 3
13
Barfield also discusses the factors this court has used 14
“to distinguish between independent contractors and 15
employees,” 537 F.3d at 143 (citing Brock v. Superior Care, 16
3 Although the Carter court did not ultimately conclude that
the prisoners were employees of the college, it noted that the
following facts about the college “may be sufficient to warrant
FLSA coverage” and certainly presented issues of material fact on
the subject: the college “made the initial proposal to ‘employ’
workers; suggested a wage as to which there was ‘no legal
impediment’; developed eligibility criteria; recommended several
inmates for the tutoring positions; was not required to take any
inmate it did not want; decided how many sessions, and for how
long, an inmate would be permitted to tutor; and sent the
compensation directly to the inmate’s prison account.” 735 F.2d
at 15.
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Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1058-59 (2d Cir. 1988)), and “to assess 1
whether an entity that lacked formal control nevertheless 2
exercised functional control over a worker,” id. (citing 3
Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 4
2003)). 3 None of the factors used in any of these cases, 5
however, comprise a “rigid rule for the identification of an 6
FLSA employer.” Id. “To the contrary, . . . they provide 7
‘a nonexclusive and overlapping set of factors’ to ensure 8
that the economic realities test mandated by the Supreme 9
Court is sufficiently comprehensive and flexible to give 10
3 In Zheng, the court considered whether a garment
manufacturer that contracted out the last phase of its production
process to workers including the plaintiffs was an “employer”
under the FLSA. It concluded that the relevant factors in such
an instance were
(1) whether [the manufacturer]’s premises and equipment were
used for the plaintiffs’ work; (2) whether the Contractor
Corporations had a business that could or did shift as a
unit from one putative joint employer to another; (3) the
extent to which plaintiffs performed a discrete line-job
that was integral to [the manufacturer]’s process of
production; (4) whether responsibility under the contracts
could pass from one subcontractor to another without
material changes; (5) the degree to which the [manufacturer]
or [its] agents supervised plaintiffs’ work; and (6) whether
plaintiffs worked exclusively or predominantly for [the
manufacturer].
Zheng, 355 F.3d at 72. These factors highlight the flexible and
comprehensive nature of the economic realities test in
determining when an entity is an “employer” (in this case,
whether the manufacturer was a “joint employer” along with
another corporation) but are not directly implicated here.
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proper effect to the broad language of the FLSA.” Id. 1
(quoting Zheng, 355 F.3d at 75-76). 2
a. Individual liability 3
None of the cases above dealt specifically with the 4
question we confront here: whether an individual within a 5
company that undisputedly employs a worker is personally 6
liable for damages as that worker’s “employer.” The only 7
case from our Circuit to confront the question squarely is 8
RSR, 172 F.3d 132. RSR provided guards, pre-employment 9
screening, and other security services. It was sued for 10
FLSA violations with regard to its security guards. Its 11
chairman of the board, Portnoy, was found by the district 12
court after a bench trial to be an “employer” under the 13
statute. We affirmed, in a decision that both applied the 14
four-factor test from Carter and noted other factors bearing 15
upon the “overarching concern [of] whether the alleged 16
employer possessed the power to control the workers in 17
question.” Id. at 139. 18
As background, we noted that “[a]lthough Portnoy 19
exercised broad authority over RSR operations . . . , he was 20
not directly involved in the daily supervision of the 21
security guards.” Id. at 136. Nonetheless, because “he was 22
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the only principal who had bank credit, he exercised 1
financial control over the company.” Id. “Thus, he had 2
authority over” the operations manager, who directly 3
supervised the guards. Id. “Portnoy kept himself apprised 4
of RSR operations by receiving periodic reports [including] 5
work orders, memos, investigation reports, and invoices 6
concerning the business operations, as well as weekly 7
timesheets of [a manager’s] duties.” Id. at 137. He also 8
“referred a few individuals to RSR as potential security 9
guard employees,” “assigned guards to cover specific 10
clients, sometimes set the rates clients were charged for 11
those services, gave [a manager] instructions about guard 12
operations, and forwarded complaints about guards to” a 13
manager. Id. 14
Portnoy also “signed payroll checks on at least three 15
occasions” and “established a payment system by which 16
clients who wanted undercover operatives would pay” 17
Portnoy’s separate labor-relations firm. Id. Additionally, 18
Portnoy “represented himself to outside parties as” being 19
“the ‘boss’ of RSR” by “allowing his name to be used in 20
sales literature, by representing to potential clients that 21
he was a principal with control over company operations . . 22
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. and by giving [a manager] instructions with respect to [] 1
clients’ security needs.” Id. 2
We determined that at least three of the four Carter 3
factors applied. First, Portnoy had hired employees, and 4
although this “involved mainly managerial staff, the fact 5
that he hired individuals who were in charge of the guards 6
[was] a strong indication of control.” Id. at 140. Second, 7
Portnoy had, “on occasion, supervised and controlled 8
employee work schedules and the conditions of employment.” 9
Id. Third, he had “participate[d] in the method of 10
pay[ing]” the guards, even though he was not involved in 11
determining their salaries, because he had previously 12
“ordered a stop to the illegal pay practice of including 13
security guards on 1099 forms as independent contractors,” 14
and he “had the authority to sign paychecks throughout the 15
relevant period.” Id. Although there was no evidence that 16
Portnoy had been involved in maintaining employment records, 17
we confirmed that the fact that “this fourth factor is not 18
met is not dispositive.” Id. The “‘economic reality’ test 19
encompasses the totality of circumstances, no one of which 20
is exclusive.” Id. at 139. In sum, we determined that 21
Portnoy was “not only a 50 percent stockowner; he had direct 22
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involvement with the security guard operations from time to 1
time and was generally involved with all of RSR’s 2
operations.” Id. at 141. 3
RSR also highlighted two legal questions relevant here. 4
The first concerns the scope of an individual’s authority or 5
“operational control” over a company – at what level of a 6
corporate hierarchy, and in what relationship with plaintiff 7
employees, must an individual possess power in order to be 8
covered by the FLSA? The second inquiry, related but 9
distinct, concerns hypothetical versus actual power: to what 10
extent and with what frequency must an individual actually 11
use the power he or she possesses over employees to be 12
considered an employer? 13
i. Operational control 14
