By letter dated October 25, 2011, counsel for Prudential filed a letter with the… v. Sard Custom Homes UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 2 August…

* By letter dated October 25, 2011, counsel for Prudential
filed a letter with the Clerk of Court informing the Court that
"the issues being pursued in the appeal do not involve
matters that were litigated by Prudential before the District
Court." Letter dated October 25, 2011, from Patrick M. Fahey,
Esq. to Office of the Clerk, at 1. Prudential has thereafter not
participated in this appeal, although it remains technically a
party to it listed as a defendant-appellee in the caption.
11-3298
Scholz Design v. Sard Custom Homes
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 2
August Term, 2011 3
(Argued: February 23, 2012 Decided: August 15, 2012) 4
Docket No. 11-3298 5
------------------------------------- 6
Scholz Design, Inc., 7
Plaintiff-Appellant, 8
- v - 9
Sard Custom Homes, LLC, Prudential Connecticut Realty, * & 10
Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate, LLC, 11
Defendants-Appellees. 12
------------------------------------- 13
Before: LEVAL, SACK, and HALL, Circuit Judges. 14
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District 15
Court for the District of Connecticut (Janet Bond Arterton, 16
Judge) granting defendants' motion to dismiss. We conclude that 17
the district court erred in deciding that because the 18
architectural drawings at issue did not contain a level of detail 19

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2
sufficient to enable construction of homes based on them, they 1
were not protected by the Copyright Act. We also conclude that 2
the drawings are sufficiently original to receive protection as 3
"pictorial, graphic, [or] sculptural works," 17 U.S.C. 4
§ 102(a)(5), under the Copyright Act, and we reverse the judgment 5
of the district court insofar as it held otherwise. Because the 6
court dismissed the plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and 7
violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act based on its 8
conclusion that the drawings were not protected by copyright, we 9
vacate its dismissal of those claims and to that extent remand 10
the case to the district court. 11
Reversed in part; vacated and remanded in part. 12
Appearances: LOUIS K. BONHAM, Osha Liang, LLP, 13
Austin, TX (Holly M. Polglase, Hermes, 14
Netburn, O'Connor & Spearing, P.C., 15
Boston, MA, on the brief) for Plaintiff- 16
Appellant. 17
JOHN J. ROBACYNSKI, Alan J. Rome, Rome, 18
Clifford, Katz & Koerner, LLP, Hartford, 19
CT, for Defendant-Appellee Sard Custom 20
Homes, LLC. 21
THOMAS J. FINN, Paula Cruz Cedillo, 22
McCarter & English LLP, Hartford, CT, 23
for Defendant-Appellee Coldwell Banker 24
Residential Real Estate, LLC. 25

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1 An "elevation" is a "scale drawing of the side, front, or
rear of a structure." Am. Heritage Dictionary 580 (4th ed.
2006).
2 These images and the allegedly infringing uses at issue
may be viewed at http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/scholzdesign.htm.
3
SACK, Circuit Judge: 1
BACKGROUND 2
The plaintiff-appellant, Scholz Design, Inc. 3
("Scholz"), alleges that three front-elevation 1 architectural 4
drawings of homes it designed in the late 1980s were copied and 5
posted on various websites by the defendants in violation of 6
Scholz's copyrights. The plaintiff also makes related claims for 7
breach of contract and violations of the Digital Millennium 8
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201, et seq. 9
Scholz created technical drawings, or blueprints, for 10
three homes -- which it called the "Springvalley A," 11
"Wethersfield B," and "Breckinridge A" -- and submitted them to 12
the Copyright Office in 1988 and 1989 together with the front 13
elevation drawings that are the subject of this suit, each 14
showing the appearance of the front of the houses surrounded by 15
lawn, bushes, and trees. See Scholz Design, Inc. v. Sard Custom 16
Homes, LLC, No. 11-3298, Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 73, 76, 87 17
(2d Cir. Oct. 11, 2011). 2 Scholz was granted registration of 18
copyrights based on all these submissions. 19

