P. v. Lightsey

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CHRISTOPHER CHARLES LIGHTSEY,
Defendant and Appellant.

S226760

Kern County Superior Court
SC056801A

August 17, 2026

Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban, Evans, and Detjenconcurred.

PEOPLE v. LIGHTSEY
S226760

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

Defendant Christopher Charles Lightsey represented himself during a portion of his capital trial, whichtook place between 1993 and 1995. In his automatic appeal, we heldthat the trial court reversibly erred by permitting Lightsey to represent himself during proceedings in July 1994 to determine whether he was mentally competent to stand trial. (People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 674 (LightseyI); see id. at p. 692 [it “is beyond question” that the trial court “violated state statutory law by failing to appoint counsel” to represent Lightsey during the July 1994 competency hearing].) Accordingly, wereversed the judgment and remandedfor “the trial court to determine whether a retrospective evaluation of defendant’s competence to stand trial is feasible and, if it is, to hold such a hearing.”(Id. at p. 674.)“If the trial court determines that conducting a retrospective competency hearing is not feasible, or if a retrospective competency hearing is held at which defendant proves he was incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence [citation], then the only permissible remedy would be to let stand our reversal, subject to defendant’s being retried if he is at that time mentally competent to stand trial. If a fair and reliable retrospective competency hearing can be conducted, and at that hearing defendant fails to prove he was incompetent, the judgment will be reinstated.” (Id. at pp. 709–710.)
On remand, the trial court determined that a retrospective evaluation of Lightsey’s competency was feasible and proceeded to find thatLightsey was competent to stand trial in 1994.It then reinstated the judgment. We conclude that the trial court erred in determining that a retrospective competency hearing was feasible. In so holding, we emphasize that retrospective competency hearings are generally disfavored. In this case, given the unavailability of a key expert and other witnesses, as well as the limitations of the record resulting from the trial court’s failure to appoint counsel for the July 1994 proceeding, we find that the prosecution did not meet its burden to show that the evidence in the record was sufficient “to reliably determine the defendant’s mental competence when tried earlier.” (People v. Ary (2011) 51 Cal.4th 510,520 (Ary).) Accordingly, we reverse the reinstated judgment. (See Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 709 [“If the trial court determines that conducting a retrospective competency hearing is not feasible. . . , then the only permissible remedy would be to let stand our reversal”].)
I.
In 1993, Lightsey was charged with capital murder. During the proceedings, numerous issues arose regarding Lightsey’s representation and his mental competency. We described those issues in Lightsey’s automatic appeal. (LightseyI, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp.682–690.)In short, “defendant’s counsel moved five different times during trial to have the trial court declare a doubt about defendant’s mental competence to stand trial. The court granted two of the motions—the first on March 7, 1994, and the second on July 7, 1994—held hearings both times, and twice concluded defendant was not incompetent.” (Id. at p. 690.)
In our prior opinion, we detailed the trial court’s second declaration of doubt as to Lightsey’s mental competence, which followed the trial court granting Lightsey’s motion to represent himself (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806) and the appointment of advisory counsel:“[O]n April 11, 1994, the trial court, after a very lengthy discussion, granted defendant’s Faretta motion and relieved Attorneys [Edward] Brown and [James] Sorena. Two days later, at defendant’s request, Attorney Ralph McKnight, Jr., was appointed as advisory counsel for defendant. On June 29, 1994, Attorney McKnight, although serving only as advisory counsel, filed a motion requesting that the trial court terminate defendant’s self-representation due to his asserted mental incompetence. Included with the motion were declarations from McKnight and defendant’s former attorney, Sorena. McKnight declared that in his view, based on the eight times he had met with defendant, defendant was ‘demonstrating signs of serious mental instability’ and ‘appears to be unable to comprehend and appreciate either the substantive or the procedural law which is applicable in this matter.’ According to McKnight, defendant’s ‘prior waiver of counsel appears to be a direct outgrowth of his delusion that the justice system in general, and defense attorneys in particular, are in league against him in an all pervasive conspiracy. He also appears to have a belief in his own super competence, which causes [him] to believe that he alone has the correct interpretation of the law. These delusions render him incompetent to knowingly and intelligently appreciate the difficulties he will face representing himself and what is at stake.’ McKnight reported that, as was the case with defendant’s prior attorneys, defendant ‘refuses to cooperate with myself as his advisory counsel, refuses to accept advice from me, and remains hostile, accusatory and suspicious.’ Further, defendant had repeatedly asked counsel to make various motions or take other actions which were ‘impossible, impractical or inconsistent,’ and then cited counsel’s refusal to follow defendant’s orders as further proof counsel was ‘part of the conspiracy against him.’
