Marriage of R.M. and P.N.

Filed 8/21/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re the Marriage of R.M. and P.N.
R.M.,
Respondent,
v.
P.N.,
Appellant,
DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT
SERVICES,
Respondent.
D086317
(Super. Ct. No. D541463)
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Chandra Reid, Judge. Affirmed.
Joshua M. Searcy for Appellant.
R.M., in pro per, for Respondent, R.M.

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Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant Attorney
General, Maureen C. Onyeagbako and Ricardo Enriquez, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Respondent Department of Child Support Services.1
R.M. (Father) and P.M. (Mother) are the divorced parents of a special-
needs daughter, F.N. (Daughter). After Father lost his job, the family court
calculated new spousal and child support obligations using the statutory
formula at Family Code section 4055,2 which requires assessing each
spouse’s gross income as defined in section 4058. (§§ 4055, 4058.) Mother
appeals the orders, contending the court erred by including in her gross
income the payments Mother received for In Home Supportive Services
(IHSS) she provided to Daughter. Mother contends the IHSS payments
should have been excluded under section 4058, subdivision (c), which
excludes “income derived from any public assistance program, eligibility for
which is based on a determination of need.” (§ 4058, subd. (c).) Mother also
contends that the court erred by failing to consider Father’s substantial
assets and his ability to cover significant monthly expenses, and basing its
calculation on Father’s self-reported income despite Father’s record of
concealing assets.
We conclude that IHSS payments are income from a needs-based public
assistance program. But because Daughter, not Mother, was the recipient of
1 California’s Family Code provides that in all actions involving
paternity or support, the local child support agency and the Attorney General
represent the public interest in establishing, modifying, and enforcing
support obligations. (Fam. Code, § 17406, subd. (a).)
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

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those services, and her needs, not Mother’s, determined eligibility for IHSS
payments, we conclude the family court properly declined to exclude Mother’s
IHSS payments from Mother’s gross income under section 4058, subdivision
(c). We further hold the court did not abuse its discretion in determining
Father’s income.
We affirm the spousal and child support orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother and Father were married for 13 years and have three children,
including Daughter. During the marriage Mother was the in-home caregiver
for the children and did not work outside the home. Father and Mother
divorced in 2013.
Daughter has special needs and requires 24-hour care. Daughter lives
with her siblings and Mother in a two-bedroom apartment. Mother works as
an IHSS caregiver for Daughter and as a parttime classroom aide. Mother is
unable to work fulltime due to being Daughter’s primary caretaker.
Prior family court orders required Father to pay $1,850 per month in
child support and $1,300 per month in spousal support. In July 2024, Father
filed a request to reduce his child and spousal support obligations after he
lost his job that paid $17,830 per month.
Mother objected to Father’s requests. She claimed Father had
substantial assets, investment and rental income, the ability to earn, and a
history of altering income to avoid paying child and spousal support. Mother
claimed she was at full earning capacity given her need to care for Daughter.
Mother stated Daughter spent 99 percent of the time with her and one
percent with Father.
While Father’s motion was pending, Mother filed a request to extend
child support for Daughter under section 3910 on the grounds that Daughter

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was incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient means to
support herself. Father opposed extending child support because Daughter
had reached the age of majority (18 years old) and she was no longer in high
school.
Following a consolidated hearing on all pending requests, the family
court issued a written order, attaching its guideline calculations. It denied
Father’s motion to terminate child support, ruling Daughter was enrolled in a
program equivalent to high school and was entitled to child support up until
her nineteenth birthday under section 3901 subdivision (a)(1). The court
granted Mother’s motion to extend support for Daughter, ruling that
although she was an adult, Daughter was incapacitated, unable to earn a
living, and without sufficient means to support herself.
The court calculated new child support amounts. It determined Father
received $1,950 per month in unemployment from August 1, 2024, through
January 31, 2025. Starting February 1, 2025, Father’s income increased to
$3,0503 a month in self-employment. The court calculated Mother’s income
as $7,608 per month, which, according to supporting documents, consisted of
$1,448 earned as an instructional aid and $6,160 in IHSS payments. The
3 The court cited a different amount, $3,405 per month, as Father’s
monthly self-employment income in its analysis of spousal support. It is
unclear how the court arrived at this figure. Father’s financial documents
supported monthly self-employment income of $3,050 per month, and his
counsel cited the same amount at the hearing. While the court recited the
lower amount in its written order, it appears to have relied on the higher
figure, $3,405, in calculating the guideline child support, based on the
worksheet attached to the court order. Father asks us to affirm the court’s
orders and did not object to its use of the higher figure in its findings or its
calculation of child support.