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4
In February 1992, Scholz and Sard Custom Homes ("Sard") 1
entered into an agreement (the "Builder Agreement I") permitting 2
Sard to construct homes using Scholz's home plans, including 3
these three designs. See Builder Agreement I at 1-2, J.A. 97-98. 4
The three-year contract required Sard to pay Scholz $1 per square 5
foot of each home constructed using its plans, up to a maximum of 6
$50,000 a year. Id. at §§ 5,9,10. Scholz and Sard renewed the 7
contract for another three-year term in 1995 (the "Builder 8
Agreement II"). Builder Agreement II at 1-2, J.A. 100-101. Both 9
agreements required that Sard not "copy or duplicate any of the 10
[Scholz] materials nor . . . [use them] in any manner to 11
advertise or build a [Scholz Design] or derivative except under 12
the terms and conditions of the agreement." Builder Agreement I 13
at 1; Builder Agreement II at 1. 14
Scholz alleges that, after the termination of Scholz’s 15
agreement with Sard and in a manner not permitted by the 16
agreement, Sard and co-defendant Prudential Connecticut Realty 17
("Prudential") posted copies of Scholz's copyrighted drawings of 18
the Springvalley and Wethersfield homes on two different websites 19
to advertise Sard’s "ability" to build the homes. Am. Compl. 20
¶ 15. Scholz also alleges that Sard and co-defendant Coldwell 21
Banker Residential Real Estate, Inc. ("Coldwell Banker") copied 22
Scholz's copyrighted image of the Breckinridge design on Coldwell 23
Banker's website for the same unpermitted purpose. Scholz 24

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5
further alleges that Sard, Prudential, and Coldwell Banker "may 1
have used, reproduced, displayed, distributed, marketed or 2
advertised" those designs through other means in addition to the 3
websites identified. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18,33. 4
In October 2010, Scholz brought suit against the three 5
defendants in the United States District Court for the District 6
of Connecticut. The February 1, 2011, amended complaint alleges 7
two counts of copyright infringement, two violations of the 8
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., breach of contract, and 9
violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), 17 10
U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9-72. 11
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing 12
inter alia that the pictures "could not have been copyrighted as 13
architectural works because, the copyrights having been granted 14
in 1988 and 1989, they predate the [Architectural Works Copyright 15
Protection Act ("AWCPA"), Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VII (1990)] 16
and that the conceptual nature of these depictions means that 17
they are not protected by Scholz's copyright because they contain 18
insufficient detail from which a building could be constructed." 19
Scholz Design, Inc. v. Sard Custom Homes, LLC, No. 10-cv-1681, 20
2011 WL 2899093, at *2, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76663, at *6 (D. 21
Conn. July 15, 2011). The district court (Janet Bond Arterton, 22
Judge) agreed. The court, in its "Ruling on Motions to Dismiss," 23
reasoned that "copyright protection extends to the component 24

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3 The district court also dismissed two claims brought under
the Lanham Act. See Scholz Design, 2011 WL 2899093, at *3-*4,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76663, at *6-*8. The plaintiff does not
appeal the dismissal of those claims, which were brought against
all defendants. This accounts for Prudential's withdrawal from
these proceedings -- Prudential had only filed a motion to
dismiss in the district court with regard to the Lanham Act
claims, and did not ask for dismissal of the copyright
infringement, breach of contract, or DMCA claims against it. See
note *, supra.
6
images of architectural designs to the extent that those images 1
allow a copier to construct the protected design," and therefore 2
"the copied images do not fulfill the intrinsic function of an 3
architectural plan and thus the act of copying them does not 4
violate any right protected by a copyright for architectural 5
technical drawings." Id. at *3, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76663, at 6
*9. 7
Because it concluded that the plaintiff's amended 8
complaint did not state a claim for copyright infringement, the 9
district court also granted defendants' motion to dismiss claims 10
alleging violations of the DMCA and breach of contract, which, in 11
the district court's view, required that the plaintiff have a 12
valid copyright infringement claim. 3 Id. at *4, 2011 U.S. Dist. 13
LEXIS 76663, at *14. 14
The plaintiff appeals. 15