“Attorney Sorena’s declaration echoed these concerns. In their first meeting, defendant could not focus his discussion, was very suspicious of Sorena, and by the conclusion of the 45-minute meeting was convinced that Sorena was ‘part of a pervasive conspiracy against him.’ According to Sorena, defendant believed ‘all members of the justice system were in collusion to execute him, including the court reporters who falsified the transcripts of prior hearings.’ Based upon Sorena’s contact with another criminal defendant who had been diagnosed with paranoid and delusional disorders, Sorena ‘was convinced after my interview with [defendant] that he was genuinely delusional to the point where his ability to assist counsel was in substantial doubt.’
“On July 7, 1994, the trial court, based on Attorney McKnight’s motion and over defendant’s objections, again suspended the proceedings for an assessment of defendant’s mental competence. The court, however, permitted defendant to continue to represent himself, including choosing one of the experts who would interview him.
“The two resulting medical opinions concerning defendant’s competence presented to the court in written reports came to conflicting conclusions. The expert chosen by the court, Psychiatrist Luis Velosa, concluded defendant was ‘suffering from a psychiatric disorder which impairs his thinking process . . . best classified as bipolar disorder (manic type) or a paranoid disorder. The defendant at present is exhibiting psychotic symptoms characterized by a thought disorder in which [he] experiences racing thoughts, looseness of associations, rambling of thoughts, sometimes without any logical connection. In addition, the defendant experiences paranoid thinking, persecutory delusions, [and] a false belief that there is a conspiracy against him.’ Dr.Velosa concluded that defendant ‘is at present able to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings taken against him. However, because of his psychiatric symptoms, the defendant at present is unable to cooperate in a rational manner with counsel in presenting a defense. Furthermore, despite . . . the fact that the defendant has a vast knowledge of the legal system and legal proceedings, because of his psychiatric symptoms, [he] is not able to represent himself.’ Dr.Velosa also noted that defendant’s judgment was ‘impaired and he [had] no insight into his mental disorder.’
“The expert chosen by defendant, Psychiatrist Sakrapatna Manohara, found defendant to be ‘generally cooperative but . . . quite manipulative.’ Defendant’s speech was ‘coherent but appeared to be circumstantial,’ and he was ‘blaming all his problems on the system.’ Dr. Manohara found defendant ‘did not appear to be really delusional although he was highly mistrustful of the system and the attorneys.’ According to Dr. Manohara, defendant ‘performed well’ in tests designed to assess his memory and concentration, and he ‘showed appropriate affect to thought content.’ Defendant exhibited ‘some anger and frustration’ at being ‘railroaded’ and believed he needed to ‘let go and let God take care of things.’ In Dr. Manohara’s opinion, defendant had a ‘grandiose sense of self importance,’ tended to ‘exaggerate achievements and talents,’ spoke in a manner that was ‘excessively impressionistic and lacking in detail,’ and believed ‘his problems [were] unique and [could] only be understood by other special people.’ Defendant did not have a ‘clear-cut psychotic disorder,’ but did appear to be ‘excessively mistrustful of the system,’ and exhibited a narcissistic personality disorder. Dr. Manohara concluded that defendant’s ‘personality disorder makes it difficult to work with him as an attorney but . . . he is competent to stand trial. However, he is not competent to represent himself because of his lack of objectivity and his grandiose sense of self importance and his tendency to be circumstantial with a sense of entitlement. He may over-react to criticism with feelings of rage.’
“The trial court held a hearing concerning defendant’s mental competence on July 28, 1994. In summarizing the doctors’ reports, the trial court noted Dr. Manohara had found defendant competent to stand trial, while ‘Dr. Velosa, although he reflects what I would suggest to be some reservation in that regard, he does indicate that [defendant was] able to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings.’ Defendant, who continued to represent himself at the hearing, insisted he was competent to proceed and demanded a jury trial on the issue of his mental competence. The prosecutor, also apparently desiring a finding defendant was competent, suggested defendant waive his right to a jury trial and agree to submit the matter on the experts’ reports if the trial court was ‘inclined to find that [defendant] is competent to stand trial, which I believe is what he wishes.’ The trial court then asked defendant whether he would ‘waive a jury trial on that issue so we can get on with the show.’ Defendant agreed to do so, and the court proceeded to find defendant competent. Thereafter, Attorney McKnight, who had not participated in the hearing, asked to be relieved as advisory counsel based on the complete breakdown of his relationship with defendant. The trial court granted the request.” (Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp.685–687.)
