Massoud Heidary v. Amazon.com, Inc., Ring, LLC

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
MASSOUD HEIDARY,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
AMAZON.COM, INC., RING, LLC,
Defendants-Appellees
______________________
2024-1580
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland in No. 8:22-cv-02319-TDC, Judge The-
odore D. Chuang.
______________________
Decided: October 15, 2024
______________________
MASSOUD HEIDARY , Gaithersburg, MD, pro se.
J ENNIFER L IBRACH N ALL , DLA Piper LLP (US), Austin,
TX, for defendants-appellees. Also represented by ANKUR
VIJAY D ESAI, Washington, DC; STANLEY J OSEPH
P ANIKOWSKI, III, San Diego, CA.
______________________
Before L OURIE, P ROST , and STARK, Circuit Judges.
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HEIDARY v. AMAZON. COM , INC. 2
L OURIE, Circuit Judge.
Massoud Heidary appeals from a decision of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland dismissing Hei-
dary’s patent infringement claims for improper venue and
failure to state a claim. Heidary v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
706 F. Supp. 3d 525 (D. Md. 2023) (“Decision”). For the fol-
lowing reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Heidary owns U.S. Patent 10,380,862 (“the ’862 pa-
tent”), which issued on August 13, 2019. The ’862 patent
is directed to a “fire protection system” for suppressing fire
spread by shutting off the fan in an HVAC system when a
fire is detected by a smoke detector. ’862 patent col. 1 ll.
9–18. Claim 1 of the ’862 patent reads as follows:
1. A system for suppressing fire in a building, the
system comprising:
a plurality of smoke detector units,
each smoke detector unit compris-
ing:
a smoke detector,
a power supply,
an auxiliary power supply,
a camera connected to the
smoke detector, and
a wireless transmission unit
connected to the camera,
a normally closed relay,
a fan controller connected to an HVAC
unit,
a thermostat,
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HEIDARY v. AMAZON. COM , INC. 3
a display unit,
a micro-controller for the display unit,
a wireless receiver for the micro-controller,
a telephone system,
wherein upon detection of a smoke by any one of
the smoke detectors, the respective smoke detector
passes a signal to a normally closed relay to open
and to cut-off the power supply to the thermostat
as well as fan controller thereby shutting off the
fan unit; and activates the respective camera and
the wireless transmission unit to transmit a signal
to a wireless receiver connected to the micro-con-
troller so as to display the location of the fire on the
display unit connected to the micro-controller.
’862 patent col. 3 ll. 6–31.
Heidary filed the present suit against Amazon.com,
Inc. (“Amazon”) and Ring, LLC (“Ring”) (collectively “Ap-
pellees”) on September 13, 2022, alleging patent infringe-
ment. Decision, 706 F. Supp. 3d at 528–29. According to
Heidary’s complaint, Amazon sells two specific prod-
ucts—the X-SENSE Wi-Fi Smoke Alarm and the Aegislink
Wi-Fi Smoke Alarm (collectively the “accused prod-
ucts”)—that meet each and every limitation of claim 1 of
the ’862 patent. S.A. 30–31, ¶¶ 12–13.1
Ring moved to dismiss Heidary’s complaint for im-
proper venue under Rule 12(b)(3) and Appellees jointly
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim of patent in-
fringement under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Decision, 706 F. Supp. 3d at 529–30. Spe-
cifically, Ring contended that Heidary failed to show that
1 “S.A.” refers to the supplemental appendix in-
cluded with Appellees’ informal brief.
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HEIDARY v. AMAZON. COM , INC. 4
Ring resides in or has a regular and established place of
business in the District of Maryland. Id. Appellees further
contended that Heidary did not plead facts sufficient to
show that either of the accused products plausibly contains
each and every limitation of claim 1 of the ’862 patent and
thus there can be no direct infringement. Id. at 533–34.
Given their contention that the predicate act of direct in-
fringement failed, Appellees argued Heidary’s inducement
infringement claim necessarily failed as well. Id. at
534–35.
The district court granted Appellees’ motions and dis-
missed the complaint without prejudice. Decision, 706 F.
Supp. 3d at 535.
* * *
Heidary initially appealed his case to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the Fourth Circuit sub-
sequently transferred the case to this court. Heidary v.
Amazon.com, Inc., No. 24-1012 (4th Cir. Mar. 12, 2024),
ECF No. 11 (order transferring appeal to this court). We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
D ISCUSSION
Heidary challenges the district court’s decision to dis-
miss the complaint for each of (1) improper venue as to
Ring and (2) failure to adequately plead patent infringe-
ment. We discuss each issue in turn.
I
We first address whether the district court erred in de-
termining that the claims against Ring must be dismissed
due to improper venue. We apply our own law when re-
viewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3) regarding
improper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) because
“[§ 1400(b) venue] is an issue unique to patent law and is
therefore governed by Federal Circuit precedent.” Valeant
Pharms. N. Am. LLC v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 978 F.3d
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HEIDARY v. AMAZON. COM , INC. 5
1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2020). We review whether venue is
proper under § 1400(b) de novo. Westech Aerosol Corp. v.
