Franz A. Wakefield, Dba Cooltvnetwork.com, Inc. v. Blackboard Inc., Meta Platforms, Inc., Fka Facebook, Inc., International Business…

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
FRANZ A. WAKEFIELD, DBA
COOLTVNETWORK.COM, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
BLACKBOARD INC., META PLATFORMS, INC.,
FKA FACEBOOK, INC., INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION,
KALTURA, INC., MICROSOFT CORPORATION,
OOYALA, INC.,SNAP INC., TRAPELO CORP.,
Defendants-Appellees
______________________
2024-2030, 2024-2031, 2024-2032, 2024-2033, 2024-2035,
2024-2036, 2024-2037, 2024-2038
______________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware in Nos. 1:19-cv-00291-JLH, 1:19-cv-
00292-JLH, 1:19-cv-00293-JLH, 1:19-cv-00294-JLH, 1:19-
cv-00296-JLH, 1:19-cv-00297-JLH, 1:19-cv-00534-JLH,
1:19-cv-00535-JLH, Judge Jennifer L. Hall.
______________________
Decided: April 23, 2025
______________________
F RANZ A. WAKEFIELD, Fort Lauderdale, FL, pro se.
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WAKEFIELD v. BLACKBOARD INC. 2
MICHAEL S. N ADEL , McDermott Will & Emery LLP,
Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee Blackboard Inc.
BRYAN SCOTT HALES , Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Chicago,
IL, for defendant-appellee International Business Ma-
chines Corporation.
SETH W. LLOYD, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Washing-
ton, DC, for defendant-appellee Kaltura, Inc. Also repre-
sented by K YLE W.K. MOONEY , New York, NY.
J OHN D. VANDENBERG, Klarquist Sparkman, LLP,
Portland, OR, for defendant-appellee Microsoft Corpora-
tion. Also represented by J OSEPH T HOMAS J AKUBEK.
RICHARD G REGORY F RENKEL , Latham & Watkins LLP,
Menlo Park, CA, for defendant-appellee Ooyala, Inc.
HEIDI L YN K EEFE , Cooley LLP, Palo Alto, CA, for de-
fendants-appellees Snap Inc., Meta Platforms, Inc. Snap
Inc. also represented by Reuben H. Chen. Meta Platforms,
Inc. also represented by P HILLIP EDWARD MORTON, Wash-
ington, DC.
RICARDO B ONILLA, Fish & Richardson P.C., Dallas, TX,
for defendant-appellee Trapelo Corp. Also represented by
N EIL J. MCN ABNAY , LANCE E. WYATT , J R.
______________________
Before L OURIE, D YK, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
P ER CURIAM .
In 2022, this court affirmed the judgment of the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware holding
invalid all claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,162,696 (’696 pa-
tent). See CoolTVNetwork.com, Inc. v. Blackboard, Inc.,
No. 2021-2191, 2022 WL 2525330 (Fed. Cir. July 7, 2022)
(per curiam). More than a year later, the named inventor
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WAKEFIELD v. BLACKBOARD INC. 3
of the ’696 patent, Franz A. Wakefield, doing business as
CoolTVNetwork.com, Inc. (CoolTV),1 filed a motion for re-
lief from the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 60(b). The district court denied Mr. Wakefield’s
motion as untimely and additionally denied Mr. Wake-
field’s subsequent motion for reargument. SAppx 461.2
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion,
we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2019, CoolTV sued Blackboard Inc., Meta Platforms,
Inc., International Business Machines Corporation, Kal-
tura, Inc., Microsoft Corporation, Ooyala, Inc., Snap Inc.,
and Trapelo Corp. (Appellees) in the District of Delaware
for infringement of the ’696 patent. Following a claim con-
struction hearing, the magistrate judge concluded in a re-
port and recommendation that certain means-plus-
function limitations of independent claim 1 of the ’696 pa-
tent are indefinite. See SAppx 46–54. The magistrate
judge also concluded that similar limitations of independ-
ent claims 15 and 17–18 are indefinite based on CoolTV
failing to make separate arguments with respect to those
limitations and failing to challenge Appellees’ argument
that those limitations should be treated the same as and
rise and fall with the means-plus-function limitations of
claim 1. SAppx 51, 54.