Following the July 1994 competency hearing, Lightsey continued to show signs of mental deterioration, yet the trial court did not conduct any further proceedings to evaluate his competency.
The jury ultimately convicted Lightsey of the first degree murder of William Compton (Pen. Code, §187; all further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code), burglary (§§459, 460, subd.(a)), and robbery (§§211, 212.5, subd.(a)). As to each count, the jury found true the allegations that Lightsey personally used a deadly weapon (§12022, subd.(b)(1)) and that he had served a prior prison term (§667.5, subd.(b)). The jury also found true the special circumstance allegationsthat the murder was committed in the course of a burglary and a robbery (§190.2, subd.(a)(17)(A), (G)) and the murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture (§190.2, subd.(a)(18)). Following a penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death.
In his automatic appeal, we held that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing Lightsey to represent himself atthe second competency proceedings. (Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 674.) “The plain language of section 1368, specifically addressing the procedures in criminal competency proceedings, provides that when the trial court states on the record that a doubt exists concerning the defendant’s mental competence, ‘[i]f the defendant is not represented by counsel, the court shall appoint counsel.’ (§1368, subd. (a), italics added.) Nothing could be clearer.” (Lightsey I, atp. 692; see id. at p. 702 [“the trial court’s failure to appoint counsel to represent defendant at the competency proceedings in violation of section 1368 constitutes a reversible miscarriage of justice under article VI, section 13 of our state Constitution”].)We remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. (Id. at p. 674.)
On remand, the parties addressed the feasibility of a retrospective competency hearing. The prosecutor, bearingthe burden of persuasion, argued there was sufficient evidence available to conduct such a hearing. In her briefing, the prosecutor described the contemporaneous medical evidence: the examinations by Dr. Manohara and Dr. Velosa conducted for the July 1994 competency hearing at issue; a report prepared by Dr. Richard Burdick conducted for the March 1994 competency hearing; and the examination by Dr. William Pierce conducted in October 1994 for the penalty phase, which involved reviewing the reports prepared by Dr. Burdick, Dr. Manohara, and Dr. Velosa. The prosecutor represented that two of those experts, Dr. Burdick and Dr. Manohara, would not be available for the competency hearing, and the two remaining experts, Dr. Pierce and Dr. Velosa, would be available. Dr. Pierce was prepared to testify as to his opinion that Lightsey was “incompetent back in 1994.”
In addition, the prosecutor provided declarations from employees with the Kern County Sheriff’s Department who interacted with Lightsey in various capacities during his trial. The prosecutor asserted: “These individualswill testify to their observations of Mr. Lightsey as far as his interactions with his attorneys, their opinions of his understanding of the proceedings and his behavior during the relevant timeframe.”
Finally, the prosecutor argued that the case presented “a unique and ample opportunity to assess the defendant’s statements since he represented himself at a number of court hearings, prior to the trial.” The prosecutor further claimed aspects of Lightsey’s self-representation demonstrated he understood the nature of the proceedings.
Defense counsel argued against feasibility largely based on the fact that one of the two experts who evaluated Lightsey in July 1994 was not available to testify at any retrospective competency hearing. Counsel asserted that “[u]nder Penal Code section 1369, any retrospective competency hearing cannot be properly held absent admissible evidence of at least two license [sic] psychologists or psychiatrists.”Lightsey’s counsel maintained that “the issue is whether there was an opportunity to cross-examine the unavailable declarant on the subject of their testimony and that the interest or motive for the hearing and testimony is similar in nature.” Defense counsel noted that Dr. Pierce was not evaluating Lightsey’s competency in 1994.Defense counsel also noted there were several critical witnesses who were no longer available, including Lightsey’s original counsel (Stan Simrin), lead trial counsel (William Dougherty), and his mother. Lightsey’s counsel pointed out that both attorneys “had direct personal contact with the defendant and would have relevant testimony to provide on behalf of the defendant regarding the issue of competency.” Defense counsel also surmised that Lightsey’s mother, who was deceased,“would be able to give critical insight and direct observations as to her son’s emotional and mental state during the course [of] the trial.”