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4 This appeal and the district court's decision focus on
whether the drawings at issue are properly subject to copyright
protection, rather than whether they have been copied. Indeed,
during the oral argument on the motion to dismiss before the
district court, the court assumed that the defendants "just cut
and pasted [the drawings] on to the[] website[s] for purposes of
this motion." Transcript of Oral Argument on Mot. to Dismiss,
Scholz Design, Inc. v. Sard Custom Homes LLC, No. 10-cv-1681, at
21 (D. Conn. Sept. 12, 2011), ECF No. 78.
7
DISCUSSION 1
I. Standard of Review 2
We review a district court's grant of a motion to 3
dismiss de novo, accepting all factual allegations in the 4
complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the 5
plaintiff's favor. Flagler v. Trainor, 663 F.3d 543, 546 n.2 (2d 6
Cir. 2011); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 7
II. Copyright Infringement 8
In order to demonstrate copyright infringement, a 9
plaintiff must show ownership of a valid copyright and copying of 10
the protectable elements of the copyrighted work. 4 See Medforms, 11
Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Solutions, Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 109 (2d 12
Cir. 2002). A certificate of copyright registration is prima 13
facie evidence of ownership of a valid copyright, but the alleged 14
infringer may rebut that presumption. MyWebGrocer, LLC v. 15
Hometown Info, Inc., 375 F.3d 190, 192 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing 17 16
U.S.C. § 410(c)). To qualify for copyright protection, a work 17
must be original –- that is, it must be independently created by 18

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8
the author and possess "at least some minimal degree of 1
creativity." Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 2
U.S. 340, 345 (1991). The work need not be "particularly novel 3
or unusual." Mattel, Inc. v. Goldberger Doll Mfg. Co., 365 F.3d 4
133, 135 (2d Cir. 2004). "[T]he requisite level of creativity is 5
extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast 6
majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess 7
some creative spark, no matter how crude, humble or obvious it 8
might be." Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (citation and internal 9
quotation marks omitted). 10
The defendants' principal argument, with which the 11
district court agreed, was that the allegedly infringed drawings 12
were not entitled to copyright protection because they lacked 13
sufficient detail to allow for construction of the homes 14
depicted. We disagree. Copyright protection of a pictorial 15
work, whether depicting a house, or a flower, or a donkey, or an 16
abstract design, does not depend on any degree of detail. The 17
rights Scholz claims in this suit derive from the general 18
copyright law and not from the AWCPA, which has no relevance to 19
the suit. 20
A. Copyright for Pictorial Works 21
Scholz’s copyright allegations are straightforward: It 22
created three separate original drawings (depicting homes), 23
registered them with the Copyright Office, and the defendants 24

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5 Most cases examining alleged infringement deal with
thornier issues than whether a work is sufficiently creative to
be protected by copyright, such as whether an "inexact copy" is
substantially similar enough to constitute infringement, see
Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc.,
338 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[T]he defendant may infringe
on the plaintiff's work not only through literal copying of a
portion of it, but also by parroting properties that are apparent
9
without authorization made exact copies of those drawings on 1
their websites. Nothing more is required for a copyright claim. 2
The district court apparently was of the view that, 3
because the drawings were architectural, something more was 4
required for their copyright protection. It is black-letter law, 5
however, that courts accept as protected "any work which by the 6
most generous standard may arguably be said to evince 7
creativity." 1-2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on 8
Copyright § 2.08 (2012). Justice Holmes explained more than a 9
century ago that "[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for 10
persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves the 11
final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations." Bleistein 12
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). As 13
noted above, the only requirement for copyrightability of a work 14
is that it "possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity 15
. . . no matter how crude, humble or obvious it might be." 16
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 17
While we have not had occasion to consider a case 18
presenting precisely the same issue as does this one, 5 we have 19

