Extreme Crafts VII, LLC v. Cessna Aircraft Company

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 22, 2012
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 11-15212
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 9:10-cv-80292-KLR
EXTREME CRAFTS VII, LLC,
a Florida limited liability company,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY,
a foreign corporation,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(June 22, 2012)
Before CARNES, BARKETT and HILL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Extreme Crafts VII, LLC (“Extreme”) appeals an adverse summary
judgment in favor of Cessna Aircraft Company, (“Cessna”). Extreme sued Cessna
claiming fraudulent and negligent inducement to enter into a contract for the
purchase of a Cessna aircraft.
Prior to the contract at issue, Extreme purchased two aircraft from Cessna.
Thereafter, it entered into a contract to purchase a more expensive third aircraft, a
Sovereign, which Extreme hoped to sell to a third party at a significant profit.
When the aviation market took a severe downturn, Extreme was unable to sell its
position and declined to complete the payments on the contract. After Cessna
retained the deposit sums, as expressly provided for in the purchase contract,
Extreme then claimed it was duped into purchasing the aircraft due to
representations made by Cessna’s sales representative and sued Cessna for
fraudulent inducement, fraud, negligent misrepresentations and unjust enrichment.
Specifically, Extreme claimed that Cessna made the following fraudulent
statements to induce the signing of the contract:
a. There is a two year wait for the Sovereign.
b. The Sovereign is in short supply.
c. There is a backlog for the Sovereign.
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d. Cessna’s sales history for the Sovereign showed that Extreme would have
no problem “flipping” the aircraft contract.
e. Purchasing the Sovereign now would place Extreme in a position to sell
the Sovereign contract within a year.
f. Extreme will definitely be able to sell the Sovereign before the final
deposit is required because Cessna had buyers that did not want to wait two
years.
g. The real money is in the Sovereign, it’s an easy million bucks.
h. Extreme would definitely net a minimum of $1 million profit upon the
sale of the Sovereign contract.
i. The Sovereign is marketable and desirable.
However, Frederick Middleton, Extreme’s representative who took part in the
negotiations with Cessna about purchasing the Sovereign, admitted in his
deposition that some of these statements were true when they were made and/or he
had no information to suggest otherwise.
In awarding Cessna summary judgment, the district court held that the
alleged fraudulent statements were not actionable as fraud because they were
either puffing or contained future promises that were not actionable as fraud.
Specifically, the district court determined, based on the undisputed material facts,
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that the alleged statements by Cessna’s sales representative (i.e. the marketability
of the Sovereign, the present backlog of buyers, the ability to flip the contract)
were either true when made, concern future performance and/or are speculative
and do not rise to the level of fraud or negligent misrepresentations. The district
court also held, based on the undisputed material facts, that there was no
justifiable reliance on the statements.
DISCUSSION
Initially, Extreme argues that the district court was prejudiced and biased
against it. We have reviewed the record and do not find evidence sufficient to
support this claim; a review of the record plainly shows that the district court’s
ruling was based on the undisputed evidence.
Extreme next argues that the district court erred in failing to consider facts
in the light most favorable to Extreme as the non-moving party, by making factual
determinations unsupported by the record, and by making determinations that the
jury should have made. Again, we find that undisputed facts supported the district
court’s conclusion as a matter of law.
Extreme also argues that after soliciting “supplemental filings,” the district
court struck Extreme’s filing declaring that it was improper as “the Court did not
state that it wanted additional briefing and/or memoranda of law,” but, at the same
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time, permitted Cessna to file a deposition of Ralph Lloyd, a Cessna sales director.
At the hearing, and in response to Extreme’s reference to Lloyd’s deposition,
counsel for Cessna responded that the deposition testimony was not before the
district court in the summary judgment papers. At the end of the hearing, the
district court provided an opportunity for counsel to supplement the record, stating
“[i]f you have any other things you want [sic] file, do it within three days.” The
district court did not invite further memoranda of law. Although the district court
could have been clearer, we cannot say it was an abuse of discretion to disregard
additional legal arguments made after the hearing.
Finally, Extreme argues that the district court erred in awarding Cessna
liquidated damages without their filing an action for such an award. This did not
happen. Extreme’s unjust enrichment count was premised on Extreme’s claim that
Cessna would be unjustly enriched if allowed to retain the $2,250,000 deposit for
the Sovereign. Cessna retained the deposit, as permitted in the purchase
agreement, when Extreme breached the agreement by not paying the additional
sums due. The district court simply held that Cessna’s retaining the deposit was
not unjust enrichment because the purchase agreement governs the rights and
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duties of the parties to the deposit money. This was not error.1
For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED
Extreme argues that the district court erred in applying Kansas law, which has a more1
burdensome standard of proof for fraud claims than Florida law does. We need not decide which
state’s law applies, however, because Extreme failed to create a genuine issue of material fact
under either standard. So, even if Florida law does apply, the result is the same. We have also
considered Extreme’s remaining contentions and conclude that they lack merit.
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