3M Co., 927 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Under § 1400(b), “[a]ny civil action for patent infringe-
ment may be brought in the judicial district where the de-
fendant resides or where the defendant has committed acts
of infringement and has a regular and established place of
business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). It is the plaintiff’s burden
to establish proper venue. Westech, 927 F.3d at 1382.
A “domestic corporation ‘resides’ only in its State of in-
corporation for purposes of the patent venue statute.” TC
Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 581 U.S.
258, 262 (2017). If the defendant does not reside in the rel-
evant district, then venue is only proper if each of the fol-
lowing requirements are met: “(1) there must be a physical
place in the district; (2) it must be a regular and established
place of business; and (3) it must be the place of the defend-
ant.” In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
The district court concluded that Heidary failed to es-
tablish that venue is proper for Ring. Decision, 706 F.
Supp. 3d at 530. We agree.
Heidary’s complaint alleged that “Ring, LLC (‘Ring’) is
[a] Limited Liability company and exists under the laws of
the State of Delaware.” S.A. 29, ¶ 5. As a Delaware entity,
and not a Maryland corporation, Ring does not reside in the
District of Maryland for patent venue purposes.2 Accord-
ingly, Heidary could only establish that venue is proper as
to Ring if he alleged or established that Ring has
2 We have applied TC Heartland’s holding to venue
issues relating to LLCs, like Ring. See In re Google LLC,
949 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (applying, without discus-
sion, TC Heartland’s “corporation” standard to an LLC).
The parties neither dispute nor address this potential is-
sue, so neither do we.
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HEIDARY v. AMAZON. COM , INC. 6
committed infringing acts in Maryland and that it has a
regular and established place of business in that state. See
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). In that regard, the district court cor-
rectly determined that Heidary pleaded no facts and other-
wise made no showing that Ring has a physical place of
business in the District of Maryland. See S.A. 29, ¶¶ 5–9
(failing to make allegations regarding Ring’s physical pres-
ence in the District of Maryland). Absent such plausible
allegations, the district court correctly ordered the dismis-
sal of the claims against Ring due to improper venue.
II
We next turn to whether the district court erred in dis-
missing Heidary’s claims of direct infringement. Appellees
jointly moved to dismiss Heidary’s direct infringement
claims, and the district court granted this motion. Deci-
sion, 706 F. Supp. 3d at 535. Therefore, we will consider
the correctness of the district court’s decision on infringe-
ment with respect to both parties.
This court applies the law of the regional circuit, which
here is the Fourth Circuit, when reviewing a motion to dis-
miss under Rule 12(b)(6). In re Bill of Lading Transmis-
sion & Processing Sys. Pat. Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1331
(Fed. Cir. 2012). The Fourth Circuit reviews challenges to
a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
de novo. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus.,
637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir.2011). To survive a motion to
dismiss in the Fourth Circuit, “a plaintiff must plead
enough factual allegations to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d
605, 616 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)). However, “[w]e apply our own law to the
specific question of whether a complaint states a claim of
patent infringement on which relief may be granted.”
AlexSam, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., No. 2022-2036, 2024 WL
4439292, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 8, 2024).
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HEIDARY v. AMAZON. COM , INC. 7
Pleadings must be “construe[d] . . . liberally” for pro se
litigants. Bing, 959 F.3d at 618. However, “liberal con-
struction does not mean overlooking the pleading require-
ments under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id.
(citing Weidman v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 776 F.3d 214, 219
(4th Cir. 2015)). Thus, a pro se litigant still must plead
“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasona-
ble inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
On appeal, Heidary contends that the district court
erred by prematurely dismissing the patent infringement
claim on the basis that the district court did not consider
the “totality” of the ’862 patent in its infringement analy-
sis. Appellant’s Br. 2. Appellees respond that the accused
products cannot plausibly constitute the “complete” inven-
tion of the ’862 patent based on the pleadings, and thus
Heidary failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Appel-
lees’ Br. 6.
While it is not required that a plaintiff detail how each
limitation of a claim is infringed, the plaintiff cannot list
the claim limitations in his complaint and “merely con-
clud[e] that the accused product has those [limitations].”
Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am., 4 F.4th 1342, 1352–53
(Fed. Cir. 2021). Rather, “[t]here must be some factual al-
legations that, when taken as true, articulate why it is
plausible that the accused product infringes the patent
claim.” Id.
Direct infringement arises under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a),
which specifies that “whoever without authority makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within
the United States . . . infringes the patent.” For direct in-
fringement, “one or more claims of the patent [must] read
on the accused device . . . .” Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Med-
tronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1310 (Fed. Cir.