-- 9 of 26 --

only when numerous aesthetic decisions embodied in the
plaintiff's work of art . . . are considered in relation to one
another."), or whether elements of an allegedly infringed work
that have been appropriated are facts or ideas not amenable to
copyright, see Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky, Skelly Engineers LLP,
303 F.3d 460, 467 (2d Cir. 2002) ("To the extent that the site
plan sets forth the existing physical characteristics of the site
. . . it sets forth facts; copyright does not bar the copying of
such facts."); Attia v. Soc. of N.Y. Hosp., 201 F.3d 50, 56 (2d
Cir. 1999) ("We may assume with Plaintiff that the ideas taken,
or at least some of them, are powerful, dynamic ideas of immense
value . . . . Under the law of copyright, however, the power of
an idea does not improve the creator's right to prevent
copying."). Those issues are not presented by this appeal.
10
said in affirming summary judgment for the defendants based on 1
alleged copying of certain conceptual elements of an 2
architectural sketch that, although the copying of "ideas" at 3
issue there did not constitute infringement, "we do not mean to 4
suggest that, in the domain of copyrighted architectural 5
depictions, only final construction drawings can contain 6
protected expression." Attia v. Soc. of N.Y. Hosp., 201 F.3d 50, 7
57 (2d Cir. 1999). 8
We see no reason why Scholz's drawings depicting the 9
appearance of houses it had designed should be treated 10
differently from any other pictorial work for copyright purposes. 11
Andrew Wyeth and Edward Hopper were famous for their paintings of 12
houses, and Claude Monet for paintings of the Houses of 13
Parliament and of Rouen Cathedral. None of these depictions of 14
buildings were sufficiently detailed to guide construction of the 15
buildings depicted, but that would surely not justify denying 16

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11
them copyright protection. If an exact copy of Scholz’s drawings 1
was made by the defendant, as alleged, and as appears to be the 2
case based on the evidence submitted with the complaint, that 3
would appear to constitute infringement. 4
B. Copyright Registration 5
The defendants argue that Scholz's pictorial 6
representations of the houses are not entitled to copyright 7
protection because its certificates of registration referred to 8
"architectural technical drawings" as the "nature of authorship," 9
and in the "nature of work" sections referred to "blueprints." 10
See, e.g., Certificate of Copyright at 1, J.A. 42. This was 11
significant, according to the defendants, because regulations 12
promulgated under the AWCPA, governing the copyright extended to 13
buildings based on copyrighted architectural plans, provide that 14
"[w]here dual copyright claims exist in technical drawings and 15
the architectural work depicted in the drawings, any claims with 16
respect to the technical drawings and architectural work must be 17
registered separately." 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(c)(4). 18
Scholz's registration of the subject drawings under 19
section 102(a)(5) occurred prior to passage of the AWCPA. Scholz 20
accordingly was not seeking, and did not receive, registration 21
under that later expansion of the copyright law. Its 22
registration of its drawings did not become invalid as the result 23

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12
of the subsequent passage of the AWCPA. That later expansion of 1
the copyright law is not involved in this suit. 2
C. The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act 3
We think that the district court's ruling likely 4
stemmed from a misunderstanding regarding the relationship both 5
before and after enactment of the AWCPA between the scope of 6
protection for pictorial works such as these drawings under the 7
Copyright Act, and that afforded architectural works under the 8
Copyright Act. 9
While we think this to be a straightforward case of 10
infringement, the district court did not. The defendants 11
contended, and the district court agreed, that because the 12
drawings at issue were "architectural drawings," something more 13
was required of them for copyright protection than would be 14
required for any other "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work" 15
under section 102(a)(5). Indeed, architectural works are 16
currently afforded special status under the law. That special 17
status is, however, irrelevant for purposes of this case because 18
Scholz is not alleging infringement under the AWCPA, but under 19
the pre-existing protection of the Copyright Act for pictorial 20
works. The fact that Scholz's drawings might or might not be 21
protected under the AWCPA, depending on various factors, does not 22
deprive them of the protection they have as pictorial works 23
regardless of those factors. 24

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6 In or about 1990 the United States became a signatory to
the Berne Convention, which required copyright protection for
constructed buildings. The AWCPA fulfilled this obligation. See
Leceister v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1226 (9th Cir. 2000)
(Fisher, J., dissenting) ("The sole purpose of legislating at
this time is to place the United States unequivocally in
compliance with its Berne Convention obligations." (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 101-735, at 20)).
7 As the defendants acknowledge, because the Breckinridge
drawings and plans were published two years prior to the passage
of the AWCPA, the home itself would not have even been subject to
protection as an architectural work. 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.11(d)(3)(i). The record does not reflect whether the other
homes were ever registered under section 102(8).
13
Prior to the enactment of the AWCPA, while 1
architectural structures themselves did not receive copyright 2
protection, architectural plans, blueprints, and technical 3
drawings, as well as original, creative sketches of the type at 4
issue here, were indeed covered under the Copyright Act's 5
protection of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works." 17 6
U.S.C. § 102(a)(5). 6
7
Scholz contends that the drawings are protected under 8
section 102(a)(5), and not under section 102(8), which, as part 9
of the AWCPA, added protection for "architectural works." 7
10
According to Scholz, the AWCPA is therefore inapplicable. We 11
agree. The AWCPA did not affect the copyright protection that 12
section 102(a)(5) has long extended to architectural plans, 13
drawings, and blueprints. 14
Historically, copyright law provided limited 15
protection to works of architecture. 16