CoolTV filed objections to the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation. CoolTV objected to holding the
means-plus-function limitations of claim 1 indefinite and,
1 CoolTV, the plaintiff-appellant in the first appeal,
was then represented by counsel. Mr. Wakefield now pro-
ceeds pro se as the sole proprietor of CoolTV. See ECF
No. 11.
2 “SAppx” refers to the supplemental appendix filed
by Appellees.
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WAKEFIELD v. BLACKBOARD INC. 4
in a footnote, reserved the right to raise on appeal whether
the construction of claims 15 and 17–18 “should have been
considered similarly to the means-plus-function limita-
tions in Claim 1.” SAppx 735–50, 740 n.1. The district
judge overruled CoolTV’s objections and adopted the rec-
ommended constructions. Accordingly, the district court
entered final judgment of invalidity on July 16, 2021.
SAppx 754.
CoolTV appealed to this court. In its opening brief, like
it did before the district court, CoolTV focused on claim 1
and made no separate arguments with respect to claims 15
and 17–18, save for a footnote observing that the district
court treated claims 15 and 17–18 as means-plus-function
claims. SAppx 783 n.3; see generally id. at 755–826. Fol-
lowing oral argument, a unanimous panel of this court,
consisting of Judge Newman, Judge Linn, and Judge Chen,
affirmed pursuant to Federal Circuit Rule 36. See
CoolTVNetwork.com, 2022 WL 2525330. Our mandate is-
sued on October 7, 2022.
In February 2023, Mr. Wakefield (then proceeding pro
se) filed an ultimately unsuccessful petition for a writ of
certiorari with the Supreme Court. Thereafter, on March
24, 2023, the Chief Judge of this court identified a judicial
complaint against Judge Newman under the Judicial Con-
duct and Disability Act based on probable cause that Judge
Newman had committed misconduct and/or suffered from
a mental or physical disability. A Special Committee was
appointed to investigate. In May 2023, Mr. Wakefield filed
a petition for rehearing of the denial of certiorari, based on
the recently announced complaint and investigation
against Judge Newman. Mr. Wakefield generally argued
that Judge Newman’s inclusion on the panel of this court
that affirmed the invalidity of the ’696 patent deprived him
of a fair hearing and his right to due process. See SAppx
1089. The Supreme Court denied Mr. Wakefield’s petition
for rehearing on June 26, 2023.
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WAKEFIELD v. BLACKBOARD INC. 5
On September 20, 2023, the Judicial Council of this
court issued an order suspending Judge Newman based on
misconduct for refusing to comply with an earlier order of
the Special Committee. Approximately two months later,
on November 21, 2023, Mr. Wakefield filed a motion with
the district court to set aside the judgment under Rule
60(b)(5) and (6). SAppx 1126–55. Mr. Wakefield’s motion
primarily argued that the district court should have
treated claims 15 and 17–18 differently from claim 1. See,
e.g., id. at 1136–37. The motion concluded with a brief ar-
gument concerning Judge Newman that echoed Mr. Wake-
field’s rehearing petition at the Supreme Court. See id. at
1151–52.
The district court denied Mr. Wakefield’s motion in an
oral order “at least for the reason that it is untimely.”
SAppx 461. Mr. Wakefield then filed a “Motion for Clarifi-
cation/Reargument” under the District of Delaware’s Local
Rule 7.1.5,3 arguing that his Rule 60(b) motion was not un-
timely. SAppx 1232–52. The district court denied that mo-
tion by another oral order. SAppx 461.
Mr. Wakefield appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In the context of Rule 60(b), we have explained that
“our general practice is to apply the law of the regional cir-
cuit. Because rulings under Rule 60(b) commonly involve
procedural matters unrelated to patent law issues as such,
we often defer to the law of the regional circuit in reviewing
such rulings.” Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 279 F.3d
1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); see also
Cardpool, Inc. v. Plastic Jungle, Inc., 817 F.3d 1316, 1321
(Fed. Cir. 2016); O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power
3 Rule 7.1.5 permits motions for reargument to be
filed within 14 days of a decision. See D. Del. LR 7.1.5.
