Gwendolyn Williams v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-14704
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-00692-JFK

GWENDOLYN WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(February 20, 2020)
Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Gwendolyn Williams appeals the district court’s order affirming the
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denying her application for
disability insurance benefits (DIB), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On appeal, she
argues that substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s decision to give Dr.
Steven Lobel’s opinion only some weight and that a vocational expert (VE) should
have been called to testify about Dr. Lobel’s findings. Williams also argues that
substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s determination that she could
perform her past relevant work, as the ALJ did not make sufficient findings about
the requirements of that work. As the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence, we affirm.
I
The facts of this case are familiar to the parties, so we’ll proceed to the
merits of Williams’s appeal. We review the ALJ’s decision for substantial
evidence, and its application of legal principles de novo. Moore v. Barnhart, 405
F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). “Substantial evidence is less than a
preponderance,” id., but “more than a scintilla”—it “is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” Winschel v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “We may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the
evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Id. (alteration
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accepted) (quotation omitted). Therefore, “[e]ven if the evidence preponderates
against the Commissioner’s findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is
supported by substantial evidence.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d
1155, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). Further, “there is no rigid
requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in [her]
decision,” so long as a claimant’s overall medical condition is considered. Dyer v.
Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
II
A
When determining what weight to give a medical opinion, the factors
considered include: (1) the “[e]xamining relationship”; (2) the “[t]reatment
relationship”—including the “[l]ength of the treatment relationship and the
frequency of examination”; (3) the “[s]upportability” of the medical opinion; and
(4 ) the “[c]onsistency” of the medical opinion as compared to other evidence. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)–(4). Generally, the Social Security Administration (SSA)
gives “more weight to medical opinions from [a] treating source[],” because
treating “sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a
detailed, longitudinal picture of” a claimant’s medical history. Id.
§ 404.1527(c)(2). Additionally, treating sources “may bring a unique perspective
to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical
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findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative
examinations.” Id.
We have held, therefore, that the opinion of a treating physician must be
given “substantial or considerable weight” unless “good cause” is shown to the
contrary. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (quotation omitted). We have found good
cause where: “‘(1) [the] opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) [the]
evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) [the] opinion was conclusory or
inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.’” Id. (quotation omitted).
“The ALJ must clearly articulate the reasons for giving less weight to the opinion
of a treating physician, and the failure to do so is reversible error.” Lewis v.
Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). The standards are lower,
however, for non-treating physicians—like “one-time examiners”—as “their
opinions are not entitled to deference.” McSwain v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 617, 619
(11th Cir. 1987).
B
Williams argues that the ALJ’s decision to give Dr. Lobel’s opinion only
some weight was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree. Dr. Lobel
only examined Williams once for a consultative evaluation, so he is not a “treating
source” entitled to deference. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)–(2) (distinguishing
treating sources from providers of consultative examinations). The ALJ was free,
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therefore, to disregard his opinion without having to articulate good cause. See
McSwain, 814 F.2d at 619.
Nevertheless, the ALJ’s decision was indeed supported by substantial
evidence. The ALJ did credit several findings in Dr. Lobel’s opinion, but she
chose not to give weight to his statement that Williams could only stand/walk for
two hours a day, in 20-minute intervals. As the ALJ explained, there was no other
evidence in Williams’s medical record indicating she had such a limitation.
Additionally, Williams’s brief focuses on a portion of Dr. Lobel’s opinion in
which he stated that she needs to take 15-minute breaks after every two hours she
spends sitting during the workday—she alleges that this means she would have to
spend two hours of each eight-hour work day on break. She contends that a
vocational expert (VE) should have testified at her hearing before the ALJ, to
explain that this limitation “would prevent the full performance of work at any
exertional level,” as it means that she would be spending 25% of her working day
on breaks.
Williams’s math, however, is a bit off. Taking 15-minute breaks every two
hours during the workday would only result in 45 minutes of break time during
working hours. So, as the government explains in is brief, “Dr. Lobel’s opinion
that [Williams] required 15-minute breaks after any periods of sitting for two hours
was consistent with the ability to work a full day, and was not an additional
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limitation or restriction that the ALJ needed to” take into account—such breaks are
contemplated by the SSA as part of a normal workday schedule. See, e.g., SSR 96-
9P, 1996 WL 374185, at *6–7 (Jul. 3, 1996).
1
And, regardless, ALJs are not
required to refer to every single piece of evidence presented to them in their
decisions. Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision to give Dr.
Lobel’s opinion only some weight was supported by substantial evidence.
III
A
Social security regulations outline a “five-step sequential evaluation
process” to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1).
The ALJ must evaluate whether: (1) the claimant is “performing substantial gainful
activity”; (2) the claimant has “a severe impairment”; (3) that “severe impairment
. . . meets or equals an impairment specifically listed in” the C.F.R.; (4) the
claimant has the residual functional capacity (RFC) to “perform her past relevant
work”; and (5) in light of the claimant’s “age, education, and work experience,”
she can “perform other work of the sort found in the national economy.” Phillips
v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2004). If the ALJ determines that

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“Sitting: In order to perform a full range of sedentary work, an individual must be able to
remain in a seated position for approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday, with a morning
break, a lunch period, and an afternoon break at approximately 2-hour intervals.” SSR 96-9P,
1996 WL 374185, at *6 (Jul. 3, 1996).
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the claimant is not disabled at any step of the evaluation process, the inquiry ends.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
A claimant’s RFC is “that which [she] is still able to do despite the
limitations caused by . . . her impairments,” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238, and it is
determined by evaluating her ability to lift weight, sit, stand, push, pull, etc. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1545(b). A claimant’s RFC is used to determine her capability for
performing designated levels of work (sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very
heavy). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. An “ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC
using all relevant medical and other evidence in the case.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at
1238.
“[ A] full and fair record” must be developed regarding the demands of a
claimant’s past relevant work. Schnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir.
1987). In evaluating the demands of a claimant’s past work, an ALJ may rely on
the job descriptions set forth in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) to
determine the level of the work (from sedentary to very heavy) it required, as well
as the claimant’s own account of the work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2).
B
Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Williams
could perform her past relevant work. The ALJ properly relied on Williams’s own
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statements and the DOT to determine that her RFC for light work
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allowed her to
perform her past relevant work. The DOT characterized Williams’s past relevant
work as a manager as a sedentary
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position, and Williams herself testified that she
only walked for half an hour and sat at a desk “most of the day each day” as a
manager. Williams’s RFC for light work, therefore, encompassed her previous,
sedentary position. Moreover, even if she had been assigned a more restrictive
RFC for sedentary work, she would still be qualified to perform her past relevant
work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). As a result, substantial evidence supported

2
Light work is defined as follows:

Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting
or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted
may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking
or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and
pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or
wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these
activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do
sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine
dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) (emphasis added).

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Sedentary work is defined as follows:

Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and
occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools.
Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain
amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs
are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other
sedentary criteria are met.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a).

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the ALJ’s finding that Williams’s RFC would not have precluded her from
performing her previous work as a manager.
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AFFIRMED.

4
Williams reprises her argument that a VE should have testified at her hearing as to whether her
RFC allowed her to do her past relevant work. Nevertheless, an ALJ is not required to hear the
testimony of a VE when determining the requirements of a person’s past relevant work, see 20.
C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2) (stating that a VE may be used in this context), and substantial evidence
supported the ALJ’s findings, regardless.
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