Dolby Laboratories Licensing Corporation v. Unified Patents, LLC

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
DOLBY LABORATORIES LICENSING
CORPORATION,
Appellant
v.
UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC,
Appellee
COKE MORGAN STEWART, ACTING UNDER
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACTING
DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
Intervenor
______________________
2023-2110
______________________
Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2021-
00275.
______________________
Decided: June 5, 2025
______________________
K AYVAN B. N OROOZI, Noroozi PC, Los Angeles, CA, ar-
gued for appellant. Also represented by RICHARD EPSTEIN,
Norwalk, CT.
Case: 23-2110 Document: 86 Page: 1 Filed: 06/05/2025

-- 1 of 8 --

DOLBY LAB’ YS LICENSING CORP . v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC 2
ANGELA M. O LIVER, Haynes and Boone, LLP, Washing-
ton, DC, argued for appellee. Also represented by ADAM
L LOYD ERICKSON; D EBRA J ANECE MCC OMAS , D AVID L.
MCCOMBS , Dallas, TX; ROSHAN MANSINGHANI, J ESSICA
L EANN ANDERSEN M ARKS , Unified Patents, LLC, Chevy
Chase, MD.
K EVIN J. K ENNEDY , Appellate Staff, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, ar-
gued for intervenor. Also represented by BRIAN M.
BOYNTON; P ETER J. AYERS , MICHAEL S. FORMAN, AMY J.
N ELSON, F ARHEENA Y ASMEEN RASHEED, Office of the Solic-
itor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexan-
dria, VA.
______________________
Before M OORE, Chief Judge, CLEVENGER and CHEN,
Circuit Judges.
MOORE, Chief Judge.
Dolby Laboratories Licensing Corporation (Dolby) ap-
peals from a final written decision of the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (Board) determining all challenged claims of
U.S. Patent No. 10,237,577 are not unpatentable. Because
Dolby fails to establish an injury in fact sufficient to confer
standing to appeal, we dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Dolby owns the ’577 patent, directed to a prediction
method using an in-loop filter. ’577 patent at 1:54–58. Uni-
fied Patents, LLC (Unified) petitioned for inter partes re-
view (IPR) challenging claims 1, 7, and 8 of the ’577 patent
as anticipated and obvious. J.A. 76. In its petition, Unified
certified it was the sole real party in interest (RPI) under
37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(1). J.A. 81. Dolby identified nine other
entities it believed should also have been named as RPIs
(Alleged RPIs). J.A. 3568–86. In its institution decision,
the Board declined to adjudicate whether the Alleged RPIs
Case: 23-2110 Document: 86 Page: 2 Filed: 06/05/2025

-- 2 of 8 --

DOLBY LAB’ YS LICENSING CORP. v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC 3
were RPIs and instituted review with Unified as the sole
RPI. J.A. 5044–47.
In its final written decision, the Board held Unified
failed to show any of the challenged claims are unpatenta-
ble. J.A. 36. The Board again declined to adjudicate the
RPI dispute, explaining such a determination is unneces-
sary because there is no evidence any of the Alleged RPIs
are time-barred or estopped under 35 U.S.C. § 315 from
bringing the IPR or that Unified purposefully omitted any
of the Alleged RPIs to gain an advantage. J.A. 3–5 (citing
SharkNinja Operating LLC v. iRobot Corp., No. IPR2020-
00734, Paper 11 at 2, 16, 18, 32 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 6, 2020)
(precedential)). The Board followed the United States Pa-
tent and Trademark Office’s practice of only adjudicating
RPI disputes when material to the proceeding in the inter-
est of cost and efficiency. SharkNinja, No. IPR2020-00734,
Paper 11 at 18–20. Dolby appeals. Unified and the Direc-
tor of the Patent and Trademark Office, who has inter-
vened, challenge standing on appeal.
D ISCUSSION
We have jurisdiction to review final decisions of the
Board pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A). However, our
jurisdiction is limited to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S.
CONST . art. III, § 2, cl. 1. To establish a case or controversy,
a party must meet the “irreducible constitutional minimum
of standing.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992). Although a party does not need Article III standing
to file an IPR petition or obtain a Board decision, the party
must establish standing once it seeks our review of the
Board’s final decision. Allgenesis Biotherapeutics Inc. v.
Cloudbreak Therapeutics, LLC, 85 F.4th 1377, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 2023).
To meet Article III standing requirements, an appel-
lant must have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is
fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the [appellee],
and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
Case: 23-2110 Document: 86 Page: 3 Filed: 06/05/2025