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14
Architectural plans, while not explicitly 1
mentioned in the Copyright Act of 1976, were 2
covered under a provision affording 3
protection to "pictorial, graphic, and 4
sculptural works." But architectural 5
structures themselves were afforded virtually 6
no protection. 7
. . . 8
[After the AWCPA,] the holder of a copyright 9
in an architectural plan . . . has two forms 10
of protection, one under the provision for an 11
"architectural work" under 17 U.S.C. § 12
102(a)(8), and another under the provision 13
for a "pictorial, graphical, or sculptural 14
work" under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5). 15
T-Peg, Inc. v. VT. Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 109-10 (1st 16
Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Oravec v. Sunny Isles 17
Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1228 n.8 (11th Cir. 2008) 18
("[T]he scope of copyright protection for architectural plans 19
registered under § 102(a)(5) was unaffected by the AWCPA."); H.R. 20
Rep. No. 101-735 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 21
6950-51. ("Protection for architectural plans, drawings, and 22
models as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works under section 23
102(a)(5) . . . is unaffected by this bill. . . . The bill's 24
intention is to keep [the copyright in the architectural work and 25
the copyright in plans and drawings] separate. An individual 26
creating an architectural work by depicting that work in plans or 27
drawing will have two separate copyrights, one in the 28
architectural work (section 102(a)(8)), the other in the plans or 29
drawings (section 102(a)(5))."). 30

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15
Thus, prior to passage of the AWCPA courts had held 1
that use of copyrighted architectural plans to construct a 2
building would not constitute infringement, but then as now, 3
copying those plans would. See Nat'l Med. Care, Inc. v. 4
Espiritu, 284 F. Supp. 2d 424, 435 (S.D. W.Va. 2003) (explaining 5
that prior to the passage of the AWCPA "most courts agree[d] that 6
copying a structure depicted in plans, without copying the plans 7
themselves, [was] not copyright infringement," but that "an 8
unauthorized copy of an architectural plan infringes on a 9
technical drawing copyright"); see also Imperial Homes Corp. v. 10
Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972) (copyrighted 11
architectural plans do not confer exclusive right to reproduce 12
the depicted building); Nat'l Med. Care, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 435 13
("[A]n as-built structure or feature cannot be an infringing copy 14
of a technical drawing."). The district court summarized this 15
case law correctly when it explained that "[t]he rule which 16
emerges from [the pre-AWCPA] cases is that one may construct a 17
house which is identical to a house depicted in copyrighted 18
architectural plans, but one may not directly copy those plans 19
and then use the infringing copy to construct the house." Scholz 20
Design, 2011 WL 2899093, at *2, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76663, at 21
*8 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). As a 22
commentator recently explained: 23

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16
Even though our copyright statutes were 1
silent about architecture until 1990, it was 2
well established that plans, blueprints and 3
models were copyrightable writings under the 4
1909 Act's category of "drawings or plastic 5
works of a scientific or technical 6
character," and then as "pictorial, graphic, 7
and sculptural works" under the 1976 Act. 8
The scope of an architect's copyright 9
protection was, however, quite limited. The 10
unauthorized copying of plans or blueprints 11
constituted infringement, but most 12
authorities concluded that plans were not 13
infringed by using them, without the 14
architect's permission, to construct the 15
building they depicted. Moreover, the 16
prevailing view was that an architect's 17
rights did not extend to the actual building 18
derived from his or her plans. A building, 19
as a useful article, could be protected by 20
copyright only to the extent it had artistic 21
features that could be identified separately 22
from, and were capable of existing 23
independently of, the structure's utilitarian 24
aspects. 25
David E. Shipley, The Architectural Works Copyright Protection 26
Act at Twenty: Has Full Protection Made a Difference? 18 J. 27
Intell. Prop. L. 1, 3 (2010) (footnotes omitted); see also Daniel 28
Su, Note, Substantial Similarity and Architectural Works: 29
Filtering Out "Total Concept and Feel," 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1851, 30
1861, 1863 (2007) ("[A]rchitectural plans and drawings were 31
protected under the Copyright Act of 1976. They fit comfortably 32
within the definition of 'pictorial, graphic and sculptural 33
works' . . . . However, copyrighted plans did not give the 34
authoring architect the exclusive right to build the structure 35