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WAKEFIELD v. BLACKBOARD INC. 6
Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The time-
liness of Mr. Wakefield’s motion is not unique to patent
law. See Marquip, Inc. v. Fosber Am., Inc., 198 F.3d 1363,
1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 1999). We thus apply Third Circuit law.
The Third Circuit “review[s] grants or denials of relief
under Rule 60(b), aside from those raised under Rule
60(b)(4), [4] under an abuse of discretion standard.” Sover-
eign Bank v. REMI Cap., Inc, 49 F.4th 360, 364 (3d Cir.
2022) (citation omitted). The Third Circuit also reviews a
denial of a motion for reargument, and the district court’s
application of its own local rules, for an abuse of discretion.
See Jilin Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, 447 F.3d 196, 199
n.4 (3d Cir. 2006); Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d
604, 613 (3d Cir. 2018). “A district court abuses its discre-
tion when it bases its decision upon a clearly erroneous
finding of fact, an erroneous conclusion of law, or an im-
proper application of law to fact.” Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d
113, 118 (3d Cir. 2014).
D ISCUSSION
Rule 60(b) permits a court, “[o]n motion and just
terms,” to relieve a party from a final judgment for five
specified reasons or, under Rule 60(b)(6), for “any other
reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule
60(c)(1) provides the time in which a Rule 60(b) motion
must be made: “A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made
within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3)
no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or
4 Mr. Wakefield cites to Rule 60(b)(4) in his motion
for reargument and on appeal, but his Rule 60(b) motion
was based on only 60(b)(5) and (6). See, e.g., SAppx 1135;
cf. United States v. Franz, 772 F.3d 134, 150 (3d Cir. 2014)
(“[R]aising an argument for the first time in a motion for
reconsideration results in waiver of that argument for pur-
poses of appeal.”).
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WAKEFIELD v. BLACKBOARD INC. 7
order or the date of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1)
(emphasis added). Mr. Wakefield’s motion, filed under
Rule 60(b)(5) and (6), is not subject to the one-year limita-
tion.
“[W]hat is a reasonable time must depend to a large
extent upon the particular circumstances alleged.” Lasky
v. Cont’l Prods. Corp., 804 F.2d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 1986) (ci-
tation omitted). A Rule 60(b) motion is not made within a
reasonable time when “the reason for the attack . . . was
available for attack upon the original judgment.” Mool-
enaar v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 822 F.2d 1342, 1348 (3d
Cir. 1987); see also Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528,
538 (2022) (declining to define Rule 60’s “reasonable time”
standard but noting that Courts of Appeals have used it to
deny Rule 60(b) motions alleging errors that should have
been raised in a timely appeal).
Mr. Wakefield filed his Rule 60(b) motion more than
two years after the district court’s final judgment and more
than one year after our mandate affirming that judgment.
The thrust of that motion, and of Mr. Wakefield’s argu-
ments on appeal, is that claims 15 and 17–18 should have
been evaluated for validity separately from claim 1, rather
than treated as means-plus-function claims along with
claim 1. In other words, Mr. Wakefield seeks to relitigate
the validity of claims 15 and 17–18 based on arguments
that could have been raised in the original appeal of the
district court’s judgment. Rather than develop such an ar-
gument, CoolTV’s opening brief in the first appeal merely
made a passing reference to it in a footnote. See SAppx 783
n.3. Mr. Wakefield argues that intervening precedent ren-
ders his motion timely, citing Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp.,
28 F.4th 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2022). But, without addressing
whether Dyfan has any import on the merits of Mr. Wake-
field’s arguments, Dyfan was decided by this court in
March 2022, during the pendency of and prior to oral argu-
ment in the first appeal. “Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for
appeal.” Moolenaar, 822 F.2d at 1347. Under these
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WAKEFIELD v. BLACKBOARD INC. 8
circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in finding that Mr. Wakefield’s motion was not made
within a reasonable time. See, e.g., id. at 1348 (concluding
that a Rule 60(b) motion was not made within a reasonable
time where brought almost two years after the district
court’s initial judgment and “the reason for the attack upon
that judgment was available for attack upon the original
judgment”).5
The facts presented in this case are quite similar to
those in Odyssey Logistics & Technology Corp. v. Stewart,
130 F.4th 973 (Fed. Cir. 2025). There, a patent applicant
waited more than one year after the issuance of our man-
date affirming the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s denial
of a patent application in filing a request for review by the
Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office
based on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Arthrex, Inc., 594 U.S. 1 (2021). See Odyssey, 130 F.4th
at 976–77. Analogizing the Patent Office’s discretion in
denying review to the Rule 60(b) context, we affirmed the
denial of review because the party “had notice of the . . . is-
sue . . . and made no effort to present this argument” until
a substantial amount of time had passed. Id. at 978–79.