On May 6, 2013, the trial court determinedthat a retrospective competency hearing was feasible. The court considered“the passage of time”of 19 years, “[t]he availability of contemporaneous medical evidence,” and the “availability of individuals and trial witnesses, both expert and nonexpert, who are in a position to interact with the defendant before and during trial.”The court said that “if time passage alone was the center or focus of the determination, that there would be a, per se, rule in determining whether reversal is automatic or not.” As to the availability of contemporaneous medical evidence, the trial court said evidence “appears to be present by way of some experts who are still willing and available to testify.”The court also said Lightsey made contemporaneous statements that could be introducedand considered.As to the availability of witnesses who interacted with Lightsey, the trial court said“there appears to be a lack of abundance of those that are still available.”But the court maintained that “there still appear to be quite a few available for this Court’s consideration, both those that have been cited by the People and those that have been cited procedurally through the interaction with the defendant by way of counsel, as well as potential family members and the like.” The court concluded: “It does appear that information is available and will provide the defense a fair opportunity to prove incompetence; and, therefore, the court is going to find that the People have met their burden and that this Court can conduct a meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospectively the defendant’s competency back in 1994 encompassing 1995.”
In February 2015, the trial court held a competency hearing.On February 20, 2015, a jury found Lightsey had been competent to stand trial.On February 27, 2015, the trial court reinstated the death penalty judgment.
On appeal, Lightsey asserts that the trial court erred in determining a retrospective competency hearing was feasible. He alsopresents various claimsof evidentiary and instructional error relating to the retrospective competency hearing and argues there was insufficient evidence establishing his competence.
II.
We explained the relevant legal principles in Lightsey I:“The United States Supreme Court has ‘repeatedly and consistently recognized that“the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process.” ’ (Cooper v. Oklahoma (1996) 517U.S. 348, 354.) A defendant is deemed incompetent to stand trial if he lacks ‘“ ‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . . [or] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ”’ (Ibid., quoting Dusky v. United States (1960) 362U.S. 402, 402 (Dusky).)‘Even when a defendant is competent at the commencement of his trial, a trial court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial.’ (Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420U.S. 162, 181 (Drope).) State constitutional authority is to the same effect. (See People v. Koontz (2002) 27Cal.4th 1041, 1063.)
“The applicable state statutes essentially parallel the state and federal constitutional directives. Section 1367, subdivision (a) provides: ‘A person cannot be tried or adjudged to punishment while that person is mentally incompetent. A defendant is mentally incompetent for purposes of this chapter if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.’
“Section 1368 provides in pertinent part: ‘(a) If, during the pendency of an action and prior to judgment, a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the mental competence of the defendant, he or she shall state that doubt in the record and inquire of the attorney for the defendant whether, in the opinion of the attorney, the defendant is mentally competent. If the defendant is not represented by counsel, the court shall appoint counsel. At the request of the defendant or his or her counsel or upon its own motion, the court shall recess the proceedings for as long as may be reasonably necessary to permit counsel to confer with the defendant and to form an opinion as to the mental competence of the defendant at that point in time. [¶] (b) If counsel informs the court that he or she believes the defendant is or may be mentally incompetent, the court shall order that the question of the defendant’s mental competence is to be determined in a hearing which is held pursuant to Sections 1368.1 and 1369. If counsel informs the court that he or she believes the defendant is mentally competent, the court may nevertheless order a hearing. Any hearing shall be held in the superior court.’
“As we stated in People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 737–738, a trial court is obligated to conduct a full competency hearing if substantial evidence raises a reasonable doubt that a criminal defendant may be incompetent. This is true even if the evidence creating that doubt is presented by the defense or if the sum of the evidence is in conflict. The failure to conduct a hearing despite the presence of such substantial evidence is reversible error.”(Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 690–691.)
A finding of such error gives rise to the possibility of a retrospective competency hearing. “Before conducting the retrospective competency hearing, the trial court must determine whether such a hearing will be feasible. . . . ‘Feasibility in this context means the availability of sufficient evidence to reliably determine the defendant’s mental competence when tried earlier.. . . “[T]he defendant will be placed in a position comparable to the one he would have been placed in prior to the original trial.” ’ [Citation.] In assessing whether a retrospective competency hearing is feasible, the trial court should consider ‘ “ ‘ “(1) [t]he passage of time, (2) the availability of contemporaneous medical evidence, including medical records and prior competency determinations, (3) any statements by the defendant in the trial record, and (4) the availability of individuals and trial witnesses, both experts and non-experts, who were in a position to interact with [the] defendant before and during trial”’” ’ [citation], as well as any other facts the court deems relevant. We stress that the focus of the feasibility determination must be on whether a retrospective competency hearing will provide defendant a fair opportunity to prove incompetence, not merely whether some evidence exists by which the trier of fact might reach a decision on the subject. In making its feasibility determination, the court must consider the fairness of requiring defendant, who has already established a reversible statutory violation, to prove his incompetence to stand trial in 1994 with the now 18-year-old evidence of his prior mental condition still available to him today.. . . [T]he remedy provided must be ‘procedurally adequate and substantively acceptable under the Due Process Clause.’ [Citation.] Because of the inherent difficulties in attempting to look back to the defendant’s past mental state [citation], the burden of persuasion will be on the People to convince the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence that a retrospective competency hearing is feasible in this case.” (LightseyI, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp.710–711.)