In addition to applying the Carter test, RSR noted the 15
district court’s recognition that Portnoy exercised direct 16
authority over the two persons most responsible for managing 17
the security guards, as well as the fact that “[b]ecause 18
[Portnoy] controlled the company financially, it was no idle 19
threat when he testified that he could have dissolved the 20
company if [one of the managers] had not followed his 21
directions.” Id. at 140 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we 22
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emphasized that we rejected Portnoy’s argument “that 1
evidence showing his authority over management, supervision, 2
and oversight of RSR’s affairs in general is irrelevant, and 3
that only evidence indicating his direct control over the 4
guards should be considered.” Id. We concluded that this 5
formulation “ignores the relevance of the totality of the 6
circumstances in determining Portnoy’s operational control 7
of RSR’s employment of the guards.” Id. We also noted that 8
“operational control” had been cited as relevant by other 9
circuits considering the question of individual liability 10
under the FLSA. See id. 11
“Operational control” is at the heart of this case. 12
Catsimatidis’s core argument is that he was a high-level 13
employee who made symbolic or, at most, general corporate 14
decisions that only affected the lives of the plaintiffs 15
through an attenuated chain of but-for causation. Although 16
Catsimatidis undisputedly possessed broad control over 17
Gristede’s corporate strategy, including the power to decide 18
to take the company public, to open stores, and to carry 19
certain types of merchandise, he contends that a FLSA 20
“employer” must exercise decision-making in a “day-to-day” 21
capacity. Appellant’s Br. at 3. By this, he appears to 22
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mean decisions about individual store-level operations, 1
close to, if not actually including, the particular working 2
conditions and compensation practices of the employees 3
themselves. Plaintiffs counter that many cases have found 4
individuals with “operational control” on a more general 5
level to be employers. Appellees’ Br. at 28-31. 6
Most circuits to confront this issue have acknowledged 7
– and plaintiffs do not dispute – that a company owner, 8
president, or stockholder must have at least some degree of 9
involvement in the way the company interacts with employees 10
to be a FLSA “employer.” Many cases rely on Wirtz v. Pure 11
Ice Co., 322 F.2d 259, 262 (8th Cir. 1963), for this 12
proposition. In Wirtz, the court concluded that the 13
individual defendant was not an employer even though he was 14
the “controlling stockholder and dominating figure” because 15
although he “could have taken over and supervised the 16
relationship between the corporation and its employees had 17
he decided to do so,” he did not. Id. (quotation marks 18
omitted). The defendant visited the facility at issue a few 19
times per year but “had nothing to do with the hiring of the 20
employees or fixing their wages or hours,” and he “left the 21
matter of compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act up to 22
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the various managers of the businesses in which he had an 1
interest.” Id. at 262-63. The court noted, however, that 2
if it were to consider “a combination of stock ownership, 3
management, direction and the right to hire and fire 4
employees, then a contrary conclusion would be well 5
supported.” Id. at 263. 6
In RSR, we cited three cases with holdings in 7
accordance with Wirtz in resolving the “operational control” 8
issue. First, in Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 9
190, 194-95 (5th Cir. 1983), the Fifth Circuit determined 10
that an individual without an interest in the employer 11
corporation could be held liable if he “effectively 12
dominates its administration or otherwise acts, or has the 13
power to act, on behalf of the corporation vis-a-vis its 14
employees” – or if he lacked that power but “independently 15
exercised control over the work situation.” The Sabine 16
court found the individual defendant liable because he 17
“indirectly controlled many matters traditionally handled by 18
an employer in relation to an employee (such as payroll, 19
insurance, and income tax matters),” noting also that the 20
defendant’s “financial gymnastics directly affected Sabine’s 21
employees by making it possible for Sabine to meet its 22
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payroll and keep its employees supplied with the equipment 1
and materials necessary to perform their jobs.” Id. at 195. 2
(quotation marks omitted). 3
Second, in Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 4
F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir. 1991), the Sixth Circuit was unmoved 5
by the protestations of an individual defendant who 6
testified that he “made major corporate decisions” but “did 7
not have day-to-day control of specific operations.” The 8
court found that the defendant’s responsibilities, which 9
included determining employee salaries, constituted 10
“operational control of significant aspects of the 11
corporation’s day to day functions.” Id. (quotation marks 12
omitted) (emphasis in original). 13
Finally, in Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1511 (1st 14
Cir. 1983), the First Circuit imposed liability on 15
individual defendants “who together were President, 16
Treasurer, Secretary and sole members of the Board” of the 17
defendant company. One of the defendants had been 18
“personally involved in decisions about layoffs and employee 19
overtime hours,” id., and the defendants together had 20
“operational control of significant aspects of the 21
corporation's day to day functions, including compensation 22
21

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of employees, and [] personally made decisions to continue 1
operations despite financial adversity during the period of 2
nonpayment,” id. at 1514. 3
Plaintiffs in our case place particular emphasis on the 4
statement by the Agnew court that “[t]he overwhelming weight 5
of authority is that a corporate officer with operational 6
control of a corporation’s covered enterprise is an employer 7
along with the corporation, jointly and severally liable 8
under the FLSA for unpaid wages.” 4 Id. at 1511. Although 9
this appears to suggest that any amount of corporate control 10
is sufficient to establish FLSA liability, the First Circuit 11
warned against taking the FLSA’s coverage too far, noting 12
that “the Act’s broadly inclusive definition of ‘employer’” 13
could, if “[t]aken literally and applied in this context[,] 14
. . . make any supervisory employee, even those without any 15
4 This language was cited by our Circuit in a case
concerning the meaning of the word “employer” in the context of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), in which
we noted that “[i]n FLSA cases, courts have consistently held
that a corporate officer with operational control who is directly
responsible for a failure to pay statutorily required wages is an
‘employer’ along with the corporation, jointly and severally
liable for the shortfall.” Leddy v. Standard Drywall, Inc., 875
F.2d 383, 387 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Agnew, 712 F.2d at 1511).
