United States of America v. Forrest T. Goodwin, Jr.

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 16-1981
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
FORREST T. GOODWIN, JR.,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lynch, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Jeffrey W. Langholtz, by appointment of the court, on brief
for appellant.
Renée M. Bunker, Assistant United States Attorney, and
Richard W. Murphy, Acting United States Attorney, on brief for
appellee.
August 8, 2017

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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. After his conviction in 2012 for
acting as an accessory after the fact to an armed credit union
robbery, Forrest Goodwin was sentenced to forty-two months'
imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release
subject to standard and special conditions. During the period of
supervised release, Goodwin repeatedly violated release conditions
pertaining to substance abuse. In 2016, he was arrested, and the
U.S. Probation Office filed a petition for revocation of his
supervised release. At the revocation hearing, the district court
sentenced Goodwin to ten months' imprisonment, to be followed by
two years of supervised release subject to the same previously
imposed conditions. On appeal from the revocation sentence,
Goodwin challenges the term and the substance-abuse-related
conditions of his supervised release sentence. We affirm.
I.
In June 2012, Goodwin was found guilty of acting as an
accessory after the fact to an armed credit union robbery. There
was trial evidence that Goodwin used the robbery proceeds to
purchase drugs. Goodwin's presentence investigation report
("PSR") for the robbery offense disclosed a history of substance
abuse and drug-related prior convictions. Adopting the PSR's
guidelines sentencing range of thirty-seven to forty-six months,
the district court sentenced Goodwin to forty-two months'
imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervision. Among

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other conditions for release, the court mandated that Goodwin not
use or possess any controlled substance, alcohol, or other
intoxicant; that he participate in a substance-abuse treatment
program; and that he report to his probation officer for testing.
Goodwin was released from prison in December 2014, but
arrested again in May 2016 following his repeated violations of
supervised-release conditions. The Revocation Report carefully
described the many instances of Goodwin's continued drug use,
failure to report for testing, and refusal to submit to further
testing. The report also noted that Goodwin made statements to
his probation officer denying that he had a drug-addiction problem.
At the revocation hearing, Goodwin admitted to all of these
violations. Goodwin's counsel explained, there is "no question
that [Goodwin] is addicted to opiate drugs"; "[i]f given [a] second
chance, [Goodwin] understands that he now needs to work with, and
not against, his probation officer"; "[Goodwin] is in agreement
with the 24-month term of supervised release" and "understands
that basically he needs to do all of his supervised release over
again"; and "really what [Goodwin] has is a drug problem and he's
trying to address it."
The district court remembered Goodwin's case "extremely
well," having presided over Goodwin's trial and sentencing hearing
in 2012. In revoking Goodwin's original supervised release, the
court imposed a ten-month prison term, to be followed by two years

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of supervised release subject to the same set of previously imposed
conditions. The court also imposed a ninety-day period of
community confinement as a new special condition of release. The
court described post-revocation supervised release as a final
"opportunity for change" -- Goodwin's last chance to "cooperate
with counseling and treatment" and "conquer [his] drug problem."
Goodwin now challenges this new term of supervision and
the substance-abuse-related requirements. Goodwin argues that the
district court committed plain error because (1) supervised
release will likely fail, given Goodwin's ongoing struggles with
substance abuse; and, in any event, (2) the release conditions are
not sufficiently related to Goodwin's original robbery offense.
The government disputes that Goodwin's sentence was in
error, but also argues as a threshold matter that Goodwin waived
his challenges when his counsel stated at the revocation hearing
that Goodwin "agree[d] with the 24-month term of supervised
release." Goodwin maintains that he forfeited, but did not waive,
his objections.
II.
We ordinarily review a district court's revocation
sentence, including any conditions of supervised release, for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Marino, 833 F.3d 1, 10 (1st
Cir. 2016). If the defendant forfeited his claims, we review only
for plain error. United States v. York, 357 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir.