“[E]ven if the trial court initially determines a retrospective competency hearing is feasible, the trial court may later revisit the issue of the fairness and reliability of the resulting hearing. In other words, our reversal would stand and defendant would be entitled to a new trial if the trial court were to determine in hindsight that, despite its initial feasibility finding, the actual hearing had not met the feasibility requirements.” (Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p.711.)
III.
As an initial matter, Lightsey assertsthat we should review the trial court’s feasibility ruling independently rather than for abuse of discretion, as the Attorney General urges.He claims that “the predominantly legal nature of the crucial questions in a feasibility determination, the importance of the constitutional issues at stake, and the consequences of an erroneous determination . . . support the need for independent review of the feasibility determination, without deference to the trial court.”A trial court’s decision to hold a competency hearing is entitled to deference on review. (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 847; People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 220.) However, we agree with Lightsey that the issue of whether a retrospective competency hearing is feasible is a mixed question of law and fact.“We previously have observed that in most instances, mixed questions of fact and law are reviewed de novo — with some exceptions, such as when the applicable legal standard provides for a ‘ “strictly factual test, such as state of mind.” ’ [Citations.] ‘ “This is so because usually the application of law to fact will require the consideration of legal concepts and involve the exercise of judgment about the values underlying legal principles.” ’” (Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 385 (Haworth).)
The evaluation of feasibility in this case largely calls for consideration of undisputed facts —the passage of time, the record developed at trial,andthe availability of witnesses at any retrospective competency hearing. This court is in the same position on appeal as the trial court was at the time of the feasibility hearing in May 2013 to determine whether a retrospective competency hearing was feasible. (See Haworth, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 385)However, we need not conclusively resolve which standard of review applies because we would not uphold the trial court’s feasibility determination even under an abuse of discretion standard.In reaching our conclusion that the trial court erred, we need not reweigh any evidence. (See People v. Johnson & Johnson (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 295, 352 [under an abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court does not reweigh evidence or substitute its notions of fairness for those of the trial court].)
Retrospective competency hearings are generally disfavored. Aretrospective competency hearing may go forward only if it will “provide[] a defendant with an opportunity to have a competency trial comparable to the one the defendant should have been given but was denied.” (People v. Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58, 93 (Wycoff); cf. Drope, supra, 420U.S. at p. 183 [noting “the inherent difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc determination under the most favorable circumstances”]; Moran v. Godinez (9th Cir. 1994) 57F.3d 690, 696 [“although retrospective competency hearings are disfavored . . . , they are permissible whenever a court can conduct a meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospectively the competency of the defendant”], citations omitted.)The prosecution has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that“it remains possible to give defendant that to which he was entitled at trial — a fair and reliable opportunity to prove his incompetence with the assistance of counsel.” (Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 707; see also id. at pp. 710–711.)For several reasons, we conclude that the prosecution did not meet this burden here.
First, we note the obvious: the passage of time was extraordinarily long. Nineteen years had elapsed between the flawed competency hearing in 1994 and the trial court’s feasibility determination in 2013. This factor weighs against a finding of feasibility.
Next, we address the contemporaneous medical evidence, whichbears significantly on whether a reliable reconstruction of Lightsey’s mental state in 1994 is possible. As we discussed in Lightsey I, theabsence of counselhampered the development of the evidence, particularly the medical evidence, at the July 1994 competency hearing. “There are, in fact, myriad possible strategic choices counsel might have made that could have affected the outcome, for example, by choosing a defense expert different from the expert defendant chose, asking for a third expert to break the tie between the two experts already consulted or, most notably, declining to submit the matter for the trial court’s determination based on the written reports and instead demanding defendant’s competence be tried to a jury.” (Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 701.)