Because Leddy did not require or contain any actual analysis of
the FLSA, however, this statement does not constitute a holding
that liability on the basis of “operational control” requires an
individual to have been directly responsible for FLSA violations.
22

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control over the corporation’s payroll, personally liable 1
for the unpaid or deficient wages of other employees.” Id. 2
at 1513. 3
Drawing on this language, the First Circuit later 4
concluded that individuals who had “exercised some degree of 5
supervisory control over the workers” and been “responsible 6
for overseeing various administrative aspects of the 7
business” but had not demonstrated other important 8
characteristics – “in particular, the personal 9
responsibility for making decisions about the conduct of the 10
business that contributed to the violations of the Act” – 11
were not personally liable under the FLSA. Baystate 12
Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 678 (1st 13
Cir. 1998). The court rejected an “expansive application of 14
the definition of an ‘employer’” that would find that “the 15
significant factor in the personal liability determination 16
is simply the exercise of control by a corporate officer or 17
corporate employee over the ‘work situation.’” Id. at 679. 18
No other decision has gone as far as Baystate; most courts 19
have endeavored to strike a balance between upholding the 20
broad remedial goals of the statute and ensuring that a 21
liable individual has some relationship with plaintiff 22
employees’ work situation. 23
23

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For example, in Gray v. Powers, 673 F.3d 352, 354-57 1
(5th Cir. 2012), the court found that the co-owner of a 2
company that owned a nightclub was not a bartender’s 3
“employer” despite being a signatory on the corporate 4
account and “occasionally sign[ing] several pages of pre- 5
printed checks.” The individual defendant had little 6
control over the bar and its employees except to direct a 7
bartender to serve certain customers on several occasions 8
when he was at the bar. Id. at 354. Similarly, in Patel v. 9
Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 638 (11th Cir. 1986), the Eleventh 10
Circuit held that an individual who was both president and 11
vice president of a corporation, as well as a director and 12
principal stockholder, was not an employer because he did 13
not “have operational control of significant aspects of [the 14
company’s] day-to-day functions, including compensation of 15
employees or other matters ‘in relation to an employee.’” 16
By contrast, in Reich v. Circle C. Investments, Inc., 17
998 F.2d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 1993), the court found that a 18
non-owner of a company that had invested in a nightclub had 19
exercised sufficient “control over the work situation” as 20
the “driving force” behind the company. The court cited 21
evidence that the individual hired employees, gave them 22
24

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instructions (including specific songs for dancers’ 1
routines), and signed their payroll checks. Id. He had 2
also removed money from corporate safes, “ordered one 3
employee to refrain from keeping records of the tip-outs,” 4
and “spoke[n] for [the company] during the Secretary’s 5
investigation of possible FLSA violations.” Id. 6
These cases reaffirm the logic behind our holding in 7
RSR, which focused on defendant Portnoy’s “operational 8
control of RSR’s employment of the guards,” see RSR, 172 9
F.3d at 140 (emphasis added), rather than simply operational 10
control of the company. Evidence that an individual is an 11
owner or officer of a company, or otherwise makes corporate 12
decisions that have nothing to do with an employee’s 13
function, is insufficient to demonstrate “employer” status. 14
Instead, to be an “employer,” an individual defendant must 15
possess control over a company’s actual “operations” in a 16
manner that relates to a plaintiff’s employment. It is 17
appropriate, as we implicitly recognized in RSR, to require 18
some degree of individual involvement in a company in a 19
manner that affects employment-related factors such as 20
workplace conditions and operations, personnel, or 21
compensation – even if this appears to establish a higher 22
25

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threshold for individual liability than for corporate 1
“employer” status. 2
The fundamental concern in the initial cases construing 3
the FLSA was preventing a business entity from causing 4
workers to engage in work without the protections of the 5
statute. It was an “economic reality” that the “homework” 6
cooperative in Goldberg functioned as the workers’ employer 7
because it paid them to create clothing, even if the 8
compensation structure technically circumvented agency-law 9
concepts of formal employment. See Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 31 10
(stating that the Court would be “remiss . . . if we 11
construed the Act loosely so as to permit this homework to 12
be done in ways not permissible under the Regulations”); see 13
also United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 (1945) 14
(“A worker is as much an employee when paid by the piece as 15
he is when paid by the hour.”). This concern is not as 16
pressing when considering the liability for damages of an 17
individual within a company that itself is undisputedly the 18
plaintiffs’ employer. 19
Even in the individual-liability context, however, “the 20
remedial nature of the [FLSA] . . . warrants an expansive 21
interpretation of its provisions so that they will have ‘the 22
26

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widest possible impact in the national economy.’” RSR, 172 1
F.3d at 139 (quoting Carter, 735 F.2d at 12). Nothing in 2
RSR, or in the FLSA itself, requires an individual to have 3
been personally complicit in FLSA violations; the broad 4
remedial purposes behind the statute counsel against such a 5
requirement. The statute provides an empty guarantee absent 6
a financial incentive for individuals with control, even in 7
the form of delegated authority, to comply with the law, and 8
courts have continually emphasized the extraordinarily 9
generous interpretation the statute is to be given. Nor is 10
“only evidence indicating [an individual’s] direct control 11
over the [plaintiff employees] [to] be considered.” RSR, 12
172 F.3d at 140. Instead, “evidence showing [an 13
individual’s] authority over management, supervision, and 14
oversight of [a company’s] affairs in general” is relevant 15
to “the totality of the circumstances in determining [the 16
individual’s] operational control of [the company’s] 17
employment of [the plaintiff employees].” Id. 18
