Milford Casualty Ins. Co. v. William Stacey Meeks

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-13500
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:20-cv-00036-LGW-BWC
MILFORD CASUALTY INS. CO.,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM STACEY MEEKS,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________
(April 23, 2021)
Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
USCA11 Case: 20-13500 Date Filed: 04/23/2021 Page: 1 of 10

-- 1 of 10 --

2
William Stacey Meeks appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to
dismiss and its grant of summary judgment in favor of Milford Casualty Insurance
Company (“Milford”). He argues that the district court should have declined to
exercise jurisdiction over Milford’s declaratory judgment action because of a
parallel pending action in state court. He also says the district court’s grant of
summary judgment is based on an incorrect interpretation of Milford’s insurance
policy. After careful consideration, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Incident1
During the early morning hours in December 2016, Abdi Mahad was driving
a tractor trailer on behalf of BIH Express, Inc. (“BIH”) on Georgia Highway 15
when he lost control of the vehicle. The truck overturned and slid across the
highway into the lane in which Meeks was driving. Meeks’s vehicle crashed into
the overturned truck, knocking him unconscious. When Meeks awoke sometime
later, he called 911 and then checked on Mahad. Meeks says when he arrived at
the truck he saw Mahad standing upright in the overturned cab with papers stuffed
under his arm and looking through other papers scattered about the floor. Mahad
told Meeks that he was okay and Meeks walked back to his car.
1 Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we present the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party (here, Meeks). S.E.C. v. Monterosso, 756 F.3d 1326, 1333
(11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
USCA11 Case: 20-13500 Date Filed: 04/23/2021 Page: 2 of 10

-- 2 of 10 --

3
Sometime later, vehicles driven by Scott Buchanan and Roy Johnson also
crashed into the overturned truck, injuring both drivers. The precise timing of
these collisions is unsettled. Meeks testified that he does not know how long he
was unconscious after his collision or how long he stayed in his car once he
regained consciousness. Meeks further testified that he does not know how much
time passed between his collision and the second collision, though he believes it
was more than five minutes. He testified that the time between the second and
third collisions was probably about five to seven minutes.
B. The Policy
BIH is the named insured under a motor carrier liability policy (“the
Policy”) that was issued in Kentucky and assumed by Milford. The Policy
obligates Milford to pay all applicable bodily injury or property damage claims
“caused by an ‘accident’ and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of
covered ‘autos’.” The Policy defines the term “Accident” as “continuous or
repeated exposure to the same conditions resulting in ‘bodily injury.’”
The Policy also contains a “Limit of Insurance” provision that states, in
relevant part:
Regardless of the number of covered ‘autos’, ‘insureds’, premiums
paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the ‘accident’, the most we
will pay for the total of all damages . . . combined resulting from any
one ‘accident’ is the Limit of Insurance for Covered Autos Liability
Coverage . . . . All ‘bodily injury’ [and] ‘property damage’ . . . resulting
USCA11 Case: 20-13500 Date Filed: 04/23/2021 Page: 3 of 10

-- 3 of 10 --

4
from continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same
conditions will be considered as resulting from one ‘accident’.
The limit of insurance is $1,000,000 per accident.
C. Procedural History
Buchanan, Johnson, and Meeks all asserted claims against BIH for injuries
sustained in the accident. The parties disagree about the exact nature and timing of
the payout, but it is undisputed that Milford paid at least $1,000,000 (the limit of
insurance under the Policy) in settlement to either Buchanan or Johnson, but that
Meeks received no payment under the Policy.
In August 2018, Meeks filed an action in the Superior Court of Charlton
County, Georgia, alleging that BIH and Mahad were liable to him for his injuries.
The complaint also listed Milford as a defendant. While that action was pending,
Milford filed the lawsuit now on appeal seeking a declaration under the
Declaratory Judgment Act that it had exhausted its limits under the Policy and
“owes no indemnity coverage” to Meeks nor has any obligation to provide a
defense to any party in the underlying action. Thereafter, Milford moved for
summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to judgment on this issue as a
matter of law. Meeks then filed a motion to dismiss Milford’s action for
declaratory relief. Meeks argued that the district court should exercise its
discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act to not hear Milford’s action
because a parallel state court action is pending.
USCA11 Case: 20-13500 Date Filed: 04/23/2021 Page: 4 of 10

