USA v. Harrison Norris, Jr.

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 4, 2011
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 10-15901
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:05-cr-00479-JOF-AJB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HARRISON NORRIS, JR.,
a.k.a. Hardbody Harrison,
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(October 4, 2011)
Before HULL, PRYOR, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Harrison Norris, Jr. appeals his 35-year sentence for peonage, providing and
obtaining forced labor, trafficking for peonage and forced labor, sex trafficking,
witness tampering, obstructing a peonage investigation, and conspiracy to do the
same. After a jury convicted him of these charges in 2007, the district court
imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. On Norris’s appeal, we affirmed his
convictions, but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. See United
States v. Norris, 358 F. App’x 60 (11th Cir. 2009) (unpublished). On remand, the
district court conducted a de novo resentencing and sentenced Norris to a total of
35 years’ imprisonment. Norris now appeals his new sentence, arguing that the
district court committed procedural and substantive errors.
Where appropriate, we review a final sentence imposed by the district court
for reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard, taking into account the
totality of the circumstances. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). But
because this appeal is based on specific remarks made by the sentencing court to
which Norris did not object, we review only for plain error. United States v.1
Rodriguez, 627 F.3d 1372, 1380 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1840
Norris contends that he orally objected to the presentence report’s factual findings. This1
appeal, however, challenges only the sentencing court’s remarks characterizing Norris’s
treatment of his victims. Moreover, although he “objected to the sentencings as unreasonable,”
Norris does not claim to have objected to the challenged remarks specifically. See United States
v. Gallo-Chamorro, 48 F.3d 502, 507 (11th Cir. 1995) (“To preserve an issue for appeal, a
general objection or an objection on other grounds will not suffice.”).
2

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(2011). Under that standard, reversal is warranted only where the defendant
demonstrates: (1) error; (2) that was plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and
(4) that seriously affects the fairness of judicial proceedings. Id.
Norris argues the sentencing court committed a procedural error by
selecting a sentence based on its erroneous finding that Norris’s victims endured
worse treatment than 19th century African-American slaves. In support, Norris
refers to a comment from the sentencing judge:
Some years ago I got interested in my family history and I started
doing research. My family has been in the South for awhile. I started
running into a lot of information about slavery, which was all very
interesting to me. I don’t want to pretend that I am an expert on that
subject, but I will observe that, based on what I read and what I saw,
perhaps the majority of the slaves in Georgia in 1850 had more
freedom than these women did.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the sentencing court’s comment about 19th
century slavery is erroneous, Norris has failed to show that this comment affected
his substantial rights. “Making that showing almost always requires that the error
must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Id. at 1382
(internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]here the effect of an error on the result in
the district court is uncertain or indeterminate–where we would have to speculate
– the appellant has not met his burden of showing a reasonable probability of a
different result.” Id.
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In this case, the effect of the sentencing judge’s characterization of Norris’s
treatment of his victims is uncertain and indeterminate. Norris does not establish a
reasonable probability that a different sentence would have resulted but for the
sentencing judge’s purported error. Accordingly, he has failed to show the district
court plainly erred in imposing the 35-year sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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