As noted, Lightseyrepresented himselfin July 1994 with the clear objective of avoiding any determination that he was incompetent.He repeatedly stated his deep-seated, delusional belief that there was a systemic conspiracy against himbased on outlandishideas, asserting, for example, that“the prosecution had a hatred of Jesus” and was“seeking to persecute him as a way of repersecuting or persecuting or recrucifying Jesus.”In Lightsey’s mind, any attorney who represented him was involved in the conspiracy against him. Consequently, he was fixated on representing himself and proving the charges and proceedings were the result of widespread fraud, including the manufacturing of evidence by court reporters.Lightsey engaged in delusions and uncontrolled outbursts throughout the proceedings.
At the competency hearing, Lightseywanted tobe deemedcompetentand“ ‘get on with the show’ ” to prove the charges were fraudulent and a result of the conspiracy against him. (Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 687.)With this goal, at the time a doubt was declared as to his competency,Lightseydid the bare minimum to satisfy the requirements of section 1369. Two court-appointed experts prepared reports: The expert Lightsey chose, Dr. Manohara,acknowledgedhisbehavioral issues butdid not reach the conclusionthat he was incompetent, and the court-appointed expert, Dr. Velosa, found that “because of his psychiatric symptoms,”Lightsey was “unable to cooperate in rational manner with counsel in presenting a defense.”As noted in his briefing, Lightsey “declined to use the competency experts on the court approved list and instead chose his experts by ‘instinct’ out of a telephone book.”During one expert’s evaluation, Lightsey said, “Of course, I am competent and you are going to find me competent.”Lightsey also stated that his objective was “to prove that there is a conspiracy against him and that he is ready to go ‘to the newspapers and T.V. and bring the whole matter out in the open.’ ”
Nevertheless, the expert reports were somewhat mixed as to the extent of Lightsey’s delusions and whether he was competent.As noted, Lightsey insisted thathe was competent and wanted a jury trial to prove he was not incompetent. The prosecutor then suggested thatLightsey submit the reports without a jury trial or any cross-examination. In response,the trial courtconfirmed with Lightsey that he was not contesting the issue of whether he was competent to stand trial.The trial court proceeded to present Lightsey with the option to “ ‘get on with the show’ ” andavoid further proceedings relating to his competency.(LightseyI, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 687.) As expected, Lightsey opted to do so.
Bysubmitting the issue before a court that signaledit would find him competent, Lightsey acquiescedin finding himself competent. He presentedunchallenged evidenceto that effect, including a report by an expertthat Lightsey selected on a whim,and did not develop any evidence supporting a finding of incompetence. In short, the evidence bearing on Lightsey’s competence was not developed in a manner that meaningfully examined all sides of the issue.This context is critical as we considerwhether the evidence available for a retrospective competency hearing was sufficient to “reliably” determine Lightsey’s mental competence when tried earlier. (Ary, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 520.)
The record shows that Lightsey did not avail himself of opportunities that any effective appointed counsel would have pursued. If Lightsey had had the hearing to which he was entitled,an attorney appointed to represent himcould have probedexperts through cross-examination about any evidence suggesting he was competent, such asthe degree to whichhe was able to perform competency in order to “prove” the mass conspiracy against him.(See People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219, 240, fn.8 (Rodas)[in determining feasibility, we consider “whether evidence exists bothto show defendant’s competence at the time of trial and to permitdefendant to respond fully to that showing, such that a fair andreliable determination that defendant was competent to standtrial could be made”], italics added.)At the feasibility hearing, Dr. Manohara was unavailable for cross-examination, andit is questionable whether Lightsey couldeffectively probe the nuances of the opinions offered by Dr. Velosa in 1994.Additionally, he was unable to cross-examine Dr. Burdick, who had opined based on an admittedly brief encounterthat Lightsey was competent in March 1994. Moreover, an attorney could have made “myriad possible strategic choices . . . that could have affected the outcome,” including choosing a different expert,“asking for a third expert to break the tie between” Dr. Manohara and Dr. Velosa, or “demanding defendant’s competence be tried to a jury.” (Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 701.) Such choices may have produced a more fulsome record from which to conduct a retroactive assessment of Lightsey’s competence.In light of these circumstances, the contrast between the hearing that Lightsey had and that which he should have hadwas significant.
The Attorney General argues that a retrospective competency hearing was feasiblelargely based on “significant contemporaneous medical evidence”andthe availability of Dr. Velosa and Dr. Pierce.It is true that some medical evidence had been developed in July 1994 and was available for a retrospective competency determination. (See Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 707 [“the subject of defendant’s mental competence actually was reviewed at the time of the trial and contemporaneous evidence specifically addressing that issue presumably still exists”].) But in Lightsey I,“[w]e stress[ed] that the focus of the feasibility determination must be on whether a retrospective competency hearing will provide defendant a fair opportunity to prove incompetence, not merely whether some evidence exists by which the trier of fact might reach a decision on the subject.” (Id. at p. 710.)