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2004). If the defendant instead affirmatively assented to parts
of his sentence, any objections thereto are waived and cannot be
resurrected on appeal. United States v. Rodriguez, 311 F.3d 435,
437 (1st Cir. 2002). Goodwin has conceded forfeiture but he
contests the government's assertion of waiver. We need not address
the waiver dispute, however, because the record clearly
establishes that the supervised-release component of Goodwin's
revocation sentence was not in error.
"When a judge revokes a defendant's supervised-release
term, the new sentence may include an additional supervised-
release stint . . . ." Marino, 833 F.3d at 10 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(h)). Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in sentencing Goodwin to a new two-year period of supervision.
During his initial term of supervised release, Goodwin flouted his
release conditions. In addition, he flatly denied to his probation
officer that he had any drug addiction. At the revocation hearing,
however, Goodwin requested a "fresh start," and his counsel
emphasized that Goodwin was ready to "work with, and not against,
his probation officer." After recounting Goodwin's original
offense and sentence, as well as the uncontroverted evidence of
Goodwin's ongoing struggles with substance abuse, the district
court decided to give Goodwin a second chance. In setting the
term of supervision for the post-revocation sentence, the court
warned that if Goodwin did not seize this opportunity he would

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find himself in jail "for a long time." The district court's
sentence was eminently reasonable in light of Goodwin's record of
recurrent non-compliance and his professed motivation to overcome
his drug addiction.
Undermining his own representations to the district
court at the revocation hearing, Goodwin now argues that his
ongoing substance-abuse problem warrants foregoing any further
supervision. His rationale runs counter to the rehabilitative and
deterrent ends of supervised release. As the government puts it,
"[i]t would seem odd to reward Goodwin for his repeated acts of
intransigence, flouting of release conditions and non-compliance
with drug-treatment opportunities with a free pass on supervised
release altogether."
The cases on which Goodwin relies in seeking to avoid
post-revocation supervision are inapposite. United States v. Mora
involved reversal of a lifetime term of supervised release (TSR),
an unreasonable upward departure that had been imposed on the sole
basis of recidivism. See 22 F.3d 409, 413-14 (2d Cir. 1994).
Here, the district court imposed a TSR of just two years after
taking into account Goodwin's representations at his revocation
hearing. United States v. Tsosie generally discusses how district
courts have the authority to terminate, revoke, or extend terms of
supervision, but nowhere does it suggest that non-compliance
warrants foregoing a post-revocation TSR. See 376 F.3d 1210, 1215

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(10th Cir. 2004), abrogated in part by Tapia v. United States, 564
U.S. 319 (2011). As for United States v. Thornhill, it involved
a fact-specific assessment that does not have any bearing on
Goodwin's case. See 759 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2014). In Thornhill,
the district court opted, at a third round of revocation
proceedings, to impose extended incarceration but no new TSR. See
id. at 305-06. By contrast, Goodwin acknowledged his substance-
abuse problem at his first revocation hearing and professed his
motivation and readiness to overcome it.
Goodwin separately argues that the supervised-release
conditions relating to drug rehabilitation are "insufficiently
correlated" to his offense of acting as an accessory after the
fact to an armed credit union robbery. This argument also fails.
As the district court recalled at the revocation hearing, Goodwin's
initial offense did bear a connection to his drug addiction:
Goodwin immediately used the robbery proceeds to purchase drugs.
Regardless, the Sentencing Guidelines "do not limit district
courts to consideration only of the facts of the crime charged."
York, 357 F.3d at 19-20. Rather, the district court should
consider the defendant's history "regardless of the nature of the
crime of conviction," and can impose release conditions that are
"reasonably related to" any of the permissible goals of supervised
release: "(1) the defendant's offense, history, and
characteristics; (2) the need to deter the defendant from further

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criminal conduct; (3) the need to protect the public from further
crimes by the defendant; and (4) the effective educational,
vocational, medical, or other correctional treatment of the
defendant." Id. at 20. The substance-abuse treatment mandated
here by the district court serves the correctional purpose of
helping Goodwin "conquer [his] drug problem" and avoid criminal
conduct that would land him back in jail for a much longer period
of time.
III.
The district court committed no error, plain or
otherwise. Accordingly, we affirm Goodwin's sentence.

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