A person exercises operational control over employees 19
if his or her role within the company, and the decisions it 20
entails, directly affect the nature or conditions of the 21
employees’ employment. Although this does not mean that the 22
27

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individual “employer” must be responsible for managing 1
plaintiff employees – or, indeed, that he or she must have 2
directly come into contact with the plaintiffs, their 3
workplaces, or their schedules – the relationship between 4
the individual’s operational function and the plaintiffs’ 5
employment must be closer in degree than simple but-for 6
causation. Although the answer in any particular case will 7
depend, of course, on the totality of the circumstances, the 8
analyses in the cases discussed above, as well as the 9
responsibilities enumerated in the Carter factors, provide 10
guidance for courts determining when an individual’s actions 11
rise to this level. 12
ii. Potential power 13
In RSR, we noted that “operational control” need not be 14
exercised constantly for an individual to be liable under 15
the FLSA: 16
[Employer] status does not require continuous 17
monitoring of employees, looking over their 18
shoulders at all times, or any sort of absolute 19
control of one’s employees. Control may be 20
restricted, or exercised only occasionally, 21
without removing the employment relationship from 22
the protections of the FLSA, since such 23
limitations on control do not diminish the 24
significance of its existence. 25
26
172 F.3d at 139 (quotation marks and alteration omitted). 27
28

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The district court in this case appears to have relied on 1
this language in stating that “[w]hat is critical is that 2
Mr. Catsimatidis has [certain] powers to delegate” and that 3
“[t]here is no area of Gristede’s which is not subject to 4
his control, whether [or not] he chooses to exercise it.” 5
Torres III, 2011 WL 4571792 at *2-3. The parties also 6
dispute the importance of evidence indicating that 7
Catsimatidis only rarely exercised much of the power he 8
possessed. 9
Employer power that is “restricted or exercised only 10
occasionally” does not mean “never exercised.” In Donovan 11
v. Janitorial Services, Inc., 672 F.2d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 12
1982), the Fifth Circuit noted that the company owner’s 13
“considerable investment in the company gives him ultimate, 14
if latent, authority over its affairs,” and the fact that he 15
had “exercised that authority only occasionally, through 16
firing one employee, reprimanding others, and engaging in 17
some direct supervision of Johnson Disposal drivers, does 18
not diminish the significance of its existence.” In 19
Superior Care, this court noted that although 20
representatives of the defendant business, a nurse-staffing 21
company, visited job sites only infrequently, the company 22
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had “unequivocally expressed the right to supervise the 1
nurses’ work, and the nurses were well aware that they were 2
subject to such checks as well as to regular review of their 3
nursing notes.” 840 F.2d at 1060. “An employer does not 4
need to look over his workers’ shoulders every day in order 5
to exercise control.” Id. Similarly, in Carter, we 6
rejected the proposition that the community college was not 7
employing prison inmates solely because the prison had 8
“ultimate control” over the prisoners, reasoning that the 9
community college also made decisions that affected the 10
prisoners’ work. 735 F.2d at 13-14. 11
The Eleventh Circuit has squarely held that even when a 12
defendant “could have played a greater role in the day-to- 13
day operations of the [] facility if he had desired, . . . 14
unexercised authority is insufficient to establish liability 15
as an employer.” Alvarez Perez v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel 16
Club, Inc., 515 F.3d 1150, 1161 (11th Cir. 2008). The 17
Alvarez court found that an officer in a company that owned 18
a kennel club was not an employer, in part because even 19
though he might have had the authority to do so, he “had not 20
taken part in the day-to-day operations of the facility, had 21
not been involved in the supervision or hiring and firing of 22
employees, and had not determined their compensation.” Id. 23
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Unlike Alvarez, RSR does not state unambiguously that 1
unexercised authority is insufficient to establish FLSA 2
liability, and we see no need to do so here in light of the 3
evidence of the authority that Catsimatidis did exercise. 4
Nonetheless, all of the cases discussed indicate that the 5
manifestation of, or, at the least, a clear delineation of 6
an individual’s power over employees is an important and 7
telling factor in the “economic reality” test. Ownership, 8
or a stake in a company, is insufficient to establish that 9
an individual is an “employer” without some involvement in 10
the company’s employment of the employees. 11
II. Catsimatidis as “employer” 12
“Using this ‘economic reality’ test, we must decide 13
whether [Catsimatidis] is an employer under the FLSA.” See 14
RSR, 172 F.3d at 140. Is there “evidence showing his 15
authority over management, supervision, and oversight of 16
[Gristede’s] affairs in general,” see id., as well as 17
evidence under the Carter framework or any other factors 18
that reflect Catsimatidis’s exercise of direct control over 19
the plaintiff employees? 20
21
22
31

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a. Catsimatidis’s overall authority 1
Catsimatidis is the chairman, president, and CEO of 2
Gristede’s Foods, Inc. Joint App’x 1016. 5 He does not 3
report to anyone else at Gristede’s. Id. at 1794. 4
Catsimatidis personally owns the building in which 5
Gristede’s headquarters is located. Id. at 1789-90. His 6
office is in that building, shared with Charles Criscuolo, 7
Gristede’s COO. Id. at 1793-94. Catisimatidis was “usually 8
there for part of the day, at least [four] days a week.” 9
Id. at 1334. The human resources and payroll department is 10
located in the same building. Id. at 1794-5. Regarding his 11
duties, Catsimatidis testified: “I do the banking. I do the 12
real estate. I do the financial. . . . I come up with 13
concepts for merchandising. . . . I’m there every day if 14
there is a problem,” including problems with buildings, 15
problems with the “Department of Consumer Affairs, 16
governmental relations,” and “[p]roblems with vendors, 17
relationships with vendors, it takes up most of the time.” 18
Id. at 1800-01. 19
20
5Although Catsimatidis’s and other employees’ functions
within Gristede’s appear to have shifted during the lengthy
pendency of this lawsuit, all references are to the period
relevant to the case.