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court found that IHSS monies were income for calculating child support. It
found Father had a one percent timeshare.
The court ordered support as follows: From August 1, 2024, through
January 31, 2025, Father’s child support was reduced to $297 per month.
Effective February 1, 2025, the child support obligation increased to $660 per
month.
Turning to spousal support, the court found that Father’s loss of
employment constituted a material change of circumstances that was not
voluntary. The court then applied the section 4320 factors to calculate new
levels of spousal support. The court found Mother had an associate’s degree
and training and experience as a pharmacy technician, but had not worked in
that field since 2000 due to Daughter’s needs. Father had degrees in
economics and business.
The court found Mother’s earning capacity was impaired by periods of
unemployment incurred during the marriage to permit her to devote time to
domestic duties, specifically to be the primary caregiver for Daughter, who
required 24-hour care.
The court found Father’s income had dropped to $1,950 in
unemployment from August 1, 2024, through January 1, 2025. He began
earning self-employment of $3,405 monthly in February 2025.4 The court
found Father’s earning capacity was $100,000. The court further found
Father owned $400,000 in cryptocurrency, $300,000 in retirement accounts,
$250,000 in real estate, $200,000 in collectible automobiles, and $115,000 in
stocks. But it ruled it had insufficient evidence of the purchase prices,
4 As stated, the documents reflected $3,050 per month in self-
employment income to Father.

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current values, or liquidity of Father’s assets to include them in Father’s
income, and relied solely on his unemployment benefits and subsequent self-
employment income.
The family court found Mother had assets of $5,300 in a bank account
and $168,000 in a retirement account in addition to her combined monthly
income. The court accepted Father’s claim of monthly expenses of
approximately $11,264.50 and Mother’s claim of $8,587 in expenses, and
concluded neither party could meet these needs in a way consistent with the
standard of living maintained during the marriage.
The court concluded that the balance of the hardships favored Mother,
as she was unable to work fulltime hours due to being the primary caregiver
for Daughter. Although Father was unemployed, the court saw nothing to
prevent him from reaching his earning capacity.
After analyzing the section 4320 factors, the court reduced Father’s
spousal support obligation from $1,300 to $0 for the period Father was on
unemployment. Starting February 1, 2025, Father was ordered to pay $650
per month in spousal support.
Mother timely appealed the child and spousal support orders.
The San Diego Department of Social Services (Department) filed a responsive
brief supporting the court’s decision to include Mother’s IHSS payments in
calculating her gross income for child support. Father filed a responsive brief
urging us to affirm the family court’s spousal and child support orders.5
5 Father does not appeal the denial of his request to terminate child
support.

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DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We review both child support and spousal support awards for abuse of
discretion. (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 282-283
(Cheriton), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re
Marriage of Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1049.) However, with
respect to child support we must “ ‘recognize that determination of a child
support obligation is a highly regulated area of the law, and the only
discretion a trial court possesses is the discretion provided by statute or
rule.’ ” (Cheriton at p. 283.) Accordingly, a court’s discretion does not permit
it to “ignore or contravene the purposes of the law regarding . . . child
support.” (County of Stanislaus v. Gibbs (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1417, 1425.)
To the extent that the court’s decision reflects an interpretation of the
statutory definition of income for child support purposes, this is a question of
law that we review de novo. (In re Marriage of Pearlstein (2006) 137
Cal.App.4th 1361, 1371–1372 (Pearlstein).)
II. Calculating Child Support
In determining child support, the family court uses the statewide
uniform guideline set forth in section 4055. (§ 4055, subd. (a); In re Marriage
of Wittgrove (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1326.) This calculation requires
the court to determine each parent’s “net monthly disposable income.”
(§ 4055, subd. (b)(1)(C).) Net monthly disposable income, in turn, is
determined by first calculating a parent’s “annual gross income” under the
broad provisions of section 4058. (§ 4055, subd. (b)(2); see County of Placer v.
Andrade (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1395–1396.)