-- 16 of 26 --

17
depicted within the plans. . . . [T]he AWCPA extend[ed] 1
copyright protection to physical buildings."). 2
D. The District Court Opinion 3
Sketches or drawings such as those allegedly infringed 4
here, therefore, did receive protection before enactment of the 5
AWCPA, although the architectural works they depicted did not. 6
The district court seems to have misunderstood the import and 7
relevance of this distinction in concluding that under section 8
102(a)(5), architectural sketches or drawings are required to 9
include a certain level of detail to receive protection. Where 10
the complaint alleges unlawful copying of a pictorial work 11
registered under section 102(a)(5), there is no requirement of 12
any level of detail. 13
The district court relied principally on three other 14
cases in determining that the drawings at issue were not 15
copyrightable. See Scholz, 2011 WL 2899093, at *3, 2011 U.S. 16
Dist. LEXIS 76663, at *9 ("Under Attia, as well as Jones, and 17
Lamont, copyright protection extends to the component images of 18
architectural designs to the extent that those images allow a 19
copier to construct the protected design." (citations omitted)). 20
First, the court looked to Attia, which examined whether the 21
defendants had infringed the plaintiff's drawings of a proposed 22
expansion of New York Hospital. 201 F.3d at 57. The plaintiff 23
had submitted a plan for the hospital's modernization. He 24

-- 17 of 26 --

18
prepared a series of preliminary drawings and sketches 1
illustrating his plan, which would have expanded the hospital 2
through a new building constructed in the airspace over the FDR 3
Drive in New York City. Id. at 52. The plaintiff and his firm 4
were not selected to be the architects for the plan. Eli Attia 5
later saw a New York Times article discussing a similar design. 6
He brought a copyright infringement suit against the architect 7
who had created that plan alleging infringement of his drawings. 8
Id. The district court granted summary judgment to the 9
defendants after concluding that their design and plaintiff's 10
design could not be considered "substantially similar" as a 11
matter of law. 201 F.3d at 53. 12
For purposes of that appeal, we assumed that the 13
similarities between the plaintiff's and defendants' drawings 14
were indeed attributable to copying. 15
The problem underlying Plaintiff's claim of 16
copyright infringement, however, is that not 17
all copying from copyrighted material is 18
necessarily an infringement of copyright. 19
There are elements of a copyrighted work that 20
are not protected even against intentional 21
copying. It is a fundamental principle of 22
our copyright doctrine that ideas, concepts, 23
and processes are not protected from copying. 24
. . . A copyright thus protects not the 25
author's ideas, but only her expression of 26
them. 27
Id. at 53-54. 28

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19
"The problem of distinguishing an idea from its 1
expression is particularly acute when the work of 'authorship' is 2
of a functional nature, as is a plan for the accomplishment of an 3
architectural or engineering project." Id. at 55. For example, 4
"generalized notions of where to place functional elements, how 5
to route the flow of traffic, and what methods of construction 6
and principles of engineering to rely on" are ideas, and can be 7
appropriated by others without infringing on a copyright. Id. 8
We determined that the alleged similarities of the allegedly 9
protected work to the allegedly infringing work, were "concepts 10
and ideas," and "barely a first step toward the realization of a 11
plan." Id. at 55-56. While many of the ideas and placements 12
were similar, overall, "Defendants' design has very little in 13
common with Plaintiff's." Id. at 57. 14
The district court in the case before us concluded that 15
the Attia court's reference to preliminary concepts and ideas 16
meant that non-detailed drawings could not be subject to 17
copyright protection. But Attia never alleged that his sketches 18
themselves were unlawfully copied. Instead he contended that 19
certain elements of his sketches were incorporated into the 20
allegedly infringing plans, such as placement of the hospital 21
expansion above the FDR Drive. We in no way suggested that the 22
plaintiff's drawings in Attia did not enjoy copyright protection. 23
Our ruling was merely that, assuming the defendant copied 24