-- 3 of 8 --

DOLBY LAB’ YS LICENSING CORP . v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC 4
decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016).
To establish an injury in fact, an appellant must show it
has “suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’
that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or immi-
nent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. at 339 (quoting
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). As the party seeking judicial re-
view, Dolby bears the burden of establishing it has stand-
ing. Phigenix, Inc. v. Immunogen, Inc., 845 F.3d 1168, 1171
(Fed. Cir. 2017).
Dolby argues it has standing to appeal the Board’s re-
fusal to adjudicate the RPI dispute based on (1) the statu-
tory right of a “dissatisfied” party under 35 U.S.C. § 319;
(2) the violation of Dolby’s statutory right to information
under 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2); and (3) various harms stem-
ming from the Board’s refusal, which amount to injury in
fact.1 We conclude Dolby failed to meet its burden to es-
tablish standing on any ground.
I.
Dolby first argues 35 U.S.C. § 319 confers standing to
appeal the Board’s decision because it is a “dissatisfied”
party. Dolby Op. Br. 12; see also 35 U.S.C. § 319 (“A party
dissatisfied with the final written decision of the [Board]
under section 318(a) may appeal the decision pursuant to
sections 141 through 144.”). We do not agree. It is well
established that a statutory right to appeal under the
America Invents Act (AIA) does not obviate the require-
ment for Article III standing. See, e.g., JTEKT Corp. v.
GKN Auto. LTD., 898 F.3d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“In
a series of decisions, we have held that the statute cannot
1 Dolby repeats these arguments to assert standing
to challenge (1) SharkNinja as procedurally void and
(2) the Board’s grant of Unified’s motion to seal certain in-
formation related to the unadjudicated RPI dispute as con-
fidential. Dolby Op. Br. 24, 28.
Case: 23-2110 Document: 86 Page: 4 Filed: 06/05/2025

-- 4 of 8 --

DOLBY LAB’ YS LICENSING CORP. v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC 5
be read to dispense with the Article III injury-in-fact re-
quirement for appeal to this court.”).
II.
Dolby also argues 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2) grants patent
owners an informational right to know the identities of all
RPIs in IPR proceedings, and the violation of such a right
constitutes an injury in fact. Dolby Op. Br. 12–13; Dolby
Reply Br. 1–10; see also 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2) (“A petition
filed under section 311 may be considered only if the peti-
tion identifies all real parties in interest.”). We do not
agree.
The Supreme Court has found an informational right
exists in cases involving “public-disclosure or sunshine
laws that entitle all members of the public to certain infor-
mation.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 441
(2021). For instance, denial of access to records from the
American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on the
Federal Judiciary constituted an injury in fact because the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) requires that ad-
visory committee minutes, records, and reports be made
publicly available. Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S.
440, 449, 446–47 (1989) (citing 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(b)).
Similarly, denial of information about the American Is-
rael Public Affairs Committee’s contributors and activities
constituted an injury in fact because the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA) requires political committees to dis-
close detailed reports of donors, contributions, and expend-
itures. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20, 14–
15 (1998) (citing 2 U.S.C. §§ 432–34). FECA specifically
provides a statutory cause of action for any party to file suit
if they believe a violation of the Act, such as failure to dis-
close certain information, has occurred. Id. at 19 (quoting
2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1), (a)(8)(A)).
One of the express purposes of FACA and FECA is thus
to allow the public access to certain information. By
Case: 23-2110 Document: 86 Page: 5 Filed: 06/05/2025