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Section 4058 defines a parent’s gross income as “income from whatever
source derived,” and provides a non-exhaustive list of sources. (§ 4058, subd.
(a); see also Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 285.) Subdivision (c) of
section 4058 exempts from income the following: “any income derived from
child support payments actually received,” “income derived from any public
assistance program, eligibility for which is based on a determination of need,”
and child support received for children from another relationship.
Because Mother raises a question of the statutory definition of income
for child support purposes, we review this issue de novo. To resolve Mother’s
claim we must interpret the language “public assistance program, eligibility
for which is based on a determination of need” in subdivision (c) of section
4058 and determine if IHSS fits within that interpretation. (§ 4058, subd.
(c).)
Our task in construing a statute is to “ ‘ascertain the intent of the
Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ ” (Wilcox v. Birtwhistle
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 977.) To do so, “[t]he words of the statute are the
starting point. ‘Words used in a statute . . . should be given the meaning they
bear in ordinary use. [Citations.] If the language is clear and unambiguous
there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the
intent of the Legislature.’ ” (Id. at p. 977.)
A. Public Assistance Program
The court in Elsenheimer v. Elsenheimer (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1532
(Elsenheimer) had occasion to consider the language of the income exclusion
at section 4058 subdivision (c). In that case, a disabled mother received
federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits and argued that those
payments should be excluded from her annual gross income under section
4058, subdivision (c) for purposes of calculating child support. Examining the

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language of the statute, the court observed that the exclusion “on its face
applies broadly to include any public assistance program, so long as eligibility
for the program is based on a determination of the individual’s need.” (Id. at
pp. 1538–1539.) The court considered definitions of “public assistance” in
other statutes, and found in Welfare and Institutions Code section 10061 a
definition of public assistance programs as “[state] public social service
programs . . . [that] provide aid and medical assistance to those in need
including those who are aged, blind, or disabled.” (Id. at p. 1539.)
The court concluded that SSI qualified as such a need-based program,
since eligibility “is based on a person’s status as aged, blind, or disabled and
how much income the person has from other sources.” (Elsenheimer, supra,
124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1539.) The court ultimately construed section 4058
subdivision (c) to cover the disabled mother’s SSI benefits. (Elsenheimer, at
pp. 1538–1539; see also In re S.M. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 21, 30 [The basic
purpose underlying the SSI program is to provide “ ‘minimal cash welfare
benefits for the indigent blind, aged, and disabled.’ ”].)
With this understanding, we turn to the IHSS program.
B. The IHSS Program
The IHSS program provides supportive services “to aged, blind, or
disabled persons . . . who cannot perform the services themselves and who
cannot safely remain in their homes unless the services are provided.” (Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 12300, subd. (a); Basden v. Wagner (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th
929, 939 (Basden).)
California’s Department of Social Services oversees the IHSS program
and promulgates regulations to assist in its implementation. (Norasingh v.
Lightbourne (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 740, 744.) County welfare departments
process IHSS applications, determine an applicant’s eligibility and needs, and

