Treybig v. Meza 11/20/25 Orange/AD

Filed 11/20/25
APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF ORANGE
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
GLORIA C. TREYBIG, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
ARACELI MEZA, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
2024-01416924
(Super. Ct. No. 2023-01366882)
OPINION
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Alma
Hernandez, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Melinda M. Luthin for Defendants and Appellants Araceli Meza, Alma
Meza, Jose Ramirez, and Jacqueline Ramirez.
Steven Silverstein for Plaintiffs and Respondents.1
* * *
Defendants and appellants Araceli Meza, Alma Meza, Jose Ramirez,
and Jacqueline Ramirez (collectively Meza and Ramirez) appeal from an
order granting a motion to strike costs filed by plaintiffs and respondents
Gloria C. Treybig and Lawrence Treybig (Treybigs). We reverse and remand
for further proceedings.
1 Respondents did not file a brief. Although we have discretion to decide
the appeal on the record, appellant’s opening brief, and oral argument of
appellant, we decline to exercise our discretion to disregard oral argument
offered by their counsel. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.882(c)(1)(B).)

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PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Treybigs filed an unlawful detainer complaint seeking unpaid rent
for October 2023 and November 2023 on residential real property occupied by
Meza and Ramirez and located at 319 South Broadway, Santa Ana,
California.
Prior to the scheduled trial, the Treybigs accepted payment of past due
rent and allowed Meza and Ramirez to retain possession of the property. The
Treybigs filed a dismissal without prejudice on May 10, 2024, followed by a
dismissal with prejudice six days later.
Meza and Ramirez sought costs of $2,607.55 as prevailing parties. The
Treybigs filed a motion to strike costs, accompanied by the Declaration of
Steven Silverstein in which he declared after continuance of an April 25,
2024 trial date, the parties agreed to settle the action, with Meza and
Ramirez agreeing to remit payment of rent for September 2023 through April
2024 and in exchange for payment, the Treybigs agreeing to allow them to
remain as tenants. The Treybigs contended there was no prevailing party,
but if there was a prevailing party, it was the Treybigs, because they had a
net monetary recovery consistent with Code of Civil Procedure2 section 1032,
subdivision (a)(4).
In opposition, Meza and Ramirez submitted the joint declaration of
Araceli Meza and Jose Ramirez wherein they declared the Treybigs brought
the action based on false claims they failed to pay rent for October 2023 and
November 2023 when, in fact, they tried repeatedly to pay rent for October
2023, but the Treybigs refused to accept, and/or returned uncashed, the
checks they presented. They also declared the Treybigs closed the bank
account into which they regularly deposited their rent checks. Consistently,
2 Undesignated references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

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Meza’s and Ramirez’s verified amended answer alleges they were not in
default, because the Treybigs refused to accept payment of rent. Finally, they
declared all the costs they claimed on the cost memorandum were paid from
their own pockets.
Meza’s and Ramirez’s attorney Melinda Luthin submitted a declaration
stating the case was meritless and the Treybigs knew it, because she
informed Silverstein that Meza and Ramirez paid rent for October 2023 on
several occasions and attempted to pay rent for November 2023 on several
occasions, but the Treybigs refused to accept the checks. She also declared
Silverstein himself refused to accept rent for October 2023, despite the fact
the 3-day notice he prepared directed Meza and Ramirez to pay rent to his
office. Luthin declared she warned Silverstein her clients would seek
sanctions for continuing the meritless case.
Luthin declared as they were exchanging exhibits and waiting for a
trial interpreter, Silverstein asked if Meza and Ramirez were interested in
settling. Luthin reminded Silverstein they would lose the case and there was
an attorney fees clause in the lease. Silverstein eventually stated the
Treybigs would accept the rent previously refused and dismiss the case,
attempting to characterize it as a settlement. Luthin “very clearly informed []
Silverstein that [Meza and Ramirez] were not agreeing to any settlement.”
She told him if the Treybigs refused to dismiss the case, Meza and Ramirez
were going to trial and would prevail. The Treybigs subsequently dismissed
the case.
There is no settlement agreement in the record on appeal, nor is there
any mention of a settlement agreement having been executed or read into the
record in the motion papers or during oral argument on the motion.