As the Attorney General acknowledges, the state of contemporaneous medical evidence carries particular weight in determining whether a retrospective competency hearing is feasible. The medical evidence adduced in July1994 wasnot developed with the assistance of counsel due to the trial court’s error, and the medical evidence that was developedinvolved nuanced and complex judgments regarding Lightsey’s mental state. Nearly 20 years later, with the unavailability of witnesses and passage of time, the prosecution did not demonstrate that the deficiencies in the development and testing of the contemporaneous medical evidence due to the trial court’s failure to appoint counsel could be remediated. This weighs strongly against the reliability of a retrospective determination of Lightsey’s competence.
In addition, the Attorney General’s reliance on Dr. Pierce’savailability for a competency determination overlooks the weakness of the evidence profferedand how the prosecutor’s proffer of his testimony was inherently unfair to Lightsey. At the feasibility hearing, the prosecution did not demonstrate how Dr. Pierce’s testimony meaningfully contributed to a reliable determination of Lightsey’s competence. Dr. Piercedid not evaluate Lightsey to assess whether he was competent to stand trial in July 1994. Instead, he was retained months later to support the development of mitigation evidence for the sentencing phase. For that purpose,Dr. Pierce reviewedthe contemporaneous medical opinions as to Lightsey’s competency in July 1994 as part of his evaluation in October 1994. Dr. Pierce was also not licensed at the time of the feasibility hearing. (See § 1369, subd. (a)(1) [requiring opinions of “licensed” experts].)Because these issues with Dr. Pierce’s testimony as to Lightsey’s competency in July 1994 were readily apparent at the feasibility hearing, it was entirely foreseeable that the prosecutor, while pointing to Dr. Pierce’s availability to demonstrate feasibility, would proceed to undermine Dr. Pierce’s testimony at any eventual competency hearing.And although there was a degree of overlap between the testimony of Dr. Pierce and that of Dr. Velosa, who was also available to testify,Dr. Pierce’s testimony differed in his specific diagnosis and went a little further than Dr. Velosa’s in opining that Lightsey did not understand the nature of the proceedings.
Dr. Pierce’s opinion in 1994 was relevant tothe penalty proceedings, and his opinion was favorable to Lightsey in that context. However, the prosecutiondid not show how Dr. Pierce’s opinioncompensates for the absence of appointed counsel who could have developed contemporaneous medical evidence or challenged the evidence that was presented in July 1994.(See Lightsey I, supra, 54Cal.4th at p. 708 [after-the-fact expert opinions “might onlycircumstantially assist” the determination of adefendant’s competence at trial]; Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5that p. 241 [a retrospective competency hearing was not feasible, in part, because it would“require an attempt by psychologists or psychiatrists toreconstruct defendant’s mental condition at trial based on theprior medical reports and defendant’s behavior at the time oftrial”].) In sum, the availability of Dr. Pierce carrieslittle or no weight in establishingthata retrospective hearing would provide Lightsey with a fair opportunity to prove his incompetenceat trial.
The Attorney General also points to the availability of four officers who guarded Lightsey during his competency trial, the prosecutor’s representation that four of Lightsey’s trial attorneys (Brown, McKnight, Sorena, and James Gillis, who was initially appointed as advisory counsel in August 1994) may have been available, and statements from Lightsey at several hearings in July and August of 1994. As to thefour officers, those non-expert witnesses were responsible for transporting Lightsey and ensuring courtroom safety and security; they were not charged with evaluating or observing whether Lightsey was able to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or to assist counsel in the conduct of the defense in a rational manner.And as to the four trial attorneys, the prosecutor’s mere assertion of their availability, without any supporting declaration or evidence, does nothing to establish the actual availability of those potential witnesses. Such speculation does little to aid the prosecution in carrying its burden of proving feasibility.
Further, the Attorney General, like the prosecutor at the feasibility hearing, focuses on select passages of Lightsey’s statements withoutdemonstrating how those statements relate to the paranoia and delusions he exhibited at the time a doubt was declared as to his competency to stand trial.Particularly in light of the deficiencies in the contemporaneous medical evidence, the various statements chosen by the prosecutor do not help to demonstrate that a retrospective hearing would place Lightsey “in a position comparable to the one he would have been in at a timely competency trial.” (Wycoff, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 96, citing Ary, supra, 51Cal.4th at p. 520.)