Mr. Wakefield’s motion also briefly argued that he did
not receive a fair hearing during his first appeal, in viola-
tion of his right to due process, because of Judge Newman’s
5 Mr. Wakefield appears to argue to us that claim 1
of the ’696 patent was also erroneously invalidated. See,
e.g., Appellant’s Br. 13–14, 46. This argument, not raised
to the district court in the Rule 60(b) motion, is forfeited.
See Simko v. U.S. Steel Corp., 992 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir.
2021). Even if that argument had not been forfeited, the
district court would not have abused its discretion in deem-
ing the argument untimely for the same reason as with re-
spect to claims 15 and 17–18: Mr. Wakefield may not use
Rule 60(b) as a substitute for appeal.
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WAKEFIELD v. BLACKBOARD INC. 9
inclusion on the panel that decided that appeal. See SAppx
1151–52.6 Although the motion cited to the Judicial Coun-
cil’s September 2023 order suspending Judge Newman,
Mr. Wakefield first pressed this same theory for relief in
his May 2023 rehearing petition to the Supreme Court, fol-
lowing the March 2023 order that announced the complaint
against Judge Newman. Yet Mr. Wakefield waited approx-
imately eight months following the March 2023 order and
approximately six months following the rehearing petition
to file his Rule 60(b) motion. Given the “overriding interest
in the finality and repose of judgments,” Martinez-McBean
v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d 908, 913 (3d Cir. 1977)
(citation omitted), and considering the very brief treatment
that Mr. Wakefield’s motion afforded this argument to at-
tack a then-28-month-old judgment, we cannot say that the
district court abused its discretion in also deeming this por-
tion of Mr. Wakefield’s motion not made within a reasona-
ble time. See also, e.g., Moolenaar, 822 F.2d at 1347
(“Reopening the case many years later . . . totally disre-
gards the important principle that litigation must finally
end . . . .”); Harrison v. Harrison, No. 22-3361, 2023 WL
7017695, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 25, 2023) (per curiam) (holding
that a Rule 60(b) motion was not made within a reasonable
time where it was filed almost one year after the judgment
and “was filed several months after the date of the latest
‘new evidence’ on which [the motion was] based”).
6 This court must call attention to what is, at best, a
careless misrepresentation in Appellees’ response brief.
Appellees assert that Mr. Wakefield’s Rule 60(b) motion
“made no mention of Judge Newman.” Appellees’ Br. 26.
This is simply untrue, as even a basic computer word
search of the motion would reveal. See SAppx 1134, 1151–
52; see also SAppx 1225 n.7 (Appellees’ opposition to
Mr. Wakefield’s motion acknowledging that the motion
made this very argument).
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WAKEFIELD v. BLACKBOARD INC. 10
The district court also denied Mr. Wakefield’s motion
for reargument. The court’s local rules specify that such
motions “shall be sparingly granted.” D. Del. LR 7.1.5.
“[R]eargument may be appropriate where ‘the [c]ourt has
patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision
outside the adversarial issues presented to the [c]ourt by
the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of
apprehension.’” Johnson v. Diamond State Port Corp., 50
F. App’x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Brambles USA,
Inc. v. Blocker, 735 F. Supp. 1239, 1241 (D. Del. 1990)). The
district court found that none of those circumstances were
present. See SAppx 461. Mr. Wakefield identifies no rea-
son why the district abused its discretion in denying that
motion and nor do we see any.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Wakefield’s remaining argu-
ments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing rea-
sons, we affirm the district court’s orders denying
Mr. Wakefield’s Rule 60(b) motion and denying reargu-
ment.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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