-- 4 of 10 --

5
The district court considered Meeks’s motion to dismiss and Milford’s
motion for summary judgment together. The court denied Meeks’s motion to
dismiss. It found that the motion was untimely and concluded, in any event, that it
would not be appropriate to abstain from hearing Milford’s action. The court also
granted Milford’s motion for summary judgment. It held that the three collisions
constituted only one “accident” under the Policy and therefore Milford had met its
limit of insurance.
This is Meeks’s appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
We first address the district court’s denial of Meeks’s motion to dismiss
Milford’s declaratory judgment action. We then turn to the court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Milford.
A. Meeks’s Motion to Dismiss Milford’s Declaratory Judgment Action
We review a district court’s decision to hear a declaratory judgment action
for abuse of discretion. Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1134 (11th
Cir. 2005). Under this standard, “we will leave undisturbed a district court’s ruling
unless we find that the district court has made a clear error of judgment, or has
applied the wrong legal standard.” Ameritas Variable Life Ins. Co. v. Roach, 411
F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
USCA11 Case: 20-13500 Date Filed: 04/23/2021 Page: 5 of 10

-- 5 of 10 --

6
On appeal, Meeks argues both that his motion to dismiss was timely and that
the district court erred by declining to abstain from hearing Milford’s declaratory
judgment action. Because we conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion by retaining jurisdiction over Milford’s action, we need not (and do not)
address timeliness.
Our Court has identified nine factors for courts to consider in determining
whether to dismiss a pending declaratory judgment action in favor of a parallel
state action:
(1) the strength of the state’s interest in having the issues raised in the
federal declaratory action decided in the state courts;
(2) whether the judgment in the federal declaratory action would settle the
controversy;
(3) whether the federal declaratory action would serve a useful purpose in
clarifying the legal relations at issue;
(4) whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose
of ‘procedural fending’—that is, to provide an arena for a race for res
judicata or to achieve a federal hearing in a case otherwise not
removable;
(5) whether the use of a declaratory action would increase the friction
between our federal and state courts and improperly encroach on state
jurisdiction;
(6) whether there is an alternative remedy that is better or more effective;
(7) whether the underlying factual issues are important to an informed
resolution of the case;
USCA11 Case: 20-13500 Date Filed: 04/23/2021 Page: 6 of 10

-- 6 of 10 --

7
(8) whether the state trial court is in a better position to evaluate those
factual issues than is the federal court; and
(9) whether there is a close nexus between the underlying factual and legal
issues and state law and/or public policy, or whether federal common
or statutory law dictates a resolution of the declaratory judgment action.
Ameritas, 411 F.3d at 1331. This list is “neither absolute nor is any one factor
controlling.” Id.
The district court held that the balance of the relevant factors weighed in
favor of retaining jurisdiction over Milford’s declaratory judgment action. This
was not an abuse of discretion. To begin, it is undisputed that Kentucky law
governs here because the Policy was issued and delivered in Kentucky. For that
reason, we agree with the district court that factors one, five, eight, and nine weigh
in favor of retaining jurisdiction. The Georgia Superior Court, where Meeks’s
state action is pending, has no stronger interest in interpreting Kentucky law than
does the federal court. Neither is the Georgia Superior Court better positioned to
evaluate Kentucky law and apply it to the facts of this case.
Meeks’s arguments do not show the district court abused its discretion.
Meeks says the fourth factor weighs in favor of declining jurisdiction because
Milford’s declaratory judgment action is “being used to provide an arena for a race
for res judicata in a case not otherwise removable” and points to the fact that
Milford recognized the res judicata effect the federal decision would have. He also
argues that the state court is more familiar with the facts and thus better able to
USCA11 Case: 20-13500 Date Filed: 04/23/2021 Page: 7 of 10