2005). A claim reads on the accused device only if “each
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HEIDARY v. AMAZON. COM , INC. 8
and every limitation set forth in a claim appear[s] in an
accused product.” V-Formation, Inc. v. Benetton Grp. SpA,
401 F.3d 1307, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Heidary’s complaint does nothing more than list what
Heidary contends are the limitations of his claim 1 and as-
sert that Amazon “make[s], sell[s], use[s], offer[s] to sell, or
import[s] in the United States products . . . that meet each
and every limitation of claim 1.” S.A. 30, ¶¶ 12–13. This
is insufficient to state a plausible claim of patent infringe-
ment.
More particularly, as the district court explained,
“there is a facially apparent disconnect between the ’862
patent and the [accused products].” Decision, 706 F. Supp.
3d at 533. The ’862 patent claims a system with multiple
components. Specifically, claim 1 of the ’862 patent recites
a complete “system for suppressing fire” that includes “a
plurality of smoke detectors” where each smoke detector
comprises, among other components, “a fan controller con-
nected to an HVAC unit, a thermostat, a display unit, a
micro-controller for the display unit, a wireless receiver for
the micro-controller, [and] a telephone system.” Decision,
706 F. Supp. 3d at 534; see also ’862 patent col. 3 ll. 6–31
(independent claim 1). Meanwhile, as the district court
stated, the accused products “appear to consist of only
smoke detector devices, not a complete ‘fire protection sys-
tem with fan shut off, including a camera and a display
unit.’” Decision, 706 F. Supp. 3d at 534 (emphasis added).
Therein lies the facially apparent disconnect. The ’862 pa-
tent claims a fire protection system, but the accused de-
vices are merely a single component of that system.
Moreover, because “a patent on a combination is a pa-
tent on the assembled or functioning whole, not on the sep-
arate parts,” Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell
Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684 (1944), without additional
factual allegations, the district court determined it was left
with no choice but to conclude that the accused products
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HEIDARY v. AMAZON. COM , INC. 9
did not plausibly consist of the complete invention of the
asserted claims of the ’862 patent, and it therefore granted
the motion to dismiss as to the direct infringement claim.
Decision, 706 F. Supp. 3d at 534.
We agree. Heidary’s complaint fails to sufficiently
plead a claim for direct infringement. With his complaint,
Heidary submitted a screenshot depicting one of the ac-
cused products, which appears to be a Wi-Fi enabled smoke
detector, and summarily concluded the accused products
infringe claim 1 without more. S.A. 34. Although Heidary
is not required to attach claim charts or allege how each
limitation of a claim is infringed, Heidary must still “artic-
ulate why it is plausible that the accused product infringes
the patent claim.” Bot M8, 4 F.4th at 1352–53 (emphasis
added). Neither the screenshot nor Heidary’s complaint
provides any reason to plausibly conclude that the accused
products are a complete fire protection system as claimed
by the ’862 patent. In fact, the screenshot merely appears
to show that one of the accused products is a standalone
smoke detector device, which accounts for just one of the 13
limitations recited by claim 1 of the ’862 patent. S.A. 30,
¶ 13. He provides no allegations that the accused products
include anything further.
Nor do the complaint and screenshot indicate that the
other components of claim 1, e.g., ’862 patent col. 3 ll. 16–
21 (“a fan controller connected to an HVAC unit, a thermo-
stat, a display unit, a micro-controller for display unit, a
wireless receiver for the micro-controller, [and] a telephone
system”), are present in the accused products. These ma-
terials also do not plausibly convey that the accused prod-
ucts possess the functionality of the component limitations
of claim 1, e.g., id. at col. 3 ll. 22–26 (“wherein upon detec-
tion of a smoke . . . the respective smoke detector passes a
signal to a normally closed relay to open and to cut-off the
power supply to the thermostat as well as fan controller
thereby shutting off the fan unit”).
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HEIDARY v. AMAZON. COM , INC. 10
Indeed, even on appeal, Heidary appears to concede
that the accused products do not plausibly infringe claim 1
of the ’862 patent because the Appellees used only “part” of
his invention. See Appellant’s Reply Br. 2 (“[Appellees]
used part of my invention (residential smoke detector and
camera and display unit) to sell and promote smoke detec-
tor and camera and display unit.” (emphasis added)).
We therefore agree with the district court that Heidary
failed to state a claim of direct infringement and as such
the claim must be dismissed.3
III
Without a predicate finding of direct infringement,
there can be no finding of induced infringement. See Lime-
light Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 572 U.S. 915,
922 (2014). Because Heidary failed to adequately plead di-
rect infringement, we agree with the district court that
Heidary’s “induced infringement claim necessarily fails.”
Decision, 706 F. Supp. 3d at 535.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Heidary’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED
3 Even though the dismissal was without prejudice,
the docket shows no effort by Heidary to file an amended
complaint. Instead, he chose to appeal within three weeks
of when the district court issued its dismissal order.
S.A. 27.
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