Mary Nealy v. SunTrust Bank, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-11358
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
MARY NEALY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SUNTRUST BANK,
SUNTRUST BANKS, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-02885-SDG
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-11358
Before R OSENBAUM , NEWSOM , and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is an employment discrimination case under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Mary Nealy
alleges that SunTrust Bank terminated her based on her race and
gender. The district court granted summary judgment to SunTrust
because Nealy failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion. We agree and affirm.
I
Mary Nealy, an African American woman, previously
worked at SunTrust’s Atlanta office as a Processing Specialist in the
Consumer Lending Sales Center (CLSC). In this capacity, Nealy
had access to a system knows as ACAPS, which contained sensitive
client information from consumer loan applications and real estate
data used in the loan underwriting process. Donna Reed managed
the CLSC operations for SunTrust’s Atlanta and Orlando offices.
A CLSC employee in Orlando requested permission to work
a second job as a realtor. Reed had not received such a request
before, and upon consideration, she determined that allowing an
employee to maintain a real estate business on the side may cause
a conflict of interest: A CLSC employee with access to ACAPS may
use that information to further her own real estate activities. Reed
decided to prohibit CLSC employees with access to ACAPS from
maintaining active real estate licenses.
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21-11358 Opinion of the Court 3
Nealy held a real estate license and decided not to deactivate
it; thus, SunTrust terminated Nealy’s employment. Two other Af-
rican American women in the Atlanta office who had access to
ACAPS and deactivated their real estate licenses remained em-
ployed by SunTrust, and a female African American administrative
assistant who did not have access to ACAPS was allowed to retain
her real estate license.
Nealy filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against
SunTrust, alleging that it discriminated against her on the basis of
race and gender, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.1 In an amended complaint, Nealy
named six SunTrust employees from other departments as her
comparators. According to Nealy, these employees were not black
women, possessed real estate licenses, could access ACAPS, and re-
mained employed by SunTrust. Following discovery, SunTrust
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted sum-
mary judgment, concluding that Nealy failed to “establish a
prima
facie case of discrimination because she (1) failed to point to a sim-
ilarly situated comparator to support her claims of intentional dis-
crimination, and (2) did not otherwise present evidence demon-
strating racial animus.” The court noted that none of Nealy’s com-
parators “(1) worked in the CLSC, or (2) were supervised by Reed,”
1 Nealy also alleged age discrimination and race discrimination premised on a
mixed-motive theory. The district court granted summary judgment to Sun-
Trust on those claims, and Nealy does not challenge those rulings on appeal.
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-11358
and that Nealy did not cogently articulate how Reed’s decision con-
stituted evidence of discrimination. Nealy appealed.
Before us, Nealy contends that her six comparators were
similarly situated in all material respects and that SunTrust’s stated
reasoning for terminating her employment was pretext for discrim-
ination.2
II
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against
employees on the basis of race or sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits employment discrimination
on the basis of race. Both Title VII and § 1981 have the same re-
quirements of proof and use the same analytical framework.
Chap-
ter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1256–57 (11th Cir.
2012). As the Supreme Court explained in
McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, the employee carries the initial burden of establish-
ing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973). She may do so by showing that “(1) she belongs to a pro-
tected class, (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment ac-
tion, (3) her employer treated similarly situated employees outside
her classification more favorably, and (4) she was qualified to do
2 “We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment.”
Mosley
v. Zachery, 966 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020). “Summary judgment is ap-
propriate ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any ma-
terial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”
Id.
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
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21-11358 Opinion of the Court 5
the job.”
Smelter v. S. Home Care Servs. Inc., 904 F.3d 1276, 1288
(11th Cir. 2018). If the employee establishes a prima facie discrim-
ination case, the burden shifts to the employer to “articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its actions.
McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the employer meets this burden, the
employee gets a fair opportunity to show that the employer’s
stated reason is, in fact, pretext for discrimination.
Id. at 804.
In
Lewis v. City of Union City, this Court held that in mak-
ing a prima facie showing of racial discrimination, the employee
must name comparators who were “similarly situated in all mate-
rial respects” and treated more favorably. 918 F.3d 1213, 1224 (11th
Cir. 2019) (en banc). We reasoned that such a comparator may be
“subject to the same employment policy, guideline, or rule” and
will ordinarily “have been under the jurisdiction of the same super-
visor.”
Id. at 1227–28. Here, Nealy’s comparators worked in dif-
ferent departments under different supervisors with different rules.
It’s difficult to see how SunTrust treated similarly situated employ-
ees outside Nealy’s class more favorably when Nealy’s compara-
tors weren’t subject to the same policy that Reed implemented for
the CLSC.3
See Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1541 (11th Cir.
1989) (“[M]easures undertaken by different supervisors may not be
comparable for purposes of Title VII analysis.”). Moreover, other
3 Nealy also failed to establish that any of her comparators had access to all the
same confidential information that she did. So even if her comparators were
subject to the same policy regarding real estate licenses, Nealy would not nec-
essarily meet her burden of proof.
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-11358
CLSC employees within Nealy’s class remained employed after
they complied with Reed’s policy. We agree with the district court
that Nealy failed to make a prima facie showing of racial or gender
discrimination because her comparators were not similarly situ-
ated in all material respects. Thus, summary judgment was proper.
III
Because Nealy’s case fails at the first step of the
McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework, we need not consider
whether SunTrust’s reasons for terminating Nealy were pretext for
discrimination.4
AFFIRMED.
4 In her attempt to demonstrate pretext, Nealy challenges the wisdom of
Reed’s rule. We note, however, that an employer’s honest, good-faith belief
may be a legitimate reason for termination even if it’s mistaken or wrong.
“Federal courts do not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an
entity’s business decisions.”
Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466,
1470 (11th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted). So long as the discharge is not be-
cause of race or gender, the employer has not violated Title VII or § 1981.
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