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authorize services. (Basden, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 834.) An applicant
for IHSS benefits must undergo a needs assessment, which covers the
recipient’s living environment, alternative resources, and functional abilities
in the activities of daily living. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 12309.) The applicant
must supply a certification from a licensed health care professional that the
applicant is unable to perform some activities of daily living independently.
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 12309.1.)
If approved, the IHSS recipient may receive supportive services such as
domestic services, personal care services, protective supervision, and
accompaniment to health-related appointments. (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 12300, subd. (b).) The program compensates persons who provide services
to the incapacitated person. (Basden, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 931.)
The county may hire in-home supportive service providers for the IHSS
recipient, or make direct payment to the recipient to allow the recipient to
“purchase” the services. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 12302, 12304, subd. (a); see
also Basden, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 934.)
If a county hires the IHSS provider, the county assumes certain
“employer” duties with respect to the provider, such as those related to
unemployment compensation, unemployment compensation disability
benefits, and workers’ compensation, though the county is expressly not
deemed to be the provider’s employer for purposes of liability due to the
provider’s negligence or intentional torts. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 12301.6,
subds. (c)(1), (c)(2)(A), (f)(1); Basden, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 940; In re
Marriage of Scheppers (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 646, 650 (Scheppers); Guerrero
v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 912, 934 [both the state and county
are employers of the IHSS provider for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards
Act].)

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In some regards, the IHSS recipient is viewed as the employer of the
care provider, and the provider as his or her employee. (In-Home Supportive
Services v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 720, 731 [an
IHSS provider was a dual employee of the IHSS recipient and the state for
purposes of workers’ compensation coverage]; see also Welf. & Inst. Code, §§
12302.2 [the state or county shall pay contributions, premiums, and taxes “on
the recipient’s behalf as the employer”], 12302.5 [agents may act on behalf of
an IHSS recipient designated as the employer of the IHSS worker if the
recipient is unable to ensure compliance with wage, hour, and workplace
laws].)
Payments to the in-home care providers are referred to as “wages” in
the statutes. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 12306.1, 12306.2, 12306.21,
12316.9.) Providers must undergo a background check, provide proof of
identification, attend an orientation and sign an enrollment form. (See Welf.
& Inst. Code, §§ 12305.86, 12306.6, 12300.41; Bedoe v. County of San Diego
(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 56, 63.) Providers must timely submit signed payroll
timesheets. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §12300.4, subd. (g); see, e.g., Bedoe, at p. 62
[son who submitted timesheets but did not actually provide IHSS care to his
mother was required to return money to county].)
Our review convinces us that the IHSS program is a public assistance
program based on need. Borrowing the language of Elsenheimer, the IHSS
program is a “[state] public social service program[ ] . . . [that] provide[s] aid
and medical assistance to those in need including those who are aged, blind,
or disabled.” (Elsenheimer, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1539.) Eligibility for
IHSS is based on a person’s status as an aged, blind or disabled individual,
and considers the availability of other resources to assist the person. (Welf.
& Inst. Code, §§ 12300, 12309.)

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In Elsenheimer the disabled mother received the SSI benefits. Here,
Daughter is the one who is eligible as the “aged, blind, or disabled”
individual, and her need determines her eligibility for IHSS benefits.
Mother, for her part, was not the statutory recipient of the need-based public
assistance and was not eligible based on her need. Instead, she was a
provider compensated for the in-home services she provided to Daughter.
She received wages and submitted timesheets. We therefore conclude that
the IHSS payments Mother received as Daughter’s caregiver were not
“income derived from any public assistance program, eligibility for which is
based on a determination of need” within the meaning of section 4058,
subdivision (c), and were properly included in calculating Mother’s gross
income under 4058, subdivision (a) in determining guideline child support.
To the extent the guideline amount would be unjust or inappropriate, section
4057 gives courts broad discretion to modify the child support amount.
C. Reilly Is Inapposite
Mother urges us to follow Reilly v. Marin Housing Authority (2020) 10
Cal.5th 583 (Reilly) to conclude that IHSS payments to a provider, not the
recipient, should not be included as income. In Reiley, our Supreme Court
concluded that “IHSS compensation” received by a mother to provide in-home
care for her severely-disabled adult daughter should not be included as
income in determining the family’s eligibility for the Housing and Urban
Development’s Section 8 program, which provides low-income families a
monthly subsidy to pay for a portion of their rent. (Reilly, at pp. 585, 603.)
We decline to extend Reilly to Mother’s case for several reasons. First,
in Reilly the court interpreted a federal regulation that excluded “amounts
paid by a state agency to a family with a member who has a developmental
disability . . . to offset the cost of services . . . needed to keep the