-- 7 of 10 --

8
evaluate them, making factors seven and eight weigh in his favor. However, even
if we were to agree with Meeks that some factors weigh in favor of declining
jurisdiction, that would not lead us to conclude the district court abused its
discretion. As noted above, we think factors one, five, eight, and nine weigh in
favor of retaining jurisdiction. And the district court adequately considered factors
four and seven when reaching its decision. Therefore, the court neither “made a
clear error of judgment” nor “applied the wrong legal standard.” Ameritas, 411
F.3d at 1330.
B. Milford’s Motion for Summary Judgment
We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, drawing all reasonable
inferences and reviewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Newcomb v. Spring Creek Cooler, Inc., 926 F.3d 709, 713 (11th
Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Milford says it is entitled to summary judgment because it already fulfilled
its obligation under the Policy when it paid $1,000,000 to claimants other than
Meeks for claims stemming from the collisions. Under the Policy, Milford is
obligated to pay up to $1,000,000 “per accident.” Thus the central question is
whether the three collisions constituted a single accident or multiple accidents. We
USCA11 Case: 20-13500 Date Filed: 04/23/2021 Page: 8 of 10

-- 8 of 10 --

9
agree with the district court that, according to the terms of the Policy, only one
accident occurred.
Again here, Kentucky law controls. Under Kentucky law, contract
interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal. Maze v.
Bd. of Dirs. for Commonwealth Postsecondary Educ. Prepaid Tuition Trust Fund,
559 S.W.3d 354, 363 (Ky. 2018). The first question in interpreting a contract is
whether the contract is ambiguous. Bd. of Trustees of Ky. Sch. Bds. Ins. Trust v.
Pope, 528 S.W.3d 901, 906 (Ky. 2017). “A contract is ambiguous if a reasonable
person would find it susceptible to different or inconsistent interpretations.”
Hazard Coal Corp. v. Knight, 325 S.W.3d 290, 298 (Ky. 2010) (quotation marks
omitted). In the absence of ambiguity, we must interpret the contract “strictly
according to its terms” which means “assigning language its ordinary meaning and
without resort to extrinsic evidence.” Ky. Shakespeare Festival, Inc. v. Dunaway,
490 S.W.3d 691, 694 (Ky. 2016) (quotation marks omitted).
As defined in the Policy, the term “accident” unambiguously encompasses
all three collisions. The Policy defines “accident” as including “continuous or
repeated exposure to the same conditions resulting in ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property
damage.’” The inclusion of “continuous or repeated exposure to the same
conditions” clearly contemplates the situation here: multiple collisions with the
same overturned truck. The Policy’s “Limit of Insurance” section makes this even
USCA11 Case: 20-13500 Date Filed: 04/23/2021 Page: 9 of 10

-- 9 of 10 --

10
more explicit, clarifying that “repeated exposure to substantially the same
conditions will be considered as resulting from one ‘accident’” for coverage
purposes.
Meeks says the collisions here cannot constitute a single accident under the
Policy because he was exposed to “entirely different conditions” than Buchanan
and Johnson. According to Meeks, the difference is that he collided with the
overturned truck while it was sliding across the highway while Buchanan and
Johnson hit a stationary truck after the driver had time to warn approaching
motorists. This argument does not carry the day. All three motorists hit the truck
within a matter of minutes as it lay overturned in the road. The fact that Meeks’s
collision occurred while the truck was still moving and the others happened once
the truck was stationary does not change the fact that the injuries of all three
claimants arose from “substantially the same conditions.” Therefore, under the
plain terms of the Policy, only one accident occurred. Because Milford has paid
the amount required for a single accident, the district court’s grant of summary
judgment was proper.
AFFIRMED.
USCA11 Case: 20-13500 Date Filed: 04/23/2021 Page: 10 of 10

-- 10 of 10 --