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A series of subordinate managers reported to 1
Catsimatidis but did not appear to have an extensive amount 2
of interaction with him. Catsimatidis spoke to Criscuolo 3
every day because they shared an office. Id. at 1797. 4
Catsimatidis testifed that Vice President Gallo Balseca 5
“runs operations” and was “in the stores every day,” and 6
that the district managers reported to Balseca. Id. at 7
1796. Balseca reported to Criscuolo, but Catsimatidis 8
rarely spoke directly to Balseca. Id. at 1794, 1797. 9
Catsimatidis testified that the company’s director of 10
security “reports to the chief operating officer on a day- 11
to-day basis, but if there is something he thinks I should 12
know about, he would call and tell me.” Id. at 1809. 13
Catsimatidis occasionally sat in on merchandising and 14
operations meetings. Id. at 1799. 15
Catsimatidis stayed apprised of how Gristede’s was 16
doing, reviewing the overall profit and loss statements as 17
well as the “sales to purchases” statements of particular 18
stores. He received “weekly gross margin reports from all 19
the perishable departments” and “a comprehensive P[rofit] 20
and L[oss] report on a quarterly basis” that he studied in 21
depth and sometimes used to make general recommendations. 22
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Id. at 1849. As Executive Director of Human Resources and 1
Asset Protection Renee Flores stated, “if there is a store 2
that buys more than they sell, and it’s a consistent thing, 3
he may say, ‘You know what, you might want to take a look at 4
that, because they’re buying more than they’re selling.’” 5
Id. at 1450-51. 6
Catsimatidis testified that he made “big picture” 7
“merchandising decisions, like do we, for the next six 8
months, push Coca-Cola or push Pepsi-Cola?” and “the 9
decisions on having pharmacies in the stores.” Id. at 1815. 10
He testified that after making this sort of decision, he 11
would tell Criscuolo or “yell it out when they have the 12
[merchandising meeting]” in their shared office. Id. at 13
1816. He might also “yell out to go out and do more sales.” 14
Id. at 1817. 15
In general, employees agreed, as Executive Vice 16
President Robert Zorn testified, that Catsimatidis “has 17
whatever privileges an owner of a company has” to “make 18
ultimate decisions as to how the company is run,” and that 19
there was “no reason to believe that if he chose to make a 20
decision anybody there has the power to override him.” 21
Id. at 1329. They also agreed that Catsimatidis has the 22
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power to “shut down a store” or “sell a store if he felt 1
that was the appropriate thing to do.” Id. at 1370. 6
2
b. Involvement with stores 3
Although Catsimatidis did not exercise managerial 4
control in stores on the day-to-day level of a manager, the 5
evidence demonstrates that he exercised influence in 6
specific stores on multiple occasions. For example, he made 7
suggestions regarding how products are displayed in stores. 8
In general, he testified that he focused on “driv[ing] 9
sales, driv[ing] product, get[ting] more sales out of the 10
stores” through techniques such as “buying a Coca-Cola at 11
[the] right price, and [] put[ting] it on a front end 12
display at the right price.” Id. at 1819. 13
6At oral argument and in its written decision, the district
court placed substantial reliance on an affidavit that
Catsimatidis submitted in a separate lawsuit, a trademark action
brought by Trader Joe’s Company after it found out about a
Gristede’s plan to re-open a former Gristede’s store under the
name “Gristede’s Trader John’s.” The district court emphasized
that the affidavit, which discussed the process by which
Catsimatidis had come up with the idea, indicated that
Catsimatidis has the power to “set prices for goods offered for
sale,” “select the decor for the stores,” and “control any
store’s signage and advertising.” Torres III, 2011 WL 4571792,
at *1. Although the parties dispute the significance and
admissibility of the affidavit, it is not necessary to our
decision. The affidavit indicates that Catsimatidis had the
power to open a new store that was generally intended to offer
“items at prices materially lower than comparable items in our
other Gristede[ ’ ]s stores.” Joint App’x 3752. This only
underscores the implication of the evidence we have already
discussed: that Catsimatidis possessed the ability to control
Gristede’s operations at a high level.