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developmentally disabled family member at home.” (24 C.F.R. § 5.609(a)(3)
(2020); Reilly, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 590.) As a result, the court devoted a
significant portion of its discussion to the meaning of “offset” in the language
of the regulation. (Reilly, at pp. 590–596.) The Reilly court did not interpret
the specific language of the statute at issue in Mother’s case, section 4058
subdivision (c), which, among other differences, does not use the term “offset.”
Second, the purpose of the income calculation at issue in Reilly was to
determine the family’s eligibility for a Section 8 housing subsidy, prompting
the court to consider the purposes of the Section 8 program in its statutory
construction. (Reilly, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 586–87.) California’s child
support regime has its own policies and purposes. As the court
in Cheriton noted: “California has a strong public policy in favor of adequate
child support. [Citations.] That policy is expressed in statutes embodying
the statewide uniform child support guideline.” (Cheriton, supra, 92
Cal.App.4th at p. 283.)
Finally, at issue in Reilly was the annual income of the “Section 8
family.” (Reilly, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 587 [“[T]he amount of the housing
subsidy depends in large part on the ‘annual income’ the Section 8 family
receives or expects to receive” (italics added)].) The exception to income
concerned “amounts paid by a state agency to a family” to offset the costs of
providing care to their disabled family member. (24 C.F.R. § 5.609(a)(3)
(2020); Reilly, at p. 590, italics added.) Illuminating this point, the parties in
Reilly did not dispute that if the disabled adult daughter received IHSS care
from a third party rather than a family member, the amounts paid for that
care would qualify under the federal exclusion and would not have been
included in the income calculation. (Reilly, at p. 590.) Put another way, the
adult daughter’s receipt of those services would not have been included in the

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family’s income. The California Supreme Court’s decision ensured that
payments for care provided in the home by the mother were similarly
excluded from the family’s income. It was thus not material to the outcome
for the court to identify which family member—the caretaker mother or
disabled daughter—was the recipient of the needs-based IHSS compensation.
Here, we must determine whether the IHSS payments constituted
income to Mother from a need-based public assistance program. The issue
before us is Mother’s own gross income under section 4058 to calculate her
share of child support, not the family’s or household’s income to qualify for
Section 8 housing assistance. (§ 4058, subd. (a).) As discussed above, the
IHSS program identifies Daughter as the recipient of the IHSS benefits and
Mother as a provider who was paid compensation for the IHSS services. As a
result, Reilly, supra, 10 Cal.5th 583 is inapplicable.
D. Tax Treatment Is Not Dispositive
Mother further contends that the IHSS payments should be excluded
from her gross income because the Internal Revenue Service specifically
excludes IHSS payments from taxable income. But the tax treatment of the
payments is not dispositive. “[S]ection 4058 specifically includes some types
of income, such as workers’ compensation payments, that are excluded from
taxable income under the Internal Revenue Code.” (In re Marriage of
Alter (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 718, 735 (Alter).) This is because federal tax
law and state support law have different purposes. “The Internal
Revenue Code does not so much define the term ‘income’ as identify that
which, consistent with prevailing federal tax policy, might be taxed.
[Citation.] In contrast, California’s child support statutes are designed to
ensure that parents take ‘equal responsibility to support their child in the
manner suitable to the child’s circumstances.’ ” (Alter, at p. 735.)