-- 19 of 26 --

20
something from the plaintiff's drawings, what was copied was only 1
unprotected ideas, and not the plaintiff’s protected expression 2
of those ideas. That ruling simply does not support the district 3
court's analysis here. 4
The plaintiff here does not allege, as did Attia, that 5
some "concept" or "idea" reflected in his sketches was 6
appropriated –- he alleges that the entire sketch was copied. 7
Attia therefore has little relevance to the case before us. It 8
does not suggest that in the domain of architectural drawings 9
protection cannot be afforded to preliminary or conceptual 10
renderings. 11
The district court also relied on Robert R. Jones 12
Assocs. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 280 (6th Cir. 1988), which 13
examined under pre-AWCPA law the alleged infringement of 14
architectural plans effected by copying those plans and then 15
constructing a building based on them. "The rule which emerges 16
. . . is that one may construct a house which is identical to a 17
house depicted in copyrighted architectural plans, but one may 18
not directly copy those plans and then use the infringing copy to 19
construct the house." Id. at 280. 20
The circuit court ruled: "[O]ne may construct a house 21
which is identical to a house depicted in copyrighted 22
architectural plans, but one may not directly copy those plans 23
and then use the infringing copy to construct the house." Id. 24

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21
The district court in the case before us appears to 1
have understood Robert R. Jones to stand for the proposition that 2
there is an infringement only when a plan is (1) copied and (2) 3
used to construct a home. We disagree. 4
Robert R. Jones does not stand for the proposition that 5
no infringement can occur without construction. The last ten 6
words of the sentence quoted above (about using the infringing 7
copies to construct) were surplusage. What the court seems to 8
have meant was that, while the construction of the home based on 9
copyrighted plans is not an infringement (under the pre-AWCPA 10
law), the copying of the plans is an infringement. The copying 11
of the drawings constituted infringement regardless of whether 12
one goes on to construct the house. 13
Finally, in Lamont, upon which the district court also 14
relied, the court concluded that the copying of the floorplan of 15
a home from copyrighted drawings in a promotional brochure would 16
be an infringement. 17
[N]o copyrighted architectural plans . . . 18
may clothe their author with the exclusive 19
right to reproduce the dwelling pictured. 20
However, nothing . . . prevents such a 21
copyright from vesting the law's grant of an 22
exclusive right to make copies of the 23
copyrighted plans so as to instruct a would- 24
be builder on how to proceed to construct the 25
dwelling pictured. 26
458 F.2d at 898-99. In remanding the case to the district court, 27
the court of appeals explained that "[t]he exclusive right to 28

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22
copy what is copyrighted belongs to the architect, even though 1
the plans give him no unique claim on any feature of the 2
structure they detail. If it is determined . . . that the 3
[defendants] copied the floor plan set forth in the promotional 4
booklet distributed by [the plaintiff], then this copying would 5
constitute an infringement of [the plaintiff's] copyright 6
privileges." Id. at 899 (emphasis in original). 7
The district court in the case before us inferred that 8
infringement could only occur if the plans were sufficiently 9
detailed to allow for construction, perhaps because in Lamont the 10
"floor plan" was allegedly detailed enough to do so. That court, 11
however, like the court in Robert S. Jones, did not indicate that 12
a less-detailed plan or drawing would not be entitled to 13
copyright protection. 14
In sum, the district court concluded that architectural 15
drawings were required to contain sufficient detail to allow for 16
construction in order to receive Copyright Act protection. There 17
is no such requirement, however, when the claim of copyright is 18
for a "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work[]" under section 19
102(a)(5). All that is required is independent creation and 20
originality. See John Wieland Homes & Neighborhoods, Inc. v. 21
Poovey, No. 3:03CV168-H, 2004 WL 2108675, at *5, 2004 U.S. Dist. 22
LEXIS 21730, at *14 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 2, 2004) (stating that 23
"copyright protection extends to simplified floor plans, that is, 24

