Nellie Francis v. Providence School Board

Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 05-2353
NELLIE FRANCIS,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
PROVIDENCE SCHOOL BOARD,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Nellie Francis on brief pro se.
Sara A. Rapport, Senior Assistant City Solicitor, City of
Providence, on brief for appellee.
September 7, 2006

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Per Curiam. Pro se appellant Nellie S. Francis appeals
from the district court's judgment granting summary judgment to her
former employer, appellee Providence School Board, in her action
claiming violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and related violations of state law.
Francis also appeals from the denial of her motion for
reconsideration. The essence of her complaint is the School
Board's alleged failure to make reasonable accommodations for her
disabilities. After careful review of the record and indulging
every inference in Francis's favor as the non-moving party, Rathbun
v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir. 2004), we affirm the
judgment of the district court essentially for the reasons outlined
in the district court's Memorandum and Order of September 1, 2005,
and we affirm the court's denial of the motion to reconsider. We
add only the following.
In order to be entitled to a reasonable accommodation, as
a threshold matter Francis must show that she is "disabled," that
is, that she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits a major life activity. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); Toyota
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002). This
she has not done. It is not enough merely to submit a medical
diagnosis of an impairment; Francis must show that a major life
activity of central importance to her daily life is substantially
limited by her impairment, and she must show that the impairment's

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impact is permanent or long term. Toyota Motor, 534 U.S. at 196;
Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., 358 F.3d 110, 114 (1st Cir.
2004); Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 238 (1st Cir. 2002).
The record is silent on each of these fundamental questions.
Francis claims that her cervical spine and neck injuries
interfere with bending and stooping, sitting or standing for
prolonged periods of time, and lifting more than 10 lbs. While we
may assume the latter activities may, in some circumstances and
upon a proper showing, relate to a major life activity, see, e.g.,
Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Service, Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 21 (1st Cir.
2002) (lifting), in order to survive summary judgment, it is not
enough simply to assert the limitation; "[a] plaintiff must proffer
evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that [a
major life] activity is substantially or materially limited." Id.
at 24 (quoting Snow v. Ridgeview Medical Center, 128 F.3d 1201,
1207 (8th Cir. 1997)). In addition, "[t]he evidence needed to
establish the limiting qualities of a particular impairment must
always be unique to that impairment and to the individual
involved." Id. (citing Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471, 483 (1999)). Francis offered no evidence showing that her
impairment substantially or materially limits an activity of major
importance in her own daily life. Cf. Toyota Motor, 534 U.S. at
198, 202 (respondent whose medical condition required her to avoid
sweeping, quit dancing, occasionally seek help dressing, reduce how

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The School Board also explained that it was entirely within 1
Francis's discretion whether to sit or stand while teaching.
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often she plays with her children, gardens, and drives long
distances, did not meet her burden of showing she was disabled; she
could still brush her teeth, wash her face, bathe, tend to her
flower garden, fix breakfast, do laundry, and pick up around the
house).
Moreover, the School Board accommodated most of Francis's
requests -- including assigning her a parking space near the 1
entrance, providing a locked drawer for storing her teaching
materials, and providing a custodian to assist in lifting heavy
objects -- except her request to start work 30 minutes late every
day and to have a full-time teacher's aide assigned to her. It is
not entirely clear from the record whether Francis sought the late
start solely in order to avoid being in the halls at the busiest
time of the day for fear that she might be pushed or shoved by
milling students, or whether she also believed that she lacked the
strength to work a full 6½ hour day. Regardless of the reason,
however, the School Board explained that it could not grant these
requests because to do so would substantially alter the essential
functions of Francis's teaching job, which included covering first
period home room each morning. Francis does not dispute the School
Board's explanation for its actions. Indeed, she asserts that she
was able to and did, in fact, perform all of her teaching duties

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during the final months she worked, without either a full-time
teacher's aide or a late start to the day. This admission further
undermines her disability claim.
In view of the above and for further reasons discussed by
the district court, we are satisfied that Francis did not establish
a viable claim for violation of the Americans With Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. ("ADA"). Nor is it suggested that
state law would afford redress not otherwise available under the
ADA. The entry of summary judgment was correct.
We also find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the
motion to reconsider. Cintron-Lorenzo v. Departamento de Asuntos
del Consumidor, 312 F.3d 522, 527 (1st Cir. 2002); Aybar v.
Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 1078 (1988).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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