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Catsimatidis testified specifically that “when [he] 1
used to go around the stores, [he] used to make comments to 2
the store managers about displays,” telling them, for 3
example, “if you put up this product, you might sell $100 a 4
week.” Id. at 1828. He would make visits to “five or ten” 5
stores on Saturday mornings, staying about ten minutes in 6
each one. Id. He referred to these as “just [] goodwill 7
visit[s], merchandising, sales, what are we doing right, 8
what are we doing wrong, what can we do better.” Id. at 9
1831-32. His deposition also contained the following 10
exchange: 11
Q: Why did you want to visit every store? 12
13
A: To check the merchandising. 14
15
Q: Can’t the store managers take care of that 16
themselves? 17
18
A: If the store managers did it perfectly, then I 19
wouldn’t have to visit the stores. 20
21
Q: But you have a level of trust in the store managers, 22
right? 23
24
A: You hope so, yes. 25
26
Q: Why do you think it was necessary for the president 27
of the company to go around to all these stores? 28
29
A: For the same reason Sam Walton went and visited his 30
stores. 31
32
Q: What reason is that? 33
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1
A: You just get a better feeling for merchandising. Sam 2
Walton was a great merchandiser. 3
4
Q: On the Saturday morning visits to the stores, what 5
did you do? 6
7
A: I walked in, introduced myself to the manager, most 8
of them I knew, and just we would talk about 9
merchandising. I would say is this selling, is this 10
not selling, are you missing any products that you 11
think you should have? And I would – I felt I would 12
get input from store managers on merchandising 13
problems. 14
15
Id. at 1829-30. 16
Catsimatidis would also address problems that occurred 17
in individual stores. For example, he testified that if a 18
vendor called him and said there was a problem, “[m]aybe 19
that he was supposed to have a display and not have a 20
display,” he would not get involved personally but would 21
refer the issue to Criscuolo. Id. at 1827. Catsimatidis 22
testified that “if a store didn’t look clean, or if it was 23
very cluttered, [he] would make the comment about it . . . 24
to the store manager, and then follow up and say it to 25
[Criscuolo].” Id. at 1831. On one occasion, he went to a 26
store and was “annoyed” that a type of fish he tried to buy 27
was not in stock, so he “sent an e-mail to the meat 28
director, copy to his boss, . . . sent one to the store 29
manager, and sent one to the district manager.” Id. at 30
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1882. Catsimatidis commented that the emails were his 1
attempt to “bring[] it to their attention that the 2
department looked bad” and that he “would hope the 3
supervisor or the merchandisers would fix it.” Id. at 1883. 4
Additionally, Catsimatidis testified that the company’s 5
system automatically forwards him copies of any consumer 6
complaints, which he then forwards by email “to the 7
responsible parties . . . with a comment of ‘What the hell 8
is happening?’” Id. at 1821. For example, he might forward 9
a complaint about a store being dirty, and he sent a 10
complaint about lids not fitting coffee cups to the deli 11
director. Id. He testified, “I figured if they think I 12
know about the problem, they’ll work harder towards fixing 13
it.” Id. at 1822. When asked why this was, he said, “I 14
guess they want to keep the boss happy, and I want to keep 15
the consumers happy,” and that “one of my jobs is how to get 16
the consumers in our stores, and how to keep them in our 17
stores.” Id. at 1823. He has directed similar complaints 18
to store managers. Id. at 1825. 19
Mitchell Moore, a former store manager, testified that 20
Catsimatidis asked him to get involved with a “reset” at a 21
particular store, meaning an effort to “change the store 22
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around, move items around the store, allocation, bring in 1
new items.” Id. at 1418. Moore also testified that 2
Catsimatidis, while walking through a store, might “want me 3
to change a display around or to make it fuller or to put a 4
different variety in there,” or to “put signs on certain 5
items, give them a good deal on it” if he wanted Moore to 6
“push a particular item.” Id. at 1421-22. Zorn said that 7
he had seen Catsimatidis go to stores for grand openings or 8
reopenings, “walk up and down the aisles . . . ask[] 9
questions about – you know, he sees a product that is new 10
and asks, you know – you know, who we buy that from and, you 11
know, comments on the store decor,” although Zorn noted that 12
Catsimatidis was “there more in a PR capacity than a 13
management type capacity.” Id. at 1352-53. 14
c. The Carter factors 15
The first element of the Carter test considers whether 16
the individual defendant “had the power to hire and fire 17
employees.” Barfield, 537 F.3d at 142 (quotation marks 18
omitted). The evidence demonstrates that Catsimatidis 19
possesses, but rarely exercises, the power to hire or fire 20
anyone he chooses. He testified, “I guess I can fire the 21
people that directly report to me,” which he said would 22
39

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include “only maybe four or five” employees such as the COO 1
and CFO. Joint App’x 1863. He testified in 2005 that he 2
could not remember having fired anyone in five or six years. 3
Id. at 1862. In RSR, we emphasized that the hiring and 4
firing of “individuals who were in charge of [the plaintiff 5
employees] is a strong indication of control.” RSR, 172 6
F.3d at 140. 7
Zorn testified that Catsimatidis had hired him and 8
“obviously would” have the authority to hire and fire 9
others, “but he doesn’t get involved in that.” Joint App’x 10
1338. For example, when Zorn was “involved in letting go 11
long-time employees for various reasons,” he let 12
Catsimatidis know “as a courtesy” and fired the employees 13
even if Catsimatidis “wasn’t happy about it.” Id. at 1343. 14
On one occasion when both Zorn and Catsimatidis interviewed 15
a potential manager, Catsimatidis “was in favor of it but he 16
left the decision to” Zorn. Id. at 1342. Catsimatidis 17
promoted Deborah Clusan from director of payroll to director 18
of payroll and human resources. Id. at 476. He promoted 19
Moore to store manager from night manager. Moore testified 20
that Catsimatidis “came to speak with me, asked me what my 21