-- 5 of 8 --

DOLBY LAB’ YS LICENSING CORP . v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC 6
contrast, the purpose of the AIA is “to establish a more ef-
ficient and streamlined patent system that will improve
patent quality and limit unnecessary and counterproduc-
tive litigation costs.” Thryv, Inc v. Click-To-Call Techs.,
LP, 590 U.S. 45, 54 (2020) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 112–98,
pt. 1, at 40 (2011)).
Even if patent owners have a right under 35 U.S.C.
§ 312(a)(2) to have RPI disputes adjudicated, such a right
only arises in the context of IPR proceedings; there is no
freestanding right to that information. Rather than creat-
ing a special statutory cause of action, the AIA bars judicial
review of IPR institution decisions, which includes deci-
sions concerning the RPI requirement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 312(a)(2). ESIP Series 2, LLC v. Puzhen Life USA, LLC,
958 F.3d 1378, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2020); cf. SIPCO, LLC v.
Emerson Elec. Co., 980 F.3d 865, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see
also 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (“The determination by the Director
whether to institute an inter partes review under this sec-
tion shall be final and nonappealable.”). We therefore hold
the AIA does not create an informational right.
III.
Dolby argues it has suffered an injury in fact because
(1) the Alleged RPIs may be breaching license agreements,
(2) the empaneled Administrative Patent Judges (APJs)
that rendered the Board’s final written decision may have
conflicts of interest with the Alleged RPIs, (3) the Alleged
RPIs may not be properly estopped in future proceedings,
and (4) Unified may be disincentivized from filing IPRs if
it must identify its members as RPIs. Dolby Op. Br. 12–
15. We conclude Dolby’s purported injuries are too specu-
lative to establish Article III standing.
First, Dolby does not argue any of the Alleged RPIs are
subject to license agreements with Dolby, much less pro-
vide evidence the Alleged RPIs are breaching license agree-
ments. See Dolby Op. Br. 12–13; see also Apple Inc. v.
Qualcomm Inc., 992 F.3d 1378, 1383–84 (Fed. Cir. 2021)
Case: 23-2110 Document: 86 Page: 6 Filed: 06/05/2025

-- 6 of 8 --

DOLBY LAB’ YS LICENSING CORP. v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC 7
(holding appellant failed to show standing to appeal an IPR
final decision based on ongoing license obligations that
would not be affected by the validity determination).
Second, Dolby provides no evidence any of the APJs
had a potential conflict based on any of the Alleged RPIs,
despite Dolby’s counsel knowing the identities of the Al-
leged RPIs and having the ability to request the APJs’ fi-
nancial disclosures once the case was empaneled. See
Dolby Op. Br. 13; Director Br. 20–21. The APJs had suffi-
cient information to ensure a lack of conflicts because
Dolby identified the Alleged RPIs before institution.
J.A. 3573–74. More importantly, Dolby cannot show harm
from a potential conflict because it prevailed before the
Board. J.A. 36. Dolby does not seek to disturb the decision
in its favor issued by the APJs it claims may have had a
conflict.
Third, Dolby provides no evidence it will be barred from
asserting estoppel against the Alleged RPIs in hypothetical
future litigation. See Dolby Op. Br. 14. Nor does Dolby
claim that any of the Alleged RPIs is engaged in, or intends
to engage in, activity that may trigger an infringement
suit. Id. It is undisputed there is no pending or threatened
litigation related to the ’577 patent such that estoppel is-
sues would be implicated. J.A. 4–5. It is also undisputed
there is no collateral estoppel effect of the Board’s refusal
to adjudicate the RPI dispute that would prevent Dolby
from raising the issue in future proceedings, whether be-
fore the Board or in district court. Director Br. 15; Unified
Br. 15, 18.
Finally, Dolby provides no evidence Unified would
change its strategies should it be required to disclose its
members as RPIs. See Dolby Op. Br. 14–15. Dolby merely
speculates that, if required to do so, Unified may never
challenge another Dolby patent again. Id. The only sup-
port Dolby cites is Unified’s CEO’s testimony that requir-
ing its members to be named as RPIs in IPRs would be “a
Case: 23-2110 Document: 86 Page: 7 Filed: 06/05/2025

-- 7 of 8 --

DOLBY LAB’ YS LICENSING CORP . v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC 8
dramatic departure” from its existing practices. J.A. 3662
at 24:23–24. That is far too speculative to establish injury
in fact.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we conclude Dolby has failed to es-
tablish an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III
standing. We dismiss the appeal and do not reach the mer-
its of Dolby’s substantive challenges.
DISMISSED
COSTS
No costs.
Case: 23-2110 Document: 86 Page: 8 Filed: 06/05/2025

-- 8 of 8 --