USA v. Sumerlin

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APR 22, 2011
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 10-13769
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:09-cr-00271-LSC-HGD-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL DONNELL SUMERLIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
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(April 22, 2011)
Before HULL, MARTIN and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant-appellant Michael Donnell Sumerlin was indicted in 2009 with
distributing 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)

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and (b)(1)(A). The government filed its notice of intent to seek enhanced
penalties based on Sumerlin’s prior felony drug convictions. Following a jury
trial, Sumerlin was convicted of the offense; the proof at trial established the
amount of drugs to be 126 grams.
The probation officer determined Sumerlin’s guideline range to be 360
months to life imprisonment due to the quantity of drugs involved and Sumerlin’s
status as a career offender. Because Sumerlin had two prior felony drug
convictions, however, the mandatory minimum sentence was life imprisonment
under § 841(b)(1)(A). Although Sumerlin raised the question whether the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) would apply to his crack cocaine offenses, he
conceded that the Act did not appear to be retroactive. The court sentenced
Sumerlin to the mandatory minimum of life imprisonment. This is Sumerlin’s
appeal.
Sumerlin argues that the FSA should apply retroactively to his sentence
because, even though the Act does not contain any express language indicating its
application to pending cases, the mandatory minimum sentence he is serving no
longer furthers a valid legislative purpose. He further alleges that the pre-FSA
version of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), under which he was sentenced, was
unconstitutional on its face and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
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When a defendant fails to object to a district court’s action below, we will
review his arguments on appeal for plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 733-34 (1993). On August 3, 2010, Congress enacted the FSA to
“restore fairness to Federal cocaine sentencing.” Pub. L. No. 111-120, 124 Stat.
2372, 2372 (2010). The FSA increased the amounts of crack cocaine required to
trigger the mandatory minimum sentences under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) from 50 to
280 grams. Id. § 2(a)(1). Prior to enactment of the FSA, defendants who had two
prior felony drug convictions when they committed an offense involving 50 grams
or more of crack cocaine faced a mandatory term of life imprisonment. 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A) (2009). The FSA did not amend the requirement that, once
triggered, statutory mandatory-minimum sentences apply. See United States v.1
Gomes, 621 F.3d 1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 2010). The FSA contains no language
indicating its application to offenses committed before its enactment. See
generally 124 Stat. 2372.
The general savings statute provides in relevant part that “[t]he repeal of any
statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty . . . incurred
under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide.” 1 U.S.C.
The mandatory minimums would not apply only if the government filed a motion for1
substantial assistance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) or the defendant qualified for safety-valve relief
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Neither exception is applicable here.
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§ 109. In Gomes, we held that § 109 barred the FSA from applying retroactively
to the defendant’s punishment because he committed his crimes before the FSA
took effect. Gomes, 621 F.3d at 1346.
Moreover, we have upheld the constitutionality of the pre-FSA sentencing
statute on numerous occasions. See, e.g., United States v. Hanna, 153 F.3d 1286,
1288-89 (11th Cir. 1998) (rejecting Due Process or Equal Protection Clause
arguments); United States v. Byse, 28 F.3d 1165, 1170-71 (11th Cir. 1994)
(holding that discriminatory impact of the crack-to-powder ratio does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause absent a showing of discriminatory purpose).
Under the prior precedent rule, we are bound to follow prior precedent
“unless and until it is overruled by this court en banc or by the Supreme Court.”
United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting
United States v. Brown, 342 F.3d 1245, 1246 (11th Cir. 2003)). Therefore, the
district court did not plainly err in sentencing Sumerlin under the pre-FSA version
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Accordingly, we affirm Sumerlin’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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