background was, . . . and then the next day the vice 22
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president called me, and told me that I would be starting in 1
the Store 504 the next day.” Id. at 1412, 1415. Moore, 2
like other employees, indicated that he “view[ed] Mr. 3
Catsimatidis as [his] boss” and that Catsimatidis would have 4
the power to fire a store employee. Id. at 1425-26. 5
The second Carter factor asks whether the individual 6
defendant “supervised and controlled employee work schedules 7
or conditions of employment.” Barfield, 537 F.3d at 142 8
(quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs overstate the 9
importance of the two pieces of evidence on which they rely 10
for this factor. Although they state in their brief that 11
Catsimatidis said he “has handled complaints from Gristede’s 12
workers’ union representatives ‘every week for as long as I 13
could remember,’” Appellees’ Br. at 39, this 14
mischaracterizes Catsimatidis’s testimony; he stated that he 15
had not been personally involved in union negotiations or 16
discussions of problems, see Joint App’x 1802-03, 1812, 17
1876. Plaintiffs also assert that Catsimatidis “authorized 18
an application for wage subsidies and tax credits on behalf 19
of Gristede’s employees.” Appellees’ Br. at 39. The 20
evidence reflects only that Catsimatidis signed the 21
application for tax credits to which Gristede’s was entitled 22
41

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for employing people “coming off of Social Services, off of 1
welfare.” Joint App’x at 482-83. Moreover, plaintiffs do 2
not indicate how this affected their “work schedules or 3
conditions of employment.” Although Catsimatidis’s 4
involvement in the company and the stores as discussed above 5
demonstrates some exercise of operational control, it does 6
not appear to relate closely to this factor of the 7
Carter test. 8
The third factor asks whether the individual defendant 9
“determined the rate and method of payment.” Barfield, 537 10
F.3d at 142 (quotation marks omitted). The district court 11
and plaintiffs emphasize the fact that Catsimatidis’s 12
electronic signature appears on paychecks. This – like all 13
factors – is not dispositive. See Gray, 673 F.3d at 354. 14
Nonetheless, we held in RSR that “[t]he key question is 15
whether [the defendant] had the authority to sign paychecks 16
throughout the relevant period, and he did.” RSR, 172 F.3d 17
at 140. 18
RSR also focused on the fact that the defendant 19
“controlled the company financially.” Id. It is clear that 20
Catsimatidis possessed a similar degree of control. He 21
testified that he keeps track of “payroll” as “a line item 22
42

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on accounting” and “a part of profit and loss,” to know what 1
percentage of Gristede’s sales and expenses payroll 2
comprises, but he does not get involved with individual 3
salaries or schedules. Joint App’x at 1834-35. Although he 4
did not speak to his managers “about people getting paid,” 5
id. at 1834, he knew that employees were paid on time 6
“[b]ecause the unions would have come down on us real hard” 7
if there was a problem. Id. at 1852. Catsimatidis 8
explained that he might also learn about a problem “[i]f I 9
walked down the aisle, and the employee saw me, they might 10
complain,” although the official procedure for such 11
complaints involved the employees’ union and store manager. 12
Id. at 1866-67. Catsimatidis set up a meeting between 13
lower-level managers and an outside payroll company, id. at 14
1452-53, and although he did not know specifically “if 15
George Santiago in the store got a paycheck that week,” his 16
“rules are if somebody works, they get paid,” id. at 469. 17
The district court also noted that Catsimatidis stated “in 18
open Court in this proceeding that he could shut down the 19
business, declare bankruptcy, as well as provide the 20
personal signature necessary for a bank letter of credit to 21
be issued in favor of Gristede’s,” Torres III, 2011 WL 22
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4571792, at *1, which further demonstrates the kind of 1
financial control emphasized in RSR. 2
The fourth Carter factor asks whether the individual 3
defendant “maintained employment records.” Barfield, 537 4
F.3d at 142 (quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs offer 5
only that “Catsimatidis works in the same office where 6
employment records are kept” and promoted the payroll 7
director, Appellees’ Br. at 41, essentially admitting that 8
Catsimatidis did not meet this factor. In sum, the evidence 9
– much of it Catsimatidis’s own testimony – indicates that 10
Catsimatidis meets the first and third Carter factors. 11
d. Totality of the circumstances 12
There is no question that Gristede’s was the 13
plaintiffs’ employer, and no question that Catsimatidis had 14
functional control over the enterprise as a whole. His 15
involvement in the company’s daily operations merits far 16
more than the symbolic or ceremonial characterization he 17
urges us to apply. Unlike the defendant in Wirtz, who 18
visited his company’s facilities only a few times a year, 19
Catsimatidis was active in running Gristede’s, including 20
contact with individual stores, employees, vendors, and 21
customers. Catsimatidis dealt with customer complaints, in- 22
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store displays and merchandising, and the promotion of store 1
personnel. That he may have done so “only occasionally” 2
does not mean that these actions are irrelevant, see RSR, 3
172 F.3d at 139, especially when considered in the context 4
of his overall control of the company. 5
Although there is no evidence that he was responsible 6
for the FLSA violations – or that he ever directly managed 7
or otherwise interacted with the plaintiffs in this case – 8
Catsimatidis satisfied two of the Carter factors in ways 9
that we particularly emphasized in RSR: the hiring of 10
managerial employees, and overall financial control of the 11
company. See id. at 136-37, 140 (finding that the 12
individual defendant “exercised financial control over the 13
company” and “frequently” gave instructions to subordinate 14
managers); see also Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 15
972 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that the individual defendant 16
was the “‘top man’” in a hotel company who “held [the 17
hotels’] purse-strings and guided their policies” and that 18