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The trial court granted the motion on July 22, 2024. The court
disagreed with Meza and Ramirez that no settlement occurred. The court
found the Treybigs were the prevailing parties, because they received a net
monetary recovery within the meaning of section 1032, subdivision (a)(4) and
(b). Citing DeSaulles v. Community Hospital of Monterey Peninsula (2016) 62
Cal.4th 1140, 1152-1153 (DeSaulles), the court found the definition of
“prevailing party” as a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered (§
1032, subd. (a)(4)) was not intended to encompass defendants that entered
into a monetary settlement in exchange for dismissal. The trial court
reasoned because Meza and Ramirez agreed and did pay the Treybigs rent for
the months of September through April and were allowed to remain at the
property, it could not be seriously argued the Treybigs did not obtain a “net
monetary recovery” by settling the lawsuit, and whether the parties call the
agreement a settlement is of no consequence.
Meza and Ramirez timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
A trial court’s determination a litigant is a prevailing party, along with
its award of fees and costs, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Goodman v.
Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1332.) An abuse of discretion occurs when the
exercise of discretion is predicated upon factual findings not supported by
substantial evidence. (Grossmont Union High School Dist. v. Diego Plus
Education Corp. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 552, 572, fn 5.) Substantial evidence
is not the same as any evidence; evidence is substantial if it is legally
ponderable and thus reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (Eagle Fire &
Water Restoration, Inc. v. City of Dinuba (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 448, 471.)
Section 1032, subdivision (a)(4) defines the prevailing party entitled to
recover costs as “the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in

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whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor
defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who
do not recover any relief against that defendant.”
Meza and Ramirez argue they are the prevailing parties because they
are defendants “in whose favor a dismissal is entered.” We agree.
It is uncontroverted the Treybigs filed a dismissal with prejudice. There
is no settlement agreement in the record. There is no evidence of a settlement
other than Silverstein’s uncorroborated, conclusory, and sparce declaration.3
In contrast, Luthin’s declaration establishes in detail the circumstances
around Meza’s and Ramirez’s refusal to settle the case, including that the
unlawful detainer action never should have been filed, because the 3-day
notice upon which it was based was defective given their doomed attempts to
pay rent for October and November 2023. (See Heffesse v. Guevara (2025) 108
Cal.App.5th Supp. 74, 83 [3-day notice overstating amount of rent due cannot
support unlawful detainer action]; see also Eshagian v. Cepeda (2025) 112
Cal.App.5th 433, 459 [when 3-day notice fails to strictly comply with section
1161(2), unlawful detainer complaint fails to state a cause of action].)
Luthin’s declaration is also corroborated by the joint Declaration of Araceli
Meza and Jose Ramirez. Silverstein’s characterization of the case as “settled”
is a legal conclusion. We reject it.
Further, the trial court’s reliance on DeSaulles is misplaced, because it
is distinguishable. In DeSaulles, there was a settlement placed on the record
to permit the court to retain jurisdiction under section 664.6. (DeSaulles,
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1145.) Here there was not.
3 At oral argument, Silverstein stated there was a “written agreement”
and a stipulation. Counsel did not cite to the record on appeal, and we have
not located any such documents.

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There is no substantial evidence to support the finding Meza and
Ramirez are unentitled to costs. The record indicates the Treybigs accepted
previously refused rental payments prior to trial and dismissed the action
with prejudice. The trial court focused on the monetary exchange and did not
analyze the merits, including that the Treybigs unexplainedly changed course
to finally accept previously refused rent as trial loomed while the parties
waited for an interpreter to become available. This was an abuse of
discretion.
Without a finding of a valid, enforceable settlement agreed to by all
parties, Meza and Ramirez were “defendant(s) in whose favor a dismissal is
entered” within the meaning of section 1032, subdivision (a)(4). As prevailing
parties, they are entitled to costs as a matter of right.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Meza
and Ramirez are entitled to costs on appeal.
Kimberly A. Knill
Presiding Judge
WE CONCUR:
Thomas S. McConville
Judge
Megan L. Wagner
Judge