United States v. Dianne Wilkerson

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 11-1069
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
DIANNE WILKERSON,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Thompson, Circuit Judges.
Judith H. Mizner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, on brief
for appellant.
Kelly Begg Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Carmen M.
Ortiz, United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
April 5, 2012

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Per Curiam. Defendant-appellant Dianne Wilkerson, a former
state senator in Massachusetts, pleaded guilty to federal charges
of attempted extortion (18 U.S.C. § 1951) based on her acceptance
of money offered in exchange for her favorable influence in her
official capacity. Her crime involved two separate matters: the
issuance of a liquor license for a new club, and the sale and
development of a parcel of publicly-owned land. After she pleaded
guilty, the district court received a lengthy presentence report,
and conducted a thorough sentencing hearing. Before imposing
sentence, the district court stated its reasons in some detail. It
imposed a prison term of forty-two months, which was near the
middle of the applicable range under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines.
The defense takes issue with three separate conclusions that
it attributes to the district court, based on the court's statement
of reasons in support of the sentence imposed. First, in relation
to a prior conviction for failure to file tax returns, Wilkerson
released a public statement in which she said "[f]or public
officials, there should be a higher expectation about how we
conduct even our personal affairs. This is a personal tax matter."
The district court stated its own view that "[a] tax violation by
a public official is not a personal matter." The defense construes
the district court's statement as a rebuke and an accusation that
Wilkerson did not accept full responsibility for her prior crime.
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The context in which the district court made the statement makes
this interpretation unlikely. The court explained that it did "not
want to twist people's words around and turn them on them" but did
"want to make a larger point." It then posited that Wilkerson had
fallen into neglect of her own legal responsibilities by following
an unbalanced and over-committed approach in her public service.
The court's comment is most plausibly interpreted as a segue to
make a "larger point," and a fair one, about the public
implications of an over-engaged official's failure to attend to his
or her own legal responsibilities.
The defense also takes issue with the district court's
comment, concerning Wilkerson's prior state civil campaign-finance
violations, that she "was simply inattentive and inattentive in a
way that permitted her to have access to money that she should not
have had." The defense construes this comment as accusing
Wilkerson of putting disputed funds to personal use. This is too
strong of an imputation. However technical Wilkerson's violations
might have been, and however little money was diverted to personal
use, campaign-finance violations involve a recipient's impropriety
in connection with received funds. The district court's colloquial
phrasing about "access to money she should not have had" is a fair
comment on the implications of non-compliance with campaign-finance
requirements.
Finally the defense disputes the district court's conclusion
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that Wilkerson's engagement as a college "consultant" was one of "a
series of very embarrassing things" she did in response to her
financial troubles. The defense makes the point that it is not
improper for a legislator to teach or lecture at a college. This
is a fair point in the abstract, but the district court's comment
was specific to the circumstances of Wilkerson's arrangement. In
response to overtures from a donor who was supportive of Wilkerson
and mindful of her financial troubles, the college leadership
decided to offer Wilkerson fifteen thousand dollars for an
engagement of six months. Her work largely consisted of arranging
three lectures, to be given by other speakers, on topics of public
concern. Measuring the 'proportionality' of compensation is not an
exact science, but Wilkerson's arrangement with the college
certainly would have been remunerative, and the main impetus behind
it appears to have been the influence brought to bear by her
supporter. The district court's skeptical appraisal of Wilkerson's
arrangement with the college was within the bounds of
reasonableness.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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