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Notably, section 4053, which lists the principles to be followed by the
court in setting the child support award, states that the guideline takes into
account the parents’ “actual income,” not their taxable income. (§ 4053, subd.
(c).) A parent may have income that is not taxable but that would be
available for support for the child. (Alter, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 735.)
The child support laws focus on “how much money a parent has available for
the support of the minor children.” (Id. at p. 734.) So too here. Indeed, the
fact that the IHSS payments are untaxed to Mother means she has more
money available to support her child than parents who receive other types of
compensation.
E. Consideration of Father’s Assets
Mother contends the family court abused its discretion by failing to
consider Father’s substantial wealth in determining his support obligation.
While Mother does not specify whether she challenges child or spousal
support, Mother only cites statutes and authorities relating to the
determination of child support, so we confine our discussion to the child
support order.
Challenging the court’s finding that it lacked sufficient information to
include Father’s assets in determining his income, Mother argues that the
court had enough evidence to recite the value of Father’s assets in its support
order, and Father’s own testimony about selling assets demonstrated the
liquidity of at least some of the assets. Mother also contends the court erred
by trusting Father’s self-reported income “when it was clearly demonstrated
that [Father] had omitted significant assets and income and enjoyed a much
more affluent lifestyle” than his reported income could sustain.
As stated above, a parent’s gross income includes income from
whatever source derived. (§ 4058.) We note initially that, while the

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definition of income in section 4058 is broad, it is not limitless. (Scheppers,
supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 649.) Generally, the types of income specified in
the statute consist of money that the support obligor actually receives, and
not unrealized increases in the value of assets. (Pearlstein, supra, 137
Cal.App.4th at p. 1372; In re Marriage of Henry (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 111,
119 [“If the Legislature had intended that the unrealized increase in the
value of an asset should be considered income, it would have said so.”].)
“Support payments usually are paid from present earnings, not liquidation of
preexisting assets.” (Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal.4th 657, 670; Scheppers,
supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 651 [“ ‘Income is the key factor in our system, not
capital or net worth.’ ”]; In re Marriage of Reynolds (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th
1373, 1380 [“Only investment income, not investment principal, should be
available to pay spousal support . . . .”].)
When a parent’s annual gross income is unknown, section 4058,
subdivision (b)(1)(A) gives the court discretion to consider the parent’s
earning capacity in lieu of the parent’s income. In doing so, the court must
consider the parent’s specific circumstances, including evidence of the
parent’s assets, among other factors, affecting the parent’s ability to earn.
(§ 4058, subd. (b)(2).) Courts may consider a parent’s assets in setting child
support, at least to the extent the assets can produce income. (Cheriton,
supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 291).
Father’s declarations and exhibits and his testimony at the hearing
supplied substantial evidence for the court to reasonably conclude that the
earning potential and availability of Father’s assets was too uncertain to rely
on in determining Father’s monthly income. Father submitted an income
and expense declaration, earnings statements from his prior employer, and a
profit and loss report from his self-employment. At the hearing, Father

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provided additional details regarding his assets. He explained that he had
sold some cryptocurrency, though there was a cost associated with doing so,
and the proceeds were not accurately represented by Mother’s counsel. He
stated he used the proceeds to pay his expenses during his period of
unemployment and they were unavailable to pay support. Father said that
two of the five vehicles listed among his assets were “broken” and would not
reach market value until he repaired them. Father said he owned real estate
in Arnold, California, which he had succeeded in renting out on three
occasions for $500 per month or less each time.
Father also provided explanations for income Mother claimed he had
failed to report, including a $25,000 transfer from a Wells Fargo account, a
$40,000 severance payment Father received from his prior employer, and
other income totaling $120,000. Father further explained that he reported
many of the assets on the profit and loss statement for his limited liability
company.
Ultimately, there was substantial evidence supporting the family
court’s decision not to impute additional income from Father’s assets. The
court could conclude from Father’s testimony that those assets were not
regularly producing income, and it was uncertain when and how much
income they could produce. Moreover, the court, having assessed Father’s
credibility, was apparently satisfied with Father’s explanations and made no
finding that Father omitted assets as Mother alleges.
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion.

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DISPOSITION
The support orders are affirmed. Father shall recover his costs on
appeal.
O’ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
M CCONNELL, P. J.
DO, J.

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