In evaluating whether a retrospective competency hearing was feasible, we note that although the passage of time of nearly two decades is not dispositive, it undoubtedly “aggravate[d] the[] difficulties” with the available evidence. (Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383U.S. 375, 387 [thepassage of time of six years “aggravate[d] these difficulties”of thejury unable to observe the defendant and experts testifying solely based on information from the record].) In Wycoff, where “the trial court erred by failing to initiate the formal competency procedures set forth in sections 1368 and 1369,” we held that “the passage of time”— 13 years—“and the corollary difficulty of reconstructing defendant’s mental state at the time of trial” made a retrospective competency hearing infeasible. (Wycoff, supra, 12Cal.5th at pp. 91, 95.) The Attorney General argued in Wycoffthat the defendant’s extensive testimony at trial could be used by experts to retrospectively evaluate his competency, that an available contemporaneous expert report “includes lots of information that defendant could use,” and that “several people who interacted with defendant during the relevant time period (including his attorneys, the prosecutor, and [the psychologist who prepared the expert report]) might be able to appear as witnesses.” (Id. at p. 95.) We held that “none of that potential evidence could possibly place defendant ‘ “in a position comparable to the one he would have been placed in” ’ if a timely competency trial had been held” 13 years earlier. (Ibid.)
We observed in Wycoff that the trial court there conducted “no timely . . . competency trial,” whereas the trial court in Lightsey’s case “conducted a timely competency trial” albeit without appointing counsel as statutorily required. (Wycoff, supra, 12Cal.5th at pp. 95, 96.) Because contemporaneous evidence was developed for the competency trial in Lightsey’s case, “we concluded that the trial court should at least consider whether a reliable retrospective competency determination might be feasible.” (Id. at p. 96, citing Lightsey I, supra, 54Cal.4th at pp. 706–710.) Having now reviewed the record adduced at the feasibility hearing conducted by the trial court in May 2013, weconclude that while “some evidence” was available for consideration, it was not sufficient to provide Lightseywith a “fair opportunity” to prove his incompetenceat trial (Lightsey I, at p. 710) “given the passage of time and the corollary difficulty of reconstructing defendant’s mental state at the time of trial” (Wycoff, at p. 95).
Our consideration of whether a retroactive competency hearing was feasibleis limited to the evidence before the trial court at the feasibility hearing in 2013.The trial court’s error in finding a competency hearing to be feasiblecould not be cured by anysubsequentcompetencyhearing, even though asubsequenthearing couldestablishthe opposite — i.e., that “despite [the court’s] initial feasibility finding, the actual hearing had not met the feasibility requirements.” (Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 711.)Here, whateveradditionalevidence was developed or presented at the 2015 hearing was irrelevant to whether the prosecutor met its burden ofestablishingfeasibility in 2013.
Finally, the trial court’s error with regard to feasibility is not subject to harmless error analysis. In Lightsey I, we concluded that the trial court’s original error in failing to appoint counsel for Lightsey at the July 1994 competency proceedings was a miscarriage of justice that required reversal of the judgment if a retrospective competency hearing was not feasible.(Lightsey I,supra, 54Cal.4th at pp.699–702.)Because we have now determined that such a hearing was not feasible, the judgment must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Because of the passage of time, the unavailability of key witnesses, and the fact that the circumstances of the competency hearing in July 1994 — especially the failure to appoint counsel to represent Lightsey — compromised the quality and fairness of the evidence available nearly 20 years later, we hold that the trial court erred in finding that a retrospective competency hearing was feasible. Accordingly, we reverse the reinstated judgment “subject to defendant’s being retried if he is at that time mentally competent to stand trial.” (Lightsey I, supra, 54Cal.4th at pp. 709–710.)In light of this disposition, we have no need to address Lightsey’s other claims relating to the retrospective competency hearing.
LIU, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C.J.
CORRIGAN, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
EVANS, J.
DETJEN, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Lightsey
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Procedural Posture(see XX below)
Original Appeal XX
Original Proceeding
Review Granted(published)
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted

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Opinion No. S226760
Date Filed: August 17, 2026
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Court: Superior
County: Kern
Judge: John Kelly
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Counsel:

Mary K. McComb and Galit Lipa, State Public Defenders, Alexander Post, Adriana Gonzalez, Nina Wilder, Deputy State Public Defenders, and Cristina Borde for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Sean M. McCoy and Kari Ricci Mueller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Alexander Post
Deputy State Public Defender
1111 Broadway, Suite 1000
Oakland, CA 94607
(510) 267-3300

Kari Ricci Mueller
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street
Sacramento, CA 95614
(916) 210-7731