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23
promotional cut sheets, of copyrighted architectural plans," and 1
therefore concluding that the defendant was liable when a 2
draftsman he hired essentially copied the cut-sheet in preparing 3
plans for a home); see also Donald Frederick Evans and Assocs. v. 4
Cont'l Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d 897, 904-05 (11th Cir. 1986) 5
("[C]onstruction of a substantially identical residential 6
dwelling is not prohibited by the existence of a copyright in the 7
architectural drawings for the original dwelling, but . . . if 8
the builders of the substantially identical structure copied the 9
floor plan set forth in a promotional booklet distributed by the 10
builder of the original, then this copying would constitute 11
infringement of the original builder's copyright privileges." 12
(citation and footnote omitted)); Lamont, 458 F.2d at 899 ("If it 13
is determined upon remand that the [defendants] copied the floor 14
plan set forth in the promotional booklet distributed by [the 15
plaintiffs], then this copying would constitute an infringement 16
of [the plaintiff's] copyright privileges."); Arthur Rutenburg 17
Corp. v. Parrino, 664 F. Supp. 479, 481 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (ruling 18
that the copying of a floor plan constituted copyright 19
infringement). 20
Although we have not directly addressed the question 21
with which the district court grappled here, we have twice 22
explained that architectural technical drawings might be subject 23
to copyright protection even if they are not sufficiently 24

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24
detailed to allow for construction. See Attia, 201 F.3d at 57 1
("[W]e do not meant to suggest that, in the domain of copyrighted 2
architectural depictions, only final construction drawings can 3
contain protected expression."); Sparaco, 303 F.3d at 469 ("We do 4
not mean to imply that technical drawings cannot achieve 5
protected status unless they are sufficiently complete and 6
detailed to support actual construction."). 7
We see this, then, as a straightforward case of 8
copyright infringement. The plaintiff created original drawings 9
which were properly registered with the copyright office. The 10
defendants allegedly used exact copies of those drawings without 11
permission. Nothing more is required in order to state a claim 12
for copyright infringement. The district court's grant of a 13
motion to dismiss these claims is therefore reversed. 14
III. Fair Use 15
The defendants contend that even if Scholz had a valid 16
copyright in the drawings, the defendants are not liable for 17
infringement because their usage of the images constituted fair 18
use. "[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes 19
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 20
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is 21
not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107. Four 22
factors must be considered in deciding whether a particular use 23
is "fair": "(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 24

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25
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 1
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) 2
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 3
the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use 4
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." 5
17 U.S.C. § 107. 6
The district court declined to address this argument, 7
having concluded that in any event Scholz had not stated a valid 8
copyright infringement claim. Scholz Design, 2011 WL 2899093, at 9
*3 n.2, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76663, at *10 n.2. "It is our 10
settled practice to allow the district court to address arguments 11
in the first instance." Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 45 (2d 12
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). On remand, the 13
defendants may choose to raise this defense again. We intimate 14
no views as to the proper outcome of such an inquiry. 15
IV. DMCA and Breach of Contract Claims 16
The district court dismissed both of these claims after 17
concluding that they required Scholz to "have a valid copyright 18
claim." Scholz Design, 2011 WL 2899093, at *4, 2011 U.S. Dist. 19
LEXIS 76663, at *14. The dismissal of the breach of contract 20
claim was error. Scholz alleged that Sard used Scholz’s drawings 21
in unauthorized ways long after their agreements had expired. 22
This breach of contract claim did not depend on Scholz’s 23
possession of a valid copyright. We therefore vacate the 24

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26
district court’s dismissal of the breach of contract claim. In 1
addition, because we vacate the district court’s dismissal of the 2
copyright claim, we also vacate its dismissal of the DMCA claim. 3
Again, we suggest no views on our part as to the proper outcome 4
of such an inquiry. 5
CONCLUSION 6
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 7
court is reversed in part, and vacated and remanded in part for 8
further proceedings. Costs to Scholz against Sard and Coldwell 9
Banker. 10

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