the hotels “speaking pragmatically, . . . functioned for the 19
profit of his family”). This involvement meant that 20
Catsimatidis possessed, and exercised, “operational control” 21
over the plaintiffs’ employment in much more than a “but- 22
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for” sense. His decisions affected not only Gristede’s 1
bottom line but individual stores, and the personnel and 2
products therein. 3
We recognize that the facts here make for a close case, 4
but we are guided by the principles behind the liquidated 5
damages provision of the FLSA in resolving the impact of the 6
totality of the circumstances described herein. The Supreme 7
Court has noted that “liquidated damages as authorized by 8
the FLSA are not penalties but rather compensatory damages 9
‘for the retention of a workman’s pay which might result in 10
damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate 11
other than by liquidated damages.’” Republic Franklin Ins. 12
Co. v. Albemarle County Sch. Bd., 670 F.3d 563, 568 (4th 13
Cir. 2012) (quoting Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 14
697, 707 (1945)); see also Marshall v. Brunner, 668 F.2d 15
748, 753 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that liquidated damages “are 16
compensatory, not punitive in nature”). 17
As counsel for amicus curiae the Secretary of Labor 18
explained at oral argument, the purpose of the FLSA is not 19
to punish an employer but to remunerate aggrieved employees. 20
Considered in the context of the expansive interpretation 21
that courts have afforded the statute, this policy reasoning 22
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particularly counsels in favor of finding that Catsimatidis 1
was an “employer” given the failure of the settlement 2
between the corporate defendants and the plaintiff 3
employees. Catsimatidis was not personally responsible for 4
the FLSA violations that led to this lawsuit, but he 5
nonetheless profited from them. And although the Gristede’s 6
Supermarkets business entity appears to have been larger 7
than other businesses discussed in the cases that have 8
considered this question, the company was not so large as to 9
render Catsimatidis’s involvement a legal fiction. The 10
company is not public. Its stores, in which Catsimatidis 11
actively exercised his influence, are all in the New York 12
City metropolitan area, as are the company headquarters, 13
where he worked almost daily. In sum, as the district court 14
concluded, “it is pellucidly clear that he is the one person 15
who is in charge of the corporate defendant.” 7 Torres III, 16
2011 WL 4571792, at *3. 17
18
7The district court’s decision indirectly referenced
statements made by Catsimatidis in open court at a hearing on the
settlement agreement to the effect that he was “here to speak for
1,700 employees that [sic] their jobs . . . on the line,” that he
“represent[ed] the 1,700 current employees,” and that he was
“their employer.” Joint App’x 3594-95. We do not, of course,
afford these statements weight as legal conclusions, but they are
telling.
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Although we must be mindful, when considering an 1
individual defendant, to ascertain that the individual was 2
engaged in the culpable company’s affairs to a degree that 3
it is logical to find him liable to plaintiff employees, we 4
conclude that this standard has been met here. 5
Catsimatidis’s actions and responsibilities – particularly 6
as demonstrated by his active exercise of overall control 7
over the company, his ultimate responsibility for the 8
plaintiffs’ wages, his supervision of managerial employees, 9
and his actions in individual stores – demonstrate that he 10
was an “employer” for purposes of the FLSA. 11
III. New York Labor Law 12
The NYLL defines “employer” as “any person . . . 13
employing any individual in any occupation, industry, trade, 14
business or service” or “any individual . . . acting as 15
employer.” N.Y. Lab. Law. §§ 190(3), 651(6). The 16
definition of “employed” under the NYLL is that a person is 17
“permitted or suffered to work.” Id. § 2(7). 18
The district court granted partial summary judgment in 19
plaintiffs’ favor on their NYLL claims, but neither its oral 20
nor its written decision contained any substantive 21
discussion of the issue. Plaintiffs assert that the tests 22
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for “employer” status are the same under the FLSA and the 1
NYLL, but this question has not been answered by the New 2
York Court of Appeals. Defendants respond that corporate 3
officers cannot be held liable under the NYLL simply by 4
virtue of their status, but plaintiffs are arguing that 5
Catsimatidis should be held liable “not as [a] corporate 6
officer[] or shareholder[], but as [an] employer[].” See 7
Chu Chung v. New Silver Palace Rest., Inc., 272 F. Supp. 2d 8
314, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 9
Plaintiffs also contend in their response brief that 10
“there is no need to also establish [Catsimatidis’s] status 11
as an employer under state law” because the settlement 12
agreement establishes that he will be personally liable “‘if 13
the Court holds John Catsimatidis to be an 14
employer’–period.” Appellees’ Br. at 41-42 (quoting 15
Settlement Agreement § 3.1(H)). Defendants do not respond 16
to this in their reply brief. 17
In light of the possible disagreement between the 18
parties regarding the need for us to decide this issue of 19
state law, and particularly in light of the absence of 20
discussion of the issue in the district court’s decision, we 21
vacate the grant of summary judgment in plaintiffs’ favor on 22
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the NYLL claims and remand to the district court. The case 1
will return to the lower court in any event for a 2
determination of damages in light of our holding today; in 3
the process, the parties and the district court may 4
determine (1) whether the NYLL question requires resolution, 5
and (2) what that resolution should be. 6
Conclusion 7
We have examined all of Catsimatidis’s arguments on 8
appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing 9
reasons, the judgment of the district court granting partial 10
summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs is AFFIRMED IN PART, 11
VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 12
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